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Abstract	
	
The	conformity	of	the	European	Commission’s	cartel	enforcement	policies	with	
rights	 protection	 has	 become	 a	 topic	 of	 considerable	 importance	 in	 recent	
times.	The	wide-ranging	discretion	and	enhanced	investigatory	powers	that	the	
Commission	 derives	 under	 Regulation	 1/2003,	 coupled	 with	 the	 European	
Union’s	proposal	 to	 accede	 to	 the	European	Convention	 for	 the	Protection	of	
Human	 Rights	 and	 Fundamental	 Freedoms,	 underlines	 the	 need	 for	 the	
Commission’s	 policies	 and	 procedures	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 necessary	 rights	
protection	requirements.	 	This	 issue	is	amplified	in	cartel	cases,	because	when	
the	Commission	 fines	 an	undertaking,	 the	 fine	 aims	not	merely	 to	 punish	 the	
undertaking	 in	 question	 but	 also	 to	 deter	 other	 undertakings	 from	 being	
involved	in	cartels	in	the	future.	
	
This	 thesis	 assesses	 whether	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies	
comply	with	procedural	rights	and	the	ECHR.	Alongside	this	analysis,	the	thesis	
identifies	 ways	 of	 enhancing	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies,	
whilst	 ensuring	 they	 remain	 in	 compliance	with	 the	 relevant	 rights	protection	
provisions.	 It	 does	 so	 by	 considering	 each	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	
enforcement	policies	in	turn.	Chapter	2	lays	the	foundations	of	the	analysis	by	
investigating	why	we	would	want	 undertakings	 to	 qualify	 for	 right	 protection	
and	whether	 they	 do	 indeed	 qualify	 under	 the	 Convention.	 In	 Chapter	 3,	 the	
Commission’s	 fining	 guidelines	 and	 procedures	 are	 assessed,	 examining	 the	
potential	legal	certainty	and	equality	concerns.	It	finds	that,	whilst	compliance	is	
achieved	in	the	broad	sense,	several	possible	enhancements	could	be	made	to	
the	current	procedure.	Chapter	4	considers	the	Commission’s	Leniency	Notice;	
specifically,	 the	 case	 law	 of	 the	 EU	 courts	 regarding	 the	 disclosure	 of	
confidential	leniency	documents	and	the	recently-enacted	Damages	Directive.	It	
concludes	 that	 the	drafters	of	 the	Damages	Directive	were	 correct	 to	 enact	 a	
blanket	 ban	 against	 disclosure	because	 an	undertaking	may	have	 a	 legitimate	
expectation	of	non-disclosure.	However,	the	chapter	also	determines	that	there	
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is	 a	 more	 effective	 means	 of	 ensuring	 that	 the	 rights	 of	 all	 the	 parties	 are	
adequately	 protected.	 Chapter	 5	 assesses	 the	 Commission’s	 settlement	
procedure	 and	 the	 ways	 it	 can	 be	 enhanced	 whilst	 complying	 with	 rights	
requirements.	Although	it	establishes	that	a	US-style	plea	bargaining	procedure	
could	 be	 implemented	 within	 the	 EU	 –	 and	 would	 bring	 a	 variety	 of	
enhancements	 –	 it	 concludes	 that	 it	would	 be	more	 practical	 to	 improve	 the	
current	procedure	with	four	key	additions.	This	would	enable	the	vast	majority	
of	the	benefits	of	a	plea	bargaining	system	to	be	realised	without	the	need	for	a	
mass	overhaul	of	the	Commission’s	procedures.	
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Chapter	1:	Introduction	
	
1.1	Introduction	
	
This	 thesis	 assesses	 whether	 the	 European	 Commission’s	 (hereafter	 ‘the	
Commission’)	cartel	enforcement	policies	comply	with	procedural	rights	and	the	
European	 Convention	 for	 the	 Protection	 of	 Human	 Rights	 and	 Fundamental	
Freedoms,1	(ECHR).	 Alongside	 this	 analysis	 it	 also	 assesses	 ways	 of	 improving	
the	Commission’s	cartel	enforcement	policies	–	whilst	remaining	compliant	with	
rights	protection	requirements.	
	
1.1.1	Setting	the	scene	
Competition	policy	seeks	to	ensure	that	undertakings	compete	fairly	with	each	
other	to	enable	the	benefits	of	competition	to	be	achieved	within	the	market.2	
The	benefits	of	 competition	are	multiple	and	may	 include	 lower	prices	 for	all,	
improved	 quality,	 greater	 choice	 for	 consumers,	 increased	 innovation,	 more	
efficiency,	 and	 heightened	 competitiveness	 in	 global	markets.3	In	 an	 effort	 to	
see	these	benefits	realised	within	the	EU	market,	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	
of	 the	 European	 Union	 (TFEU),	 sets	 out	 a	 series	 of	 rules	 regarding	 cartels,	
abuses	of	a	dominant	position	and	state	aid.4		
	
In	terms	of	infringements	of	competition	law,	cartel	conduct	is	considered	to	be	
the	most	serious,	given	that	such	collusive	agreements	lead	to	a	variety	of	anti-
competitive	 issues.	 In	particular,	 cartels	 can	 result	 in	 artificially	 inflated	prices	
for	goods	and	services	and,	 in	addition,	a	reduction	in	the	production	of	these	
due	to	the	fact	that	cartels	can	act	in	the	same	way	as	a	monopoly,	leading	to	a																																																									
1	Rome,	4.X1.1950.	
2	For	the	sake	of	clarity,	this	thesis	adopts	the	definition	of	an	‘undertaking’	that	the	EU	courts	
adopt;	see	Case	C-41/90	Höfner	and	Elser	v	Macrotron	GmbH	[1991]	ECR	I-1979;	[1993]	4	CMLR	
306,	para	21.	
3	European	Commission,	‘Why	is	competition	policy	important	for	consumers?’	(European	
Commission	Website)	<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/why_en.html>	accessed	4	
April	2014.	
4	The	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	[2008]	OJ	C115/47.	
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deadweight	 loss	 to	 society.5	Because	 of	 this,	 cartels	 have	 been	 likened	 to	
“cancers	 on	 the	 economy”.6	Article	 101(1)	 of	 the	 TFEU	 tackles	 cartels	 by	
prohibiting,	 inter	 alia,	 agreements	 between	 competitors,	 concerted	 practices	
and	 decisions	 of	 associations	 of	 undertakings	 that	 fix	 prices,	 restrict	 output,	
share	markets	or	rig	bids.7	The	Commission	is	tasked	with	enforcing	Article	101	
TFEU	and	has	the	power	to	impose	fines	on	corporations	for	breaches	of	Article	
101(1)	 TFEU.8	The	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 regime	 consists	 of	 four	
main	 tools	 or	 policies.	 The	 first	 is	 Regulation	 1/2003,9	which	 sets	 out	 the	
Commission’s	powers	and	the	rules	on	implementing	competition	that	are	laid	
down	 in	 Article	 101	 and	 102	 TFEU.	 The	 second	 of	 these	 is	 the	 Commission’s	
fining	 guidelines. 10 	These	 guidelines	 set	 out	 the	 various	 steps	 that	 the	
Commission	undertakes	when	calculating	the	fine	for	a	breach	of	Article	101(1)	
TFEU.	 The	 third	 of	 these	 enforcement	 policies	 is	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	
notice.11	This	 policy	 explains	 how	 and	 in	what	 circumstances	 the	 Commission	
will	award	an	undertaking	a	reduction	in	fine	for	self-reporting	its	involvement	
in	 a	 cartel	 and	 for	 providing	 the	 Commission	 with	 continued	 and	 complete	
cooperation.	The	fourth-main	cartel-related	policy	operated	by	the	Commission	
is	the	direct	settlement	procedure.12	This	procedure	grants	an	undertaking	a	ten	
percent	reduction	 in	fine	where	the	undertaking	agrees	to	settle	 in	 lieu	of	the	
Commission	having	to	follow	the	full	standard	procedure.	
																																																								
5	See	George	G	Djolov,	The	Economics	of	Competition:	The	Race	to	Monopoly	(Haworth	Press	
2006).	
6	Graeme	Samuel,	‘Cracking	Cartels	International	and	Australian	Developments’	(Lecture	
24.11.04)	
<http://www.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=566510&nodeId=fbb75ca69fcfd484197d
b3663ac100ab&fn=Session%201%20-%20Graeme%20Samuel%20-
%20ACCC%20opening%20comments.rtf>	accessed	28th	May	2011.	
7	It	should	be	noted	that	Article	101	TFEU	only	applies	when	the	agreement	affects	trade	
between	Member	States.	
8	Council	Regulation	(EC)	No	1/2003	of	16	December	2002	on	the	Implementation	of	the	Rules	
on	Competition	laid	down	in	Articles	81	and	82	of	the	Treaty,	(2003)	OJ	L1/1,	Article	23	(2).	
9	ibid.	
10	Commission,	‘Guidelines	on	the	method	of	setting	fines	imposed	pursuant	to	Article	23(2)(a)	
of	Regulation	No	1/2003	(Guidelines	on	fining	undertakings)’	[2006]	OJ	C210/02.	
11	Commission,	‘Commission	Notice	on	Immunity	from	fines	and	reduction	of	fines	in	cartel	
cases	(Leniency	in	cartel	cases)’	[2006]	OJ	C298/17.	
12	Commission,	‘Commission	Notice	on	the	conduct	of	settlement	procedures	in	view	of	the	
adoption	of	Decisions	pursuant	to	Article	7	and	Article	23	of	Council	Regulation	(EC)	No	1/2003	
in	cartel	cases’	[2008]	OJ	C167/1.	
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These	four	main	cartel	enforcement	policies	offer	a	procedural	basis	in	which	to	
strengthen	 the	 practical	 enforcement	 of	 Article	 101(1)	 TFEU	 by	 assisting	 the	
Commission	 in	 deterring,	 detecting,	 punishing	 and	 prosecuting	 cartels.	 To	
further	enhance	the	effectiveness	of	Article	101(1)	TFEU,	one	has	to	be	careful	
as,	by	 increasing	the	punishment	and	deterrence	of	cartel	conduct,	one	needs	
to	balance	the	goals	of	competition	law	–	on	the	one	hand	–	with	the	rights	of	
companies	–	on	the	other	hand.	
	
The	ECHR	provides	the	key	legal	footing	for	human	rights	in	Europe.	The	ECHR	
came	 into	 force	on	3rd	 September	1953	and	 seeks	 to	protect	 individuals	 from	
arbitrary	 abuses	 or	 interferences	 by	 the	 State.	 The	 desire	 and	 need	 for	 this	
protection	has	stemmed	from	a	variety	of	concerns	regarding	rights	protection	
within	 Europe	but,	 in	 particular,	 relates	 to	 the	 atrocities	 that	 occurred	during	
World	 War	 Two.	 Since	 the	 Convention	 has	 come	 into	 force,	 it	 has	 been	
recognised	that	individuals	also	need	protection	from	powerful	private	powers	
that	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 unduly	 interfere	 with	 an	 individual’s	 rights.	 The	
protection	 offered	 by	 the	 Convention	 extends	 beyond	 ‘natural	 persons’	 to	
include	 ‘legal	 persons’,13	meaning	 that	 companies	 can	 also	 qualify	 for	 human	
rights	protection.	Indeed,	in	recent	years	there	has	been	an	increasing	interest	
in	the	rights	of	companies	and	the	ECHR,14	and	particularly,	in	the	context	of	EU	
cartel	enforcement	proceedings.15	
	
This	thesis	considers	these	two	areas	of	law	–	competition	law	and	human	rights																																																									
13	See,	for	example,	The	Sunday	Times	v	UK	[1979]	2	EHRR	245	and	Article	34	ECHR.	
14	For	example	see,	Marius	Emberland,	The	Human	Rights	of	Companies:	Exploring	the	Structure	
of	ECHR	Protection	(Oxford	University	Press	2006)	and	Winfried	Muijsenbegh	and	Sam	Rezai,	
‘Corporations	and	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights’	(2012)	25	Pacific	McGeorge	
Global	Business	&	Development	Law	Journal	43.	
15	For	example	see,	Robert	Lande,	‘Quick	–	Somebody	call	Amnesty	International!	Intel	says	EU	
Antitrust	fine	violated	Human	Rights’	(2009)	746(9)	Federal	Trade	Commission:	Watch	1,	Albert	
Sanchez-Graells	and	Francisco	Marcos,	‘”Human	Rights”	Protection	for	Corporate	Antitrust	
Defendants:	Are	we	not	Going	Overboard?’	(2014)	University	of	Leicester	School	of	Law	
Research	Paper	No	14-04	<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2389715>	
accessed	April		20th	2014.	Particularly,	we	are	finding	the	focus	on	companies	rights	protection	
being	with	regards	to	procedural	rights	protection,	e.g.	Angus	MacCulloch,	‘The	privilege	against	
self-incrimination	in	competition	investigations:	theoretical	foundations	and	practical	
implications’	(2006)	26(2)	Legal	studies	211.	
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law	 –	 and	 analyses	 whether	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies	
comply	 with	 procedural	 rights	 and	 the	 rights	 contained	 within	 the	 ECHR.	 In	
addition	to	this	research	question,	this	thesis	also	identifies	ways	of	 improving	
and	enhancing	 the	Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	policies	whilst	 remaining	
compliant	with	an	undertaking’s	procedural	rights.	To	effectively	answer	these	
questions,	 the	 thesis	 has	 been	 separated	 into	 five	 distinct	 chapters.	 Each	
chapter	has	its	own	unique	set	of	questions	that	aim	to	assist	in	answering	the	
abovementioned	main	research	questions	of	the	thesis.	
	
To	begin	with,	Chapter	2	 seeks	 to	determine	whether	corporations	qualify	 for	
rights	protection	under	the	ECHR	and	why	we	might	want	corporations	to	have	
human	 rights	 protection.	 It	 then	 proceeds	 to	 explain	 why	 the	 ECHR	 has	
primarily	been	chosen	for	this	analysis	and	the	reasons	why	the	protection	of	an	
undertakings	 procedural	 rights	 are	 important,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 EU	 cartel	
enforcement	 regime.	 The	 research	 questions	 in	 this	 chapter	 form	 the	
foundation	of	 the	 remainder	of	 the	 thesis	 and	are,	 therefore,	 of	 fundamental	
importance.	 This	 chapter	 is	unique	 in	 that	 it	 is	 one	of	only	 a	 few	 studies	 that	
considers	 why	 undertakings	may	 need	 rights	 protection	 in	 the	 context	 of	 EU	
cartel	enforcement.	
	
Chapter	 3	 asks	 whether	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process	 complies	 with	 the	
necessary	 requirements	 of	 the	 ECHR	 (particularly	 legal	 certainty)	 and	 the	 EU	
principle	 of	 equal	 treatment.	 The	 first	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 focuses	 its	
attention	 solely	 on	 legal	 certainty,	 assessing	 whether	 specific	 considerations	
within	the	fining	process	comply	with	legal	certainty;	namely,	(a)	the	use	of	non-
exhaustive	lists,	(b)	the	‘specific	deterrence’	stage,	and	(c)	the	ten	percent	cap.	
The	second	section	assesses	whether	the	Commission	applies	specific	stages	in	
the	 Fining	Guidelines	 equally	 to	undertakings,	 particularly	with	 regards	 to	 the	
‘inability	 to	 pay	 discount’.	 It	 then	 proceeds	 to	 consider	 the	 significance	 of	
broader	factors,	including	an	undertaking’s	nationality	and	size.	
	
Chapter	4	discusses	the	recently	passed	Damages	Directive	and	seeks	to	answer	
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whether	 the	 blanket	 ban	 it	 places	 on	 disclosure	 –	 in	 the	 context	 of	 leniency	
documents	–	 is	 the	 correct	 approach	 for	 the	EU	 to	adopt.16	It	 undertakes	 this	
analysis	 by	 considering	 three	 potential	 procedural	 right	 challenges	 that	 an	
undertaking	may	attempt	to	make	to	disclosure:	(a)	its	legitimate	expectation	of	
non-disclosure,	 (b)	 its	 right	 to	privacy	 (Article	8	of	 the	ECHR),	and	finally,	 (c)	a	
breach	of	 its	 confidence	 if	 disclosure	 occurs.	 Indeed,	 the	 discussion	 regarding	
the	 potential	 procedural	 right	 challenges	 that	 an	 undertaking	 can	 bring	
regarding	 disclosure	 is	 what	 makes	 this	 chapter	 unique,	 as	 the	 literature	 is	
lacking	in	this	analysis.	In	addition,	further	novelty	is	derived	from	the	chapter’s	
consideration	of	whether	the	Damages	Directive	has	found	the	correct	balance	
with	regards	to	disclosure	based	on	an	undertaking’s	rights.	
	
Chapter	 5	 proceeds	 to	 identify	 what	 the	 Commission’s	 direct	 settlement	
procedure	 can	 learn	 from	 the	 US	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 to	 help	 improve	 its	
utilisation,	success	and	efficiency	–	whilst	remaining	compatible	with	Article	6	of	
the	 ECHR.	 In	 addition	 to	 this,	 Chapter	 5	 ascertains	 whether	 the	 EU	 could	
implement	a	plea	bargaining	system	for	managing	and	settling	cartel	cases.	This	
chapter’s	novelty	lies	in	the	consideration	of	whether	the	EU	could	implement	a	
US-style	plea	bargaining	system	and	from	the	potential	improvements	that	can	
be	made	 to	 the	 current	 system	 based	 upon	 the	 lessons	 learned	 from	 the	US	
system.	
	
The	 thesis	 finally	 concludes	 with	 Chapter	 6	 considering	 how	 the	 current	 EU	
cartel	 enforcement	 programme	 can	 be	 improved	 to	 ensure	 fair	 and	 equal	
treatment	 to	 undertakings	 within	 the	 fining	 procedure,	 comply	 with	 rights	
protection	and	enhance	 the	EU	settlement	programmes	overall	 efficiency	and	
utilisation.	 This	 chapter	 will	 identify	 and	 propose	 the	 policy	 reforms	 and	
recommendations	 that	 have	 been	 identified	 by	 this	 thesis	 and	 that	 are	
necessitated	in	order	for	the	Commission	to	make	these	improvements.																																																									
16	Council	Directive	2014/104/EU	of	26	November	2014	on	certain	rules	governing	actions	for	
damages	under	national	law	for	infringements	of	competition	law	provisions	of	the	Member	
States	and	of	the	European	Union	[2014]	L	349/1.	
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1.1.2	Significance	of	the	thesis	
The	research	questions	that	this	thesis	seeks	to	answer	are	of	great	importance	
for	a	variety	of	reasons,	which	shall	now	be	highlighted	and	discussed	in	detail	
below.	Human	rights	have	always	played	an	 important	role	within	the	EU.17	In	
1969	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Justice	 (hereafter,	 ‘the	 ECJ’)	 itself	 acknowledged	
that	it	has	a	responsibility	to	protect	‘the	fundamental	human	rights	enshrined	
in	the	general	principles	of	Community	law’.18	This	was	reaffirmed	in	the	case	of	
Internationale	 Handelgesellschaft	 where,19	in	 its	 dictum,	 the	 ECJ	 stated	 how	
fundamental	 rights	 form	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	 general	 principles	 of	 EU	 law	
which	 it	 must	 seek	 to	 protect.	 In	 addition,	 the	 ECJ	 has	 also	 held	 that	
international	human	rights	treaties	form	another	source	of	fundamental	rights	
within	the	EU,20	particularly	the	ECHR.21		
	
One	 of	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 decisions	 regarding	 fundamental	 rights	
protection	by	 the	ECJ,	particularly	 in	 light	of	 Internationale	Handelgesellschaft	
(owing	 to	 the	 conflicts	 with	 national	 law),	 was	 that	 it	 became	 necessary	 to	
develop	 a	 doctrine	 to	 protect	 fundamental	 human	 rights	within	 the	 EU	 itself.	
This	 culminated	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Charter	 of	 Fundamental	 Rights	 of	 the	
European	Union,	which	came	into	force	in	2000.22		
	
It	is	therefore	evident	that	fundamental	rights	protection	has	been	a	prominent	
issue	 that	 the	 EU	 and	 its	 courts	 have	 sought	 to	 effectively	 promote	 for	 a	
prolonged	period	of	time.	A	consideration	of	whether	the	Commission’s	cartel	
enforcement	 policies	 comply	 with	 fundamental	 rights	 is	 of	 clear	 significance.	
Indeed,	in	a	recent	statement	made	by	Štefan	Füle,	the	European	Commissioner																																																									
17	Moreover,	ensuring	that	citizens	receive	equal	treatment	has	also	played	a	key	role	in	the	EU.	
See,	for	example,	Council	Directive	75/117/EEC	of	10	February	1975	on	the	approximation	of	
the	laws	of	the	Member	States	relating	to	the	application	of	the	principle	of	equal	pay	for	men	
and	women	was	passed	to	ensure	equality	amongst	pay	for	men	and	women.	
18	Case	29/69	Stauder	v	City	of	Ulm	[1969]	ECR	419.	
19	Internationale	Handelgesellschaft	v	Einfuhr	–	und	Vorratstelle	für	Getreide	und	Futtermittel	
[1974]	2	CMLR	540.	
20	For	example,	see	Case	4/73	Nold	v	Commission	[1974]	ECR	491.	
21	For	example,	see	Case	36/75	Rutili	v	Ministre	de	l’Intérieur	[1975]	ECR	1219.	
22	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	of	the	European	Union	[2000]	OJ	C	364/01,	hereafter	the	
‘CFREU’.	
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for	 Enlargement	 and	 European	Neighbourhood	Policy,	 he	 stated	 that	 “for	 the	
EU,	 human	 rights	 and	 fundamental	 freedoms	 are	 the	 silver	 thread	 running	
through	our	actions	both	at	home	and	in	our	external	relations”.23	His	words	are	
a	 testament	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 ensuring	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 policies	
comply	 with	 human	 rights	 and	 fundamental	 freedoms,	 given	 the	 degree	 to	
which	these	rights	permeate	through	wider	EU	policy.	
	
In	recent	years,	the	need	for	fundamental	rights	to	be	protected	in	the	EU	has	
become	more	pronounced,	with	the	EU’s	pending	accession	to	the	ECHR.24	As	a	
result	 of	 Article	 6(2)	 TEU,	which	 obliges	 the	 EU	 to	 accede	 to	 the	 ECHR,	 there	
now	exists	a	formal	requirement	for	EU	law	and	the	Commission’s	policies	and	
procedures	to	be	compliant	with	the	ECHR.25	While	full	membership	by	the	EU	
of	 the	 ECHR	 is	 currently	 on	 hold,	 given	 CJEU	 Opinion	 2/13,	 the	 clearly	
mandatory	nature	of	Article	 6(2)	 TEU	 (“The	Union	 shall	 accede	 to	 the	 ECHR”)	
means	membership	must	come	at	 some	stage.26	Given	 that,	 if	 it	 remains	non-
compliant	 with	 the	 ECHR,	 the	 Commission	 risks	 breaching	 human	 rights	
whenever	 it	 enforces	 these	 policies	 and	 procedures	 on	 an	 individual	 or	
company.		
	
Furthermore,	it	is	also	important	that	the	Commission’s	procedures	are	seen	to	
be	objectively	legitimate	by	complying	with	fundamental	legal	principles	such	as	
certainty,	 equality	 and	 fairness.	 The	 importance	 of	 legitimacy	 within	 the	
application	of	the	law	should	not	be	underestimated.	If	laws	or	the	enforcement	
of	 laws	 are	 perceived	 to	 be	 arbitrary	 and	 illegitimate,	 the	 credibility	 of	 the																																																									
23	Štefan	Füle,	‘Human	rights	and	fundamental	freedoms	—	the	silver	thread	running	through	
our	actions’	(Speech	delivered	to	One	World	Documentary	Film	Festival,	Brussels,	24	March	
2014)	<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-248_en.htm>	accessed	24	March	
2014.	
24	The	Treaty	of	Lisbon	Article	6,	paragraph	2.	
25	The	ECJ	was	recently	asked	to	comment	on	the	draft	agreement	for	the	accession	of	the	EU	to	
the	ECHR	and	whether	it	is	compatible	with	the	EU	Treaties.	The	Court	identified	a	variety	of	
potential	issues	with	the	EUs	accession,	which	will	need	addressing	before	the	EU	can	accede	to	
the	ECHR.	ECJ,	‘Request	for	an	Opinion	pursuant	to	Article	218(11)	TFEU,	made	on	4	July	2013	
by	the	European	Commission’	
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=160882&pageIndex=0&doc
lang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=196643>	accessed	7	July	2015.	
26	Opinion	2/13	on	EU	Accession	to	the	ECHR	EU:	C:	2014:	2454,	[192]	CJEU.	
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Commission	 and	 the	 law	 itself	 will	 be	 brought	 into	 question,	 and	 may	 be	
damaged.	
	
Protecting	the	rights	of	corporations	 is	becoming	more	widespread	and,27	as	a	
consequence,	 it	 is	 now	more	 likely	 that	 an	 undertaking	 accused	 of	 breaching	
competition	 law	 will	 argue	 that	 its	 rights	 have	 been	 infringed.28	Indeed,	 the	
rights	 of	 corporations	 are	 more	 important	 than	 they	 have	 ever	 been	 in	 the	
context	 of	 potential	 competition	 law	 breaches,	 as	 fines	 for	 breaching	
competition	 law	 appear	 to	 be	 increasing	 along	with	 the	 impact	 they	 have	 on	
firms.29	As	these	fines	are	seen	as	punitive	and	aim	to	deter	future	breaches	of	
competition	 law,	 and	 thus	 may	 well	 constitute	 ‘proceedings	 of	 a	 criminal	
nature’	and	so	come	within	the	ambit	of	Article	6	and	7	of	the	ECHR,	they	run	
the	 risk	 of	 potentially	 breaching	 the	 ECHR	and	other	 procedural	 rights	 if	 they	
are	too	excessive,	too	uncertain	or	are	not	applied	coherently.30	
	
The	Commission	has	a	wide-ranging	discretion	with	regards	to	how	it	operates	
and	applies	its	policies.	This	discretion	could	lead	to	undertakings	being	treated	
unfairly	or,	more	 importantly,	 it	may	 lead	 to	potential	breaches	of	procedural	
rights	or	the	ECHR.	This	problem	has	been	exacerbated	in	recent	years	with	the	
Commission	 gaining	 even	 wider	 and	 enhanced	 investigatory	 powers	 under	
Council	 Regulation	 1/2003.31	Owing	 to	 this	 wide-ranging	 discretion,	 concerns	
surrounding	 abuses	 of	 process	 or	 unfairness	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	
Commission’s	procedures	can	be	raised	by	undertakings.	Determining	whether	
these	 concerns	 actually	 occur	 in	 practice	 is	 imperative,	 not	 only	 for	
undertakings	but	also	more	widely	for	the	legitimacy	of	the	Commission	and	its	
																																																								
27	For	example,	see	Société	Colas	Est	v	France	(2004)	39	EHRR	17	and	Funke	v	France	(1993)	1	
CMLR	897.	
28	For	example,	see	A.	Menarini	Diagnostics	S.R.L.	v	Italie	(2011)	App	no	43509/08.	
29	There	is	evidence	to	support	this,	but	also	to	contradict	it.	For	example	Veljanovski	has	found	
that	in	some	instances	fines	are	higher	and	in	others	they	are	lower.	Cento	Veljanovski,	‘Are	
European	Cartel	Fines	Ridiculously	High?’	(2012)	Case	Associates	-	Case	Note	
<http://www.casecon.com/data/pdfs/Casenote63HighfinesFeb2012.pdf>	accessed	30	May	
2013.	
30	For	example,	see	the	Courts	analysis	in	Menarini	(n	28).	
31	Council	Regulation	(n	8).	
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procedures.	
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1.2	Existing	Literature	
	
This	 section	of	 the	 chapter	 offers	 a	 brief	 review	of	 the	 key	 literature	 and	 the	
gaps	within	this	literature	with	regards	to	the	areas	that	the	thesis	considers.	It	
should	be	noted	that	a	significantly	more	detailed	literature	review	is	conducted	
within	each	of	the	subsequent	chapters.	
	
The	works	of	many	academics	have	informed	this	thesis,	but	those	of	particular	
influence	 in	 the	 shaping	 and	 scoping	 of	 it	 have	 been	Wouter	Wils,32	Arianna	
Andreangeli, 33 	Andreas	 Scordamaglia-Tousis, 34 	Marius	 Emberland, 35 	Peter	
Whelan,36	and	Cento	Veljanovski.37	
	
Much	has	been	written	on	the	EU	Commission’s	cartel	enforcement	procedures	
and	 policies.	 However,	 to	 date,	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 literature	 that	 analyses	 the	
Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies	 against	 the	 rights	 enshrined	 in	 the	
ECHR.	Nonetheless,	 there	has	been	 research	 conducted	 into	 this	 area.38	Some	
																																																								
32	Wouter	P	Wils,	Principles	of	European	Antitrust	Enforcement	(Hart	Publishing	2005).	
33	Arianna	Andreangeli,	EU	Competition	Enforcement	and	Human	Rights	(Edward	Elgar	2008).		
34	Andreas	Scordamaglia-Tousis,	EU	Cartel	Enforcement:	Reconciling	Effective	Public	
Enforcement	with	Fundamental	Rights	(Wolters	Kluwer	Law	International	2013).	
35	Marius	Emberland,	The	Human	Rights	of	Companies:	Exploring	the	Structure	of	ECHR	
Protection	(Oxford	University	Press	2006).	
36	See,	Peter	Whelan,	'Criminal	Cartel	Enforcement	in	the	European	Union:	Avoiding	a	Human	
Rights	Trade-Off',	Chapter	10	in	C.	Beaton-Wells	and	A.	Ezrachi	(eds),	Criminalising	Cartels:	
Critical	Studies	of	an	International	Regulatory	Movement,	Hart	Publishing,	Oxford,	2011;	Peter	
Whelan,	‘Protecting	Human	Rights	in	the	Context	of	European	Antitrust	Criminalisation’,	
Chapter	9,	in	Lianos	&	Kokorris	(eds),	The	Reform	of	EC	Competition	Law:	Towards	an	Optimal	
Enforcement	System,	Kluwer	International:	Amsterdam,	2010;	and,	Peter	Whelan,	‘Legal	
Certainty	and	Cartel	Criminalisation	within	the	EU	Member	States'	(2012)	71(3)	Cambridge	Law	
Journal	677.	
37	For	example,	see	Cento	Veljanovski,	‘European	Cartel	Fines	under	the	2006	Penalty	
Guidelines:	A	Statistical	Analysis’	(2010)	Case	Associates	
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1723843>	accessed	27	May	2013	and	
Cento	Veljanovski,	‘Cartel	Fines	in	Europe:	Law,	Practice	and	Deterrence’	(2007)	30(1)	World	
Competition	65.	
38	See,	for	example,	Evelyne	M	Ameye,	‘The	interplay	between	human	rights	and	competition	
law	in	the	EU’	(2004)	25(6)	ECLR	332,	Wolfgang	Weiss,	‘Human	rights	and	EU	antitrust	
enforcement:	News	from	Lisbon’	(2011)	32(4)	ECLR	186	and	Wouter	P	Wils,	Principles	of	
European	Antitrust	Enforcement	(Hart	Publishing	2005).	
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authors	 have	 considered	 a	 selection	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 procedures	 and	
policies	against	particular	aspects	of	human	rights	or	in	an	isolated	context.39	
	
Wils	 has	 conducted	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 various	 changes	 brought	 about	 by	 the	
Regulation	 1/2003.40	His	 work	 consisted	 of	 six	 essays	 that	 analysed	 the	main	
characteristics	of	the	new	enforcement	systems.41	The	key	part	of	his	work,	for	
this	 research,	 is	 his	 assessment	 of	 the	 compatibility	 of	 the	 new	 enforcement	
system	with	the	ECHR	and	CFREU.	Wils’	main	focus	was	around	the	right	to	fair	
trial,	ne	bis	in	idem,	the	privilege	against	self-incrimination,	and	the	right	to	an	
independent	 and	 impartial	 tribunal.	 Nonetheless,	 this	 thesis	 is	 appreciably	
different	 to	Wils’	 work.	 This	 thesis	 focuses	 its	 attention	 on	 the	 Commission’s	
three	 cartel	 enforcement	 tools.	 It	 also	 considers	 a	 wider	 variety	 of	 rights,	
including,	inter	alia,	legal	certainty,	the	right	to	privacy,	legitimate	expectations	
and	equal	treatment.	
	
Andreangeli	 has	 considered	 the	 procedural	 rights	 protection	 that	 those	
investigated	by	the	Commission	have	 in	 relation	to	Article	101	and	102	of	 the	
TFEU	and	the	Merger	Control	Regulation.42	Her	analysis	focuses	predominately	
on	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘administrative	 fairness’	 enshrined	 within	 the	 ECHR	 under	
Article	 6	 and	 the	 role	 the	 hearing	 officer	 plays	 in	 this	 regard.	 This	 is	 a	 good	
foundation	 when	 considering	 procedural	 rights	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	
Commission’s	 cartel	enforcement	 regime	but	 this	 thesis	 considers	a	 variety	of	
different	 aspects	 to	 Andreangeli’s	 work.	 To	 begin,	 this	 thesis	 focuses	 its	
attention	 solely	 on	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 regime,	 whereas,	
Andreangeli’s	 work	 considers	 a	 much	 broader	 range	 of	 competition	
enforcement	 tools.	 Although	 she	 considers	 a	 broader	 range	 of	 tools,	 her																																																									
39	See,	for	example,	Wouter	P	Wils,	‘EU	Anti-trust	enforcement	powers	and	procedural	rights	
and	guarantees:	The	interplay	between	EU	law,	national	law,	the	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	
of	the	EU	and	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights’	(2011)	34(2)	World	Competition	189	
and	Angus	MacCulloch,	‘The	privilege	against	self-incrimination	in	competition	investigations:	
theoretical	foundations	and	practical	implications’	(2006)	26(2)	Legal	studies	211.	
40	Council	Regulation	(EC)	No	1/2003	of	16	December	2002	on	the	Implementation	of	the	Rules	
on	Competition	laid	down	in	Articles	81	and	82	of	the	Treaty,	(2003)	OJ	L1/1.	
41	Wouter	P	Wils,	Principles	of	European	Antitrust	Enforcement	(Hart	Publishing	2005).	
42	Andreangeli	(n	33).	
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analysis	 focuses	 solely	 on	 the	 consideration	 of	 ‘administrative	 fairness’.	
Conversely,	this	thesis	considers	a	much	wider	array	of	procedural	rights;	legal	
certainty,	 the	 right	 to	 privacy,	 the	 right	 to	 a	 fair	 trial,	 legitimate	 expectations	
and	equal	treatment.	Furthermore,	this	thesis	considers	the	Commission’s	fining	
guidelines,	 leniency	 policy,	 the	 recently	 enacted	 Damages	 Directive	 and	 the	
Commission’s	Settlement	procedure	against	these	various	rights	requirements.	
The	 role	of	 the	hearing	officer	 is	 considered	within	 this	 thesis	but	only	 in	 the	
context	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 settlement	 procedure	 and	 how	 to	 improve	 this	
role,	 as	Andreangeli	 has	 already	 conducted	 a	 thorough	 analysis	 of	 the	 role	of	
the	hearing	officer	within	the	context	of	cartel	enforcement.	
	
The	 research	 that	 has	 conducted	 the	 greatest	 extensive	 analysis	 (and	 is	 the	
most	 akin	 to	 this	 thesis)	 is	 that	 of	 Scordamaglia-Tousis,	 who	 has	 looked	 at	
various	 aspects	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies.43	However,	
this	thesis	varies	significantly	to	this	previously	conducted	research	in	a	number	
of	 aspects.	 To	 begin	 with,	 this	 thesis	 considers	 the	 Commission’s	 three	main	
cartel	 enforcement	 policies	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 ECHR	 and	 other	 procedural	
rights	 protections.	 It	 also	 conducts	 a	 detailed	 assessment	 of	 whether	
corporations	have	human	 rights	 and	why	we	would	want	 this	 to	be	 the	 case,	
something	that	is	lacking	in	the	work	of	Scordamaglia-Tousis	and	the	literature	
more	 widely	 in	 the	 context	 of	 cartel	 enforcement.44	This	 thesis	 also	 studies	
whether	the	Commission’s	policies	are	applied	equally	in	practice	and	considers	
privacy	in	the	context	of	the	disclosure	of	 information	to	third	parties,	both	of	
which	are	also	novel	contributions	to	the	existing	 literature.	Finally,	 this	thesis	
also	 analyses	 whether	 the	 EU	 could	 implement	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 to	
manage	cartel	settlement	cases	more	effectively	and	whether	it	would	comply	
with	the	Article	6	of	the	ECHR.	
	
																																																								
43	Scordamaglia-Tousis	(n	34).	
44	Scordamaglia-Tousis	does	very	briefly	discuss	whether	corporations	can	qualify	for	rights	
protection	as	legal	entities.		
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Emberland	 has	 studied	 the	 ECHR	 and	 the	 jurisprudence	 from	 the	 European	
Court	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (hereafter,	 the	 ‘ECtHR’)	 and	 explored	 the	 rights	
protection	afforded	to	companies	under	the	Convention,45	identifying	how	the	
Court	 has	 managed,	 and	 dealt	 with	 cases,	 which	 involved	 ‘non-human	 legal	
persons’.46 	This	 is	 an	 excellent	 work	 for	 us	 to	 build	 our	 analysis	 of	 the	
application	 of	 corporations’	 rights	 to	 competition	 law	 within	 the	 EU	 on	 –	
something	 that	 is	 omitted	 in	 Emberland’s	 work	 and	 analysis.	 However,	 there	
has	 been	 research	 conducted	 by	 Sanchez-Graells	 and	 Marcos	 regarding	
corporate	 right	 protection	 in	 antitrust	 cases.47	Their	 research	 identified	 that	
there	has	been	an	increase	in	the	rights	protection	of	companies	in	competition	
cases	 and	 they	 were	 quite	 cynical	 of	 this.	 This	 thesis	 however,	 takes	 the	
diametrically	opposing	view	to	that	of	Sanchez-Graells	and	Marcos,	the	reasons	
for	which	will	be	discussed	comprehensively	in	Chapter	2.	
	
This	 thesis	 will	 therefore	 make	 a	 significant	 contribution	 to	 the	 existing	
literature	 by	 addressing	 these	 gaps.	 It	 analyses	 the	 Commission’s	 fining,	
leniency	and	direct	 settlement	policies	 in	 the	 context	of	 rights	protection	and	
the	 ECHR,	 thereby	 furthering	 our	 knowledge	 in	 this	 area.	 Where	 the	 non-
compliance	or	potential	 improvements	are	 identified,	policy	recommendations	
shall	be	made.	
	 	
																																																								
45	Emberland	(n	35).	
46	ibid	206.		
47	Sanchez-Graells	and	Marcos	(n	15).	
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1.3	Methodology		
	
This	thesis	employs	a	variety	of	methodologies	to	enable	the	research	questions	
to	 be	 answered	 in	 the	 most	 effective	 ways	 possible;	 specifically,	 it	 utilises	
doctrinal,	 comparative	 and	 empirical	 methodologies.	 Broadly	 speaking,	 this	
thesis	 considers	 two	 separate	 areas	 of	 law	 and	 how	 they	 interact	 with	 one	
another;	‘EU	cartel	enforcement’	and	‘human	rights	law’.	The	aim	of	the	thesis	
being,	 (a)	 to	 establish	 whether	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies	
comply	with	procedural	rights,	and	(b)	identifying	ways	that	cartel	enforcement	
procedures	 can	 be	 further	 enhanced	 whilst	 remaining	 compliant	 with	 rights	
protection	requirements.	
	
The	 starting	 point	 for	 the	 analysis	 adopted	 within	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 conduct	 a	
detailed	 doctrinal	 evaluation	 of	 the	 guidelines	 against	 the	 relevant	 ECHR	
provisions,	the	ECtHR	jurisprudence	and	other	legislation	and	case	law	from	the	
relevant	 jurisdictions	 that	 considers	 procedural	 rights.	 This	 is	 crucial	 for	
answering	 the	 research	 questions	 within	 this	 thesis	 as	 it	 allows	 for	 the	
discussion	of	the	necessary	legal	considerations	alongside	the	guidelines.	Beside	
this	analysis,	other	academic	literature	—	that	has	commented	on	the	relevant	
Commission	guidelines	and	procedural	rights	issues	—	is	considered,	allowing	a	
more	informed	and	complete	analysis	to	be	undertaken.	
	
Chapters	 3	 and	 5	 then	 also	 undertake	 empirical	 analysis	 –	 which	 is	 both	
quantitative	 and	 qualitative	 –	 of	 Commission	 decisions.	 Chapter	 3	 seeks	 to	
identify	 whether	 the	 Commission’s	 policies	 have	 been	 applied	 equally	 to	
undertakings	 in	practice,	which	 requires	 consideration	of	empirical	data	 to	do	
so	effectively.	Chapter	3	also	undertakes	a	qualitative	analysis	by	considering	a	
small	number	of	cartel	fining	decisions	in-detail,	so	as	to	assess	and	analyse	how	
the	Commission	has	applied	its	fining	procedure	in	practice.	The	empirical	data	
for	the	quantitative	analysis	in	Chapter	3	is	drawn	from	the	Global	Competition	
Review’s	 (hereafter,	 ‘the	 GCR’)	 raw	 data	 set,	 ‘GCR	 EU	 Cartel	 Survey’,	 which	
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contains	 information	 on	 cartels	 from	 January	 2005	 -	 July	 2012.	 In	 addition	 to	
this,	 Chapter	 3	 also	 consults	 and	 considers	 the	Commission’s	 non-official	web	
versions	 of	 decisions,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 First	
Instance,	hereafter	the	‘CFI’,	and	the	ECJ.	Chapter	5	seeks	to	use	empirical	data	
to	 identify	 how	 the	 Commission’s	 current	 settlement	 procedure	 can	 be	
improved.	 This	 part	 of	 the	 thesis	 utilises	 a	 second	 empirical	 dataset	 that	was	
compiled	 by	 the	 author	 from	 the	 Commission’s	 published	 non-confidential	
decisions,	 summary	 decisions	 and	 press	 releases.	 It	 comprises	 of	 the	
Commission’s	 seventeen	 settlement	 decisions	 thus	 far	 and	was	 up-to-date	 on	
the	 30th	 March	 2015.	 By	 including	 an	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 the	 Commission’s	
application	 of	 its	 policies	 to	 undertakings,	 the	 thesis	 benefits	 from	 a	 greater	
robustness	in	terms	of	identifying	trends	and,	in	addition,	it	affords	weight	–	in	
the	 form	 of	 hard	 data	 –	 to	 the	 findings	 regarding	 equal	 treatment	 and	 the	
Commission’s	settlement	procedure.	
	
Further	 to	 the	 above-discussed	 methods,	 Chapter	 5	 also	 undertakes	 a	
comparative	 analysis,	 considering	 the	 approach	 undertaken	 in	 the	 US	 –	 with	
regards	to	plea	bargaining	–	to	identify	what	the	EU	system	can	learn	from	the	
US	approach	 in	order	 to	 improve	 its	own	 system	of	direct	 settlements,	whilst	
still	 complying	 with	 the	 necessary	 rights	 guaranteed	 under	 Article	 6	 of	 the	
Convention.	This	analysis	goes	beyond	a	comparison	of	the	current	EU	system	
and	that	of	the	US;	it	also	identifies	why	we	may	wish	to	implement	a	US-style	
system,	alongside	iterating	how	this	could	be	achieved	in	practice.	It	also	utilises	
this	comparison	to	help	explain	why	there	are	differences	in	the	efficiency	and	
successfulness	of	each	of	the	programmes.		
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1.4	Thesis	Synopsis	
	
The	common	theme	running	 throughout	 this	 thesis	 regards	assessing	whether	
the	 Commission’s	 various	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies	 comply	 with	 the	
necessary	procedural	rights	–	particularly	those	rights	that	are	enshrined	in	the	
ECHR.	 Additionally,	 this	 thesis	 aims	 to	 identify	ways	 of	 further	 enhancing	 the	
Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies	 whilst	 remaining	 compliant	 with	
right’s	protection.	Because	of	these	common	themes,	and	the	fact	that	Chapter	
2	answers	foundation	questions	regarding	this	research,	the	thesis	is	best	read	
as	 a	 monograph.	 However,	 the	 thesis	 has	 been	 constructed	 so	 that,	 if	 one	
desired,	each	chapter	may	be	read	independently.	
	
The	 importance	and	the	benefits	of	utilising	rights	 to	assess	 the	Commission’s	
cartel	 enforcement	 procedures	 will	 be	 illustrated	 throughout	 the	 thesis	
(Chapters	 2-6).	 Indeed,	 it	 will	 be	 shown	 that	 this	 is	 one	 of	 the	 core	 threads	
running	throughout	this	thesis	which	binds	it	together	and	makes	the	research	
and	 analysis	 unified	 and	 unique.	 Broadly,	 the	 significant	 benefits	 this	 analysis	
brings	 to	 the	 thesis	 is	 that	 it	 enables	 the	 identification	 of	 potential	
improvements	(both	in	the	sense	of	efficiency	and	fairness)	whilst	also	helping	
to	 legitimise	the	Commission’s	procedures,	ensure	 it	complies	with	procedural	
rights	and	balance	the	various	rights	of	the	parties	involved.	
	
The	 thesis	 is	 constructed	 of	 six	 chapters,	 with	 Chapters	 3-5	 each	 assessing	 a	
separate	 Commission	 cartel	 enforcement	 policy	 against	 specific	 rights	 to	
identify	 whether	 the	 policies	 comply	 with	 rights	 protection	 and	 how	 their	
protection	can	be	further	enhanced.	
	
Chapter	2	
Why	 corporations	 should	 qualify	 for	 rights	 protection	 under	 the	 ECHR	 and,	
why	it	is	important	that	the	Commission’s	cartel	enforcement	policies	comply	
with	procedural	rights	requirements	
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The	ECHR	has	been	in	force	since	the	3rd	September	1953	and	provides	a	legal	
basis	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 human	 rights	 and	 fundamental	 freedoms	 within	
Europe.	The	importance	of	human	rights	protection	has	continued	to	increase	in	
recent	years,	particularly	with	regards	to	the	rights	of	companies.	The	need	for	
this	protection	is	perhaps	most	prevalent	in	competition	cases	where	the	fines	
imposed	on	companies	by	the	Commission	are	punitive	and	deterrent	in	nature	
and	are,	hence,	often	 very	high	and	 severe.	With	 the	EU	 recently	 agreeing	 to	
accede	to	the	ECHR	–	in	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon	–	it	will	thus	be	crucial	to	ensure	
that	the	Commission’s	policies	comply	with	the	requirements	of	the	ECHR	and	
identify	 whether	 undertakings	 will	 qualify	 for	 right	 protection	 under	 the	
Convention.48	Therefore,	 the	 first	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 assesses	 whether	
companies	in	the	EU	can	qualify	for	rights	protection	under	the	ECHR	and	why	
one	would	want	companies	 to	have	 their	 rights	protected.	This	 section	of	 the	
chapter	identifies	that	companies	do	indeed	qualify	for	rights	protection	under	
the	 ECHR	 and	 proceeds	 to	 identify	 a	 variety	 of	 reasons	 for	 why	 a	 company	
needs	its	rights	protected	and	why	this	is	desirable.	It	emphasises	these	points	
by	conducting	a	detailed	case	study	of	the	Yukos	Oil	case.	
	
The	second	section	of	the	chapter	focuses	on	something	distinct	from	the	first	
research	question.	 It	begins	by	 identifying	why	 this	 thesis	chooses	 to	 focus	 its	
attention	 predominately	 on	 the	 rights	 enshrined	 in	 ECHR	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	
CFREU.	Therein,	the	section	identifies	the	key	ECHR	rights	and	other	procedural	
rights	 that	 the	 remainder	of	 this	 thesis	 shall	 apply	 to	 the	Commission’s	 cartel	
enforcement	 policies.49	The	 chapter	 identifies	 the	 following	 key	 rights	 for	 the	
assessment	of	the	Commission’s	cartel	enforcement	policies	against	procedural	
rights	 protections:50	legal	 certainty,	 the	 right	 to	 respect	 for	 one’s	 private	 and	
family	 life	 (his	 home	 and	 his	 correspondence),	 the	 right	 to	 a	 fair	 trial,	 equal																																																									
48	2007/C	306/01	Treaty	of	Lisbon	amending	the	Treaty	on	European	Union	and	the	Treaty	
establishing	the	European	Community,	signed	at	Lisbon	on	the	13	December	2007	(Article	6	
para	2).		
49	These	rights	were	chosen	because	they	are	most	applicable	to	the	Commission’s	policies	and	
have	not	been	thoroughly	analysed	in	the	previous	literature.	
50	These	rights	are	applied	to	the	following	Commission	polices:	the	Commission’s	fining	
process,	leniency	policy	and	direct	settlement	procedure.	
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treatment,	legitimate	expectations	and	breach	of	confidence.	This	section	of	the	
chapter	also	examines	and	explains	why	these	rights	need	to	be	complied	with,	
having	particular	regard	to	the	specific	Commission	cartel	enforcement	policies	
that	 the	 thesis	 assesses.	 A	 variety	 of	 factors	 and	 reasons	 for	 why	 the	
Commission’s	policies	need	to	conform	to	these	rights	are	then	identified.	
	
Chapter	3		
Evaluating	 legal	 certainty	 and	 equal	 treatment	 within	 the	 European	
Commission’s	fining	policy	for	cartels	
	
An	undertaking	that	violates	Article	101(1)	of	the	TFEU	may	be	liable	for	fines	of	
up	to	ten	percent	of	its	annual	worldwide	turnover.51	The	fines	imposed	by	the	
Commission	 have	 been	 substantial.	 For	 example,	 the	 highest	 fine	 the	
Commission	 has	 imposed	 on	 an	 undertaking	 was	 in	 excess	 of	 €896	 million,	
whereas	 the	 largest	 fine	 imposed	 on	 a	 cartel	 was	 over	 €1.3	 billion.52	It	 is	
therefore	 important	 that	when	 the	Commission	 imposes	 fines	 there	 is	 a	 clear	
and	 transparent	 process	 within	 which	 these	 fines	 are	 decided	 and	 that	 this	
process	 is	applied	equally	 to	each	undertaking.	There	are	a	variety	of	 reasons	
why	 this	 is	 important,	 but	 one	 of	 particular	 relevance	 is	 that,	 following	 the	
entrance	into	force	of	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon,	there	is	now	an	obligation	for	the	EU	
to	accede	 to	 the	ECHR.	 This	 therefore	means	 that	 it	will	 be	necessary	 for	 the	
Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 processes	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 ECHR.	 This	
chapter	assesses	whether	the	Commission’s	fining	process	does	indeed	comply	
with	the	requirements	of	the	ECHR,	particularly	in	relation	to	legal	certainty	and	
also	with	the	EU	principle	of	equal	 treatment.	The	first	section	of	 this	chapter	
analyses	the	Commission’s	fining	process	so	as	to	establish	whether	it	complies	
with	the	principle	of	legal	certainty.	Three	particular	areas	of	the	Commission’s	
fining	 process	 are	 assessed.	 First,	 the	use	of	 non-exhaustive	 lists;	 second,	 the	
calculation	 of	 the	 criterion	 of	 ‘specific	 deterrence’	 and,	 finally,	 the	 use	 of	 a																																																									
51	Council	Regulation	(n	8).	
52	Commission,	‘Cartels	-	Leniency’	<ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/leniency/leniency.html>	
accessed	10	February	2013.		
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maximum	ten	percent	cap	is	considered	alongside	the	Commission’s	discretion	
to	 impose	 a	 fine	 under	 this	 cap.	 It	 identifies	 various	 concerns	 within	 the	
Commission’s	 current	 fining	 process,	 but	 notes	 that	 these	 issues	 are	 not,	 in	
themselves,	sufficient	to	lead	to	a	breach	of	Article	7	of	the	ECHR.			
	
The	 second	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 analyses	 Commission	 fining	 decisions	 to	
identify	 whether	 the	 Commission	 has	 applied	 its	 fining	 process	 equally	 to	 all	
undertakings.	 Specifically,	 it	 considers	 the	 awarding	 of	 the	 inability	 to	 pay	
discount,	 the	 nationality	 of	 an	 undertaking,	 and	 whether	 the	 undertaking	 is	
classified	as	a	so-called	‘National	Champion’.	At	this	stage,	the	section	identifies	
concerns	 with	 the	 application	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process,	 and	
recommendations	are	made	in	an	effort	to	prevent	further	unequal	applications	
of	the	fining	policy	by	the	Commission.		
	
Chapter	4	
Do	the	provisions	in	the	Damages	Directive	on	disclosure	adequately	balance	
the	competing	rights	and	interests	at	play?	
	
In	 its	fight	to	detect	and	uncover	secretive	cartels,	the	Commission	operates	a	
leniency	 policy.	 This	 helps	 the	 Commission	 to	 detect	 cartels	 by	 allowing	 an	
undertaking	—	which	has	participated	 in	an	 illegal	cartel	—	to	report	 it	 to	the	
Commission	 in	 exchange	 for	 a	 reduction	 in	 fine	 or	 immunity.	 In	 order	 to	 be	
granted	complete	immunity	or	a	reduction	in	fine,	there	are	strict	requirements	
placed	 on	 an	 undertaking.	 One	 of	 these	 requirements	 is	 that	 an	 undertaking	
seeking	 immunity	 (or	 a	 reduction	 in	 fine)	 is	 to	 disclose	 and	 provide	 the	
Commission	with	 information	 regarding	 the	cartel.	Recently,	 there	has	been	a	
development	of	 cases	where	private	parties	 suing	 for	damages	against	 cartels	
have	sought	access	to	the	leniency	documentation	held	by	the	Commission	and	
national	competition	authorities.	In	these	cases	it	has	been	repeatedly	held	by	
the	EU	courts	 that	a	blanket	ban	on	the	disclosure	of	 these	documents	would	
breach	EU	law,	and	thus	disclosure	must	be	decided	on	by	a	case-by-case	basis	
by	a	national	court.	However,	providing	third	party	access	to	these	documents	
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has	raised	a	variety	of	concerns	for	leniency	applicants	and	led	to	fears	amongst	
many	 that	 this	may	deter	potential	 future	 leniency	applicants.	To	address	 this	
issue,	 part	 of	 the	 recently	 passed	 Damages	 Directive,	 provides	 for	 a	 total	
prohibition	on	the	disclosure	of	leniency	documents	to	third	parties.		
	
Given	 this	 recent	 development,	 the	 chapter	 takes	 this	 unique	 opportunity	 to	
discuss	the	Damages	Directive	in	the	context	of	protection	of	an	undertaking’s	
procedural	 rights.	 In	 particular,	 it	 seeks	 to	 answer	 whether	 the	 blanket	 ban	
placed	on	disclosure	of	 leniency	documents	 is	 the	correct	approach	or	 indeed	
necessary.	 It	 achieves	 this	 analysis	 by	 considering	 three	 potential	 procedural	
right	 challenges	 that	 an	 undertaking	 may	 attempt	 to	 make	 if	 leniency	
documents	were	to	be	disclosed	to	third	parties:	(a)	its	legitimate	expectation	of	
non-disclosure;	 (b)	 its	 right	to	privacy	(Article	8	of	 the	ECHR);	and	finally,	 (c)	a	
breach	of	 its	 confidence	 if	disclosure	occurs.	Using	 the	analysis	of	 these	 three	
potential	 procedural	 rights	 challenges,	 the	 chapter	 concludes	 by	 considering	
whether	the	Damages	Directive	has	struck	the	correct	balance	with	regards	to	
disclosure.	The	chapter	identifies	that	an	undertaking	would	appear	not	to	have	
a	 legitimate	 challenge	 under	 (b)	 and	 (c).	 However,	 it	 does	 seem	 that	 an	
undertaking	 would	 have	 a	 strong	 claim	 under	 (a)	 a	 legitimate	 expectation	 of	
non-disclosure.	The	chapter	concludes	that	though	the	Damages	Directive	does	
address	a	potential	rights	protection	issue,	a	better	balance	could	be	achieved	
by	 implementing	 an	 altered	 approach	 to	 the	 complete	 blanket	 ban	 on	
disclosure;	 this	 would	 mean	 that	 an	 undertakings	 procedural	 rights	 and	 the	
ability	 for	 a	 third	 party	 to	 bring	 follow	 on	 damage	 claims	 is	 more	 equitably	
balanced.	
	
Chapter	5		
What	can	the	European	Commission’s	Direct	Settlement	Procedure	learn	from	
the	US	Plea	Bargaining	System?	
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Since	 2008,	 the	 Commission	 has	 operated	 a	 settlement	 procedure	 for	 cases	
involving	cartels.53	This	procedure	allows	the	Commission	to	quickly	settle	cases	
involving	cartels	via	a	simplified	procedure.	This	procedure	can	only	be	followed	
in	 certain	 circumstances.	 For	 example,	 where	 an	 undertaking	 agrees	 to	
acknowledge	 its	 involvement	 and	 liability	 in	 the	 cartel	 and,	 in	 exchange,	 it	 is	
rewarded	with	a	ten	percent	reduction	in	fine.	
	
However,	the	uptake	and	use	of	this	procedure	has	been	slow,	thus	far	only	a	
mere	 seventeen	 cartel	 cases	 have	 been	 settled.	 The	 US,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	
operates	 a	 highly	 developed,	 refined	 and	 efficient	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 for	
the	 settlement	of	US	 cartel	 cases,54	which	 in	 the	 last	 twenty	 years,	 has	 led	 to	
over	 ninety	 percent	 of	 cartel	 cases	 in	 the	 US	 being	 concluded	 by	 plea	
agreements.55	The	EU	settlement	procedure	has	a	variety	of	differences	to	that	
of	the	US	plea	bargaining	system.	For	example,	the	EU	system	is	not	designed	to	
be	a	bargaining	 system	but,	 rather,	 is	one	which	operates	a	 fixed	 ten	percent	
reduction	in	fine	for	cooperation.56	This	chapter	therefore	asks	the	question	of	
what	 the	 EU	 settlement	 procedure	 can	 learn	 from	 the	 US	 plea	 bargaining	
system	 to	 help	 improve	 its	 utilisation,	 success	 and	 efficiency,	 whilst	 ensuring	
that	 it	complies	with	Article	6	of	 the	ECHR.	The	chapter	begins	by	considering	
the	 cases	 that	 the	 Commission	 has	 settled	 so	 far	 under	 the	 procedure	 to	
identify	weaknesses	and	procedural	 issues	within	 the	current	approach.	Then,	
the	 question	 of	 whether	 plea	 bargaining	 is	 compatible	 with	 Article	 6	 of	 the	
ECHR	 is	 deconstructed	 and	 analysed.	 Once	 it	 has	 been	 established	 that	 it	 is	
compatible,	 a	 discussion	 is	 had	 about	 the	 possibility	 of	 implementing	 such	 a	
system	within	the	EU.	This	chapter	identifies	that	it	would	indeed	be	possible	to	
implement	 such	 a	 system	 within	 the	 EU	 as	 long	 as	 rather	 radical	 procedural	
changes	are	made.	The	analysis	in	this	section	has	wider	implications	than	just																																																									
53	30th	June	2008.	Please	see:	<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-
1056_en.htm?locale=en>	accessed	21	March	2014.	
54	See	<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/302601.pdf>	accessed	21	March	2014.	
55	Scott	Hammond	‘The	U.S.	Model	of	Negotiated	Plea	Agreements:	A	Good	Deal	with	Benefits	
for	all’	(Speech	delivered	to	OECD	Competition	Committee	Working	Party	No.3,	Paris,	17	
October	2006).	
56	See,	Maarten	Pieter	Schinkel,	‘Bargaining	in	the	Shadow	of	the	European	Settlement	
Procedure	for	Cartels’	(2011)	56(2)	The	Antitrust	Bulletin	461.	
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for	the	Commission’s	direct	settlement	procedure,	as	it	identifies	the	necessary	
requirements	that	a	signatory	party	to	the	Convention	will	need	to	ensure	are	
met	 to	 utilise	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 within	 their	 jurisdiction	 –	 so	 that	 it	
remains	 compliant	 with	 Article	 6	 of	 the	 ECHR.	 The	 chapter	 concludes	 by	
identifying	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 efficiency	 and	 utilisation	 of	 the	 EU	 direct	
settlement	procedure	 can	be	 improved	whilst	 retaining	 compatibility	with	 the	
ECHR.	It	identifies	four	suggestions	for	improvement	to	the	current	procedure.	
	
Chapter	6		
Conclusions,	 recommendations	 and	 improvements	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 EU	
cartel	enforcement	programme	and	its	compliance	with	procedural	rights		
	
The	 sixth	 and	 final	 chapter	 concludes	 the	 thesis	 by	 considering	 the	 previous	
chapters’	 analysis	 and	 identifying	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 current	 EU	 cartel	
enforcement	 procedure	 can	 be	 improved	 to	 enhance	 compliance	 with	 the	
ECHR,	the	equal	treatment	of	undertakings	and	to	tackle	other	procedural	rights	
concerns	that	have	been	identified.	This	research	is	presented	as	policy	reforms	
where	 necessary	 and	 as	 recommendations	 for	 the	 Commission.	 This	 chapter	
ends	by	highlighting	areas	of	further	potential	future	research.	
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Chapter	2:	Why	Corporations	should	
qualify	for	rights	protection	under	
the	ECHR	and,	why	it	is	important	
that	the	European	Commission’s	
cartel	enforcement	policies	comply	
with	procedural	rights	
requirements?1	
	
2.1	Introduction	
	
This	 chapter	 of	 the	 thesis	 assesses	 whether	 corporations	 qualify	 for	 rights	
protection	 under	 the	 European	 Convention	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (ECHR). 2 	In	
addition	 to	 this,	 it	 determines	 how	 specific	 rights	 enshrined	 in	 the	 ECHR	will	
apply	 to	 the	 European	 Commission’s	 (hereafter,	 ‘the	 Commission’)	 cartel	
enforcement	 procedures	 once	 the	 EU	 has	 acceded	 to	 the	 ECHR	 and	why	 it	 is	
important	 for	 the	 Commission’s	 procedures	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 Convention,	
procedural	 rights	 requirements	 and	 the	 principle	 of	 equal	 treatment.	 This	
chapter	 forms	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 thesis	 as,	 by	 answering	 the	
aforementioned	questions,	it	establishes	why	the	research	in	the	latter	chapters	
of	 the	 thesis	 are	 of	 fundamental	 importance.	 This	 chapter	 will	 illustrate	 that	
undertakings	 qualify	 for	 rights	 protection	 under	 the	 ECHR	 –	 when	 Member	
States	apply	national	or	EU	competition	law	–	and	why	the	Commission’s	cartel																																																									
1		A	draft	of	part	of	Chapter	2	—	which	discussed	whether	and	why	companies	need	rights	
protection	under	the	ECHR	—	was	presented	at	the	6th	Annual	Law	Research	Colloquium	in	
Norwich	on	the	21st	May	2014,	and	at	the	Society	of	Legal	Scholars’	Conference	2014	in	
Nottingham	on	the	11th	September	2014.	The	feedback	and	comments	from	the	attendees	of	
these	events	has	been	greatly	appreciated.		
2	European	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Human	Rights	and	Fundamental	Freedoms,	Rome,	
4.X1.1950.	
	 52	
enforcement	procedures	will	 need	 to	 comply	with	 the	 rights	enshrined	within	
the	ECHR	once	the	EU	accedes	to	the	ECHR.	
	
The	ECHR	has	been	in	force	since	the	3rd	September	1953	and	provides	a	legal	
basis	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 human	 rights	 and	 fundamental	 freedoms	 within	
Europe.	The	Convention	provides	protection	of	civil	and	political	rights	that	are	
considered	‘essential’,3	and	the	ECHR	itself	was	a	direct	response	to	the	human	
rights	 abuses	 that	 occurred	 during	 the	 Second	 World	 War.4	The	 Convention	
clearly	 states	 in	 Article	 1	 ECHR	 that	 signatory	 states	 must	 secure	 the	 rights	
within	 the	Convention	 to	 everyone	within	 their	 jurisdiction,5	and	 this	 includes	
corporations.6	
	
The	importance	of	human	rights	protection	has	continued	to	increase	in	recent	
years,	 particularly	with	 regards	 to	 the	 rights	 of	 corporations	 in	 relation	 to	 EU	
Competition	Law.7	Indeed,	we	find	there	have	been	a	great	many	cases	–	that																																																									
3	Jacobs,	White	and	Ovey,	The	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	(5th	edn,	Oxford	
University	Press	2010)	4.	
4	David	Harris	and	others,	Law	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	(2nd	edn,	Oxford	
University	Press	2009)	1.	
5	(n	2)	Article	1.	
6	Marius	Emberland,	The	Human	Rights	of	Companies:	Exploring	the	Structure	of	ECHR	
Protection	(Oxford	University	Press	2006)	3.	
7	For	example,	much	has	been	written	on	due	process	in	EU	Competition	Law	cases:	Andreas	
Scordamaglia-Tousis,	EU	Cartel	Enforcement:	Reconciling	Effective	Public	Enforcement	with	
Fundamental	Rights	(Wolters	Kluwer	Law	International	2013);	Arianna	Andreangeli,	EU	
Competition	Enforcement	and	Human	Rights	(Edward	Elgar	Publishing	2008);	Marius	Emberland,	
‘Protection	against	unwarranted	searches	and	seizures	of	corporate	premises	under	Article	8	of	
the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights:	The	Colas	est	Sa	v	France	approach’	(2003)	25(77)	
Mich	J	Int’l	77;	Helene	Andersson,	‘Dawn	raids	under	challenge’	(2014)	35(3)	ECLR	135;	Albert	
Sanchez-Graells	and	Francisco	Marcos,	‘”Human	Rights”	Protection	for	Corporate	Antitrust	
Defendants:	Are	we	not	Going	Overboard?’	(2014)	University	of	Leicester	School	of	Law	
Research	Paper	No	14-04	<	http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2389715>	
accessed	April	20th	2014;	Angus	MacCulloch,	‘The	privilege	against	self-incrimination	in	
competition	investigations:	theoretical	foundations	and	practical	implications’	(2006)	26(2)	
Legal	studies	211,	234;	Georg	Berrisch,	‘The	EU	courts	play	a	crucial	role	in	ensuring	compliance	
of	the	EU’s	system	of	competition	law	enforcement	with	due	process	rights’	(2014)	June	(1)	CPI	
Antitrust	Chronicle;	Evelyne	Ameye,	‘The	interplay	between	human	rights	and	competition	law	
in	the	EU’	(2004)	25(6)	ECLR	332;	Bruno	Nascimbene,	‘Fair	trial	and	the	rights	of	the	defence	in	
antitrust	proceedings	before	the	Commission:	a	need	for	reform?’	(2013)	38(4)	EL	Rev	573;	
Peter	Oliver	and	Thomas	Bombois,	‘Competition	and	Fundamental	Rights	Survey’	(2014)	5(7)	
Journal	of	European	Competition	Law	&	Practice	498;	Tim	Ward	QC	and	Brendan	McGurk,	
‘Competition	Law	and	Human	Rights:	The	Privilege	against	Self-incrimination	and	related	rights	
in	Competition	Investigations’	(2013)	Comp	Law	304;	Lyubomir	Talev,	‘ECHR	Implications	in	the	
EU	Competition	Enforcement’	(2010)	<http://www.varadinovlaw.com/en/wp-
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cover	 various	 areas	 of	 law	 –	 where	 corporations	 have	 argued	 that	 their	
fundamental	 rights	 have	 been	 infringed.8	The	 need	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 the	
rights	of	corporations	is	perhaps	most	prevalent	in	competition	cases	where	the	
fines	imposed	on	undertakings	by	the	Commission	are	punitive	and	deterrent	in	
nature	and,	thus,	are	often	very	high	and	severe	–	particularly	when	compared	
to	fines	for	other	administrative	offences.9	Indeed,	some	undertakings	that	have	
been	 fined	 by	 the	 Commission	 have	 claimed	 that	 the	 fines	 imposed	 by	 the	
Commission	are	so	large	that	they	are	effectively	criminal	fines	that	violate	the	
corporation’s	rights.10	
	
There	 has	 been	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 literature	 written	 generally	 on	
whether	 corporations	 should	 qualify	 for	 human	 rights,	with	 a	 sizable	 amount	
arguing	against	corporations	having	rights	protection,	and	a	significantly	 lesser	
amount	 arguing	 that	 corporations	 should	 qualify	 for	 rights	 protection.11	This																																																																																																																																																							
content/uploads/2010/12/clasf-paper-talev_echr_final_15092010.doc>	accessed	27	April	2014;	
David	Hart	QC,	‘European	Commission	fines	and	their	compliance	with	Article	6’	(UK	Human	
Rights	Blog)	<http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2013/08/12/european-commission-fines-and-
their-compliance-with-article-6/>	accessed	4	July	2014;	Anca	Chirita,	‘Procedural	rights	in	EU	
administrative	competition	proceedings:	Ex	ante	Mergers’	(2014)	
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2492826>		accessed	8th	September	
2014;	Albert	Graells,	‘The	EU’s	Accession	to	the	ECHR	and	Due	Process	Rights	in	EU	Competition	
Law	Matters:	Nothing	New	Under	the	Sun?’	(2012)	<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2156904>	
accessed	10th	July	2014;	Donald	Slater,	Sébastien	Thomas	and	Denis	Waelbroeck,	‘Competition	
Law	Proceedings	before	the	European	Commission	and	the	Right	to	a	Fair	Trial:	no	need	for	
reform?’	(2009)	The	Global	Competition	Law	Centre	Working	Papers	Series,	CGLC	Working	
Paper	04/08	<https://www.coleurope.eu/content/gclc/documents/GCLC%20WP%2004-08.pdf>	
accessed	5	January	2014;	Michael	Han	and	Janet	Wang,	‘Due	process	in	Chinese	Competition	
Law	regime’	(2014)	June	(1)	CPI	Antitrust	Chronicle;	Stephen	Harris,	‘Due	process	and	
procedural	rights	under	the	China	anti-monopoly	law’	(2014)	June	(1)	CPI	Antitrust	Chronicle;	
Paul	Lugard,	‘Procedural	fairness	and	transparency	in	antitrust	cases:	Work	in	progress’	(2014)	
June	(1)	CPI	Antitrust	Chronicle;	Martin	Möllmann,	‘Due	process	in	Antitrust	Proceedings	before	
the	European	Commission:	Fundamental	rights	are	not	enough’	(2014)	June	(1)	CPI	Antitrust	
Chronicle;	Toshiaki	Takigawa,	‘Balancing	Fairness	and	Efficiency	in	the	Globalized	Competition	
Law	Enforcement:	Insights	from	JFTC	Experiences’	(2014)	June	(1)	CPI	Antitrust	Chronicle	and	
Stanley	Wong,	‘The	Independence	of	Decision-Maker	Principle	in	Competition	Law	Enforcement’	
(2014)	June	(1)	CPI	Antitrust	Chronicle.	
8	For	example,	see	Société	Colas	Est	v	France	(2004)	39	EHRR	17,	The	Sunday	Times	v	UK	(1979)	2	
EHRR	245	and	Autronic	AG	v	Switzerland	(1990)	ECHR	12.	
9	Hart	(n	7).	
10	See	Robert	Lande,	‘Quick	–	Somebody	call	Amnesty	International!	Intel	says	EU	Antitrust	fine	
violated	Human	Rights’	(2009)	746(9)	Federal	Trade	Commission:	Watch	1.	
11	Emberland	(n	6)	3;	Marius	Emberland,	‘The	Corporate	Veil	in	the	Case	Law	of	the	European	
Court	of	Human	Rights’	(2003)	ZaoRV	63,	945;	Lucien	Dhooge,	‘Human	Rights	for	Transnational	
Corporations’	(2007)	16(2)	Journal	of	Transnational	Law	&	Policy	197;	Elizabeth	Pollman,	
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debate	has	not	merely	been	confined	to	the	EU,	it	has	and	remains	an	ongoing	
discussion	 across	 the	 Atlantic	 too.12	There	 are	 a	 variety	 of	 arguments	 for	 and	
against	corporations	having	rights	protection	and	these	shall	be	 identified	and	
discussed	 in	 the	 next	 section	 of	 the	 chapter.	 However,	 there	 are	 a	 few	 key	
pieces	of	literature	that	warrant	discussion	at	this	early	stage.		
	
One	of	the	most	detailed	and	thorough	discussions	regarding	the	human	rights	
of	 corporations	 under	 the	 ECHR	 is	 by	 Emberland.13	He	 identifies	 the	 ECtHR’s	
response	to	complaints	from	corporations	and	how	the	Court	has	dealt	with	and	
managed	these	cases.	This	is	an	excellent	piece	yet	it	can	be	distinguished	from	
this	 chapter.	 This	 thesis	 seeks	 to	 establish	 whether	 corporations	 qualify	 for	
rights	under	the	Convention,	and	the	reasons	why	we	would	want	this	to	be	the																																																																																																																																																							
‘Reconceiving	Corporate	Personhood’	(2011)	4	Utah	Law	Review	1629;	Anna	Grear,	Redirecting	
Human	Rights:	Facing	the	Challenge	of	Corporate	Legal	Humanity	(Palgrave	Macmillan	2010)	6;	
Anna	Grear,	‘Challenging	Corporate	‘Humanity’:	Legal	Disembodiment,	Embodiment	and	Human	
Rights’	(2007)	7(3)	HRLR	515-517;	Anna	Grear,	'Human	Rights	--	Human	Bodies?	Some	
Reflections	on	Corporate	Human	Rights	Distortion,	The	Legal	Subject,	Embodiment	and	Human	
Rights	Theory'	(2006)	17	Law	and	Critique	171;	Andreangeli	(n	7)	15-23;	Arianna	Andreangeli	
'Competition	law	and	human	rights:	striking	a	balance	between	business	freedom	and	
regulatory	intervention'	in	Lianos	and	Sokol	(eds)	The	Global	Limits	of	Competition	Law	
(Stanford	University	Press,	2012)	22-36;	Anat	Scolnicov,	‘Lifelike	and	Lifeless	in	Law:	Do	
Corporations	Have	Human	Rights?’	Legal	Studies	Research	Paper	Series:	University	of	Cambridge	
(2013);	Christopher	Harding,	Uta	Kohl	and	Naomi	Salmon,	Human	Rights	in	the	Market	Place:	
The	Exploitation	of	Rights	Protection	by	Economic	Actors	(Ashgate	Publishing	2008),	Uta	Kohl	
‘The	Sun,	Liverpudlians	and	‘The	Truth’:	A	Corporate	Right	to	Human	Rights?’;	Steven	Ratner,	
‘Corporations	and	Human	Rights:	A	Theory	of	Legal	Responsibility’	(2001)	111	Yale	Law	Journal	
443;	Dale	Rubin,	‘Corporate	Personhood:	How	the	Courts	have	Employed	Bogus	Jurisprudence	
to	Grant	Corporations	Constitutional	Rights	Intended	for	Individuals’	(2010)	28	Quinnipiac	Law	
Review	523;	Thom	Hartmann,	Unequal	Protection:	The	Rise	of	Corporate	Dominance	and	the	
Theft	of	Human	Rights	(Rodale	Press	2004);	Addo,	'The	Corporation	as	a	Victim	of	Human	Rights	
Violations',	in	Addo	(ed.)	Human	Rights	Standards	and	the	Responsibility	of	Transnational	
Corporations	(Hague	Kluwer	1999);	MacCulloch	(n	7);	Winfried	H.A.M	van	den	Muijsenbegh	and	
Sam	Rezai,	‘Corporations	and	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights’	(2012)	25	Pacific	
McGeorge	Global	Business	&	Development	Law	Journal	43;	Bruce	Wardhaugh,	Cartels,	Markets	
and	Crime:	A	Normative	Justification	for	the	Criminalisation	of	Economic	Collusion	(Cambridge	
University	Press	2013);	Israel	De	Jesus	Butler,	‘Ensuring	Compliance	with	the	Charter	of	
Fundamental	Rights	in	Legislative	Drafting:	The	Practice	of	the	European	Commission’	(2012)	
37(4)	EL	Rev	397;	Richard	Schragger	and	Micah	Schwartzman,	‘Some	Realism	About	Corporate	
Rights’	(2013)	University	of	Virginia	School	of	Law	Public	Law	and	Legal	Theory	Research	Paper	
Series	2013-43	<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2360309>	accessed	
March	20th	2014;	Sanchez-Graells	(n	7)	and	Helena	Paul,	‘Corporations	are	not	human,	so	why	
should	they	have	human	rights?’	<http://econexus.info/publication/corporations-are-not-
human-so-why-should-they-have-human-rights>	accessed	10	March	2014.	
12	For	example,	see	Dhooge	(ibid)	and	Pollman	(ibid).	Even	churches	have	been	considered	for	
whether	they	should	qualify	for	rights	protection,	see	Schragger	and	Schwartzman	(ibid).		
13	Emberland	(n	6).	
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case,	it	then	focuses	its	attention	to	applying	the	most	relevant	ECHR	rights	(and	
other	procedural	 rights)	 to	the	Commission’s	cartel	enforcement	procedure	to	
ensure	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 procedures	 do	 not	 breach	
these	rights.	
	
In	 the	 specific	 context	of	 competition	 law	 there	has	been	a	 lack	of	discussion	
regarding	whether	corporations	qualify	for	rights	protection	and	whether	they	
should	 or	 should	 not.14	MacCulloch	 has	 briefly	 engaged	 in	 a	 discussion	 on	
corporations	 and	 human	 rights,	 and	 has	 suggested	 that	 they	 have	 been	
extended	 to	undertakings	 in	competition	 law	 investigation	cases,	with	 specific	
regards	 to	 the	 privilege	 against	 self-incrimination. 15 	The	 most	 detailed	
discussion	to	date	is	that	which	Sanchez-Graells	and	Marcos	contributed.16	They	
identified	 that	 there	 is	 a	 clear	 trend	 towards	 the	 increased	 protection	 of	
‘corporate	 human	 rights’	 in	 competition	 law	 cases,	 and	 are	 very	 skeptical	 of	
this;	arguing	that	this	 increase	 is	based	upon	an	uncritical	extension	of	human	
rights	protection	to	corporations.	They	conclude	their	piece	by	warning	of	 the	
potential	harmful	effects	 that	 can	arise	 for	 competition	and	human	 rights	 law	
with	 an	 ‘overstretched	 conception	 of	 due	 process	 protection.’17	This	 chapter	
takes	the	diametrically	opposing	view	to	that	of	Sanchez-Graells	and	Marcos.	It	
will	be	illustrated	later	why	it	is	believed	that	the	rights	have	not	been	extended	
to	corporations	(under	the	ECHR)	and	why	it	is	so	valuable	undertakings’	rights	
are	protected	in	competition	law	proceedings.	
	
Scordamaglia-Tousis	 has	 considered	 procedural	 rights	 and	 how	 they	 can	 be	
reconciled	 with	 the	 EU	 cartel	 enforcement.18	Within	 this	 analysis	 he	 briefly	
discusses	 whether	 corporations	 can	 qualify	 for	 rights	 protection	 as	 legal	
entities.	He	has	not,	however,	discussed	the	important	and	fundamental	issues	
of	why	 corporations	 need	 rights	 protection	 in	 the	 context	 of	 competition	 law																																																									
14	Andreangeli	has	consider	this	briefly	in	the	competition	of	EU	competition	enforcement.	
Andreangeli	(n	7)	15-23.	
15	MacCulloch	(n	7).	
16	Sanchez-Graells	(n	7).	
17	ibid.	
18	Scordamaglia-Tousis	(n	7).	
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proceedings	 or	 why	we	would	wish	 for	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	
procedure	to	adhere	to	fundamental	rights.19		
	
Because	 of	 this	 lack	 of	 detailed	 analysis	 –	 of	 these	 issues	 within	 the	 current	
literature	 –	 this	 chapter	 aims	 to	 address	 the	 gap	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 EU	
cartel	enforcement.	To	effectively	achieve	this	the	chapter	 is	structured	 in	the	
following	 manner.	 The	 first	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 assesses	 whether	
corporations	in	the	EU	can	qualify	for	rights	protection	under	the	ECHR	and	why	
one	would	want	companies	to	have	their	rights	protected.	The	Yukos	Oil	case	is	
utilised	 to	discuss	and	highlight	 the	 reasons	 for	 corporations	 requiring	human	
rights	 protection	 and	 the	 potential	 issues	 that	 can	 occur	 if	 rights	 are	
inadequately	 protected. 20 	The	 second	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 focuses	 on	
something	that	 is	distinct	 from	the	first	section.	 It	begins	by	 identifying	why	 it	
has	 been	 chosen	 for	 this	 thesis	 to	 focus	 its	 attention	 predominately	 on	 the	
ECHR	as	opposed	to	the	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	of	the	European	Union	
(‘CFREU’).21	Therein,	 the	 section	 identifies	 the	key	ECHR	and	procedural	 rights	
that	 the	 remainder	 of	 this	 thesis	 applies	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	
enforcement	 policies.22		 It	 then	 illustrates	 how	 these	 chosen	 rights	 apply	 and	
will	 be	 engaged	 by	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 procedures.	 Finally,	
the	last	section	of	the	chapter	examines	and	explains	why	these	rights	(and	the	
principle	of	equal	treatment)	need	to	be	complied	with,	having	particular	regard	
to	 the	 three	 specific	 Commission	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies	 that	 the	 thesis	
assesses.	
	 	
																																																								
19	ibid.	
20	Oao	Neftyanaya	Kompaniya	Yukos	v	Russia	(2012)	App	no	14902/4.	
21	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	of	the	European	Union	[2000]	OJ	C	364/01.	
22	For	clarity,	these	rights	were	chosen	because	they	are	most	applicable	to	the	Commission’s	
policies	and	have	not	been	thoroughly	analysed	in	the	existing	literature.	
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2.2	Corporations	and	human	rights	
2.2.1	Do	corporations	qualify	for	human	rights?	
The	first	question	that	needs	to	be	answered	is	whether	corporations	qualify	for	
human	rights	protection	under	the	ECHR.	This	section	will	illustrate	that	they	do	
and	argues	compelling	reasons	why	the	answer	to	this	question	should	be	yes	
and	indeed	why	we	would	want	this	to	be	the	case.	
	
The	 first	 place	 to	 begin	 when	 considering	 this	 question	 is	 to	 consult	 the	
Convention	itself.	When	we	read	Article	1	of	the	ECHR,	we	see	it	clearly	states	
that:	 ‘The	 High	 Contracting	 Parties	 shall	 secure	 to	 everyone	 within	 their	
jurisdiction	 the	 rights	and	 freedoms	defined	 in	Section	 I	of	 this	Convention’.23	
We	can	identify	from	this	that	signatory	parties	to	the	Convention	must	ensure	
that	they	provide	these	rights	to	everyone	within	their	 jurisdiction.	The	critical	
question	here	is	how	broadly	we	can	interpret	the	term	‘everyone’.	By	its	literal	
interpretation	‘everyone’	 is	a	broad	and	encompassing	term	but	unfortunately,	
it	 provides	 no	 apparent	 indication	 as	 to	 whether	 its	 definition	 includes	
corporations.	Consequently,	we	need	to	consider	Article	34	of	the	Convention,	
which	 details	 individual	 applicants.	 It	 states	 that	 ‘the	 Court	 may	 receive	
applications	 from	 any	 person,	 non-governmental	 organisation	 or	 group	 of	
individuals	 claiming	 to	 be	 the	 victim	 of	 a	 violation	 by	 one	 of	 the	 High	
Contracting	 Parties	 of	 the	 rights	 set	 forth	 in	 the	 Convention	 or	 the	 Protocols	
thereto’.24	Article	 34	 of	 the	 Convention	 therefore	 establishes	 who	 has	 locus	
standi	to	bring	proceedings	and,	as	is	evident	from	the	wording	of	the	provision,	
this	includes	non-governmental	organisations	and	groups	of	individuals.	Thus,	it	
appears	 on	 a	 literal	 interpretation,	 to	 include	 corporations,	 because	 non-
governmental	organisations	include	businesses.	Furthermore,	when	we	consult	
the	original	drafting	of	 the	Convention,	 it	becomes	apparent	 that	 the	drafters	
had	 always	 intended	 for	 corporations	 to	 qualify	 for	 protection	 under	 the	
																																																								
23	ECHR	(n	2)	emphasis	added.	
24	ibid.	
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Convention.25	For	 example,	 if	 we	 consider	 the	 first	 preliminary	 draft	 of	 the	
Convention,	 it	 contained	 a	 right	 petition	 to	 the	 ECtHR	 for	 ‘any	 natural	 or	
corporate	 person’.26	This	 term	 was	 later	 amended	 to	 ‘corporate	 body’	 and,	
eventually	 it	 was	 replaced	 with	 the	 term	 ‘non-governmental	 organisation’.27	
However,	there	was	and	remains	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	these	changes	to	
the	 terminology	 were	 implemented	 to	 diminish	 the	 rights	 protection	 of	
corporations.28	Although,	 it	 has	 been	 noted	 by	 Emberland	 that	 this	 fails	 to	
explain	why	companies	were	‘straightforwardly	integrated	in	the	Convention	or	
[…]	what	form	of	protection	corporate	applicants	actually	enjoy’.29	Regardless	of	
this,	 it	remains	clear	that	corporations	were	always	 intended	to	have	standing	
to	bring	a	claim	under	the	ECHR.	Indeed,	when	we	consider	the	case	law	of	the	
ECtHR	we	see	that	the	Court	has	had	no	issues	with	permitting	corporations	to	
bring	 claims	 or	 in	 providing	 corporations	 rights	 protection	 under	 the	
Convention.	
	
The	first	corporate	claim	before	the	ECtHR	arose	in	1978	and	involved	a	private	
media	corporation’s	dispute	with	the	UK.30	In	this	case	–	and	all	cases	that	have	
followed	 it	 –	 the	 Court	 has	 had	 no	 concerns	with	 ensuring	 that	 corporations	
have	 their	 rights	 protected.31	For	 example,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Société	 Colas	 Est	 v	
France,32	the	ECtHR	confirmed	that	 it	 is	comfortable	with	 the	extension	of	 the	
protection	 offered	 by	 Article	 8	 of	 the	 Convention	 to	 a	 corporation’s	 business	
premises	 in	 certain	 circumstances.33	This	 is	 because	 of	 the	 dynamic	 nature	 of	
																																																								
25	This	assessment	is	based	on	the	discussions	in	Emberland	(n	6)	35	and	the	Travaux	
Préparatoires’.	
26	See	A	H	Robertson	(ed)	Collected	Editions	of	the	Travaux	Préparatoires’	of	the	European	
Convention	on	Human	Rights	(Martinus	Nijhoff	Dordrecht,	1975)	vol	1	296	and	298.	
27	See	A	H	Robertson	(ed)	Collected	Editions	of	the	Travaux	Préparatoires’	of	the	European	
Convention	on	Human	Rights	(Martinus	Nijhoff	Dordrecht,	1975)	vol	2	3	and	68.	
28	Emberland	(n	6).	
29	ibid	36.	
30	The	Sunday	Times	(n	8).	
31	Similarly,	in	Funke	v	France	(1993)	1	CMLR	897	the	ECtHR	was	happy	to	discuss	the	ECHR	in	
the	ambient	of	a	legal	person.	
32	(2004)	39	EHRR	17.	
33	ibid	para	41.	
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the	Convention	–	as	 it	 is	 a	 ‘living	 instrument’	 –	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 it	wished	 to	
ensure	that	the	Convention	covered	‘present-day	conditions’.34		
	
The	 preceding	 discussion	 clearly	 demonstrates	 that	 corporations	 qualify	 for	
rights	protection	under	the	Convention.	However,	what	has	not	been	shown	is	
why	we	would	want	this	to	be	the	case.	This	is	what	we	shall	now	move	on	to	
consider,	 whether	 corporations	 should	 have	 rights	 protection	 and	 why	 one	
would	wish	for	corporations	to	have	their	rights	protected.	This	assessment	will	
involve	 analysing	 the	 need	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 these	 rights	 from	 a	
‘competition	 law’	perspective.	Other	general	 reasons	 for	desiring	corporations	
to	have	rights	protection	will	also	be	identified,	analysed	and	discussed.	
2.2.2	The	Arguments	For	and	Against	Rights	Protection	
The	 discussion	 of	 the	 arguments	 for	 and	 against	 corporations	 qualifying	 for	
rights	 protection	 shall	 begin	 with	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	 most	 pertinent	
arguments	against	corporations	receiving	rights	protection.	
2.2.2.1	The	Arguments	Against	Rights	Protection	
A	variety	of	arguments	have	been	forwarded	as	to	why	corporations	should	not	
receive	rights	protection.	These	 include:	 that	 the	ECHR	was	never	 intended	to	
protect	 the	 rights	 of	 corporations;	 corporations	 are	 not	 ‘human	 beings’	 or	
‘persons’	so	how	and	why	should	human	rights	be	extended	to	them?;	granting	
corporations	 human	 rights	 dehumanises	 and	 degrades	 human	 rights;	
corporations	 have	 vast	 resources	 whereas	 human	 rights	 were	 developed	 to	
protect	the	vulnerable;	the	‘flood-gate’	argument	and	the	‘selective	rights	only’	
argument.	 These	 arguments	 shall	 now	 be	 analysed	 alongside	 the	 respective	
counter-arguments	 to	 illustrate	 why	 many	 of	 these	 arguments	 are	
fundamentally	flawed,	based	on	a	misconception	or	inaccurate	premises.	Table	
2.1	 below,	 provides	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 key	 arguments	
against	corporations	having	right	protection	and	the	counter	arguments.																																																									
34	ibid.	
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Table	2.1.	Arguments	for	and	against	Corporate	Rights	Protection	
	
	
‘What	we	now	face	is	the	danger	to	human	rights	future	presented	by	the	
genesis	of	a	corporation-friendly	human	rights	legal	sensibility’.35		
	
Probably	 the	 most	 oft	 cited	 argument	 against	 corporations	 having	 rights	
protection	 is	 that	corporations	are	not	 ‘human	beings’	or	 ‘persons’,	 therefore,	
how	can	we	give	or	extend	‘human’	rights	to	them?		
	
This	argument	can	be	succinctly	illustrated	by	the	following	quote	from	Edward,	
Baron	 Thurlow:36	‘A	 corporation,	 unlike	 a	 human	 being,	 has	 ‘no	 soul	 to	 be	
damned,	and	no	body	to	be	kicked	’’.	One	can	see	that	this	argument	is	based																																																									
35	Anna	Grear,	Redirecting	Human	Rights	(n	11)	6.	Those	who	advocate	that	corporations	should	
not	receive	rights	protection,	as	it	is	damaging	to	human	rights	often	raise	concerns	akin	to	this.	
36	Emberland	(n	6)	27,	quoting	Edward	Baron,	Thurlow	in	E	Knowles	(ed)	The	Oxford	Dictionary	
of	Quotations	(6th	edn,	Oxford	University	Press	2004)	550.	
Arguments	against	
corporations	having	human	
rights	protection	
Arguments	for	corporations	
qualifying	for	human	rights	
protection		
The	ECHR	was	never	intended	to	
protect	the	rights	of	corporations.	
The	ECHR	provides	protection	for	
corporations	and	this	was	always	
the	drafters’	intention.		
Corporations	are	not	'human	beings'	
or	'persons'	so	how	and	why	should	
human	rights	be	extended	to	them?	
Corporations	receiving	right	
protection	brings	benefits	to	the	
legal	system.	
Granting	corporations	human	rights	
dehumanises	and	degrades	human	
rights.	
Potential	for	stronger	and	better	
right	protection	for	individuals.	
Corporations	have	vast	resources	
whereas	human	rights	were	
developed	to	protect	the	vulnerable.	
A	corporation	is,	at	the	end	of	the	
day,	a	group	of	individual	right	
holders.		
The	'flood-gate'	argument.	 Corporations	are	treated	as	'legal	
persons'	in	many	areas	of	the	law	
and	are	required	to	respect	an	
individual	person’s	human	rights.	
The	‘selective	rights	only’	argument.		 Issues	with	'dual	prosecution'	
requirements.		
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on	 the	 claim	 that	 ‘the	 physical	 embodiment	 of	 human	 rights	 in	 persons	 or	
individuals	 is	 a	 crucial	 and	 central	 feature	 present	 in	 their	 creation	 and	
recognition’.37	The	 argument	 follows	 that,	 given	 corporations	 are	 not	 human	
and	have	no	physical	being,	why	should	we	–	and	how	can	we	–	provide	them	
with	rights	protection?	Those	who	advocate	along	these	 lines	often	claim	that	
when	 corporations	 gain	 rights	 protection	 it	 leads	 to	 an	 extension	 of	 rights	 or	
legal	protection	 that	 the	original	 legislation	never	envisaged,	allowed	nor	was	
designed	 for.	 Proponents	 of	 this	 view	 may	 take	 a	 ‘grant	 theory’	 view	 of	
corporations.	That	 is	to	say,	they	view	corporations	as	an	‘artificial	entity’	that	
owe	their	existence	to	the	State	–	i.e.	it	is	incorporated	and	allowed	to	trade	by	
the	 State	 –	 and	 cannot	 therefore	 derive	 any	 rights.38	This	 view	 was	 very	
prevalent	 in	 the	US	 and	 EU	 in	 the	 pre-19th	 Century	where	 corporations	were	
heavily	regulated	and	severely	limited	to	what	activities	they	could	engage	in.39	
However,	this	is	not	the	case	today.	The	formation	of	a	corporation	within	the	
EU	 and	 US	 is	 far	 easier,	 with	many	 of	 the	 restrictions	 and	 severe	 limitations	
having	been	removed.	
	
Another	 argument	 put	 forward	 (that	 extends	 and	 builds	 upon	 the	 previous	
argument)	 is	 that	 by	 granting	 corporations	 rights,	 it	 degrades,	 devalues	 and	
dehumanises	rights.40	It	is	claimed	that	by	allowing	corporations	to	have	rights,	
the	value	and	importance	of	these	fundamental	rights	is	lost	as	they	are	being	
distorted	 and	 twisted	 to	 protect	 something	 that	 they	 were	 not	 designed	 to	
protect.	Those	who	argue	along	these	lines	will	often	raise	the	context	in	which	
the	ECHR	was	developed.	Highlighting	the	atrocities	 inflicted	on	human	beings	
in	World	War	2	and	the	fact	that	the	Convention	was	primarily	enacted	to	help	
prevent	 these	 evils	 from	 occurring	 again	 in	 the	 future.	 On	 this	 basis,	 these	
individuals	will	argue	that	the	extension	of	rights	to	corporations	goes	too	far	as	
																																																								
37	Sanchez-Graells	(n	7)	5.	
38	Rubin	(n	11)	535.		
39	For	example,	corporations	were	prohibited	from	engaging	in	any	activities	not	specified	in	
their	charter.	Rubin	(n	11)	532.	
40	This	has	been	effectively	discussed	in	Scolnicov’s	piece	(n	11).	
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it	is	not	what	the	Convention	was	designed	for.41	
	
At	 first	 glance,	 these	 two	 arguments	 –	 regarding	 the	 extension	 and	
dehumanisation	of	rights	–	appear	to	make	some	potentially	robust	assertions.	
Yet	 the	 fact	 of	 the	matter	 is	 that	 both	 of	 these	 arguments	 are	 actually	 very	
dubious	 and	 can	 be	 refuted	 rather	 effortlessly.	 If	 one	 simply	 considers	 the	
original	 intention	of	 the	drafters	of	 the	Convention	and	consults	 the	 language	
used	in	the	Convention	itself,	these	arguments	begin	to	fall.	As	was	illustrated	in	
the	early	 stages	of	 this	 chapter,	 the	Convention	was	always	 intended	 to	offer	
protection	 to	 corporations.	 Indeed,	 there	has	been	no	extension	of	 the	 rights	
because	 corporations	 qualified	 for	 these	 rights	 from	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	
Convention.	Corporations	cannot	 therefore	be	accused	of	 causing	 rights	 to	be	
extended	 or	 manipulated;	 this	 is	 simply	 not	 the	 case,	 as	 corporations	 were	
always	entitled	to	this	protection.42	It	would	be	 justifiable	 to	end	the	counter-
argument	on	this	basis	alone,43	but	 let	us	first	consider	some	additional	points	
of	interest.		
	
For	 arguments	 sake,	 let	 us	 accept	 the	 claim	 that	 corporations	 were	 never	
intended	to	qualify	for	rights	protection	when	the	Convention	was	first	enacted.	
Would	this	mean	that	they	should	still	not	qualify	now?	If	we	consider	how	the	
ECtHR	has	developed	its	jurisprudence	from	the	Convention,	can	we	really	still	
substantiate	this	claim?	Social	norms	and	values	change	over	time	and	the	law	
has	 to	 develop	 to	 reflect	 this.	 For	 example,	 there	 have	 been	 periods	 in	 legal	
history	when	homosexual	practices	within	the	UK	were	illegal	and	when	women	
did	not	receive	an	equal	paycheque	to	their	male	counterparts.44	This	is	not	the	
case	today	as	our	values	and	views	as	a	society	have	altered.	Therefore,	a	 law	
that	was	 once	 accepted	 as	 serving	 a	 legitimate	 purpose	would	 be	 considered	
unacceptable	 in	modern	times.	Hence,	we	see	Parliament	reformulate	the	 law																																																									
41	Sanchez-Graells	(n	7)	3.	
42	What	is	less	clear	–	as	Emberland	has	noted	(n	7)	36	–	is	what	form	of	protection	this	takes.	
43	Which	it	would	be	possible	to	do	as	the	aforementioned	argument	effectively	counters	the	
claims	of	dehumanisation	and	extension	of	rights.	
44	In	1967	the	Sexual	Offences	Act	1967	came	into	force	decriminalising	homosexual	acts.		
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to	reflect	modern	standards,	views	and	norms.	The	Convention	itself	allows	for	
changes,	 as	 it	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 ‘living	 instrument’	 that	 adapts	 to	 modern	 day	
circumstances.	 Indeed,	 we	 find	 that	 this	 is	 one	 of	 the	 reasons	 that	 the	
Convention	 has	 been	 so	 effective	 in	 protecting	 rights,	 because	 it	 has	 the	
flexibility	to	adapt	and	change.	This	ability	to	adapt	has	allowed	the	Convention	
to	extend	rights	into	areas	that	people	would	not	have	necessarily	thought	of	as	
originally	intended	for	protection.45		
	
Can	one	legitimately	say	that	this	has	led	to	a	degradation	of	the	value	of	rights,	
simply	because	they	have	been	extended?	No,	it	 is	more	likely	that	one	would	
claim	 that	 this	 extension	 serves	 to	 reinforce	 the	 protection	 of	 an	 individual’s	
rights.	 Therefore,	 should	 it	 not	 also	 be	 the	 case	 if	 rights	 are	 extended	 to	
corporations,	as	it	will	result	in	better	protection	of	individuals	as	well?	Further	
to	 this,	 if	 we	 consider	 how	 important	 and	 influential	 corporations	 are	 today	
with	 regards	 to	 the	 community,	one	has	 to	question	why	we	would	not	want	
them	 to	 qualify	 for	 rights	 protection.	 For	 example,	 corporations	 affect	 our	
everyday	 lives,	 they	 employ	 citizens,	 impact	 on	 the	 local	 community	 and	
economy	 and	 they	 can	 protect	 the	 local	 environment	 too.46	Based	 on	 this	
discussion,	 it	seems	reasonable	to	conclude	that	–	owing	to	the	importance	of	
corporations	 today	 and	 the	 way	 that	 the	 Convention	 adapts	 to	 modern	 day	
circumstances	 –	 corporations	 would	 qualify	 for	 rights	 protection	 now	 even	 if	
they	originally	did	not.	
	
There	 is	one	more	argument	that	needs	to	be	raised	against	the	claim	that	by	
corporations	 receiving	 rights	 protection	 they	 extend	 and	 dehumanise	 rights.	
This	argument	is	two-fold.	The	first	part	relates	to	the	fact	that	a	corporation	is	
treated	as	a	legal	person	in	many	areas	of	law	to	enable	it	to	be	found	liable	for	
																																																								
45	For	example,	consider	the	way	the	Court	has	interpreted	‘within	their	jurisdiction’	to	mean	or	
the	decision	in	Goodwin	v	UK	(1996)	22	EHRR	123.			
46	It	has	been	suggested	that	corporate	human	rights	have	been	enhanced	because	of	the	
impact	they	can	have	on	the	rights	of	individuals,	see	Addo	(n	11)	187.	
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criminal	 and	 civil	 offences.47	For	 example,	 corporations	 in	 the	 UK	 can	 be	
charged	with	corporate	manslaughter	where	a	death	occurs	owing	to	a	serious	
management	 failure	 that	 results	 in	 a	 gross	 breach	 of	 a	 duty	 of	 care.48	In	 this	
case,	as	a	corporation	is	a	legal	person,	one	wonders	why	we	would	not	expect	
it	to	have	some	form	of	rights	protection?	This	is	a	serious	charge	that	will	have	
grave	 implications	 for	 the	 corporation	 both	 financially	 and	 for	 its	 reputation,	
alongside	having	an	 impact	on	 the	corporation’s	employees	and	shareholders.	
The	 court	 may	 even	 impose	 remedial	 or	 publicity	 orders	 against	 the	
corporation.49	If,	on	 the	one	hand,	we	are	willing	 to	define	a	 corporation	as	a	
‘legal	 person’	 to	 make	 it	 criminally	 liable,	 it	 seems	 somewhat	 one-sided	 and	
strange	to	state	that	they	cannot	also	constitute	a	‘legal	person’	which	qualifies	
for	rights	and,	in	turn,	has	protection	of	these	rights.	
	
The	second	part	of	the	argument	relates	to	the	idea	that	there	is	an	expectation	
that	 corporations	 will	 consider	 and	 protect	 the	 rights	 of	 individuals.50	As	 we	
place	an	expectation	on	corporations	to	not	infringe	or	unduly	affect	the	rights	
of	an	individual,	why	would	we	not	also	expect	them	to	themselves	qualify	for	
rights	 protection?	 This	 argument	 turns	 the	 tables	 on	 one	 of	 the	 arguments	
made	by	 those	opposing	 corporations	having	human	 rights.	 It	 is	 often	argued	
that	 because	 corporations	 do	 not	 accept	 their	 human	 rights	 obligations,	 they	
should	not	be	able	to	benefit	from	rights	protection.51	
	
With	both	of	these	arguments	 it	seems	illogical,	on	the	one	hand,	to	deny	the	
corporation	rights	but,	on	the	other,	to	treat	it	as	a	legal	person	or	expect	it	to	
protect	 the	 rights	 of	 individuals,	 if	 it	 cannot	 itself	 qualify	 for	 this	 protection.	
Another	 argument	 raised	 is	 that	 corporations	 often	 have	 vast	 resources	 and	
wealth,	 and	 that	 human	 rights	 were	 designed	 to	 protect	 the	 vulnerable	 and																																																									
47	For	example,	under	UK	Company	Law	a	corporation	is	treated	as	a	‘legal	person’.	Sanchez-
Graells	and	Marcos	have	noted	that	corporations	are	legal	persons	but	state	that	corporate	
personality	is	a	fiction	(n	7)	7.	
48	Corporate	Manslaughter	and	Corporate	Homicide	Act	2007.	
49	ibid	s9	and	s10	respectively.	
50	This	expectation	has	been	discussed	by	Joseph	in	Sarah	Joseph,	Corporations	and	
Transnational	Human	Rights	Litigation	(Hart	2004).	
51	Grear	(n	11)	515-517.	
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weak	 individual	 against	 the	 wealthy	 and	 powerful	 State.52 	The	 argument	
presumes	 that	because	of	 this	 it	 is	unfair	 to	provide	a	 corporation	with	 rights	
protection	as	it	does	not	need	them	given	its	vast	resources,	which	sometimes	
even	exceed	that	of	the	State.53		
	
At	 first	 glance	 this	 argument	 appears	 to	 have	 a	 small	 amount	 of	 traction;	
corporations	are	often	quite	powerful	and	are	relatively	well-equipped	to	deal	
with	 legal	 issues.	 Although,	 one	must	 remember	 that	 there	 are	 a	 great	many	
small	companies	that	do	not	have	vast	resources	and	are	not	powerful,	but	yet	
play	an	important	role	within	the	economy.	For	example,	if	we	just	consider	the	
UK	economy,	there	are	an	estimated	4.9	million	private	sector	businesses	–	with	
small	 or	 medium	 sized	 enterprises	 accounting	 for	 99.9	 percent	 of	 these.54	
Consequently,	 it	 is	 necessary	 that	 we	 provide	 adequate	 protection	 for	 these	
companies,	as	they	will	not	have	vast	resources	and	thus	in	many	instances	will	
be	weaker	and	much	less	powerful	than	the	State.	There	may	also	be	instances	
where	 these	 small	 businesses,	which	 lack	 in	wealth	 and	 resources,	 have	 their	
rights	infringed	by	the	Commission	and	yet	still	wish	to	pursue	a	claim.55	Further	
to	 this,	 it	 should	be	noted	 that	 the	Commission	 is	 actually	 a	 powerful	 agency	
when	it	 is	compared	to	a	corporation.	The	powers	they	have	to	 investigate	an	
alleged	 cartel	 are	 robust	 and	 wide-ranging,	 and	 the	 potential	 sanctions	 that	
they	 can	 impose	 for	 a	 breach	 of	 competition	 law	 are	 severe	 and	 potentially	
harmful	to	the	economy.	Therefore,	the	power	balance	is	still	favoured	towards	
the	 Commission,	 with	 the	 weaker	 party	 in	 the	 case	 being	 the	 corporations.	
Wealth	does	not	necessarily	equate	to	power.	One	only	needs	to	consider	the	
illustrative	case	of	Yukos	Oil,56	discussed	later	in	this	chapter,	to	be	aware	of	the																																																									
52	This	is	an	argument	that	Sanchez-Graells	and	Marcos	have	made	in	relation	to	due	process	
rights	(n	7)	7.	
53	Dhooge	(n	11)	242.	
54	Department	for	Business	Innovation	&	Skills,	‘Business	Population	Estimates	for	the	UK	and	
Regions	2013’	(2013)	
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/254552/13-
92-business-population-estimates-2013-stats-release-4.pdf>	accessed	13	November	2014.	
55	It	is,	however,	worth	noting	that	it	is	questionable	whether	a	small	business	would	have	the	
capital	or	resources	in	the	first	instance	to	bring	a	claim	against	the	Commission	even	with	these	
rights	being	protected.	
56	Yukos	(n	20).	
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harm	 powerful	 government	 bodies	 can	 cause	 to	 corporations.	 Additionally,	 if	
we	 analogise	 the	 situation	 of	 power	 and	 wealth	 with	 that	 of	 an	 individual	
claiming	an	abuse	of	a	human	right,	but	who	is	also	very	wealthy,	we	would	not	
expect	the	wealthy	individual	to	forgo	having	their	human	rights	protected	just	
because	they	are	wealthy.	Hence,	the	argument	made	against	corporations	not	
receiving	rights	protection	crumbles	again,	as	rights	apply	to	all,	whether	they	
are	wealthy	or	better	equipped	to	deal	with	a	claim	or	not.	If	the	previous	line	
of	 argument	 was	 to	 be	 followed	 through	 completely,	 would	 this	 mean	 that	
suspected	 or	 convicted	 terrorists	 or	 murderers	 should	 not	 qualify	 for	 rights	
protection	 because	 of	 the	 crimes	 they	 have	allegedly	 committed?57	If	 so,	 this	
would	 go	 against	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 Convention	 and	 would	 lead	 to	 the	
‘conditional	 application	 of	 human	 rights’. 58 	Consequently,	 this	 argument	
actually	 appears	 illogical	 when	 one	 considers	 the	 potential	 outcome	 that	 it	
could	 lead	 to	 if	 it	 is	 followed	 through	completely,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 rights	are	
applied	to	all	individuals	no	matter	what	their	status	or	wealth.	
	
The	next	argument,	which	 is	often	 levied	against	corporations	having	rights,	 is	
linked	to	the	aforementioned	argument.	Because	corporations	often	have	vast	
resources	and	wealth,	it	is	argued	by	some	that	this	–	coupled	with	corporations	
qualifying	 for	 rights	 protection	 –	 will	 lead	 to	 many	 cases	 being	 brought	 by	
corporate	applicants	 that	will	 tie	up	 the	courts	and	 lead	 to	a	 large	amount	of	
cases	going	before	the	ECtHR.	This	in	turn	will	mean	that	individual	right	holders	
will	 struggle	 to	bring	 their	 claims	as	 they	often	have	 fewer	 resources	and	 less	
wealth	 than	 corporations,59	who	 will	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 wait	 for	 the	 case	 to	
proceed	 through.	 This	 may	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 ‘floodgate	 argument’,	 i.e.	 that	 by	
corporations	 qualifying	 for	 rights	 protection	 there	 will	 be	 a	 significant	 rise	 in	
cases	 that	 the	Court	will	 not	be	able	 to	 cope	with.	 Further	 to	 this,	 one	might	
even	 suggest	 that	 corporations	 may	 try	 to	 use	 their	 wealth	 to	 lobby	 and	
influence	key	 individuals	 to	extend	their	 rights	 further.	However,	what	we	are																																																									
57	Muijsenbergh	and	Rezai	(n	11)	52.	
58	This	is	an	argument	that	was	forwarded	by	Muijsenbergh	and	Rezai	with	regards	to	
corporations	right	protection	(n	11).	
59	Hartmann	(n	11).		
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witnessing	 is	 that	 the	 ‘floodgate’	problem	 is	not	actually	occurring	 in	practice.	
Emberland	has	identified	that	in	the	five-year	period	between	1998-2003	there	
were	3307	 judgments	handed	down	by	the	Court,	but	only	126	of	 these	were	
made	by	corporations	or	 filed	by	persons	pursuing	corporate	 interests.60	Thus,	
we	 see	 that	 the	 empirical	 data	 does	 not	 support	 this	 claim	 and,	 as	 such,	 the	
‘floodgates’	argument	is	currently	a	non-starter.	That	said,	as	the	EU	accedes	to	
the	 ECHR	 and	 the	 rights	 of	 corporations	 gain	 even	 more	 prominence	 and	
development,	 it	will	be	 interesting	 to	see	 if	 these	 figures	change	and	whether	
the	argument	gains	increased	merit,	as	the	Commission’s	fining	procedures	will	
be	open	to	ECHR	scrutiny.	But,	currently	this	argument	is	not	an	issue.	
	
The	 final	 argument	 that	 shall	 be	 considered	 is	 perhaps	 the	 most	 difficult	
argument	 –	 for	 those	 who	 advocate	 for	 corporations	 to	 qualify	 for	 rights	
protection	 –	 to	 counter.	 The	 argument	 extends	 from	 one	 of	 the	 very	 first	
arguments	 to	 be	 considered	 in	 this	 chapter.	 As	 corporations	 are	 not	 human	
beings,	 there	 are	 certain	 rights	 that	 it	 appears	 very	 difficult	 to	 see	 being	
applicable	to	them	–	because	of	the	very	nature	of	those	rights.61	For	example,	
it	 is	hard	 to	 imagine	a	 corporation	having	 the	 right	 to	 life	or	being	able	 to	be	
tortured.	 Therefore,	 how	 can	 corporations	 qualify	 for	 rights	 protection	 if	 a	
variety	of	the	rights	do	not	or	cannot	apply	to	them?	Hence,	 it	 is	claimed	that	
this	must	mean	that	the	ECHR	was	only	ever	intended	to	protect	human	beings	
as,	 if	 not,	 it	 means	 one	 has	 to	 ‘pick	 and	 choose’	 which	 rights	 apply	 to	 a	
corporation.	 Consequently,	 this	 argument	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 one	 regarding	 ‘only	
selective	 rights’.	 The	 argument	 could	 be	 developed	 even	 further	 by	 claiming	
that	 if	 rights	which	required	a	 ‘physical	body’	–	 in	 the	 traditional	 sense	of	 the	
term	–	were	to	be	extended	to	corporations,	this	would	be	a	step	too	far	in	the	
creative	interpretation	of	human	rights.	
	
The	so-called	‘selective	rights’	criticism	is	an	interesting	one.	It	does	appear	that																																																									
60	Emberland	(n	6)	13-14.	
61	Muijsenbergh	and	Rezai	have	noted	with	specific	relation	to	certain	rights	that	holding	
otherwise	‘could	equate	corporations	with	human	beings	on	a	level	which	borders	the	
incredible’	(n	11)	51,	emphasis	added.	
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arguing	that	corporations	should	have	a	right	to	life	(for	example)	is	pushing	and	
extending	rights	for	corporations	to	the	extreme.	Nonetheless,	is	the	argument	
regarding	 only	 having	 selective	 rights	 as	 serious	 a	 challenge	 to	 corporations	
qualifying	for	rights	protection	as	it	first	seems?	
	
If	we	consider	an	analogous	situation,	we	can	draw	some	interesting	inferences.	
For	 this	 scenario	 we	 shall	 consider	 the	 Treaty	 on	 the	 Functioning	 of	 the	
European	 Union	 (TFEU).	 The	 TFEU	 is	 applicable	 to	 both	 individual	 citizens	 as	
well	as	corporations.	We	find	that	there	are	certain	provisions	that	relate	solely	
to	 the	 individual	 citizen,	 others	 exclusively	 to	 corporations	 and	 some	 which	
apply	both	to	citizens	and	corporations.62	The	fact	that	in	certain	situations	the	
provision	only	applies	to	a	corporation	or	an	individual	does	not	undermine	the	
Treaty	or	what	it	seeks	to	represent	and	achieve.	It	still	functions	correctly	and	
provides	what	it	needs	to.	Thus,	if	we	take	this	and	apply	it	to	the	ECHR,	we	see	
that	 the	Convention	 still	 functions	as	 it	was	designed	 to	when	 it	 provides	 the	
protection	of	certain	rights	for	human	beings	and,	 in	other	situations,	protects	
the	 rights	 of	 individuals	 as	 well	 as	 corporations.	 Undeniably,	 the	 rights	
themselves	will	not	apply	in	all	situations,	even	when	an	individual	human	being	
makes	 a	 claim	 of	 a	 rights	 violation,	 as	 only	 certain	 rights	 may	 have	 been	
engaged	in	that	case.	But,	again,	this	does	not	mean	that	the	Convention	is	not	
being	used	correctly	or	that	is	should	not	protect	an	individual’s	rights.	
	
This	 section	 has	 illustrated	 that	 there	 are	 many	 misconceptions	 surrounding	
corporations	 having	 rights	 protection	 and	 the	 arguments	 forwarded	 against	
rights	 protection	 for	 corporations	 are	 actually	 weak	 and	 do	 not	 withstand	
deconstruction	 when	 analysed.	 There	 are	 a	 variety	 of	 other	 reasons	 and	
arguments	 as	 to	 why	 corporations	 should	 have	 their	 rights	 protected,	 which	
shall	now	be	considered.	
																																																								
62	For	example,	Article	101	TFEU	only	applies	to	undertakings	(corporations),	though	an	
individual	may	be	classified	as	an	undertaking	in	certain	circumstances.	But,	an	individual	can	
claim	for	a	breach	of	Article	101	TFEU.	Article	45	TFEU	allows	for	the	freedom	of	movement	of	
workers,	but	only	applies	to	the	free	movement	of	individual	citizens,	not	corporations.	
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2.2.2.2	Counter-Arguments	for	Rights	Protection	
To	 begin	 with,	 by	 granting	 corporations	 rights	 it	 can	 allow	 benefits	 to	 be	
brought	to	the	 legal	system	and,63	in	this	case,	 the	Commission’s	enforcement	
procedures.	For	example,	where	a	corporation	feels	there	has	been	a	breach	of	
a	right	contained	within	the	ECHR,	it	is	likely	to	appeal	the	Commission’s	fining	
decision	and	set	out	why	it	feels	there	has	been	a	breach	of	a	right	within	the	
ECHR.	By	corporations	appealing	the	fines	imposed	by	the	Commission,	it	allows	
the	 Commission’s	 fining	 procedures	 to	 be	 enhanced	 and	 clarified	 where	 the	
need	 arises.	 This	 is	 because	when	 the	 court	 identifies	 the	 breach	of	 a	 right	 –	
owing	to	an	appeal	by	the	corporation	–	the	Commission	will	be	able	to	amend	
the	 guidelines	 to	 reflect	 the	 identified	 infringement	 or	 to	 ensure	 that	 its	
practices	take	into	consideration	the	identified	issue	in	the	future.	Therefore,	by	
corporations	 having	 rights,	 it	 brings	 benefits	 to	 the	 cartel	 enforcement	
procedure	as	a	whole,	ensuring	that	there	is	enhanced	certainty	and	procedural	
propriety	 for	 all.	 In	 addition,	 it	 also	 helps	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 enforcement	
procedures	 used	 by	 the	 Commission	 are	 applied	 fairly	 and	 consistently	 to	
corporations	as,	where	it	is	not,	the	corporation	could	appeal	the	Commission’s	
decision.	 Consequently,	 by	 allowing	 corporations	 to	 have	 rights	 protection	 it	
provides	 an	 incentive	 to	 the	 Commission	 to	 ensure	 that	 its	 procedures	 are	
applied	correctly	and	equally	to	all,	as	in	essence,	the	fact	that	a	corporation	has	
rights	protection	acts	as	a	deterrent	to	the	Commission	applying	the	procedure	
arbitrarily	or	unfairly.	
	
Another	benefit	derived	from	corporations	having	their	rights	protected	is	that	
this	means	 individuals	themselves	within	the	corporation	will	have	their	rights	
better	 protected.	 There	 are	 potential	 situations	 where	 individuals	 would	 not	
have	their	rights	protected	or	 legal	standing	to	bring	a	claim	themselves,	even	
though	 they	may	have	been	affected	by	 a	decision	made	by	 the	Commission.	
Accordingly,	 by	 corporations	 having	 their	 rights	 protected,	 individual	 right	
holders	gain	protection	that	they	may	not	have	otherwise	had.	For	instance,	if	a																																																									
63	Others	have	discussed	the	potential	benefits	to	society	as	a	whole	of	granting	corporations	
rights	protection.	For	example,	see	Harding,	Kohl	and	Salmon	(n	11)	45-48.	
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corporation	 was	 fined	 heavily	 for	 a	 breach	 of	 Article	 101	 TFEU	 and,	 for	
arguments	sake,	 the	decision	breaches	Article	7	of	 the	ECHR,	and	the	 fine	the	
Commission	had	imposed	led	to	the	corporation	making	workers	redundant	and	
causes	a	drop	in	share	price.	The	redundant	members	of	the	workforce	and	the	
shareholders	 would	 have	 no	 legal	 standing	 to	 raise	 concerns	 under	 the	
Convention	 about	 what	 has	 happened	 to	 the	 corporation	 regarding	 the	 fine.	
But,	 if	 the	 corporation	 qualifies	 for	 rights	 protection,	 it	 can	 challenge	 the	
Commission’s	 decision	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 legal	 certainty.	 If	 it	 is	 found	 by	 the	
Court	 that	 there	 has	 been	 a	 breach	 of	 Article	 7	 then	 these	 issues	 can	 be	
addressed.	 This	 means	 that	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 individuals	 affected	 by	 the	
Commission’s	 decision	 (who	 themselves	would	not	 qualify	 in	 this	 instance	 for	
legal	protection)	would	have	been	protected.	This	example	illustrates	that	when	
corporations	 receive	 rights	 protection	 it	 can	 lead	 to	 greater	 benefits	 to	
individuals	as	a	whole.	
	
Arguments	 against	 corporations	 receiving	 rights	 protection	 often	 make	
reference	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 human	 beings	 and	 that	 rights	 protection	 was	
designed	 to	 defend	 physical	 beings,	 which	 corporations	 are	 not.	 What	 these	
arguments	overlook	and	forget	to	take	into	account	is	that	corporations	consist	
of	 a	 group	 of	 individuals.	 Indeed,	 a	 corporation	 is	 effectively	 a	 collection	 of	
individual	 right	 holders.	 However,	 within	 UK	 Company	 Law	 we	 see	 that	 the	
company	 is	 treated	 as	 a	 separate	 entity	 to,	 and	 from,	 these	 individual	 right	
holders.64	This	principle	is	known	as	the	‘corporate	veil’	and	it	limits	the	natural	
person’s	 liability	 for	 the	company.	Nevertheless,	 in	 certain	 circumstances,	 this	
veil	 can	 be	 pierced	 so	 those	 behind	 the	 company	 can	 become	 liable	 for	 its	
debts.65	What	we	see	is	that	when	these	individual	right	holders	come	together	
for	 this	 shared	 purpose,	 i.e.	 the	 business,	 they	 can	 become	 an	 entity	 that	
cannot	 necessarily	 be	 broken	 down	 into	 the	 corresponding	 individual	 right	
																																																								
64	Similarly,	this	is	the	case	in	the	US.	
65	Salomon	v	A	Salomon	&	Co	Ltd	[1897]	AC	22.	
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holders.66	For	 example,	when	 a	 corporation	makes	 a	 business	 decision,	 this	 is	
not	 inescapably	 the	 decision	 of	 an	 individual	 right	 holder.	 This	 decision	 will	
often	be	made	by	a	group	of	right	holders	communally	(for	example,	a	Board	of	
Directors)	which	means	the	decision	is	not	that	of	one	person	but	of	many,	i.e.	
the	 ‘corporation’.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 ‘corporation’	 has	 a	 will	 of	 its	 own	 as	 it	
creates	 its	 own	 goals	 and	 objectives.	 The	 corporation	 is	 therefore	more	 than	
just	 the	 sum	 of	 its	 individuals’	 parts	 –	 the	 right	 holders	 –	 and,	 as	 such,	 is	
something	distinct	from	this;	if	you	will,	a	separate	legal	entity	in	its	own	right.	
Hence,	its	rights	require	protection.67	This	view	of	a	corporation	is	analogous	to	
the	view	ascribed	by	those	who	follow	‘real	entity	theory’.	This	view	holds	that	
corporations	 owe	 their	 existence	 and	 legitimacy	 to	 the	 distinct	 and	 unified	
purposes	 and	 wills	 of	 groups.68	What	 this	 argument	 establishes	 is	 that	 a	
corporation	 is	 made	 up	 of	 a	 collection	 of	 right	 holders,	 but	 its	 actions	 and	
decisions	 go	beyond	 those	of	 individual	 right	holders.	As	 such,	 the	 individuals	
behind	the	corporation	need	their	rights	protected	by	the	corporation	having	its	
rights	 protected,	 because	 an	 individual	 right	 holder’s	 rights	 will	 not	 be	
adequately	 protected	 as	 the	 corporation	 is	 distinct	 from	 the	 individual.	
Conversely	 here,	 nor	will	 the	 corporation’s	 rights	 be	 adequately	 protected	 by	
those	 of	 an	 individual	 right	 holder,	 as	 the	 corporation	 is	 distinct	 from	 that	
individual.	 For	 example,	 if	 one	 considers	 when	 the	 Commission	 conducts	 an	
investigation	 into	 a	 suspected	 cartel,	 it	 has	 broad	 powers	 under	 Regulation	
1/2003/EC	 to	 conduct	 its	 investigation.69	These	 powers	 include	 the	 ability	 to	
interview	any	natural	or	legal	person	who	consents	to	being	interviewed	for	the	
purpose	 of	 collecting	 information	 relating	 to	 the	 subject	 matter	 of	 an	
investigation.70	Additionally,	the	Commission	can	search	business	premises	and	
the	homes	of	individuals.71	Therefore,	individual	rights	holders	become	engaged																																																									
66	However,	this	is	not	the	only	reason	for	the	corporate	veil,	it	is	primarily	there	to	protect	the	
individual	from	liability	for	the	company’s	debts	if	it	is	wound	up.	
67	This	would	not	be	a	view	shared	by	all	see	Scolnicov	(n	11)	8	and	Schragger	and	Schwartzman	
(n	11).	
68	Rubin	(n	11)	535.	
69	Council	Regulation	(EC)	No	1/2003	of	16	December	2002	on	the	Implementation	of	the	Rules	
on	Competition	laid	down	in	Articles	81	and	82	of	the	Treaty,	(2003)	OJ	L1/1	
70	ibid.	
71	ibid.	
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by	 the	 Commission’s	 investigation	 but	 the	 corporation	will	 not	 have	 its	 rights	
adequately	protected	in	this	situation.	Indeed,	it	is	true	that	even	the	individual	
right	holder’s	rights	may	not	be	sufficiently	protected	here.	
	
One	 may	 wish	 to	 point	 to	 the	 illogicality	 of	 a	 corporation	 having	 a	 ‘will’	 as	
individuals	control	 the	corporation	and	 it	does	not	have	a	mind	 itself	 to	make	
decisions.	However,	 this	 fails	 to	understand	 the	argument	 raised	 in	 the	above	
discussion	 regarding	 the	 fact	 that	 an	 individual	 right	 holder	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	
corporation	does	not	usually	make	a	decision.	The	decision	is	that	of	a	group	of	
rights	holders,	who	put	forward	their	ideas	and	then,	through	coordination	and	
cohesion	 in	 the	 group,	 make	 a	 decision	 as	 the	 corporation.	 For	 example,	 it	
would	be	a	flawed	perception	(in	most	cases,	but	particularly	in	the	case	of	big	
corporations)	to	see	a	corporation	as	one	individual	who	controls	it.	If	one	were	
to	take	this	view,	who	then	controls	the	corporation	and	makes	the	decision?	Is	
it	a	worker	 lower	down	 in	the	employment	 line?	The	management	team?	The	
Board	of	Directors?	Or	the	shareholders	perhaps?		
	
The	 law	 in	 the	 UK	 typically	 views	 the	 decision	 of	 a	 company	 as	 having	 been	
made	by	the	shareholders	in	a	company.	This	therefore,	reinforces	the	previous	
point	 and	 view	 that	 a	 corporation	 is	 a	 group	 of	 individuals	 who	 collectively	
make	 a	 decision	 and,	 thus,	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 individual	
shareholders	is	not	sufficient	to	protect	the	corporation.	
	
The	final	argument	that	shall	be	discussed	in	support	of	corporations	receiving	
rights	 protection	 is	 the	 ‘dual	 prosecution’	 argument.72	This	 argument	 is	 based	
on	 the	 idea	 that	 if	 corporations	do	not	 receive	 the	 standard	 rights	protection	
under	the	Convention	that	 individuals	would	receive,	 it	will	 lead	to	a	situation	
where	 there	 will	 need	 to	 be	 separate	 offences	 or	 procedural	 safeguards	 for	
corporations	as	to	those	provided	for	individuals.	This	could	lead	to	a	variety	of	
issues	 with	 the	 enforcement	 of	 the	 law.	 For	 instance,	 managing	 cases	 which																																																									
72	This	is	the	name	given	to	the	argument	by	the	author	of	this	thesis,	as	it	has	not	been	seen	
raised	in	the	literature	in	any	guise	before.	
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involve	 corporations	 as	 well	 as	 individuals	 will	 become	 more	 complex	 and	
difficult	as	they	will	have	differing	 legal	standards	that	will	have	to	be	met,	as	
well	as	potentially	differing	charging	requirements.	This	could	lead	to	the	legal	
system	 becoming	 burdened	 by	 the	 differing	 requirements	 and	 it	 might	 also	
result	 in	 issues	 with	 regards	 to	 legal	 certainty.	 This	 is	 because	 two	 separate	
bodies	 of	 case	 law	 will	 materialise	 for	 what	 is	 in	 essence	 the	 same	 offence.	
Additionally,	 if	 one	 needed	 to	 ensure	 that	 due	 process	 rights	were	 protected	
and	adhered	to	in	another	way	–	and	not	via	the	Convention	–	it	could	have	cost	
implications.	Therefore,	as	corporations	are	currently	receiving	rights	protection	
under	the	ECHR,	it	makes	no	sense	to	change	this	approach	as	it	could	lead	to	
other	 issues	 whilst	 trying	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 legal	 requirements	 for	 the	
prosecution	of	corporate	bodies	are	met.	
	
This	section	of	the	chapter	has	identified	the	six	core	arguments	that	are	often	
forwarded	 in	 opposition	 to	 corporations	 having	 human	 rights,	 which	were	 as	
follows:	
	
1. That	the	ECHR	was	never	intended	to	protect	a	corporation’s	rights;	
2. Corporations	are	not	humans	so	how	can	they	have	human	rights?;	
3. Granting	 corporations	 rights	 degrades,	 devalues	 and	 dehumanises	
human	rights;	
4. Human	 rights	 were	 designed	 to	 protect	 the	 vulnerable,	 not	
corporations	who	have	vast	resources;	
5. The	‘flood-gate’	argument	around	corporations	bringing	cases;	
6. The	criticisms	around	corporations	only	having	‘selective	rights’.	
	
These	 arguments	 were	 analysed	 to	 show	 their	 weaknesses	 and	 flaws,	 and	 a	
variety	 of	 counter-arguments	 for	 corporations	 having	 rights	 protection	 were	
advanced,	including:	
	
1. The	 ECHR	 provides	 corporations	 with	 rights	 protection	 and	 it	 was	
always	the	drafter’s	intention;	
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2. By	corporations	having	rights	protection	it	brings	additional	benefits	to	
the	Commission’s	procedures;	
3. It	can	lead	to	stronger	and	better	rights	protection	for	individuals;	
4. A	corporation	is	in	essence	a	group	of	individual	right	holders;	
5. Corporations	 are	 treated	 as	 ‘legal	 persons’	 to	 be	 found	 guilty	 of	
offences	in	other	areas	of	law;	
6. The	potential	issues	with	‘dual	prosecution’	requirements.	
	
This	 analysis	 and	 assessment	 of	 the	 arguments	 has	 shown	 why	 the	 claims	
against	 rights	 protection	 are	weak.	 It	 also	 identified	 the	 benefits	 and	 reasons	
why	the	rights	of	corporations	should	be	protected.	However,	perhaps	the	best	
way	to	demonstrate	why	corporations	need	their	rights	protected	 is	to	use	an	
illustrative	case	that	highlights	the	potential	issues	and	problems	that	can	arise	
for	corporations,	which	is	what	the	next	section	of	this	chapter	accomplishes.	
2.2.2.3	The	Case	of	Yukos	Oil		
The	case	of	Yukos	Oil	Company	 (hereafter,	 ‘Yukos	Oil’),73	is	 an	 significant	 case	
which	 needs	 discussion	 when	 one	 wishes	 to	 study	 the	 protection	 of	 a	
corporation’s	 rights.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 case	 and	 its	 outcome	
illustrate	 what	 can	 happen	 to	 a	 company	 when	 rights	 are	 not	 adequately	
protected	at	a	national	level.74	In	addition	to	this,	it	illustrates	why	corporations	
do	in	fact	require	some	form	of	rights	protection.	
	
Before	 discussing	 the	 demonstrative	 case	 it	 is	 pertinent	 to	 make	 a	 few	
observations	 and	 to	 establish	 some	 of	 the	 background	 facts	 surrounding	 the																																																									
73	Yukos	(n	20).	
74	There	are	other	cases	that	illustrate	the	importance	of	a	corporation	having	its	rights	
protected.	For	example,	Forminster	Enterprises	v	Czech	Republic	[2008]	ECHR	1041	involved	the	
seizure/freezing	of	a	parent	companies	shares	in	the	subsidiary	after	an	alleged	fraud	by	the	
directors	of	the	subsidiary.	This	was	held	to	be	an	unlawful	violation	of	their	right	to	peaceful	
enjoyment	of	possessions,	under	Article	1	Protocol	1	of	the	ECHR.	In	the	case	of	Fortum	
Corporation	v	Finland	[2003]	ECHR	367	it	was	held	that	there	was	a	violation	of	Article	6	ECHR	
when	documents	in	an	abuse	of	dominant	position	case	were	not	disclosed	to	the	company	
under	investigation,	but	were	disclosed	to	the	court.	Other	examples	include	MGN	v	UK	[2011]	
ECHR	66.	However,	Yukos	Oil	perhaps	illustrates	these	problems	most	clearly	given	the	
extremes	of	the	case.	
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case.	This	 case	 is	an	extreme	example	of	 the	problems	 that	a	corporation	can	
potentially	 face,	but	 it	 is	often	 in	 these	type	of	situations	that	we	can	 identify	
why	something	is	required;	in	this	case,	the	protection	of	a	corporation’s	rights	
and	corporations	having	the	ability	to	go	to	a	truly	independent	body.	It	should	
be	noted	that	 the	case	of	Yukos	Oil	did	not	 involve	competition	 law	nor	did	 it	
have	anything	to	do	with	the	Commission	or	its	procedures.	This	case	involved	
Russia	and	its	national	courts.	Russia	is	not	a	member	of	the	EU;	nonetheless,	it	
is	 a	 signatory	 State	 of	 the	 ECHR,	 which	means	 that	 the	 Convention	must	 be	
applied	to	those	in	its	jurisdiction.	Because	of	this	the	ECtHR	has	the	power	to	
adjudicate	cases	regarding	alleged	infringements	of	the	Convention.	Having	said	
all	 of	 the	 above,	 this	 does	 not	 detract	 from	 the	 significance	 of	 this	 case	with	
regards	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 proceedings	 and	 the	 need	 for	 a	 corporation	 to	
have	rights	protection.	This	 is	something	that	 is	 illustrated	and	discussed	after	
the	facts	of	Yukos	Oil	have	been	laid	out.75	
	
Yukos	 Oil	 was	 originally	 a	 State-owned	 petroleum	 company	 until	 it	 was	
privatised	in	1993.	Once	privatised	the	company	traded	for	13	years	until	it	was	
declared	bankrupt	and	ceased	trading	in	August	2006.	During	this	time,	Michail	
Khodorkovsky	operated	 in	 the	oil	 industry	 and	worked	his	way	up	 to	become	
the	CEO	of	Yukos	Oil.	Yukos	Oil	performed	incredibly	well	under	Khodorkovsky’s	
leadership	and	this	 led	to	the	company	 ‘accumulating	tremendous	wealth	and	
influence’.76	However,	Khodorkovsky’s	political	stance	clashed	with	the	views	of	
the	then	Prime	Minister,	Vladimir	Putin.	This	meant	that	by	the	end	of	2003	the	
Russian	Federation	had	begun	questioning	whether	Yukos	Oil	had	diligently	paid	
its	due	 taxes	 for	 the	 year	of	 2000.	On	 the	8	December	2003,	 the	Russian	Tax	
Ministry	 announced	 a	 re-audit	 of	 Yukos	 Oil’s	 accounts.	 This	 audit	 led	 to	 the	
Russian	Tax	Ministry	concluding	that	Yukos	Oil	owed	2.9	billion	euros.	What	was	
interesting	 about	 this	 re-audit	 was	 that	 it	 only	 took	 the	 Tax	 Ministry	 three	
weeks	to	conduct	and	conclude	that	the	aforementioned	tax	was	owed.	Yukos																																																									
75	Another	good	discussion	of	this	case	and	the	outcome	of	it	can	be	found	in	Muijsenbegh	and	
Rezai	(n	11).	This	case	discussion	is	based	upon	the	case	and	their	research	into	the	judgment.	
76	ibid	60.		
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Oil	 was	 summoned	 to	 pay	 this	 amount	 within	 two	 days	 from	 the	 14	 April	
2004.77	The	Russian	Federation	opted	not	to	wait	two	days	and	the	Tax	Ministry	
requested	a	Moscow	Court	 to	order	Yukos	Oil	 to	pay	 the	amount	and	 issue	a	
freezing	 order	 for	 Yukos	 Oil’s	 assets.	 This	 order	 was	made	 on	 the	 same	 day,	
leaving	Yukos	Oil	no	time	to	release	any	assets.	The	hearing	was	scheduled	for	
21	May	2004,	and	Yukos	Oil	requested	an	adjournment	but	it	was	denied.	A	few	
days	 before	 the	 hearing,	 the	 Tax	 Ministry	 supplied	 Yukos	 Oil	 with	 an	
unnumbered	 document	 that	 comprised	 of	 over	 71,000	 pages.78	However,	 the	
Tax	Ministry	 supplied	 a	 well-ordered	 and	 numbered	 document	 to	 the	 Court,	
which	Yukos	Oil	did	not	see	until	arriving	 in	court.	Yukos	Oil	was,	nonetheless,	
given	 a	 thirty-minute	 period	 to	 consider	 the	 document	 on	 the	 lunch	 break.	
Yukos	Oil	was	required	by	the	Court	on	the	26	May	2004	to	settle	a	large	part	of	
the	 claim.	 Yukos	Oil	 attempted	 to	 appeal	 the	 Court’s	 decision,	 but	 this	 failed	
and	thus	the	Tax	Ministry	sought	enforcement	measures.	This	led	to	Yukos	Oil’s	
prime	asset	being	auctioned	off	for	a	very	small	percentage	of	its	actual	worth,	
which	 eventually	 ended	 up	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 state-owned	 Rosneft	 Oil	
Company.	The	Tax	Ministry	 then	pursued	Yukos	Oil	 for	payment	of	back	taxes	
from	 2001-2004	 totaling	 20.1	 billion	 euros.	 By	 this	 point,	 Yukos	 Oil	 was	
bankrupt	and	 it	was	 finally	 liquidated	on	 the	12	November	2007.	The	counsel	
for	Yukos	Oil	had	lodged	an	application	with	the	ECtHR	under	Article	34	ECHR,	
claiming	breaches	of	various	Convention	rights	on	the	23	April	2004.	
	
The	Russian	Federation	raised	an	objection	to	the	Court’s	jurisdiction,	claiming	
that	the	Court	had	lost	jurisdiction	to	hear	the	case	as	Yukos	Oil	had	ceased	to	
exist	by	 the	 time	the	case	was	 to	be	heard.	On	20	September	2011	 the	Court	
gave	its	judgment	on	the	merits	after	previous	dealing	with	issues	of	standing.79	
The	 Court	 had	 no	 difficulty	 in	 holding	 that	 human	 rights	 provisions	 may	 be	
applicable	to	corporations.	In	actual	fact,	their	applicability	to	corporations	was	
never	even	a	topic	of	discussion	in	this	case.																																																									
77	ibid	61.	
78	Yukos	(n	20).	
79	ibid.	
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Addressing	the	Russian	Federation’s	claim	that	the	victim	no	longer	existed	and	
thus	 the	 Court	 had	 lost	 jurisdiction,	 the	 Court	 acknowledged	 the	 need	 for	 a	
victim	to	initiate	proceedings,	but	refused	to	follow	a	rigid	interpretation	of	this	
throughout.	Again	what	we	see	here	 is	the	Court	treating	the	Convention	as	a	
living	 instrument	 and	making	 the	 Convention	 practical	 and	 effective,	 and	 not	
theoretical	and	illusionary.80	If	the	Court	did	not	do	this,	it	would	allow	the	State	
to	force	undertakings	to	cease	trading	so	as	to	prevent	them	from	having	their	
rights	adequately	protected.	
	
The	 Court	 held	 that	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 had	 breached	 its	 duty	 to	 provide	
Yukos	Oil	with	a	fair	trial,	owing	to	the	insufficient	time	it	provided	to	Yukos	Oil	
to	adequately	prepare	 its	defence,	and	 the	unjustifiable	 restrictions	placed	on	
Yukos	 Oil’s	 ability	 to	 appeal.	 The	 Court	 also	 held	 that	 the	 interference	 with	
Yukos	 Oil’s	 property	 was	 unlawful	 due	 to	 the	 unforeseen	 change	 in	 the	
interpretation	of	 a	 statutory	 time	bar	 that	 laid	down	 the	period	during	which	
Yukos	Oil	 could	have	been	held	 liable.	However,	 the	Court	 rejected	 the	other	
rights	violations	claimed	by	Yukos	Oil.	
	
This	 case	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 need	 to	 protect	 a	 corporation’s	
rights.	From	providing	the	facts	of	this	case,	it	creates	a	powerful	argument	for	
the	 need	 for	 corporations	 to	 have	 their	 rights	 protected.	When	 one	 hears	 of	
what	happened	 in	 this	case,	 it	 is	difficult	not	 to	empathise	with	Yukos	Oil	and	
see	 what	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 excessively	 unfair	 treatment	 of	 a	 corporation.	
Indeed,	 one	 of	 the	 interesting	 features	 of	 this	 case	 was	 the	 ‘potent	 and	
compelling	 demonstration	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 mere	 availability	 of	 the	
[ECtHR],	 as	 an	 international	 independent	 judicial	 venue,	 for	 a	 brutalized	
corporation	which	 simply	had	nowhere	else	 to	go.’81	Undeniably,	many	of	 the	
theoretical	arguments	regarding	the	potential	concerns	 in	the	previous	part	of	
this	chapter	and	why	a	corporation	needs	it	rights	protected,	appear	to	play	out																																																									
80	Something	which	has	been	stated	before	by	the	Court	before	see	Airey	v	Ireland	(1979)	2	
EHRR	305.	
81	Muijsenbegh	and	Rezai	(n	11)	62.	
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and	occur	in	this	case.	What	we	can	see	is	that	by	Yukos	Oil	having	their	rights	
protected	they	had	a	place	to	turn	when	they	suffered	an	infringement	of	their	
rights.	
	
Some	 may	 wish	 to	 question	 why	 it	 matters	 that	 Yukos	 Oil	 has	 its	 rights	
protected.	 Indeed,	they	may	ask	why	it	 is	 important	as	 it	 is	only	a	corporation	
and	what	 happens	 only	 affects	 shareholders.	 However,	 this	 is	 a	 short-sighted	
view	that	cannot	be	supported	when	one	considers	the	possible	implications	of	
what	 happened	 to	 Yukos	Oil.	 By	 Yukos	Oil	 being	 forcefully	 bankrupted,	 there	
were	consequences	and	‘knock-on	effects’	that	were	felt	far	wider	than	just	by	
the	shareholders.	To	begin	with,	Yukos	Oil	employees	lost	their	jobs	and,	thus,	
their	 livelihoods.	 This	 would	 have	 meant	 that	 they	 had	 to	 find	 another	 job,	
which	 would	 have	 probably	 been	 difficult	 given	 that	 other	 workers	 from	 the	
same	 company	 were	 also	 likely	 to	 be	 looking	 for	 similar	 jobs	 –	 and	 those	
workers	would	 likely	 have	 comparable	 skills	 to	 each	 other.	 Furthermore,	 one	
should	not	forget	the	implications	losing	a	job	would	have	had	on	that	individual	
and	 the	 loved	ones	 they	supported.	Here	we	can	consider	more	 than	 just	 the	
financial	implications	but	also	the	physical	and	emotional	consequences.	
	
In	addition	to	this,	there	will	be	effects	of	the	bankruptcy	to	the	economy.	Some	
assets	will	have	been	sold	on	and,	thus,	will	have	been	reutilised	but	many	will	
not	have.	These	will	sit	 idle	and	therefore	be	unutilised	which	is	a	deadweight	
loss	to	the	economy	and	society.	Customers	lose	out	too,	as	the	industry	loses	
competitive	 pressure	 as	 a	 corporation	 that	 is	 preforming	 economically	well	 is	
removed	 from	 the	 market.	 This	 increases	 the	 risks	 of	 collusion	 within	 the	
market,	 as	 there	 are	 fewer	 competitors,	 which	 can	 impact	 on	 the	 prices	
consumers	 end	 up	 having	 to	 pay.	 This	 is	 particularly	 true	 where	 the	 only	
remaining	oil	 firms	 left	within	 the	market	are	state	owned.	Also,	we	must	not	
forget	the	impact	on	Yukos	Oil’s	suppliers	here;	there	will	be	contracts	that	have	
been	 lost,	 having	 an	 impact	 on	 other	 businesses.	 Indeed,	 there	will	 be	 some	
contracts,	which	were	at	the	stage	of	partial	completion	where	significant	time	
and	 money	 had	 been	 invested	 which	 may	 have	 been	 irrecoverable	 if	 they	
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cannot	transfer	the	purchase	to	another	in	time.	
	
Finally,	one	should	not	forget	or	downplay	the	harm	this	caused	shareholders.	
Put	 simply,	 shareholders	will	 have	 lost	 the	 share	 capital	 that	 they	 invested	 in	
Yukos	Oil.	This	may	not	seem	a	great	deal	but	this	has	a	variety	of	effects	on	the	
market	and	shareholders.	Let	us	begin	by	considering	the	implications	of	this	on	
the	market.	When	businesses	go	bankrupt,	this	can	lead	to	market	uncertainty,	
particularly	 when	 they	 are	 a	 key	 part	 of	 the	 national	 infrastructure.	 For	
example,	if	we	consider	the	ramifications	of	the	bankruptcy	of	Lehman	Brothers	
in	the	US	and	what	then	happened	within	the	market	to	investor	confidence.82	
This	 uncertainty	 could	 also	 lead	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 investment	 by	 shareholders	 in	
companies	 and	 an	 unwillingness	 by	 banks	 to	 lend	money	 to	 companies.	 This	
then	has	knock-on	effects	to	the	economy	again.	For	the	shareholder	that	has	a	
diversified	and	wide-ranging	portfolio,	this	loss	may	not	be	too	great;	however,	
for	 a	 shareholder	 who	 has	 a	 more	 limited	 portfolio	 or	 only	 invests	 in	 one	
company,	 this	 could	 have	 a	massive	 impact	 on	 their	 savings	 and	 investments	
and,	in	turn,	their	future	life.	
	
Yet,	it	is	important	to	reiterate	that	this	case	is	a	very	extreme	example	where	a	
corporation	 appears	 to	 have	been	 systematically	 targeted	by	 the	 government	
and	their	departmental	bodies.	But,	nonetheless,	minor	breaches	of	rights	can	
still	have	drastic	consequences	for	corporations,	the	community	and	the	people	
involved	 and,	 as	 such,	 this	 case	 only	 serves	 to	 strengthen	 the	 claims	 that	
corporations	need	 to	have	 their	 rights	adequately	protected.	The	next	 section	
of	the	chapter	shall	move	on	to	consider	why	the	thesis	focuses	its	attention	on	
the	 ECHR	 and	which	 key	 ECHR	 and	 procedural	 rights	will	 be	 discussed	 in	 the	
remainder	of	the	thesis.	
	 	
																																																								
82	It	is	noted	though,	that	this	example	is	regarding	financial	markets	that	have	their	own	unique	
requirements	for	certainty.	Yet	some	of	the	certainty	requirements	will	be	the	same	for	
investors	and	companies	within	the	energy	market.	
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2.3	Why	is	rights	protection	important	to	cartel	enforcement?	
	
This	section	begins	by	identifying	why	the	ECHR	was	chosen	as	opposed	to	the	
CFREU.	It	then	identifies	the	key	rights	that	the	Commission’s	procedures	shall	
be	 assessed	 against.	 Next,	 why	 and	 how	 these	 rights	 will	 be	 engaged	 is	
discussed.	 And	 finally,	 it	 illustrates	 why	 it	 is	 important	 for	 the	 Commission’s	
fining	process	to	be	legally	certain,	clear	and	transparent.	It	also	identifies	why	
the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process	 needs	 to	 be	 applied	 equally	 to	 undertakings	
when	a	breach	of	Article	101(1)	TFEU	is	established.	This	section	therefore	lays	
the	foundations	for	the	research	and	demonstrates	why	the	research	questions	
this	thesis	seeks	to	answer	are	significant.	
2.3.1	Why	the	ECHR	and	which	rights?	
The	 next	 part	 of	 this	 section	 outlines	 the	 reasons	why	 this	 thesis	 applies	 the	
ECHR	 and	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	
enforcement	procedures	instead	of	the	EU’s	own	CFREU	and	the	EU	courts’	case	
law	from	the	application	of	the	CFREU.	
	
The	main	 reason	 for	 this	 choice	 stems	 from	the	nature	of	 the	ECHR.	To	begin	
with,	the	Convention	is	well-developed	and	has	a	strong	body	of	jurisprudence	
behind	 it.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 far	greater	developed	than	the	EU’s	CFREU.	The	CFREU	
only	came	into	force	in	2009,	whereas	the	ECHR	has	been	in	force	since	1953.	
This	means	that	the	ECtHR	has	amassed	a	great	deal	of	case	law	regarding	the	
ECHR	and	how	it	 is	 to	be	 interpreted	and	applied.	By	having	this,	one	can	use	
the	 ECtHR’s	 jurisprudence	 to	 analyse	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	
procedures	effectively,	which	is	something	that	would	be	difficult	to	do	with	the	
CFREU	as	information	is	lacking.83	
																																																								
83	Indeed,	it	is	worth	nothing	here	that	Article	52(3)	of	the	CFREU	regarding	the	scope	of	the	
guaranteed	rights	notes	that	‘in	so	far	as	the	Charter	contains	rights	which	correspond	to	rights	
guaranteed	by	the	ECHR,	the	meaning	and	scope	of	those	rights	shall	be	the	same	as	those	laid	
down	by	the	Convention.’	
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Another	 important	 reason	 for	 choosing	 the	 ECHR	 over	 the	 CFREU	 is	 that	 the	
ECHR	has	a	long	established	line	of	jurisprudence	of	offering	rights	protection	to	
corporations. 84 	It	 is	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 CFREU	 can	 also	 apply	 to	
corporations,	but	as	noted	before,	the	jurisprudence	and	this	principle	is	not	as	
well	developed	in	its	cases	as	it	is	under	the	ECHR.	Furthermore,	an	undertaking	
that	is	fined	by	a	National	Competition	Authority	could	bring	a	claim	against	the	
National	Competition	Authority	based	on	a	breach	of	a	 right	contained	within	
the	Convention,	as	all	EU	Member	States	are	signatories	to	the	Convention.	
	
Additionally,	as	 identified	 in	the	aforementioned	discussion	–	 in	Section	2.2	of	
this	 chapter	 –	 the	 importance	 of	 an	 independent	 and	 impartial	 court	 is	
imperative	to	ensure	that	the	rights	enshrined	within	the	law	are	being	applied	
effectively,	 correctly	 and	 fairly.	As	was	 seen	 in	 the	 case	 study	of	Yukos	Oil,	 in	
extreme	 circumstances,	 a	 corporation	 can	 become	 a	 victim	 of	 a	 personal	
campaign	 by	 a	 State,	 an	 enforcement	 body	 or	 an	 individual.	 By	 utilising	 the	
ECHR	over	 the	CFREU,	we	are	considering	 jurisprudence	which	 is	 independent	
to	 that	of	 the	EU.	Case	 law	 from	the	CFREU	stems	 from	EU	courts,	which	–	 it	
maybe	suggested	–	is	neither	impartial	nor	objective.	Indeed,	the	EU	Courts	may	
be	 reluctant	 to	 find	 breaches	 of	 the	 CFREU	 if	 it	 would	 require	 a	 significant	
amendment	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 procedures	 in	 cartel	 enforcement	 cases.	
Therefore,	 by	 utilising	 ECtHR	 case	 law,	 it	 allows	 for	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	
Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 procedures	 against	 an	 independent	 and	
objective	standard.	
	
Further	to	this,	there	is	a	requirement	that	the	EU	procedures	comply	with	the	
ECHR	in	the	future	as	the	EU	has	agreed	to	accede	to	the	ECHR	under	the	Treaty	
of	Lisbon.85	However,	given	the	opinion	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European																																																									
84	For	example,	see	The	Sunday	Times	(n	8),	Funke	(n	31)	and	Societe	(n	8).	
85	2007/C	306/01	Treaty	of	Lisbon	amending	the	Treaty	on	European	Union	and	the	Treaty	
establishing	the	European	Community,	signed	at	Lisbon	on	the	13	December	2007	(Article	6	
para	2).	There	has	been	much	discussion	within	the	literature	with	regards	to	the	EU’s	accession	
to	the	ECHR	and	the	potential	conflicts	between	the	two	supra-national	bodies	and	their	
jurisprudence:	Wolfgang	WeiB,	‘Human	Rights	in	the	EU:	Rethinking	the	Role	of	the	European	
Convention	on	Human	Rights	After	Lisbon’	(2011)	7(1)	European	Constitutional	Law	Review	64;	
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Union	(CJEU),	the	EU’s	accession	is	currently	on	hold.86	But,	because	Article	6(2)	
TEU	is	clearly	mandatory	–	‘the	Union	shall	accede	to	the	ECHR’	–	it	will	have	to	
come	 at	 some	 stage.	 Therefore,	 this	 means	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	
enforcement	procedures	will	 have	 to	 comply	with	 the	 rights	 contained	within	
the	ECHR	and,	thus,	it	is	felt	that	the	best	source	of	rights	to	consider	are	those	
protected	 by	 the	 Convention.87	Nonetheless,	 the	 observant	 will	 note	 that	
currently	 the	 EU	 is	 not	 a	 signatory	 state	 to	 the	 Convention	 and,	 as	 such,	 the	
Commission’s	policies	do	not	need	to	comply	with	 the	Convention.	Moreover,	
an	 undertaking	 will	 not	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 bring	 an	 action	 against	 the	
Commission	 as	 only	 signatory	 states	 can	 be	 brought	 before	 the	 ECtHR.	
Consequently,	no	action	can	lie	against	the	Commission.	This	means	that	even	if	
this	 thesis	 identifies	 issues	 within	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 procedures,	 an	
undertaking	cannot	raise	a	challenge	before	the	ECtHR	with	regards	to	this.		
	
This	issue	is	less	significant	to	the	importance	of	the	thesis	as	it	first	appears.	As	
was	noted	previously,	the	EU	has	agreed	to	accede	to	the	ECHR	and	therefore	
the	 Commission’s	 procedures	will	 need	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 Convention.	 This	
thesis	 therefore	 foreshadows	 how	 the	 Commission	will	 have	 to	 behave	when	
the	ECHR	accession	comes	about.	Additionally,	 the	EU	courts	regularly	seek	to	
follow	 the	 ECtHR	 jurisprudence	 and	 have	 held	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	
guidelines	 fall	 within	 the	 ambit	 of	 the	 ECHR.88	In	 turn,	 this	 gives	 additional	
weight	to	the	need	to	carry	out	this	analysis	as	the	EU	courts	seek	to	ensure	the	
Commission’s	 procedures	 and	 their	 rulings	 comply	 with	 the	 ECHR.	 Next,	 it	 is																																																																																																																																																							
Jörg	Polakiewicz,	‘EU	law	and	the	ECHR:	will	the	European	Union’s	accession	square	the	circle?’	
(2013)	6	European	Human	Rights	Law	Review	592;	Olivier	De	Schutter,	‘The	two	Europes	of	
Human	Rights:	The	emerging	division	of	tasks	between	the	Council	of	Europe	and	the	European	
Union	in	Promoting	Human	Rights	in	Europe’	(2008)	14(3)	Columbia	Journal	of	European	Law	
509;	Vasiliki	Kosta,	Nikos	Skoutaris	and	Vassilis	Tzevelekos,	The	EU	Accession	to	the	ECHR	(Hart	
Publishing	2014)	and	Kanstantsin	Dzehtsiarou	and	others,	Human	Rights	Law	in	Europe:	The	
Influence,	Overlaps	and	Contradictions	of	the	EU	and	the	ECHR	(Routledge	2014).	
86	Opinion	2/13	on	EU	Accession	to	the	ECHR	EU:	C:	2014:	2454,	[192]	CJEU.	
87	Although	it	does	appear	that	if	the	case	were	to	go	before	the	EU	courts	they	would	still	
prefer	for	the	case	to	be	framed	under	the	CFEU	as	opposed	to	the	ECHR.	See	the	comments	
made	by	Advocate-General	Koktt	in	the	companion	passage	of	her	opinion	Case	C-501/11	P,	
Schindler	v	Commission	[2013],	Opinion	of	AG	Koktt.	
88	See	C-213/02	P,	Dansk	Rorindustri	and	Others	v	Commission	[2005]	ECR	I-5425	para	223.	This	
is	discussed	at	much	greater	length	in	the	latter	part	of	this	chapter,	where	various	AG	opinions	
are	used	to	highlight	this	point.	
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worth	remembering	that	all	EU	Member	States	are	also	signatory	states	to	the	
ECHR.	By	virtue	of	this,	their	National	Competition	Authorities	would	fall	within	
the	jurisdiction	of	ECHR	law	when	they	are	enforcing	National	Competition	Law.	
National	 Competition	 Law	 incorporates	 EU	 competition	 law	 and	 the	 fining	
procedure	is	often	similar	to	that	of	the	Commission’s.	Thus,	the	findings	from	
this	 thesis	 will	 be	 applicable	 to	 Member	 States’	 National	 Competition	
Authorities.89	Finally,	 the	Commission	can	 take	over	National	Competition	Law	
investigations	 when	 the	 case	 has	 ‘community	 dimension’.	 This	 means	 that,	
depending	 on	when	 the	Commission	 takes	 over	 the	 case	 and	who	makes	 the	
final	decision,	that	the	undertakings	concerned	may	still	have	an	action	against	
the	National	Competition	Authority.	
	
Because	 of	 the	 various	 reasons	 identified	 above,	 the	 long-established	 and	
developed	 ECHR	 and	 the	 ECtHR	 jurisprudence	 has	 been	 chosen	 to	 analyse	
against	the	Commission’s	cartel	enforcement	policies.	
	
It	 has	 been	 identified	 that	 the	 following	 ECHR	 and	 procedural	 rights	 are	 the	
most	 pertinent	 to	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	
policies:90	legal	certainty	 (which	can	be	 ‘read	 in’	 through	Article	7	ECHR),91	the	
right	 to	 respect	 for	 one’s	 private	 and	 family	 life	 (his	 home	 and	 his	
correspondence	–	Article	8	ECHR),	 the	right	 to	a	 fair	 trial	 (Article	6	ECHR),	 the	
UK	 equitable	 doctrine	 of	 breach	 of	 confidence,	 the	 EU	 principles	 of	 equal	
treatment	and	legitimate	expectations.	It	is	important	to	be	clear	here	that	this	
thesis	 will	 be	 focusing	 its	 attention	 on	 the	 EU	 general	 principle,	 and	
requirement	of,	 equal	 treatment	and	will	not	 be	 considering	Article	14	of	 the	
ECHR	or	Protocol	12.	This	 is	because	both	of	 these	ECHR	rights	 focus	on	non-
discrimination,	 which	 is	 something	 that	 is	 different	 to	 equal	 treatment.	 Non-
discrimination	 is	not,	 per	 se,	 an	 issue	 that	 this	 thesis	 seeks	 to	 analyse.	 In	 this																																																									
89	For	example,	see	the	Menarini	judgment:	A.	Menarini	Diagnostics	S.R.L.	v	Italie	(2011)	App	no	
43509/08.	
90	These	rights	will	be	applied	to	the	following	Commission	polices:	the	Commission’s	fining	
process,	leniency	policy	and	direct	settlement	procedure.	
91	This	will	be	discussed	and	illustrated	in	the	latter	part	of	this	chapter.	
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context,	the	thesis	considers	the	treatment	of	two	undertakings	in	comparison	
to	one	another	to	identify	whether	they	are	treated	equally	and	fairly	or,	where	
there	 is	 unequal	 treatment,	 whether	 there	 is	 a	 justification	 for	 this.	 Other	
reasons	as	 to	why	the	EU	general	principle	 is	considered	over	the	ECHR	rights	
stems	from	the	fact	that	Article	14	of	the	ECHR	is	a	parasitic	right	and	therefore	
requires	another	ECHR	right	in	order	for	it	to	be	engaged.	Although	Protocol	12	
is	a	freestanding	right,	it	has	only	been	ratified	by	17	Member	States	so	it	is	not	
applicable	 amongst	 all	 of	 the	 signatory	 states	 to	 the	 ECHR,	 whereas	 the	 EU	
principle	 is	 applicable	 to	 all	 EU	 Member	 States.92	The	 reason	 these	 specific	
rights	were	chosen	is	because	they	are	the	most	applicable	to	the	Commission’s	
policies	and	have	not	been	thoroughly	analysed	in	the	existing	literature.	
	
2.3.2	Why	 and	 how	will	 the	 chosen	 rights	 be	 engaged	 by	 the	 Commission’s	
fining	procedure?	
	
2.3.2.1	Legal	certainty	
The	 first	 –	 and	 perhaps	 most	 fundamental	 –	 reason	 why	 legal	 certainty	 and	
equal	 treatment	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 important	 to	 EU	 cartel	 enforcement	 is	 that	
there	is	a	legal	necessity	for	adherence	with	these	principles.93	The	Court	of	First	
Instance	 (CFI)	 has	 stated	 that	 when	 the	 Commission	 are	 calculating	 fines	 the	
assessment	 must	 ‘be	 carried	 out	 in	 compliance	 with	 Community	 law,	 which	
includes	not	only	the	provisions	of	the	Treaty	but	also	the	general	principles	of	
law’.94	Within	the	EU	there	is	a	general	principle	of	law	that	requires	there	to	be	
legal	 certainty	 within	 the	 law.95	This	 aside,	 one	 can	 see	 that	 the	 Commission	
views	human	rights	as	a	key	part	of	 the	EU	 legal	 framework	and	something	 it																																																									
92	Council	of	Europe,	‘Protocol	No	12	to	the	Convention’	
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=177&CM=8&DF=7/6/2009&C
L=ENG>	accessed	18	November	2014.	
93	The	EU	courts	have	held	for	a	long	time	that	these	rights	need	to	be	respected	see	Case	29/69	
Case	29/69	Stauder	v	City	of	Ulm	[1969]	ECR	419	para	7	and	comments	made	by	Wouter	P	Wils,	
Principles	of	European	Antitrust	Enforcement	(Hart	Publishing	2005)	69.	Additionally,	The	ECJ	
has	held	that	the	Commission’s	fining	guidelines	come	within	the	principle	of	law	for	Article	7	
(1)	of	the	ECHR,	see	Dansk	(n	88)	para	223.	
94	Case	T-303/02	Westfalen	Gassen	Nederland	v	Commission	[2006]	ECR	II-4567	para	151,	
emphasis	added.	
95	Takis	Tridimas,	The	General	Principles	of	EC	Law	(Oxford	University	Press	1999)	163.	
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needs	 to	 adhere	 to	 when	 enforcing	 EU	 law.96	For	 example,	 Baroness	 Ashton	
(First	Vice	President	of	the	European	Commission)	has	stated	that	she	believes	
that	 ‘human	 rights	 should	 be	 the	 silver	 thread	 that	 runs	 through	 all	 the	
statements	 and	 actions	 of	 the	 European	 Union.’	 Indeed,	 the	 EU	 has	 recently	
created	the	CFEU,	to	provide	protection	for	human	rights	within	the	EU	because	
they	are	so	vital.97		
	
The	essence	of	 legal	 certainty	within	Europe	 can	be	derived	 from	 the	general	
principle	of	legal	certainty	or	Article	7	of	the	ECHR.	Article	7(1)	specifies	that:	
	 	
‘No	one	shall	be	held	guilty	of	any	criminal	offence	on	account	of	
any	 act	 or	 omission	which	 did	 not	 constitute	 a	 criminal	 offence	
under	 national	 or	 international	 law	 at	 the	 time	 when	 it	 was	
committed.	Nor	shall	a	heavier	penalty	be	imposed	than	the	one	
that	 was	 applicable	 at	 the	 time	 the	 criminal	 offence	 was	
committed.’	
	
As	we	can	identify	from	reading	Article	7	of	the	ECHR,	nowhere	is	there	express	
mention	of	 legal	 certainty.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 important	 that	we	begin	by	establishing	
why	and	how	Article	7	includes	the	requirement	of	legal	certainty.	98	It	will	then	
be	necessary	to	show	how	and	why	Article	7	also	extends	to,	and	requires	that,	
the	penalties	and	guidelines	used	 in	 the	 fining	of	undertakings	–	 in	cases	of	a	
breach	of	competition	law	–	need	to	be	legally	certain.	Finally,	it	is	imperative	to	
establish	how	the	Commission’s	fining	procedure	constitutes	a	criminal	sanction	
to	allow	for	the	engagement	of	Article	7	ECHR.																																																									
96	Catherine	Ashton,	‘Remarks	on	the	EU	annual	report	on	human	rights’	(Speech	delivered	to	
European	Parliament,	Strasbourg,	12	June	2013)	<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-13-527_en.htm>	accessed	14	June	2013.	
97	Indeed,	since	the	Charter	has	recently	acquired	its	legally	binding	status	‘it	has	occupied	an	
increasingly	prominent	place	in	law	and	policy-making	process	of	the	EU’	and,	thus,	it	is	now	
more	important	than	ever	to	consider	human	rights	issues.	Butler	(n	11).	
98	It	is	worth	noting	here	that	legal	certainty	is	also	a	general	principle	of	EU	law.	For	a	
discussion	of	this	see	Tridimas	(n	95)	163.	Legal	certainty	requires	that	those	subject	to	the	law	
are	able	to	know	what	the	law	is	so	as	to	be	able	to	plan	their	actions	accordingly;	and	with	
specific	reference	to	Community	legislation,	it	must	be	clear	and	predictable.	See	Joined	Cases	
212-17/80	Salumi	[1981]	ECR	2735	para	10	
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In	summary,	the	text	of	Article	7	ECHR	focuses	on	two	separate	requirements.	
The	first	is	that	a	criminal	conviction	can	only	occur	where	the	criminal	offence	
existed	at	the	time	of	the	incriminating	act	or	omission.	The	second	is	that,	the	
penalty	can	be	no	higher	than	that	that	was	applicable	at	the	time	the	offence	
was	committed.99	It	is,	however,	clear	from	the	jurisprudence	of	the	ECtHR	that	
Article	 7	 of	 the	 Convention	 also	 requires	 that	 a	 criminal	 ‘offence	 is	 clearly	
defined	 in	 law’.100	Indeed,	 the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights,	hereafter	 the	
‘ECtHR’	noted	in	Kokkinakis	that:	
	
‘The	Convention	is	not	confined	to	prohibiting	the	retrospective	
application	 of	 the	 criminal	 law	 […]	 it	 also	 embodies,	 more	
generally,	the	principle	that	only	the	law	can	define	a	crime	and	
prescribe	a	penalty	(nullum	crimen,	nulla	poena	sine	lege)	[...]	it	
follows	 from	 this	 that	 an	 offence	 must	 be	 clearly	 defined	 in	
law’.101	
	
The	Court	has	held	that	 this	condition	will	be	satisfied	when	an	 individual	can	
decipher	 from	 the	 wording	 of	 the	 provision	 (or	 if	 need	 be	 with	 the	 courts’	
assistance	 in	 its	 interpretation)	 of	 what	 acts	 and	 omissions	 will	 make	 him	
liable.102	Therefore,	 the	 ECtHR	 has	 required	 that	 the	 law	 should	 allow	 an	
individual	to	be	able	to	foresee	the	legal	consequences	that	a	given	action	may	
entail. 103 	However,	 the	 Court	 has	 accepted	 that	 ‘absolute	 certainty	 is	
unattainable’,104	as	 it	would	 lead	to	the	 law	being	too	rigid	and,	consequently,	
not	flexible	enough	to	be	able	to	keep	astride	with	the	law’s	changing	pace.105		
																																																									
99	Pieter	van	Dijk	and	others,	Theory	and	Practice	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	
(4th	edn,	Intersentia	2006)	651-652.	
100	SW	v	UK	and	CR	v	UK	(1995)	21	EHRR	363	para	35,	Brumarescu	v	Romania	(2001)	33	EHRR	35	
para	61	and	Veeber	v	Estonia	(No	2)	(2004)	39	EHRR	125	paras	30-31.	
101	Kokkinakis	v	Greece	(1994)	17	EHRR	397	para	52,	emphasis	added.	
102	ibid.	
103	The	Sunday	Times	(n	8),	para	49	and,	X	Ltd	and	Y	v	UK	(1982)	28	DR	77	para	9.	
104	See	para	35	of	R	v	Rimmington	[2006]	1	AC	459	discussing	the	ECtHR’s	interpretation	of	
Article	7	ECHR.	
105	The	Sunday	Times	(n	8)	para	49	and,	X	Ltd	(n	103)	para	9.	Indeed,	the	Court	has	noted	that	
absolute	certainty	would	be	unobtainable	in	practice.	
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From	considering	the	aforementioned	ECtHR	jurisprudence,	we	can	identify	that	
Article	7	of	the	ECHR	includes	a	requirement	for	there	to	be	legal	certainty	with	
regards	 to	 defining	 and	 setting	 out	 an	 offence	 in	 law.106	However,	 Article	 7	
ECHR	also	requires	that	the	punishment	be	of	a	criminal	nature	for	it	to	apply.	
As	a	result,	one	may	argue	that	when	the	Commission	imposes	fines	these	are	
not	of	a	criminal	nature	(as	it	is	an	administrative	system)	consequently	Article	7	
of	the	ECHR	cannot	apply.	For	example,	one	may	cite	Article	23(5)	of	Regulation	
1/2003,	which	specifically	states	that	the	Commission’s	decisions	'shall	not	be	of	
a	criminal	law	nature'.	
	
However,	the	ECtHR	has	adopted	an	autonomous	interpretation	independent	of	
the	categorisation	of	legal	proceedings	under	national	law	of	the	offence.107	The	
ECtHR	has	 embraced	 this	 approach	 to	 protect	 human	 rights	 effectively.	 If	 the	
Court	 were	 not	 to	 take	 an	 autonomous	 interpretation	 independent	 of	 the	
categorisation	of	 legal	 proceedings	 under	 national	 law	of	 the	offence	 it	 could	
lead	 to	 rights	 not	 being	 adequately	 protected.	 In	 this	 regard,	 countries	 could	
classify	offences	as	non-criminal	to	avoid	the	ECHR	being	applicable	to	them.108	
Indeed,	without	the	Court	adopting	this	approach,	it	would	lead	to	a	fractured	
application	 of	 rights,	 where	 Member	 States	 may	 contract	 out	 of	 rights	
protection	by	defining	activities	outside	the	scope	of	the	protection.	This	would	
then	 allow	 for	 a	 situation	 where	 unequal	 treatment	 could	 occur	 to	 ECHR	
applicants	based	on	the	Member	State	that	they	are	within.	This	would	damage	
the	 ECHR’s	 purpose	 and	 make	 it	 of	 limited	 use.	 Hence	 an	 autonomous	
interpretation	by	the	Court	is	of	utmost	importance.	
	
The	ECtHR	determines	whether	a	 sanction	 is	 ‘criminal’,	within	 the	meaning	of	
the	ECHR,	by	using	–	what	are	colloquially	referred	to	as	–	the	‘Engel-criteria’.109																																																										
106	This	is	something	that	various	other	legal	scholars	have	also	noted,	for	example	see,	Peter	
Whelan,	‘Legal	Certainty	and	Cartel	Criminalisation	within	EU	Member	States’	(2012)	71	(3)	
Cambridge	Law	Journal	677.	
107	For	example,	see	Engel	v	Netherlands	Series	A	no	2	(1976)	1	EHRR	647	and	Öztürk	v	Germany	
(1984)	6	EHRR	409.	
108	Indeed,	this	was	something	noted	by	the	ECtHR	in	Engel	(n	107)	para	81.	
109	ibid.	
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The	 ‘Engel-criteria’	 consist	 of	 three	 separate	 considerations.	 First,	 the	 Court	
considers	 the	 classification	 of	 the	 offence	 under	 the	 Member	 State’s	 law.	
Second,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 offence	 in	 question	 is	 examined	 and,	 finally,	 the	
nature	 and	 degree	 of	 severity	 of	 the	 penalty	 that	 may	 be	 imposed	 is	
assessed.110	It	 is	 worth	 noting	 here	 that	 the	 Court	 holds	 that	 the	 second	 and	
third	 criteria	 are	 alternative	 and	 not	 necessarily	 cumulative,111	although,	 they	
may	be	used	cumulatively	when	neither	alone	is	conclusive.112		
	
One	 of	 the	 most	 important	 ECtHR	 decisions	 concerning	 the	 nature	 of	
competition	law	fines	was	the	recent	decision	given	by	the	Court	in	Menarini	on	
the	 27	 September	 2011.113	In	 this	 case,	 the	 Italian	 Competition	 Authority	 –	
Autorità	 Garante	 della	 Concorrenza	 e	 del	 Mercato	 (hereafter,	 the	 AGCM)	 –	
fined	Menarini	 €6	million	 for	 their	 participation	within	 a	 ‘diabetes	diagnostics	
test’	 cartel.	 Menarini	 sought	 to	 have	 the	 decision	 annulled	 by	 the	 Italian	
administrative	 court.	 The	 administrative	 court	 dismissed	 the	 case,	 as	 did	 the	
higher	 Italian	 courts.	 Thus,	 Menarini	 brought	 the	 matter	 before	 the	 ECtHR,	
claiming	that	as	the	case	had	not	been	considered	by	the	Italian	appeal	courts	–	
which	had	the	jurisdiction	to	do	so	–	there	was	a	violation	of	Article	6(1)	ECHR:	
the	right	to	a	fair	trial.	
	
The	relevant	part	of	the	ECtHR	judgment	for	this	research	was	its	statement	and	
analysis	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 competition	 law	 fines.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 Court	
confirmed	that	fines	imposed	by	the	Italian	competition	authority	were	penal	in	
their	nature	and	therefore	constituted	a	‘criminal	charge’,	meaning	that	Article	
6(1)	ECHR	is	engaged.114	
	
The	Court	determined	that	the	fines	were	of	a	criminal	nature	by	applying	the	
three	‘Engel-criteria’	to	the	circumstances	in	Menarini.	First,	the	Court	looked	at																																																									
110	A	good	discussion	by	the	ECtHR	on	the	nature	of	penalties	can	be	found	in	K	v	Germany	
(2012)	ECHR	957	para	120-121.	
111	Lutz	v	Germany	(1988)	10	EHRR	182	para	55.	
112	Ezeh	and	Connors	v	UK	(2002)	35	EHRR	691.	
113	Menarini	(n	89).	
114	ibid	paras	28-45.	
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the	 classification	 of	 the	 infringement	 by	 the	 national	 legislation.	 The	 Italian	
legislation	 –	 like	 European	 legislation	 –	 classifies	 fines	 imposed	 by	 the	
competition	authority	as	administrative	and	not	criminal.	However,	 the	ECtHR	
did	not	 see	 this	 as	 determinative	 and	 thus	proceeded	 to	 consider	 the	 second	
criterion.	Here,	 the	Court	 looked	at	 the	nature	of	 the	offence	 itself	and	noted	
that	competition	law	sought	to	preserve	free	market	competition	and	that	the	
AGCM	 supervises	 the	 enforcement	 of	 this.115	The	AGCM	 therefore	 affects	 the	
general	 interests	 of	 society	 normally	 protected	 by	 criminal	 law,	 which	 had	
already	been	held	 to	be	criminal	 for	 the	purposes	of	Article	6	ECHR	 in	Société	
Stenuit	 v	 France.116	The	 Court	 also	 noted	 that	 the	 fine	 was	 essentially	 a	
punishment	 to	 deter	 repetition	 of	 the	 conduct.117	Thirdly,	 the	 Court	 assessed	
the	nature	and	severity	of	 the	applied	penalty.	The	Court	 felt	 that	because	of	
the	high	 level	of	 fines	 (€6	million	euros)	 imposed	on	Menarini	 	–	and	 the	 fact	
that	 the	penalty	 is	aimed	not	 just	at	punishing	those	who	breach	the	 law	but,	
primarily,	deterring	those	who	committed	the	breach	as	well	as	deterring	other	
undertakings	 from	 breaching	 the	 law	 –	 the	 fines	 were	 to	 be	 of	 a	 criminal	
nature.118	
	
Yet,	 the	 astute	 will	 note	 that	 the	 Menarini	 judgment	 may	 have	 held	 that	
competition	 law	 fines	are	of	criminal	nature	but	 that	 this	was	with	 regards	 to	
Article	6	ECHR	and	not	Article	7	of	the	ECHR.	Therefore,	 it	needs	to	be	shown	
that	 Article	 7	 adopts	 the	 same	 meaning	 of	 ‘criminal’	 as	 that	 under	 Article	 6	
ECHR.	The	ECtHR	held	in	the	case	of	Welch	that	the	meaning	of	‘criminal’	for	the	
purposes	of	Article	7	of	the	ECHR	has	to	be	interpreted	autonomously,	as	is	the	
case	under	Article	6	of	the	Convention.119	In	this	case	the	Court	reiterated	that	
it:	 ‘must	remain	free	to	go	behind	appearances	and	assess	for	itself	whether	a	
particular	measure	amounts	in	substance	to	a	“penalty”	within	the	meaning	of	
																																																								
115	ibid	para	40.	
116	(1992)	14	EHRR	509.	
117	Menarini	(n	89)	para	40.	
118	ibid	para	42.	
119	See	Welch	v	UK	(1995)	20	EHRR	247	para	27.	
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Article	 7.’ 120 	The	 Court	 in	 this	 case	 considered	 the	 relevant	 factors	 in	
determining	whether	a	measure	amounted	to	a	penalty	as	being:	
	
‘the	 nature	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	 measure;	 its	 characterisation	 under	
national	law;	the	procedures	involved	in	the	making	and	implementation	
of	the	measure;	and	its	severity.’121	
	
Because	 the	 ECtHR	 has	 adopted	 the	 aforementioned	 approaches	 when	
determining	the	nature	of	proceedings,	it	is	argued	–	and	accepted	–	within	this	
research	 that	 the	 ECtHR	 would	 similarly	 hold	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	
enforcement	sanctions,	fall	within	the	ambit	of	the	ECHR.	Particularly	when	one	
looks	at	the	aims	of	EU	competition	law	fines,	one	discovers	that	a	key	part	of	
the	 fine	 is	 the	deterrence	of	other	undertakings	 from	committing	competition	
law	breaches.122	This	deterrence	factor	means	that	an	undertaking	 is	punished	
more	harshly	 to	deter	other	undertakings.	 Therefore,	 it	 falls	under	a	 ‘criminal	
sanction’	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 ECHR	 –	 something	 the	 EU	 courts	 have	
recognised	themselves.123		
	
One	may	wish	to	argue	that,	although	the	ECtHR	sees	competition	law	sanctions	
as	of	a	criminal	nature,	the	Commission	and	the	European	courts	may	not	and,	
therefore,	 undertaking	 an	 analysis	 to	 ensure	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process	
complies	 with	 legal	 certainty	 is	 a	 moot	 point.	 However,	 this	 argument	 is	
profoundly	flawed	and	the	reasons	for	this	shall	now	be	examined.	
First,	 EU	 jurisprudence	 has	 recognised	 the	 need	 for	 legal	 certainty	within	 the	
law	for	a	long	time.124	Indeed,	we	find	that	the	European	courts	have	held	that	
it	 is	 important	 that	 this	 principle	be	 complied	with.125	Because	of	 this	 general	
requirement,	it	is	argued	that	the	need	to	comply	with	Article	7	of	the	ECHR	is	
further	strengthened.																																																										
120	ibid.	
121	ibid	para	28.	
122	See	Case	C-289/04	P,	Showa	Denko	v	Commission	[2006]	ECR	I-5859	para	16,	for	example.	
123	See	for	example,	C-199/92	P,	Hüls	AG	v	Commission	[1999]	ECR	I-4287	para	149.	
124	Salumi	(n	98).	
125	Stauder	(n	93)	para	7.	
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Second,	 following	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Lisbon	 there	 is	 an	 obligation	 for	 the	 EU	 to	
accede	 to	 the	 ECHR.126	Therefore,	 it	 will	 be	 necessary	 that	 the	 Commission’s	
processes	in	the	criminal	sphere	comply	with	the	requirements	of	legal	certainty	
amongst	other	things.		
	
Third,	we	 find	 that	 the	 European	 courts	 view	 competition	 law	 rules	 as	 falling	
within	the	ambit	of	the	ECHR.		For	example,	the	CFI	in	Hüls	stated	that:127	
	
‘It	 must	 also	 be	 accepted	 that,	 given	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
infringements	 in	 question	 and	 the	 nature	 and	 degree	 of	
severity	 of	 the	 ensuing	 penalties,	 the	 principle	 of	 the	
presumption	of	 innocence	applies	 to	the	procedures	relating	
to	 infringements	 of	 the	 competition	 rules	 applicable	 to	
undertakings	 that	 may	 result	 in	 the	 imposition	 of	 fines	 or	
periodic	penalty	payments.’	
	
Whilst	 it	 is	 acknowledged	 that	 this	 case	 concerned	Article	6(2)	 ECHR,	 the	 fact	
that	the	court	accepted	that	ECHR	jurisprudence	applied	to	an	EU	decision	is	the	
important	 factor	 for	 this	 research,	 as	 it	means	 that	 other	 ECHR	 jurisprudence	
could	apply	too.		
	
Fourth	and	finally,	we	find	that	the	Advocates	General	are	of	the	opinion	that	–	
although	Article	 23(5)	 of	 Regulation	 1/2003	 states	 that	 the	 fines	 are	 not	 of	 a	
criminal	 nature	 –	 the	 fines	 are	 of	 a	 criminal	 nature	 within	 the	 ambit	 of	 the	
ECHR.	For	example,	Advocate	General	Bot’s	Opinion	on	the	26	October	2010	in	
Case	 C-352/09	P	 ThyssenKrupp	 Nirosta	 v	 Commission	 is	 very	 insightful	 and	
informative	as	to	the	beliefs	and	views	which	populate	the	Commission	and	the	
European	courts:128																																																									
126	2007/C	306/01	Treaty	of	Lisbon	amending	the	Treaty	on	European	Union	and	the	Treaty	
establishing	the	European	Community,	signed	at	Lisbon	on	the	13	December	2007	(Article	6	
para	2).	
127	Hüls	(n	123)	para	150.	
128	Point	[49].	
	 92	
	‘While	this	procedure	is	not	stricto	sensu	a	criminal	matter,	it	
is	none	the	less	quasi-criminal	in	nature.	The	fines	referred	to	
in	 Article	 23	 of	 Regulation	 No	1/2003	 are	 comparable	 in	
nature	 and	 size	 to	 criminal	 penalties	 and	 the	 Commission’s	
role,	given	its	investigatory,	examination	and	decision-making	
functions,	 is	 primarily	 one	 typical	 of	 criminal	 proceedings	
against	undertakings.	In	my	view,	the	procedure	is	therefore	
covered	by	‘criminal’	within	the	meaning	of	Article	6(1)	of	the	
European	Convention	for	the	protection	of	human	rights’		
	
Similarly,	one	can	also	see	that	Advocate	General	Sharpston	holds	an	analogous	
view	to	that	of	Advocate	General	Bot:129	
	
‘In	 the	 light	 of	 those	 criteria,	 I	 have	 little	 difficulty	 in	
concluding	that	the	procedure	whereby	a	fine	is	imposed	for	
breach	of	 the	prohibition	on	price-fixing	and	market-sharing	
agreements	in	Article	81(1)	EC	falls	under	the	‘criminal	head’	
of	 Article	 6	 ECHR	 as	 progressively	 defined	 by	 the	 European	
Court	of	Human	Rights.’	
	
These	 assertions	 help	 to	 illustrate	 that	 this	 is	 not	 just	 the	 perception	 of	 one	
individual,	 but	 also	 that	 of	 the	 community.	 Indeed,	 there	 are	 other	 opinions	
that	could	be	offered,	but	it	is	believed	that	the	above	are	sufficient	to	establish	
and	 support	 the	 author’s	 claims. 130 	On	 this	 basis,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	
requirements	specified	under	Article	7	of	the	ECHR	are	viewed	as	applicable	to	
the	Commission’s	 fining	process	and,131	as	such,	 it	 is	 important	 that	 this	 fining	
process	 adheres	 to	 these	 requirements,	 as	 non-compliance	 would	 mean	 the	
Commission’s	 procedures	 breach	 the	 law	 every	 time	 it	 enforces	 Article	 101																																																									
129	Case	C-272/09	P,	KME	Germany	and	Others	v	Commission	[2011],	Opinion	of	AG	Sharpston,	
point	[64].	
130	For	another	example,	see,	the	opinion	of	Advocate	General	Léger	in	Case	C–185/95	P,	
Baustahlgewebe	v	Commission	[1998]	ECR	I–8422,	Opinion	of	AG	Léger	at	para	31.		
131	Based	on	the	analysis,	and	the	identification	of	the	autonomous	concept	of	‘criminal’.	Welch	
(n	119)	paras	27-28	and	Engel	(n	107).	
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TFEU.	 For	 example,	 if	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 procedure	 fails	 to	 comply	with	
legal	 certainty	at	 various	 stages,	or	 the	disclosure	by	 the	Commission	 to	 third	
parties	of	confidential	leniency	documents	breaches	Article	8	of	the	ECHR,	every	
time	 the	 Commission	 imposes	 a	 fine	 or	 provides	 third	 parties	 with	 access	 to	
these	 materials	 it	 would	 be	 breaching	 an	 undertaking’s	 rights	 which	 are	
protected	under	the	Convention.	
2.3.2.2	Equal	Treatment	
The	 EU	principle	 of	 equal	 treatment	 is	 also	 a	 prominent	 principle	 to	 consider	
here.	 Owing	 to	 the	 requirements	 of	 equal	 treatment,	 the	 Commission	 must	
ensure	 that	 it	 applies	 its	 fining	 policy	 equally	 to	 undertakings	 that	 are	 in	 the	
same	 position	 and,	 therefore,	 similar	 cases	 must	 be	 treated	 alike.132	It	 also	
means	 that	 ‘different	 situations	must	 not	 be	 treated	 in	 the	 same	way’	 unless	
there	 are	 good	 reasons	 to	 align	 them.133	The	 Commission	may	 derogate	 from	
the	 principle	 of	 equality	 if	 it	 is	 ‘objectively	 justifiable	 to	 do	 so’.134	This	 is	 an	
important	consideration	for	the	Commission,	as	the	General	Court	(GC)	and	the	
CJEU	will	consider	this	principle	when	a	case	is	before	them.135	Thus,	we	can	see	
that	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process	 must	 comply	 with	 the	 requirement	 of	
equal	treatment	and,	if	it	does	not,	the	European	courts	will	adjust	the	level	of	
fines	or	overturn	 the	Commission’s	decision.	 Indeed,	we	 can	 see	 cases	where	
the	courts	are	willing	to	nullify	fines	when	the	Commission	has	made	errors.	For	
example,	 in	a	recent	case	before	the	CJEU,136	the	Court	upheld	the	decision	of	
the	GC	in	annulling	the	fine	imposed	by	the	Commission.	In	this	case	it	was	held	
by	 both	 Courts	 that	 the	 Commission	 had	 made	 an	 error	 in	 its	 analysis	 in																																																									
132	Indeed,	the	European	Courts	have	held	that	EU	laws	and	measures	must	be	read	in	the	light	
of	the	principle	of	equal	treatment:	C-401/11	Blanka	Soukupová	v	Ministerstvo	zemedelství	
[2013]	223.	
133	Case	T-31/99	ABB	Asea	Brown	Boveri	v	Commission	[2002]	ECR	II-1881	para	240.	
134	ibid.	This	was	also	held	in	the	following	judgment	of	the	court,	which	was	specifically	in	
relation	to	the	Commission’s	leniency	policy.	Joined	Cases	T-259/02	to	T-264/02	and	T-271/02	
Raiffeisen	Zentralbank	Österreich	and	Others	v	Commission	(CFI,	14	December	2006)	
<curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?docid=66557&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&
occ=first&part=1&cid=1198709>	accessed	10	March	2013	para	533.	
135	It	has	been	held	in	Case	8/78	Milac	[1978]	ECR	1721	para	8,	that	the	principle	of	equal	
treatment	must	be	adhered	to	and	upheld	by	all	courts	in	the	EU	when	they	are	enforcing	EU	
law.	
136	See,	C-287/11	P,	Commission	v	Aalberts	Industries	and	Others	[2013].	
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regarding	 the	 parent	 liable	 for	 the	 infringements	 of	 competition	 law	 by	 its	
subsidiaries,	because	 the	Commission	had	 failed	 to	establish	participation	 in	a	
single,	complex	and	continuous	infringement.137	Indeed,	this	helps	illustrate	the	
importance	of	exploring	whether	the	Commission’s	fining	process	complies	with	
the	requirements	of	equal	treatment.	
2.3.2.3	Legitimate	expectations,	the	right	to	respect	for	one’s	private	and	
family	life	and	breach	of	confidence	
Chapter	4	of	 the	 thesis	 considers	whether	 the	disclosure	of	 the	Commission’s	
leniency	 documentation	 to	 third	 parties	 –	wishing	 to	 bring	 follow-on	 damage	
claims	–	can	lead	to	a	breach	of	(a)	a	‘legitimate	expectation’,	(b)	Article	8	of	the	
ECHR	 and,	 (c)	 the	 equitable	 doctrine	 of	 breach	 of	 confidence.	 Chapter	 4	 will	
demonstrate	how	these	specific	rights	and	principles	apply.	However,	it	is	worth	
drawing	the	reader’s	attention	to	a	few	matters	in	this	section	with	regards	to	
analysis	of	part	(b)	Article	8	ECHR.	Article	8	is	a	‘qualified	right’	and	therefore	it	
will	 be	 imperative	 to	 establish	 first	 how	 the	 Commission	 disclosing	 leniency	
information	to	third	parties	would	engage	this	right.	The	ECtHR	has	developed	
what	 is	 known	as	 the	 ‘standard	 approach’	 for	 dealing	with	 cases	 that	 claim	a	
breach	of	Articles	8	–	11	of	 the	Convention,138	which	 involves	 five	 stages.	The	
first	 two	 stages	 of	 the	 ‘standard	 approach’	 place	 the	 burden	 of	 proof	 on	 the	
claimant	(of	the	right	abused)	–	so	in	our	case	the	undertaking	that	submitted	
the	leniency	documents	–	and	the	three	latter	stages	shift	this	burden	of	proof	
to	the	State	(the	Commission	here).		
																																																								
137	The	Courts	did	differ	on	their	views	here	though.	The	ECJ	held	that	the	GC	may	have	erred	in	
law	by	disregarding	the	premise	that	the	three	companies	formed	a	single	economic	entity.	ibid	
para	29.			
138	Douwe	Korff,	‘The	Standard	Approach	Under	Articles	8-11	ECHR	and	Article	2	ECHR’	
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/events/conference_dp_2009/presentations_speeches/KORF
F_Douwe_a.pdf>	accessed	24	January	2014.	
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2.3.3	General	arguments	for	the	compliance	with	rights	and	the	need	of	
certainty	and	equal	treatment	in	the	Commission’s	cartel	enforcement	
procedures	
There	 are	 additional	 legitimate	 non-legal	 reasons	 for	 wishing	 for	 compliance	
with	 rights	 protection,	 certainty	 and	 equality	 within	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	
process.	These	shall	now	be	identified,	outlined	and	discussed.	The	first	of	these	
is	to	prevent	over-deterrence,	which	can	potentially	lead	to	a	reduction	in	pro-
competitive	behaviour	within	the	market.	Second,	is	to	prevent	the	perception	
of	–	or	the	actual	occurrence	of	–	abuses	of	process	by	the	Commission.	Third,	is	
to	 retain	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 underlying	 offence,	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	
fining	process.	Fourth,	for	the	financial	 implications	and	harm	that	uncertainty	
in	 the	 fining	 process	 can	 cause.	 Fifth,	 so	 as	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 leniency	 and	
settlement	 stages	 in	 the	 procedure	 are	 as	 effective	 as	 they	 can	 be	 and	 are	
actively	utilised	by	undertakings.	Sixth,	and	finally,	 to	ensure	 legitimacy	within	
the	leniency	and	settlement	stages	of	the	fining	procedure.	
	
Uncertainty	in	the	application	of	fines	or	the	application	of	the	fining	procedure	
could	cause	concerns	for	undertakings,	as	businesses	need	certainty	in	respect	
of	 what	 potential	 punishments	 they	 can	 expect	 for	 infringements	 of	
competition	 rules.139	Indeed,	 this	 is	 imperative	 as	 uncertainty	may	 lead	 to	 an	
over-deterrence	 effect	 –	 or	 even	 an	 under-deterrence	 effect	 –	 being	
experienced.140	Over-deterrence	 is	 detrimental	 to	 the	 market	 as	 it	 can	 deter	
legitimate	 business	 behaviour	 and	 conduct	 which,	 in	 turn,	 would	 lead	 to	 a	
																																																								
139	One	can	also	legitimately	raise	wider	concerns	in	relation	to	uncertainty	here.	Specifically,	
with	the	definition	and	scope	of	the	cartel	offence	under	Article	101(1)	TFEU.	The	offence	itself	
includes	‘concerted	practices’,	which	makes	the	conduct	captured	wider	and	more	uncertain	for	
undertakings.			
140	For	example,	John	E	Calfee	and	Richard	Craswell,	‘Some	Effects	of	Uncertainty	on	Compliance	
with	Legal	Standards’	(1984)	70(5)	VLR	965	and	Yannis	Katsoulacos	and	David	Ulph,	‘The	
Welfare	Effects	of	Legal	Uncertainty	and	its	Implications	for	Competition	Policy	Enforcement	
Procedures’	(2010)	CRESSE	Working	Paper	V7	
<http://www.cresse.info/uploadfiles/Lagal%20Uncertainty%20and%20Optimal%20Enforcement
%20Procedures%20May%202010.pdf>	accessed	9	July	2013,	have	found	that	legal	uncertainty	
leads	to	over	deterrence.	Over-deterrence	can	also	be	referred	to	as	a	‘chilling	effect’,	as	it	may	
chill	legitimate	business	behaviour	which	is	actually	welfare	enhancing	for	the	economy.	
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reduction	 in	 competition,	 innovation	 and	 efficiency.141	This	 is	 a	 concern,	 as	
competition	policy	 is	 there	 to	 enhance	 competition,	 innovation	 and	efficiency	
and	 ensure	 that	 the	 marketplace	 is	 not	 being	 restricted	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	
reduce	 economic	 welfare.142	Thus,	 over-deterring	 pro-competitive	 behaviour	
would	 undermine	 the	 policy	 objectives	 of	 competition	 law.	 Hence,	 it	 is	
important	 that	 the	 fining	 process	 is	 as	 certain	 as	 possible	 to	 avoid	 over-
deterring	pro-competitive	behaviour	by	undertakings.	
	
However,	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 uncertainty	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	
process	may	enhance	deterrence	and,	accordingly,	it	is	actually	beneficial	to	the	
EU	 cartel	 enforcement	 regime	 for	 there	 to	 be	 uncertainty	 in	 its	 fining	
procedure.	Neelie	Kroes,	the	former	Commissioner	for	Competition,	stated	in	a	
speech	 to	 the	 International	 Forum	 on	 European	 Competition	 Law,	 that	 she	
‘cannot	see	how	allowing	potential	infringers	to	calculate	the	likely	cost/benefit	
ratio	 of	 a	 cartel	 in	 advance	will	 somehow	 contribute	 to	 a	 sustained	 policy	 of	
deterrence	and	zero	tolerance.’143	Presumably	what	Kroes	is	highlighting	here	is	
that	 if	 an	undertaking	can	conduct	a	 cost/benefit	 analysis	 then	 they	may	well	
use	this	to	decide	whether	to	commit	a	breach	of	competition	law.	Indeed,	the	
undertakings	 could	 theoretically	 then	 add	 this	 on	 as	 a	 business	 charge	 to	
consumers	 so	 the	expense	 for	 any	 fine	 imposed	by	 the	Commission	 for	being	
involved	 in	a	cartel	 is	already	 included	 in	the	sale	of	the	product	or	service.144	
Academic	research	has	also	highlighted	that	small	amounts	of	uncertainty	may																																																									
141	John	M	Connor	and	Robert	H	Lande,	‘Optimal	Cartel	Deterrence:	An	Empirical	Comparison	of	
Sanctions	to	Overcharges’	(Unpublished,	September	2011)	
<http://works.bepress.com/robert_lande/6>	accessed	21	February	2013,	6.	
142	This	statement	is	based	upon	comments	made	by	Massimo	Motta,	Competition	Policy:	
Theory	and	Practice	(Cambridge	University	Press	2004)	30.	Within	the	EU,	competition	policy	
also	seeks	to	enhance	the	well-being	of	its	citizens,	see	Article	3,	paragraph	1,	The	Treaty	on	
European	Union	[2010]	OJ	C83/13,	hereafter	‘TEU’.	
143	Neelie	Kroes,	‘The	First	Hundred	Days	40th	Anniversary	of	the	Studienvereinigung	
Kartellrecht	1965-2005’	(Speech	delivered	to	International	Forum	on	European	Competition	
Law,	Brussels,	7	April	2005)	<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-05-205_en.htm>	
accessed	6	July	2013.	
144	This	would,	however,	require	a	thorough	and	accurate	cost/benefit	analysis	and	for	other	
undertakings	within	that	market	to	do	the	same	and	to	include	an	additional	charge	for	the	
potential	fine.	If	not,	the	undertaking	in	question	would	have	its	prices	much	higher	than	the	
other	firms	in	the	market	and	consumers	would	seek	to	purchase	the	goods	or	services	from	
other	suppliers.	
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enhance	deterrence.145	Deterrence	is	important	to	cartel	enforcement	because	
one	of	its	key	aims	is	to	deter	future	cartel	conduct.	For	example,	Werden	has	
argued	 that	 ‘deterrence	 is	 the	 only	 significant	 function	 of	 sanctions	 for	 cartel	
activity,	and	the	specific	deterrence	of	convicted	offenders	clearly	is	secondary	
to	the	general	deterrence	of	potential	offenders’.146	Thus,	because	of	the	harm	
caused	by	cartels,	 it	 is	always	better	 to	deter	and	prevent	cartels	occurring	 in	
the	first	 instance	than	trying	to	fix	 the	harm	that	has	occurred	because	of	the	
cartel.147	
	
Based	on	the	aforementioned	comments,	one	may	question	 if	we	should	seek	
to	ensure	 there	 is	 legal	 certainty	within	 the	Commission’s	 fining	process.	 It	 is,	
however,	 important	 to	 remember	 the	 potential	 problems	 discussed	 above	 in	
regards	to	over-deterrence	by	having	uncertainty	within	the	fining	process.	This	
could	 mean	 that	 having	 uncertainty	 is	 less	 effective	 than	 having	 certainty	
overall.	Additionally,	the	challenge	levelled	by	Kroes	is	a	questionable	one.	Even	
with	 clear	 guidelines,	 it	 is	 believed	 by	 the	 author	 that	 an	 undertaking	 would	
struggle	to	conduct	an	effective	cost-benefit	analysis	for	joining	a	cartel.	
	
To	begin	with,	an	undertaking	cannot	be	sure	which	 jurisdiction’s	competition	
authorities	 will	 investigate	 the	 cartel.	 If	 the	 cartel	 covers	 numerous	markets,	
then	multiple	competition	authorities	may	investigate	the	cartel	and	issue	fines.	
As	 a	 result,	 to	 conduct	 an	 effective	 cost-benefit	 analysis,	 the	 undertaking	will	
need	to	consider	the	fines	of	multiple	competition	authorities,	which	will	make	
it	harder	for	the	undertaking	to	conduct	a	cost-benefit	analysis,	then	would	be																																																									
145	Matthias	Lang,	‘Legal	Uncertainty	-	an	Effective	Deterrent	in	Competition	Law?’(Unpublished,	
February	2012)	
<https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&cad=rja&ved=0CEw
QFjAF&url=http%3A%2F%2Facle.uva.nl%2Fbinaries%2Fcontent%2Fassets%2Fsubsites%2Famste
rdam-center-for-law--economics%2Fcr-meetings%2F2012%2Fpaper-lang-
2012.pdf&ei=hDjYUcenMcWg0wWXvoDwAg&usg=AFQjCNFmyH1hYYaiv2oEFcBvpYzIKpIHxw&bv
m=bv.48705608,d.d2k>	accessed	14	June	2013	and	Peter	Whelan	'The	Degussa	Case'	(2008)	
7(8)	Competition	Law	Insight	13.	
146	Gregory	Werden,	‘Sanctioning	Cartel	Activity:	Let	the	Punishment	fit	the	Crime’	(2009)	5(1)	
Euro	CJ	26.	
147	For	example,	see	John	M	Connor,	‘Cartel	Detection	and	Duration	Worldwide’	(2011)	(2)	
September	CPI	Antitrust	Chronicle	1.	
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the	case	if	they	only	had	to	consider	one	competition	authority’s	potential	fines.	
Secondly,	 the	 undertaking	will	 need	 to	 consider	 the	 costs	 of	 private	 damages	
actions	for	an	effective	cost-benefit	analysis	to	be	conducted.	This	will	be	more	
difficult	 for	 the	 undertaking	 to	 do	 effectively,	 as	 it	 will	 be	 harder	 to	 predict	
these	 costs.148	Finally,	 an	 undertaking	will	 also	 need	 to	 assess	 the	 cost	 of	 the	
potential	harm	done	 to	 its	 reputation	and	brand	 (image)	 for	being	 in	a	cartel.	
This	 could	be	difficult	 to	quantify	effectively	as	 it	will	depend	substantially	on	
the	nature	of	 the	 cartel	 and	how	 it	 is	 reported	within	 the	media.149	For	 these	
reasons,	 it	 is	 believed	 that	 the	 arguments	 put	 forward	 for	 there	 to	 be	
uncertainty	within	 the	 fining	 process	 are	 not	 as	 robust	 or	 persuasive	 as	 they	
first	appear	when	challenged	by	the	counterarguments.	Accordingly,	it	is	argued	
in	this	research	that	uncertainty	should	be	something	we	seek	to	avoid.	
	
Uncertainty	within	 the	 fining	process	–	both	 in	 the	 sense	of	what	 fine	 can	be	
imposed	and	the	process	(i.e.	how	the	fine	is	calculated)	–	can	also	lead	to	the	
potential	 for	 abuse	 by	 the	 Commission	 in	 the	 application	 of	 fines	 on	
undertakings.	 Indeed,	 as	 the	Commission	has	a	great	deal	of	discretion	 in	 the	
application	of	 its	 fining	policy	 this	 could	 lead	 to	undertakings	 raising	concerns	
against	 the	 Commission	 in	 regards	 to	 their	 application	 of	 the	 fining	 policy;	
namely,	that	it	is	not	being	applied	fairly	or	equally	to	each	firm.	This	in	itself	is	
not	 just	 a	 theoretical	 concern	 as	 it	 could	 potentially	 occur	 in	 practice.	 For	
example,	 the	 Commission	 could	 provide	 favourable	 treatment	 to	 a	 European	
firm	 in	 a	 cartel	 which	 involves	 other	 non-EU	 firms	 or	 they	 could	 provide	
favourable	 treatment	 to	 a	 national	 champion	 or	 European	 champion.150	The	
Commission	may	never	do	this	 in	practice	but	the	potential	 for	this	to	happen																																																									
148	Particularly	so	where	the	US	market	is	concerned	as	there	is	the	potential	for	treble	damages	
here.	
149	The	importance	and	the	role	the	media	plays	in	affecting	public	opinion	regarding	a	cartel	
has	been	discussed,	with	particular	regards	to	criminal	sanctions,	by	Stephan.	See,	Andreas	
Stephan,	‘The	Battle	for	Hearts	and	Minds’:	The	Role	of	the	Media	in	Treating	Cartels	as	
Criminal’	Chapter	17,	The	Criminal	Law	of	Competition	in	the	UK	and	in	the	US:	Failure	and	
Success,	Mark	Furse	(eds),	(Edward	Elgar	Publishing:	Gloucestershire	2012).	
150	Section	3	of	Chapter	3	of	this	thesis	seeks	to	assess	potential	areas	of	unequal	treatment	in	
the	Commission’s	fining	process	and	identify	whether	it	actually	occurs	in	practice.	In	fact,	it	
appears	that	there	are	indeed	unequal	applications	of	the	fining	procedures	to	non-national	
champion	undertakings	when	compared	to	national	champions.	
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when	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 clarity	 within	 the	 procedure	 can	 still	 raise	 legitimate	
concerns	in	regards	to	inconsistency	between	cases.151	These	potential	concerns	
are	 important	 reasons	as	 to	why	undertakings	and	citizens	would	 look	 for	 the	
Commission’s	 fining	 policy	 and	 process	 to	 be	 legally	 certain,	 clearly	 defined,	
transparent	 and	 applied	 equally	 to	 undertakings.	 Hence,	 ensuring	 that	 the	
Commission’s	 fining	 process	 is	 certain	 and	 applied	 equally	 is	 of	 great	
importance.	
	
Additional	 concerns	 may	 also	 be	 raised	 here	 in	 regards	 to	 the	 effect	 that	
uncertainty	and	unequal	 treatment	can	cause	to	 the	 legitimacy	of	 the	offence	
that	 the	 fines	 are	 seeking	 to	 punish	 and	 deter.152	Equally,	 concerns	 can	 be	
raised	in	relation	to	its	impact	on	the	legitimacy	of	the	Commission’s	power	and	
its	fining	process.	It	is	vital	that	the	Commission’s	practice	is	seen	to	be	fair	and	
lawful	because	 if	 citizens	perceive	 the	 fines	as	being	 illegitimate	 this	damages	
the	underlying	offence	–	 the	cartel	prohibition	Article	101(1)	TFEU	–	and	may	
lead	to	the	enforcement	of	the	law	becoming	more	difficult.153	If	fines	are	seen	
as	 disproportionately	 high	 in	 regards	 to	 the	 offence	 –	 or	 that	 they	 are	 being	
calculated	on	an	arbitrary	or	unfair	basis	–	this	too	will	 lead	to	concerns	about	
legitimacy	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 practices	 as	 well	 as	 the	 cartel	 offence.	 The	
author	has	raised	similar	concerns	 in	regards	to	 leniency	and	the	legitimacy	of	
its	 use	 and	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 greater	 good	 before.154	This	 is	 important	 as	 one	
would	 not	wish	 for	 citizens	 or	 undertakings	 to	 see	 the	 imposition	 of	 fines	 on	
undertakings	as	simply	a	‘money	making’	exercise,	as	the	cartel	offence	and	the	
																																																								
151	This	may	occur	unintentionally	as	biases	could	creep	in	within	the	decision	making	process.	
However,	it	could	be	that	it	does	occur,	but	because	the	fining	process	affords	a	great	deal	of	
discretion	to	the	Commission	it	is	not	possible	for	us	to	identify	if	this	is	occurring	or	not.	
152	When	we	refer	to	‘legitimacy’	here,	we	broadly	mean	the	perception	an	individual	has	of	the	
process	or	procedure	in	question.		
153	This	could	raise	interesting	issues	about	the	morality	of	cartels	and	about	the	offence	which	
the	fines	are	seeking	to	punish	and	deter.	A	good	discussion	of	the	necessity	for	legitimacy	
within	EU	cartel	law	can	be	found	in	Ingeborg	Simonsson,	Legitimacy	in	EU	Cartel	Control	(Hart	
Publishing	2010).	
154	Scott	Summers,	‘What	should	the	Dishonesty	Element	of	the	UK	Cartel	Offence	be	Replaced	
with?’	[2012]	1	Comp	law	61.	
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Commission	 would	 lose	 their	 credibility.155	All	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 points	
regarding	 legitimacy	relate	to	the	perception	of	 fairness	and	 justice	within	the	
law.	They	are	broad	concepts	and	ideas	but,	nevertheless,	are	still	significant	for	
citizens	 and	 undertakings.	 Indeed,	 they	 are	 fundamental	 principles	which	 the	
law	 is	based	upon	and	 thus	must	adhere	 to.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 essential	 that	we	
maintain	 legitimacy	 within	 the	 Commission’s	 practices	 and	 within	 Article	 101	
TFEU;	by	the	Commission	being	seen	to	apply	 its	fining	policy	consistently	and	
equally	to	all	undertakings	as	well	as	the	fining	process	being	as	transparent	and	
legally	certain	as	possible.	This	discussion	of	legitimacy	has	again	highlighted	the	
importance	 for	 the	 need	 of	 certainty	 and	 equal	 treatment	 within	 the	 fining	
process.	
	
The	 next	 concern	 that	 shall	 be	 discussed	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 necessity	 for	 legal	
certainty	 and	 equal	 treatment	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process	 is	 the	
potential	cost	implications	for	undertakings.	By	having	unclear	procedures	it	can	
lead	to	undertakings	having	to	spend	excessive	sums	of	money	on	legal	advice	
in	 an	 attempt	 to	 identify	 how	 they	 –	 as	 undertakings	 –	 will	 be	 treated	 after	
being	investigated	and	what	the	punishment	(fine)	is	likely	to	be.	This	will	have	
a	direct	effect	on	the	undertaking’s	capital	in	a	variety	of	ways.	Firstly,	it	means	
funds	are	 spent	on	 legal	 advice	 instead	of	being	used	more	effectively	by	 the	
undertaking,	 which	 is	 detrimental	 to	 the	 economy.	 For	 instance,	 this	 capital	
could	 have	 been	 better	 invested	 in,	 for	 example,	 research	 and	 development,	
employees	 or	 products.	 Secondly,	 the	 uncertainty	 which	 stems	 from	 the	
undertaking	not	knowing	what	will	happen	to	it	transfers	to	market	uncertainty,	
which	is	detrimental	for	business,	share	prices	and	can	cause	more	instability	in	
a	potentially	fragile	market.	What	results	 is	a	deadweight	 loss	to	the	economy	
which	is	detrimental	for	both	the	consumers	and	the	firm.	Hence,	what	we	see	
here	 is	 another	 essential	 reason	 for	 us	 to	 seek	 legal	 certainty	 within	 the	
Commission’s	fining	process,	so	that	undertakings	can	utilise	their	capital	more																																																									
155	This	could	also	affect	compliance	with	the	law.	For	example	see,	Jonathan	Jackson	et	al,	‘Why	
do	people	comply	with	the	law?	Legitimacy	and	the	influence	of	legal	institutions’	(2012)	52(6)	
BJC	1051.	
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effectively	 when	 a	 breach	 of	 Article	 101(1)	 TFEU	 is	 found.	 By	 enabling	 the	
undertaking	 to	 have	 a	 greater	 degree	 of	 certainty,	 this	 should	 result	 in	 a	
transfer	of	benefits	for	the	economy	and	thus	consumers.156	
	
The	Commission’s	fining	process	includes	two	stages	that	can	lead	to	–	or	allow	
for	 –	 a	 reduction	 in	 fine;	 these	 are	 the	 leniency	 (eighth)	 stage	 and	 the	
settlement	(ninth)	stage.	As	these	stages	form	part	of	the	Commission’s	overall	
fining	procedure,	they	are	also	required	to	comply	with	legal	certainty	and	to	be	
applied	fairly.	There	are,	however,	additional	reasons	why	we	would	want	these	
particular	stages	within	 the	 fining	procedure	 to	comply	with	 rights	protection,	
legal	certainty	and	equal	treatment.	Indeed,	for	the	fining	procedure	as	a	whole	
to	be	as	effective	as	possible,	it	is	necessary	that	there	is	compliance,	certainty	
and	equal	treatment	within	these	two	stages	of	the	fining	procedure.	
	
Let	 us	 begin	 by	 considering	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	 stage	 in	 the	 fining	
procedure.	This	stage	allows	the	Commission	to	offer	an	undertaking	immunity	
or	partial-immunity	from	penalties	for	reporting,	cooperating	and	assisting	the	
Commission	in	its	antitrust	investigation.157	Leniency	is	incredibly	important	and	
beneficial	 as	 it	 helps	 the	 Commission	 detect,	 destabilise	 and	 deter	 cartels.158	
However,	to	achieve	these	aims	it	is	a	necessary	requirement	that	the	leniency	
programme	 is	 clear,	 transparent	 and	 certain	 in	 its	 operation.	 The	 reasons	 for	
this	will	now	be	identified	and	explained.	
	
To	 begin	 with,	 if	 an	 undertaking	 cannot	 be	 certain	 of	 the	 way	 the	 leniency	
programme	will	operate	or	be	applied,	it	is	likely	they	will	not	be	encouraged	to	
report	a	cartel.	Indeed,	Hansen	et	al	note	that	legal	certainty	plays	a	key	role	in	
leniency	applications	 as	 ‘applications	 are	predicated	 on	 legal	 certainty	 and	on																																																									
156	Again,	it	is	important	here	to	remember	that	the	EU	seeks	to	enhance	the	well-being	of	EU	
citizens:	Article	3,	paragraph	1	TEU.	
157	Wouter	P	Wils,	‘Leniency	in	Antitrust	Enforcement:	Theory	and	Practice’	(2007)	30(1)	World	
Competition	25.	
158	Panayiotis	Agisilaou,	'Collusion	in	Industrial	Economics	and	Optimally	Designed	Leniency	
Programmes	–	A	Survey'	(2013)	CCP	Working	Paper	13-3	
<competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107587/13-3+Agisilaou.pdf/9b87613a-fb52-459f-
8e9c-1eea7879547f>	accessed	2	February	2013,	3.	
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net	 global	 benefits’.159	This	 is	 because	 undertakings	 prefer	 some	 form	 of	
certainty	in	the	way	they	will	be	treated,	how	the	case	will	be	handled	and	what	
they	are	required	to	do.	If	undertakings	do	not	receive	this	then	it	is	likely	that	
the	 cartel	 will	 go	 unreported	 and,	 potentially,	 the	 cartel	 will	 continue	
undetected	and	lead	to	further	harm	to	society.	Indeed,	what	we	can	see	from	
the	history	of	the	Commission’s	leniency	programme	is	that	when	there	was	not	
a	 very	 clear	 or	 transparent	 process	 there	 was	 a	 lack	 of	 applications	 by	
undertakings	 under	 the	 Leniency	 Notice. 160 	For	 example,	 under	 the	
Commission’s	 1996	 Leniency	 Notice	 there	was	 a	 severe	 lack	 of	 reporting	 and	
most	 of	 the	 cases	 undertaken	 by	 the	 Commission	 were	 identified	 by	 the	 US	
leniency	 programme	 and	 not	 its	 own.161	This	 obviously	 has	 an	 effect	 on	 the	
Commission’s	 ability	 to	 detect,	 deter	 and	 investigate	 cartels.	 As	 these	
endeavours	(detection,	deterrence	and	investigation)	are	very	important	to	the	
success	of	the	Commission’s	cartel	enforcement	programme,	one	can	see	that	it	
is	crucial	that	the	Commission	ensures	this	stage	is	clear	and	applied	fairly	so	as	
to	 encourage	 undertakings	 to	 report	 cartel	 behaviour	 to	 the	 Commission,	 as	
well	 as	 deter	 undertakings	 from	 becoming	 involved	 in	 a	 cartel	 in	 the	 first	
instance	and,	finally,	so	as	to	destablise	any	current	cartels.162	
	
This	 potential	 problem	 with	 a	 lack	 of	 certainty	 within	 the	 operation	 and	
application	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	 programme	 has	 been	 heightened	
recently	when	the	Commission	withdrew	the	conditional	immunity	it	had	given	
to	the	undertaking	Deltafina.163	This	meant	that	Deltafina	received	a	€30	million	
fine	 for	 its	 failure	 to	 cooperate	 with	 the	 Commission.	 This	 in	 itself	 could	
potentially	 have	 the	 knock-on	 effect	 of	 leading	 to	 undertakings	worrying	 that	
																																																								
159	Marc	Hansen	et	al,	‘Leniency	Programmes	and	Incentives:	Is	there	room	for	improvement?’	
(Presentation	at	the	ICN	Cartel	Workshop,	Bruges,	October	2011)	
<www.lw.com/presentations/leniency-programmes-and-incentives>	accessed	18	March	2013.	
Emphasis	added.	
160	Andreas	Stephan,	‘An	Empirical	Assessment	of	the	European	Leniency	Notice’	(2009)	5(3)	
Journal	of	Competition	Law	&	Economics	537.	
161	ibid.	
162	This	is	owing	to	the	fact	that	cartel	participants	will	be	unsure	when	a	member	of	the	cartel	
will	renege	on	the	agreement	and	report	the	cartel	to	attempt	to	receive	immunity.	
163	C-578/11	P,	Deltafina	v	Commission	[2014].	
	103	
their	 conditional	 immunity	 may	 be	 withdrawn	 by	 the	 Commission.	 It	 is,	
however,	worth	us	now	considering	the	facts	of	this	case	to	understand	why	the	
Commission	 withdrew	 Deltafina’s	 immunity	 and	 why	 the	 CJEU	 upheld	 the	
Commission’s	 decision	 to	 do	 so.	 The	 question	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 answered	 is:	
“what	 did	 Deltafina	 do	 that	 amounted	 to	 a	 failure	 to	 cooperate	 with	 the	
Commission	 –	 which	was	 so	 bad	 that	 it	 resulted	 in	 the	 conditional	 immunity	
being	withdrawn?”	
	
In	 this	 case,	 Deltafina	 informed	 the	 National	 Association	 of	 Italian	 Tobacco	
Processors	 of	 its	 cooperation	 with	 the	 Commission	 prior	 to	 the	 Commission	
conducting	 its	 dawn	 raids.	 The	 issue	 here	 was	 that	 the	 Commission	 had	
informed	Deltafina	to	keep	its	leniency	application	secret	so	that	the	dawn	raids	
and	 investigation	would	 be	 as	 fruitful	 for	 the	 Commission	 as	 possible.	 By	 not	
keeping	its	application	for	leniency	a	secret,	as	it	was	required	to	do	so	by	the	
Commission,	 it	 in	 effect	 informed	 other	 members	 of	 the	 cartel	 that	 the	
Commission	would	be	conducting	an	investigation	into	their	cartel.	This	offered	
the	 other	 undertakings	 the	 opportunity	 to	 dispose	 of	 evidence	 and	 conceal	
parts	 of	 the	 cartel.	 The	 Court	 noted	 that	 under	 the	 2002	 Leniency	 Notice	 an	
undertaking	must	‘fully’	cooperate	with	the	Commission	on	a	‘continuous	basis’,	
which	 it	 held	Deltafina	had	not	done	 in	 this	 case,	because	of	 its	disclosure	 to	
other	members	of	 the	cartels.	Thus,	 the	Court	affirmed	the	Commission’s	 first	
ever	 decision	 to	withdraw	 immunity	 from	 fines	 for	 a	 firm	 that	was	 the	 initial	
undertaking	to	bring	evidence	of	a	cartel	to	the	Commission.164	
	
Whilst	 this	 could	 cause	 undertakings	 to	 worry	 about	 the	 potential	 for	 the	
Commission	 to	 withdraw	 immunity	 and	 in	 turn,	 discourage	 leniency	
applications,	it	is	unlikely	in	practice	to	lead	to	this.	Undertakings	are	more	likely																																																									
164	Jones	Day,	Bernard	Amory	and	Cecelia	Kye,	‘European	Court	of	Justice	upholds	European	
Commission’s	first	withdrawal	of	immunity	for	cartel	whistleblower	but	finds	General	Court	
failed	to	timely	adjudicate’	(Lexology,	25	July	2014)	
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=95bb2d5f-0717-48f2-90f8-
362f6a384056&utm_source=lexology+daily+newsfeed&utm_medium=html+email+-+body+-
+general+section&utm_campaign=lexology+subscriber+daily+feed&utm_content=lexology+dail
y+newsfeed+2014-08-01&utm_term=>		accessed	27	July	2014.	
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to	appreciate	that	this	is	a	unique	case	and	is	the	first	time	that	the	Commission	
has	ever	withdrawn	immunity.	 Indeed,	the	only	reason	the	Commission	did	so	
in	 this	 case	 was	 because	 Deltafina	 had	 not	 complied	 with	 the	 requirements	
placed	 on	 it	 by	 the	 Commission.	 Therefore,	 this	 case	 acts	 more	 as	 a	 timely	
reminder	 to	undertakings	 that	 they	must	continue	 to	 fully	cooperate	with	 the	
Commission	 throughout	 its	 investigation	 and	 comply	 with	 the	 requirements	
placed	upon	it,	or	they	may	lose	their	conditional	immunity.	
	
By	facilitating	legal	certainty	within	the	leniency	stage,	it	enables	leniency	to	be	
as	 effective	 a	 tool	 as	 it	 can	 possibly	 be.	 This	 therefore	 means	 that	 the	
Commission	can	detect	cartels	at	its	most	effective	level.	The	other	options	for	
detecting	 cartels	 –	 market	 inquiries,	 customer	 complaints	 and	 market	
investigations	 –	 never	 result	 in	 the	 same	 cost	 efficiency	 and	 effectiveness	 as	
leniency	does.	Under	 the	 leniency	programme,	 undertakings	 report	 the	 cartel	
(thus	they	assist	in	its	detection)	and	provide	a	substantial	amount	of	evidence	
to	 the	Commission	 regarding	 the	 cartel,	which	helps	 the	Commission	 save	on	
the	resources	 it	would	have	had	to	use	 in	attempting	 to	 identify	and	detect	a	
cartel.165	Hence,	making	 leniency	 as	 effective	 as	 possible	 via	 adhering	 to	 legal	
certainty	means	that	the	Commission	can	focus	and	utilise	its	resources	better.	
It	has	been	identified	that	by	having	legal	certainty	within	the	leniency	stage	of	
fining	 process	 it	 should	 help	 encourage	 undertakings	 that	 are	 involved	 in	 a	
cartel	 to	 report	 that	 cartel	 because	 leniency	 destabilises	 the	 cartel	 and	 an	
undertaking	knows	how	it	will	be	treated	and	what	to	expect.	
	
Let	us	now	consider	the	settlement	stage	in	the	Commission’s	fining	procedure	
and	why	we	would	seek	for	this	to	also	be	certain.	The	Commission’s	settlement	
procedure	was	adopted	in	2008	and	was	designed	to	speed	up	the	procedure	in	
																																																								
165	Although,	it	is	important	that	the	Commission	still	corroborates	the	information	provided	by	
the	undertaking.	For	an	example	of	the	consequences	of	not	doing	so,	one	can	consider	the	
collapse	of	the	Office	of	Fair	Trading’s	case	against	the	British	Airways	directors	(R	v	Burns	and	
Others	[2010]	EWCA	Crim	1148).	
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cartel	 decisions.166	The	 procedure	 itself	 is	 still	 very	 much	 in	 its	 infancy	 but,	
through	 the	 Commission	 and	 undertakings	 settling	 cases,	 various	 savings	 are	
made	for	both	parties.	For	example,	it	saves	the	Commission	and	undertakings	
costs	in	the	monetary	sense	as	well	as	in	time	as	they	do	not	need	to	go	through	
the	 often	 lengthy	 and	 costly	 court	 proceedings.167	However,	 to	 achieve	 the	
procedural	benefits	and	cost	benefits	of	settlement,	it	 is	and	will	be	important	
that	this	stage	 in	the	fining	procedure	 is	clear	for	undertakings	to	understand;	
as	if	not,	undertakings	will	be	unlikely	to	request	to	settle	the	case.	The	reasons	
why	this	is	the	case	will	now	be	discussed.	
	
Again,	 like	 with	 leniency,	 for	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 settlement	 procedure	 to	 be	
achieved	 it	will	be	vital	 that	this	stage	 is	also	clear	and	transparent	so	that	an	
undertaking	understands	how	this	stage	will	apply.	Undertakings	are	unlikely	to	
request	to	use	settlements	if	they	do	not	understand	what	they	are	required	to	
do	or	what	they	have	to	agree	to	in	order	to	qualify	for	this.	If	the	undertaking	
cannot	make	sense	of	this	stage	early	on	within	the	Commission’s	proceedings	
then	 it	 means	 that	 the	 cost	 savings	 and	 efficiencies	 of	 this	 stage	 will	 not	 be	
achieved	to	their	potential	maximum	and,	as	such,	there	will	be	a	deadweight	
loss	to	both	parties.	Additionally,	if	an	undertaking	cannot	understand	how	this	
stage	 in	 the	 fining	procedure	works,	 they	may	not	be	 able	 to	 identify	or	 fully	
understand	the	potential	benefits	of	engaging	with	the	Commission	and	utilising	
this	stage	and,	as	such,	again	an	opportunity	is	missed	simply	owing	to	a	lack	of	
understanding	 of	 the	 procedure.	 Of	 course,	 this	 in	 itself	 can	 be	 remedied	 by	
providing	clarity	within	the	procedure	and	guidance	on	it.	Indeed,	perhaps	this	
is	 part	 of	 the	 reason	 there	 has	 been	 such	 a	 slow	 uptake	 by	 undertakings	 to	
request	to	use	this	procedure.	The	cost	benefits	to	the	Commission	in	ensuring	
that	this	stage	is	used	where	possible	cannot	be	emphasised	enough.	
																																																								
166	European	Commission,	‘Cartel	Case	Settlement’	
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/legislation/cartels_settlements/settlements_en.html
>	accessed	13	September	2014.	
167	It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	agreeing	to	settle	does	not	remove	an	undertaking’s	right	
to	appeal	the	settlement	decision	to	the	EU	courts.	
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Another	reason	that	clarity	within	the	operation	and	application	of	settlements	
(and	leniency	in	this	instance)	will	be	beneficial	is	that	it	helps	undertakings	and	
–	 more	 generally	 –	 the	 wider	 public	 at	 large	 to	 understand	 why	 certain	
companies	are	treated	differently	to	others,	and	why	in	some	cases	companies	
are	even	rewarded	with	immunity	for	reporting	illegal	behaviour	that	they	have	
partaken	 in.	 This	 is	 key	 as	 it	 helps	 to	 encourage	 good	 business	 behaviour	 by	
identifying	why	 these	stages	are	 required	and	 it	also	helps	bring	 legitimacy	 to	
these	stages	in	the	fining	process.	This	is	because	undertakings	and	the	general	
public	are	informed	(through	clarity	and	transparency	of	these	stages)	why	they	
are	necessary	and	how	they	are	applied	fairly.	In	addition,	by	having	certainty,	
transparency	 and	 clarity	 it	 will	 help	 quell	 claims	 of	 unequal	 treatment	 in	 the	
application	of	these	stages	by	the	Commission,	as	it	will	be	clear	to	undertakings	
why	they	have	been	treated	differently,	as	the	stages	clearly	explain	why	this	is	
the	case.	
	
As	we	can	see	 from	the	above	discussion,	 it	 is	 imperative	 that	 the	 settlement	
stage	 is	 clear,	 certain	 and	 applied	 fairly	 and	 transparently	 so	 that	 the	 cost	
benefits	of	the	utilisation	of	a	settlement	procedure	come	to	fruition,	that	the	
application	of	this	stage	is	seen	as	legitimate	and	that	it	is	fairly	applied.	
	
This	section	of	the	chapter	has	identified	why	procedural	rights,	legal	certainty	
and	 equal	 treatment	 are	 relevant	 considerations	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	
process.	It	has	established	that	these	principles	need	to	be	complied	with	for	a	
variety	of	reasons,	namely:	
	
1. Because	 legal	 certainty	 and	 equal	 treatment	 are	 fundamental	 legal	
principles	and	hence	are	required	to	be	complied	with;		
2. To	 prevent	 over-deterrence,	 which	 can	 lead	 to	 a	 reduction	 in	 pro-
competitive	behaviour	within	 the	market	which	 competition	 law	 seeks	
to	promote;	
3. To	prevent	the	perception	of	–	or	the	actual	occurrence	of	–	abuses	of	
process	by	the	Commission;		
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4. To	retain	the	legitimacy	of	the	underlying	offence,	the	Commission	and	
the	fining	process;	
5. For	 the	 financial	 implications	 and	 harm	 that	 uncertainty	 in	 the	 fining	
process	can	cause;	
6. To	ensure	that	the	leniency	and	settlement	stages	in	the	procedure	are	
as	effective	as	they	can	be	and	are	actively	utilised	by	undertakings;	
7. To	ensure	legitimacy	in	the	leniency	and	settlement	stages	of	the	fining	
procedure.	
	
Because	of	the	aforementioned	reasons,	ensuring	that	the	Commission’s	fining	
process	complies	with	these	principles	is	essential.	
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2.4	Conclusion	
	
There	has	been	considerable	interest	in	recent	years	regarding	procedural	rights	
and	rights	protection	within	the	area	of	EU	Competition	Law.168	This	chapter	has	
furthered	the	discussion	of	this	by	considering	a	variety	of	questions	within	this	
topic	 area,	 which	 have	 previously	 not	 been	 effectively	 addressed	 within	 the	
literature.	 These	 contributions	 shall	 now	 be	 identified,	 as	 shall	 the	 main	
conclusions	of	the	chapter.	
	
The	 chapter	 begun	 by	 considering	 whether	 corporations	 currently	 qualify	 for	
rights	protection	under	the	ECHR.	The	Travaux	Préparatoires’	were	consulted	to	
illustrate	how	corporations	were	always	envisaged	by	the	drafters	to	qualify	for	
rights	protection	under	the	Convention.	Next,	the	chapter	engaged	in	the	highly	
topical	discussion	of	whether	 corporations	 should	qualify	 for	 rights	protection	
under	the	ECHR.	First,	the	arguments	against	corporations	being	granted	rights	
protection	were	discussed	and	analysed.	This	was	so	the	fallacies	and	weakness	
within	these	could	be	identified.	A	variety	of	arguments	were	examined	which	
focused	 their	 attention	 on	 the	 ‘extension’,	 ‘conceptual’,	 ‘flood	 gate’	 and	
‘selective	 rights	 only’	 arguments.	 These	 were	 identified	 as	 the	 standard	
‘categories	of	arguments’	which	were	forwarded	against	corporations	qualifying	
for	rights	protection.	However,	the	flaws	with	these	arguments	were	identified	
and	 illustrated	 to	 the	 reader.	 A	 notable	 criticism	 was	 the	 selective-right	
argument,	 which	 appeared	 to	 lead	 the	 strongest	 claim	 against	 corporations	
qualifying	for	protection.	Nonetheless,	by	using	an	analogy	with	the	TFEU	it	was	
possible	 to	 illustrate	that	 this	challenge	was	not	as	strong	as	 it	 first	appeared.	
Indeed,	after	this	a	series	of	counter	arguments	for	corporations	qualifying	for	
rights	protection	were	forwarded.	These	primarily	comprised	of	illustrations	and	
arguments	as	to	why	corporations	need	rights	protection.	This	included	a	novel	
argument	 that	 had	 not	 been	 previous	 seen	 or	 discussed	 in	 the	 literature;	
namely,	 that	by	corporations	not	qualifying	 for	 the	 ‘standard	 right	protection’																																																									
168	For	example,	the	June	2014	CPI	Antitrust	Chronicle	(Spring	2014,	Vol	6	No	1)	focused	solely	
on	due	process	rights.	
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this	would	lead	to	issues	regarding	dual	prosecution	requirements.	This	section	
was	concluded	with	an	analysis	of	a	variety	of	cases	to	illustrate	in	practice	why	
rights	protection	is	necessary.	This	included	a	detailed	discussion	of	the	seminal	
case	 of	 Yukos	 Oil.	 This	 case	 clearly	 identified	 that	 without	 sufficient	 rights	
protection	at	an	international	level,	serious	rights	abuses	can	occur	which	have	
further	 reaching	 consequences	 than	 just	 to	 the	 firm.	 For	 example,	 the	 local	
economy	 and	 community	 can	 also	 suffer	 when	 a	 corporation’s	 rights	 are	
abused.	
	
The	chapter	then	shifted	its	focus	and	moved	on	to	explaining	the	significance	
of	the	remainder	of	the	research	that	this	thesis	conducts	and	why	the	research	
questions	 were	 specified	 as	 they	 were.	 This	 section	 begun	 by	 explaining	 the	
importance	of	the	ECHR	in	the	context	of	EU	Competition	Law.	Then,	the	reason	
the	 ECHR	 was	 chosen	 to	 form	 the	 foundation	 for	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	
Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 procedures	 against	 was	 explained;	 namely,	
because	 it	 is	 has	 a	 well-developed	 body	 of	 jurisprudence	 and	 is	 a	 truly	
independent	body.169	
	
The	 chapter	 concluded	 by	 demonstrating	 why	 there	 is	 a	 necessity	 for	
compliance	with	 rights	protection,	 legal	 certainty	and	equal	 application	 in	 the	
Commission’s	fining	process.	It	was	identified	that	this	was	not	merely	because	
of	 the	 legal	 requirements	 for	 compliance	 but	 for	 other	 additional	 non-legal	
benefits	 that	 can	ensue	 from	compliance	with	 the	principles	of	 legal	 certainty	
and	equal	treatment.	
		
Now	that	the	foundation	questions	of	the	thesis	have	been	answered	–	namely,	
why	 corporations	 need	 rights	 protection	 and	 why	 the	 ECHR	 is	 chosen	 and	 is	
applicable	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies	 –	 and	 their	
significance	 established,	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	 thesis	 will	 take	 each	 of	 the																																																									
169	As	independent	as	one	can	be.	Even	the	ECtHR	seems	restrained	in	some	respects,	for	
instance,	the	fact	that	its	continued	existence	is	based	on	the	consent	of	the	signatory	parties	to	
abide	by	the	Courts	decisions	and	not	to	withdraw	from	the	Convention.	For	a	practical	example	
of	what	seems	to	be	a	restrained	approach	in	parts	by	the	Court	see	the	Yukos	Oil	judgment.	
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chosen	 rights	 and	 legal	 principles	 and	 apply	 them	 to	 the	 three	 cartel	
enforcement	procedures	of	the	Commission.	First,	Chapter	3	will	consider	legal	
certainty	 and	 equal	 treatment	 concerns	 alongside	 the	 Commission’s	 current	
fining	policy.	Chapter	4	analyses	disclosure	of	confidential	 leniency	documents	
in	 follow-on	 damage	 cases	 beside	 an	 undertakings	 legitimate	 expectation	 of	
non-disclosure,	the	UK	equitable	doctrine	of	breach	of	confidence	and	the	right	
to	respect	for	private	and	family	 life.	Finally,	Chapter	5	concludes	by	analysing	
the	 Commission’s	 direct	 settlement	 procedure	 and	 the	 US	 system	 of	 plea	
bargaining,	 in	 competition	 law	 cases,	 against	 the	 right	 to	 a	 fair	 trial	 so	 as	 to	
identify	 if	 the	 EU	 can	 enhance	 its	 direct	 settlement	 procedure	 from	 the	 US	
approach	or	implement	a	plea	bargaining	procedure.	
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Chapter	3:	Evaluating	legal	certainty	
and	equal	treatment	within	the	
European	Commission’s	fining	policy	
for	cartels1	
	
3.1	Introduction	
	
Article	101(1)	of	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	(TFEU)2	
prohibits,	inter	alia,	agreements	between	competitors,	concerted	practices	and	
decisions	of	 associations	of	 undertakings	 that	 fix	 prices,	 restrict	 output,	 share	
markets	or	rig	bids.3	An	undertaking	that	violates	this	provision	may	be	liable	for	
fines	 of	 up	 to	 ten	 percent	 of	 its	 annual	 worldwide	 turnover.4	The	 European	
Commission	 (hereafter,	 ‘the	 Commission’)	 enforces	 Article	 101	 TFEU	 and	 has	
the	power	to	 impose	corporate	fines	for	breaches	of	Article	101(1)	TFEU.5	The	
fines	 imposed	by	 the	Commission	have	been	 substantial.	 The	highest	 fine	 the	
Commission	has	imposed	on	an	undertaking	is	over	€896	million	and	the	largest	
fine	imposed	on	a	collective	cartel	is	over	€1.3	billion.6	Given	the	extensiveness	
of	 these	 fines,	 it	 is	 important	 that	 the	Commission	decides	 and	 imposes	 fines	
under	 a	 clear	 and	 transparent	 process	 that	 is	 applied	 equally	 to	 each	
undertaking.	 Indeed,	 there	 are	 general	 principles	 under	 EU	 law	 that	 require	
certainty	 and	 the	 equal	 application	 of	 the	 law.	 Legal	 certainty,	 for	 example,	
requires	that	‘those	subject	to	the	law	[…]	know	what	the	law	is	so	as	to	be	able	
																																																								
1	A	draft	of	Chapter	3	was	presented	at	the	8th	Competition	Law	and	Economics	European	
Network	(‘CLEEN’)	Workshop	in	Norwich	on	the	10th	June	2014.	The	feedback	and	comments	
from	the	attendees	of	the	conference	is	greatly	appreciated.	
2	[2008]	OJ	C115/47.	
3	Article	101	TFEU	only	applies	when	the	agreement	affects	trade	between	Member	States.	
4	Council	Regulation	(EC)	No	1/2003	of	16	December	2002	on	the	Implementation	of	the	Rules	
on	Competition	laid	down	in	Articles	81	and	82	of	the	Treaty,	(2003)	OJ	L1/1,	Article	23	(2).	
5	ibid.	
6	Commission,	‘Cartels	-	Leniency’	<ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/leniency/leniency.html>	
accessed	10	August	2015.	
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to	plan	 their	actions	according’.7	On	the	other	hand,	equal	 treatment	 requires	
that	 undertakings	 be	 treated	 'equally	 before	 the	 law'. 8 	Currently,	 the	
Commission’s	 fining	 procedure	 may	 fall	 foul	 of	 these	 requirements	 so	 it	 is	
important	 to	 consider	 whether	 this	 is	 the	 case.	 In	 recent	 years,	 it	 has	 been	
suggested	 that	 fines	 imposed	 on	 undertakings	 have	 been	 increasing, 9 	so	
concerns	 regarding	 a	 clear,	 transparent	 and	 fairly	 applied	 fining	 process	 have	
become	progressively	more	significant.	Indeed,	this	suggestion	of	an	increase	in	
fining	 by	 the	 Commission	 has	 even	 led	 some	 commentators	 to	 question	 the	
Commission’s	 fining	 procedures.10	For	 these	 reasons,	 this	 chapter	 aims	 to	
answer	 the	 questions	 (a)	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 procedure	
complies	 with	 the	 requirements	 of	 legal	 certainty	 and	 (b)	 whether	 the	
Commission	applies	its	fining	policy	equally	to	all	undertakings.	
	
Research	 has	 been	 conducted	 into	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 procedure,	 often	
with	particular	focus	being	given	to	the	optimal	level	of	fines	or	to	the	ways	of	
achieving	 the	 best	 deterrent	 effect.11	Empirical	 analysis	 of	 the	 Commission’s	
fining	decisions	has	also	been	undertaken	in	the	 literature.	Geradin	and	Henry	
have	 conducted	 a	 review	 of	 the	 EU	 fining	 policy	 under	 the	 old	 1998	 Fining	
																																																								
7	Takis	Tridimas,	The	General	Principles	of	EC	Law	(OUP,	1999)	163.	See	also,	Joined	Cases	212-
17/80	Salumi	[1981]	ECR	2735.	
8	Tridimas	ibid	40.	See	also,	Case	T-31/99	ABB	Asea	Brown	Boveri	v	Commission	[2002]	ECR	II-
1881.	
9	This	is	debatable;	Veljanovski	has	found	that	in	some	instances	fines	are	higher	and	in	others	
they	are	lower.	Cento	Veljanovski,	‘Are	European	Cartel	Fines	Ridiculously	High?’	(2012)	Case	
Associates	-	Case	Note	
<http://www.casecon.com/data/pdfs/Casenote63HighfinesFeb2012.pdf>	accessed	30	May	
2013.	Figures	available	from	the	Commission	show	fining	levels	have	fluctuated	between	2008	
and	2015.	Commission,	‘Cartel	Statistics’	
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf>	accessed	10	August	2015.	
10	Charles	Forelle,	‘EU	Cartel	Fines	Elicit	Human-Rights	Argument’	The	Wall	Street	Journal	(May	
16	2011)	<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704681904576319442582839696-
search.html>	accessed	31	May	2013,	suggesting	that	‘the	EU's	procedures	are	so	flawed	it	
should	not	be	permitted	to	dispense	such	big	penalties	at	all’.	
11	For	example,	Wouter	P	Wils,	‘Optimal	Antitrust	Fines:	Theory	and	Practice’	(2006)	29(2)	World	
Competition	183,	Wernhard	Moschel,	‘Fines	in	European	competition	law’	(2011)	32(7)	ECLR	
369	and	Cento	Veljanovski,	‘Cartel	Fines	in	Europe:	Law,	Practice	and	Deterrence’	(2007)	30(1)	
World	Competition	65.	
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Guidelines.12	By	considering	the	cases	under	the	1998	Guidelines	they	were	able	
to	 make	 various	 observations,	 including:	 that	 most	 infringements	 were	
categorised	as	‘severe’	or	‘very	severe’,	were	of	medium	or	long	duration	and,	
that	the	most	aggravating	factor	for	fining	was	being	a	ring	leader.	Others	have	
assessed	specific	Commission	and	court	decisions	in	an	attempt	to	identify	the	
extent	 to	 which	 deterrence	 is	 used	 in	 the	 setting	 of	 fines.13	In	 more	 recent	
years,	others	have	analysed	cases	under	the	updated	2006	Fining	Guidelines.14	
For	 example,	 Veljanovski	 has	 undertaken	 an	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 twenty-two	
cartel-fining	 decisions	 handed	 down	 by	 the	 Commission.15	He	 identified	 a	
number	 of	 results,	 but	 of	 particular	 relevance	 for	 this	 research	 is	 the	 finding	
that	 the	 Commission’s	 non-confidential	 published	 decisions	 often	 redact	 key	
information	on	the	fining	process.	Connor	has	conducted	research	into	whether	
the	Commission	has	become	more	severe	 in	 its	punishment	of	cartelists	 since	
the	 introduction	of	 the	2006	Fining	Guidelines.16	He	found	that	the	severity	of	
cartel	 fines	 is	 more	 than	 five	 times	 higher	 then	 those	 calculated	 under	 the	
previous	 1998	Guidelines,	 that	 the	 frequency	 and	 size	 of	 recidivism	discounts	
had	increased	under	these	new	Guidelines	and	that	the	Commission	had	been	
inconsistent	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	 recidivism	 penalties	 in	 the	 manner	
promised	 in	 its	 2006	 Guidelines.17	Both	 of	 these	 pieces	 of	 research	 highlight	
what	appears	to	be	a	lack	of	transparency	in	the	Commission’s	fining	procedure	
and	 suggests	 also	 that	 the	 Commission	 is	 not	 following	 its	 Fining	 Guidelines	
correctly.	This	therefore	raises	concerns	with	regards	to	legal	certainty	and	the	
equal	treatment	of	undertakings.																																																										
12	Damien	Geradin	and	David	Henry,	‘The	EC	fining	policy	for	violations	of	competition	law:	An	
empirical	review	of	the	Commission	decisional	practice	and	the	Community	courts’	judgments’	
(2005)	1(2)	ECJ	401.	
13	Morten	Hviid	and	Andreas	Stephan,	‘The	Graphite	Electrodes	cartel:	fines	which	deter?’	
Chapter	5,	Cases	in	European	Competition	Policy:	The	Economic	Analysis,	Bruce	Lyons	(eds),	
(Cambridge	University	Press:	Cambridge	2009).	
14	Commission,	‘Guidelines	on	the	method	of	setting	fines	imposed	pursuant	to	Article	23(2)(a)	
of	Regulation	No	1/2003	(Guidelines	on	fining	undertakings)’	[2006]	OJ	C210/02.	
15	Cento	Veljanovski,	‘European	Cartel	Fines	under	the	2006	Penalty	Guidelines:	A	Statistical	
Analysis’	(2010)	Case	Associates	
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1723843>	accessed	27	May	2013.	
16	John	M	Connor,	‘Has	the	European	Commission	become	more	severe	in	punishing	cartels?	
Effects	of	the	2006	Guidelines’	(2011)	32(1)	ECLR	27.	
17	Particularly,	the	Commission	had	been	lenient	towards	undertakings	by	failing	to	take	into	
account	numerous	previous	violations.	
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Much	of	the	research	conducted	into	fines	mentions	certainty	concerns	within	
the	 Fining	 Guidelines	 and	 procedure,	 but	 fails	 to	 analyse	 these	 concerns	 in	
detail	 or	 assess	 the	 legal	 implications	 of	 this.	 There	 are,	 however,	 some	
exceptions	to	this.	Torre,	for	example,	has	analysed	each	step	in	the	2006	Fining	
Guidelines	 and	 identified	 that	 non-retrospectivity	 is	 not	 breached	 by	 their	
application	 to	cases	prior	 to	 the	enactment	of	 the	Guidelines.	However,	Torre	
did	not	 consider	other	 legal	 certainty	 and	equal	 treatment	 concerns,	which	 is	
one	 area	 where	 this	 chapter	 shall	 differ.18	Hawk	 and	 Nathalie	 have	 looked	
broadly	at	legal	certainty	concerns	in	relation	to	Article	101	TFEU	but	have	not	
analysed	 the	 fining	 process	 itself.19	David	 has	 discussed	 some	 of	 the	 legal	
certainty	 concerns	 under	 the	 2006	 Fining	 Guidelines	 such	 as	 the	 areas	 of	
vagueness	contained	in	parts	of	the	Guidelines,	the	Commission’s	discretion	and	
the	need	to	achieve	deterrence	in	a	particular	case.20	He	has	not	analysed	every	
stage	 of	 the	 fining	 process	 in	 detail,	 nor	 has	 he	 assessed	 whether	 these	
concerns	occur	 in	practice.	 Scordamaglia-Tousis	has	 considered	 legal	 certainty	
(in	 the	 context	 of	 foreseeability),	 non-retroactivity	 and	 ne	 bis	 in	 idem	 with	
regards	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 2006	 Fining	 Guidelines.21	He	 identified	 that	 the	
2006	 Guidelines	 offer	 a	 departure	 from	 the	 old	 system	 of	 ‘transparent	
unpredictability’	 and	 advocates	 that	 the	 Court	 provides	 clearer	 theoretical	
foundation	 for	 predictability.22	He	 also	 found	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 current	
procedure	 does	 not	 manifestly	 depart	 from	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	
Human	Rights,23	hereafter	 ‘the	ECHR’	minimum	foreseeability	 threshold.24	This	
chapter	improves	upon	the	research	that	Scordamaglia-Tousis	has	conducted	by																																																									
18	Fernando	C	D	L	Torre,	‘The	2006	Guidelines	on	Fines:	Reflections	on	the	Commission’s	
Practice’	(2010)	33(3)	World	Competition	359.		
19	Barry	E	Hawk	and	Denaeijer	Nathalie,	‘The	Development	of	Articles	81	and	82:	Legal	Certainty’	
in	Claus-Dieter	Ehlermann	&	Isabela	Atanasiu	(eds),	European	Competition	Law	Annual	2000:	
The	Modernisation	of	EC	Antitrust	Policy	(Hart	Publishing:	Oxford	2001)	129.	
20	Eric	David,	‘Chapter	8	–	Tools	for	an	Optimal	Enforcement	of	European	Antitrust	Law:	
Examples	of	Guidelines	on	the	Method	of	Setting	Fines	and	on	Commitment	Proceedings.	Is	the	
European	Commission	Right?’	in	Loannis	Lianos	and	Loannis	Kokkoris	(eds),	The	Reform	of	EC	
Competition	Law:	New	Challenges	(Kluwer	Law	International	BV:	Netherlands	2012)	139.	
21	Andreas	Scordamaglia-Tousis,	EU	Cartel	Enforcement:	Reconciling	Effective	Public	
Enforcement	with	Fundamental	Rights	(Wolters	Kluwer	Law	International	2013).	
22	ibid	419.	
23	European	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Human	Rights	and	Fundamental	Freedoms,	Rome,	
4.X1.1950.	
24	Scordamaglia-Tousis	(n	21)	419.	
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considering	 specific	 stages	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 Fining	 Guidelines,	 the	 ten	
percent	 cap,	 the	 Commission’s	 discretion	 within	 the	 application	 of	 the	
Guidelines,	and	whether	 the	Guidelines	are	applied	equally	 to	undertakings	 in	
practice.	
	
There	 has	 also	 been	 a	 lack	 of	 analysis	 within	 the	 literature	 of	 the	 concerns	
regarding	 equal	 treatment	 of	 undertakings	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	
Commission’s	fining	process.25	This	is	an	important	consideration,	given	that	the	
aforementioned	 literature	 appears	 to	 illustrate	 that	 the	 Commission	 is	 not	
following	 its	 Guidelines	 nor	 being	 very	 transparent	 with	 how	 it	 reaches	 its	
decisions.26	The	opportunity	to	assess	whether	the	Commission	has	applied	 its	
fining	 policy	 equally	 is	 often	 available	 with	 the	 data	 collected	 by	 researchers	
but,	 unfortunately,	 a	 lack	 of	 analysis	 has	 been	 conducted	 into	 whether	 the	
Commission	applies	 its	policy	equally	 to	undertakings.27	Gilliams	has	discussed	
competition	 law	 fines	 and	 the	 requirement	 of	 proportionality,	 which	 in	 parts	
incorporates	 the	 necessity	 for	 equality.28	He	 identified	 the	 problem	 between	
balancing	 the	 need	 for	 proportionality	 with	 deterrence	 within	 fining	
undertakings.29	However,	 there	 have	 been	 some	 studies	 considering	 equality	
within	the	Commission’s	fining	procedure.	Voss	has	examined	the	Commission’s	
fining	 procedure	 and	 whether	 the	 principle	 of	 equality	 acts	 as	 a	 limit	 to	 the	
Commission’s	discretion.30	She	identified	that	the	principle	of	equality	has	‘very																																																									
25	Stephan	has	touched	upon	the	differences	in	treatment	of	undertakings	regarding	the	‘in	
ability	to	pay	discounts’	briefly	in	Andreas	Stephan,	‘The	bankruptcy	wildcard	in	cartel	cases’	
(2006)	Journal	of	Business	Law	510,	526-527.	
26	Veljanovski	(n	15)	and	Connor	(n	16).	
27	For	example	of	opportunities	for	this	analysis	to	be	considered	see,	Cento	Veljanovski,	
‘European	Cartel	Fines	under	the	2006	Penalty	Guidelines:	A	Statistical	Analysis’	(2010)	Case	
Associates	<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1723843>	accessed	27	May	
2013,	John	M	Connor,	‘Has	the	European	Commission	become	more	severe	in	punishing	cartels?	
Effects	of	the	2006	Guidelines’	(2011)	32(1)	ECLR	27,	Damien	Geradin	and	David	Henry,	‘The	EC	
fining	policy	for	violations	of	competition	law:	An	empirical	review	of	the	Commission	decisional	
practice	and	the	Community	courts’	judgments’	(2005)	1(2)	ECJ	401.	
28	Hans	Gilliams,	‘Proportionality	of	Fines	for	Infringements	of	Competition	Law’	in	Dirk	Arts	and	
others	(eds),	Liber	Amicorum	Jacques	Steenbergen,	mundi	et	Eurpae	civil	(Larcier,	2014)	and	
Hans	Gilliams,	‘Proportionality	of	EU	Competition	Fines:	Proposal	for	a	Principled	Discussion’	
(2014)	37(4)	World	Competition	435.	
29	This	is	something	that	is	similarly	problematic	when	balancing	equality	and	deterrence.	
30	Katharina	Voss,	‘The	Principle	of	Equality:	A	Limit	to	the	Commission’s	Discretion	in	EU	
Competition	Law	Enforcement’	(2013)	Global	Antitrust	Review	149.	
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little	 influence’	 on	 the	 Commission’s	 actions.31	This	 chapter	 goes	 further	 and	
considers	 specific	 stages	within	 the	Commission’s	Fining	Guidelines	 to	 identify	
potential	equality	problems.	Meyring	has	analysed	one	of	the	recent	European	
General	 Court’s	 (GC)	 judgments	 and	 identified	 that	 the	 Court	 is	 not	 ensuring	
consistency	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 Fining	 Guidelines.32	Thus,	
there	 is	 a	 clear	 gap	 here	 that	 warrants	 investigation.	 This	 chapter	 seeks	 to	
address	 this	 gap	within	 the	 literature	 by	 assessing	whether	 the	 Commission’s	
fining	 process	 complies	with	 the	 requirements	 of	 legal	 certainty	 and	 of	 equal	
treatment.	 To	 enable	 this	 research	 question	 to	 be	 answered	 and	 analysed	
effectively,	the	chapter	is	split	into	two	sections.		
	
The	 chapter	 begins	 by	 analysing	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process	 so	 as	 to	
establish	whether	 it	 complies	with	 the	 principle	 of	 legal	 certainty.	 It	 achieves	
this	 analysis	 by	 assessing	 (a)	 the	 use	 of	 non-exhaustive	 lists,	 (b)	 the	 ‘specific	
deterrence’	 stage,	 and	 (c)	 the	 ten	 percent	 cap.	 Alongside	 this	 assessment,	 an	
examination	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 discretion	 is	 pursued,	 regarding	 what	 the	
benefits	and	problems	with	 this	discretion	are	and	whether	 the	Commission’s	
fining	process	breaches	Article	7	of	the	ECHR.	After	the	potential	legal	certainty	
concerns	 within	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process	 have	 been	 discussed,	 the	
chapter	moves	 on	 to	 assess	 and	 analyse	whether	 the	 Commission	 applies	 its	
fining	 process	 equally	 to	 all	 undertakings.	 It	 achieves	 this	 by	 considering	 the	
Commission’s	application	of	the	Fining	Guidelines	to	undertakings,	specifically:	
(a)	the	inability	to	pay	discount	(hereafter,	‘ITP’)	stage,	(b)	the	nationality	of	an	
undertaking	and	(c)	National	Champions	(hereafter,	‘NC’).	
	
	 	
																																																								
31	ibid.		
32	Bernd	Meyring,	‘How	much	Consistency	is	Required	for	Cartel	Fines?’	(2013)	4(2)	Journal	of	
European	Competition	Law	&	Practice	142.	
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3.2	Is	the	EU	cartel	fining	policy	consistent	with	legal	certainty?	
	
As	 established	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 it	 will	 be	 important	 that	 the	
Commission’s	policies	comply	with	the	rights	enshrined	in	the	ECHR,	particularly	
legal	certainty.	This	part	of	 the	chapter	proceeds	 to	analyse	 the	Commission’s	
fining	 process	 to	 identify	 whether	 it	 complies	 with	 the	 principle	 of	 legal	
certainty.	Before	commencing	 this	analysis	 the	Commission’s	 fining	procedure	
shall	be	examined	and	explained.			
	
The	Commission’s	fining	policy	is	set	out	in	a	variety	of	policy	documents.	These	
documents	 are	 known	 as	 ‘soft	 law’	 as	 they	 are	 Guidelines	 that	 aid	 the	
Commission	 in	 its	 interpretation	 and	 enforcement	 of	 the	 law.	 The	 Fining	
Guidelines	themselves	lay	down	the	procedure	for	the	fining	process	but	should	
not	be	consulted	alone,	as	they	do	not	cover	all	of	the	Commission’s	policies	in-
depth.33	One	 should	 also	 consult	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	 notice,34	direct	
settlement	 procedure35	and	 Council	 Regulation	 No	 1/2003	 documentation	 to	
fully	understand	the	fining	process.		
	
The	Commission	published	its	original	Guidelines	on	the	method	of	setting	fines	
on	the	14	January	1998.36	Prior	to	the	 introduction	of	the	Guidelines,	a	variety	
of	 judgments	 by	 the	 EU	 courts	 highlighted	 the	 desirability	 of	 the	 Commission	
making	its	methods	of	calculating	and	enforcing	fines	more	transparent.37	Thus,	
the	 1998	 Guidelines	 were	 published	 to	 ensure	 that	 transparency	 and	
																																																								
33	Commission,	(n	14).	
34	Commission,	‘Commission	Notice	on	Immunity	from	fines	and	reduction	of	fines	in	cartel	
cases	(Leniency	in	cartel	cases)’	[2006]	OJ	C298/17.	
35	Commission,	‘Commission	Notice	on	the	conduct	of	settlement	procedures	in	view	of	the	
adoption	of	Decisions	pursuant	to	Article	7	and	Article	23	of	Council	Regulation	(EC)	No	1/2003	
in	cartel	cases’	[2008]	OJ	C167/1.	
36	Commission,	‘Guidelines	on	the	method	of	setting	fines	imposed	pursuant	to	Article	15(2)	of	
Regulation	No	17	and	Article	65(5)	of	the	ECSC	Treaty’	[1998]	OJ	C9/3.	Prior	to	this,	the	fines	
were	calculated	without	any	Guidelines.	The	operation	of	this	system	led	to	a	variety	of	
concerns	being	raised	against	the	Commission.	See	Bael	for	a	discussion	of	these	concerns:	Ivo	
Van	Bael,	‘Fining	a	la	carte:	the	lottery	of	the	EU	competition	law’	(1995)	16(4)	ECLR	237.	
37	For	example,	see	Case	T-309/94	KPN	v	Commission	[1998]	II-1007	paras	77	and	78.	
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impartiality	 ensued	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 decisions.38	These	 Guidelines	 were	
then	replaced	with	new	Guidelines	in	2006	to	further	develop	this	policy	and	to	
provide	a	greater	degree	of	certainty	for	undertakings.		
	
The	Commission’s	leniency	policy	was	introduced	in	its	first	incarnation	in	1996,	
but	 was	 amended	 in	 2002	 and	 again	 in	 2006	 to	 provide	 a	 greater	 degree	 of	
certainty	for	undertakings	in	how	leniency	is	awarded	by	the	Commission.				
	
On	 the	 30	 June	 2008,	 the	 Commission	 introduced	 its	 settlement	 procedure.39	
This	 procedure	 allows	 undertakings	 to	 settle	 their	 case	 with	 the	 Commission	
and	 receive	 a	 reduction	 in	 fine	 for	 doing	 so.	 The	 settlement	 procedure	 helps	
speed	 up	 cases	 and	 reduces	 costs	 for	 the	 Commission	 and	 undertakings	 by	
allowing	a	streamlined	approach	to	be	taken.40	
	
Diagram	3.1	below	and	Table	Apen.1	 in	 the	Annex	 illustrates	 the	method	 the	
Commission	utilises	when	calculating	fines	for	competition	law	breaches.	
	 	
																																																								
38	Commission	(n	14)	para	3.	
39	Commission,	‘Antitrust:	Commission	introduces	settlement	procedure	for	cartels’	Commission	
press	release	(20	June	2008)	<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-
1056_en.htm?locale=en>	accessed	2	June	2013.	
40	Commission,	‘Antitrust:	Commission	introduces	settlement	procedure	for	cartels	–	frequently	
asked	questions’	<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-458_en.htm>	accessed	24	
June	2013.	
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Diagram	3.1	Summary	of	the	2006	Commission	Fining	Process	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
The	Commission	has	a	great	deal	of	discretion	in	the	setting	of	a	fine.	Indeed,	if	
one	looks	at	the	Fining	Guidelines	themselves,	it	clearly	states	that:	
	 	
‘In	exercising	its	power	to	impose	such	fines,	the	Commission	
enjoys	 a	 wide	 margin	 of	 discretion	 within	 the	 limits	 set	 by	
Regulation	No	1/2003.'41		
	
Discretion	is	beneficial	in	relation	to	flexibility	to	punish	undertakings	effectively	
for	competition	 law	breaches	as,	by	having	this	flexibility,	the	Commission	can	
take	 a	 variety	 of	 factors	 into	 consideration.	 For	 example,	 some	 undertakings’	
competition	law	breaches	may	be	more	heinous	than	others	and	thus	worthy	of	
a	harsher	punishment,	such	as	where	the	undertaking	has	previously	engaged	in	
a	cartel	or	was	a	ringleader	of	the	cartel	and	coerced	other	undertakings	to	join	
the	 cartel.	 However,	 by	 having	 this	 flexibility	 it	 also	 means	 that	 there	 is	 an	
																																																								
41	Commission	(n	14)	para	2,	emphasis	added.		
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inevitable	trade-off	with	certainty	for	undertakings.	This	is	because,	to	allow	for	
this	 flexibility,	 there	 has	 to	 be	 a	 wider	 margin	 of	 appreciation	 for	 the	
Commission	 in	 the	 Guidelines	 than	 would	 otherwise	 be	 the	 case	 where	 the	
Guidelines	were	more	 restrictive.	The	 important	question	here	 is	whether	 the	
amount	of	discretion	that	the	Commission	has	within	the	fining	process	causes	
enough	 of	 a	 challenge	 to	 legal	 certainty	 to	 raise	 legitimate	 concerns	 under	
Article	7	ECHR.	To	enable	this	analysis	to	be	conducted	effectively,	the	research	
shall	focus	on	three	specific	areas	of	the	Commission’s	fining	process.	First,	the	
use	 of	 non-exhaustive	 lists	 shall	 be	 considered	 and	 assessed.	 Then,	 the	
calculation	of	the	criterion	of	‘specific	deterrence’	will	be	analysed;	and	finally,	
the	 use	 of	 a	 maximum	 ten	 percent	 cap	 is	 considered	 alongside	 the	
Commission’s	discretion	to	impose	a	fine	under	this	cap.		
	
The	 empirical	 analysis	 within	 this	 section	 and	 the	 following	 section	 uses	 a	
variety	 of	 data	 sources.	 The	 data	 is	 predominately	 drawn	 from	 the	 Global	
Competition	 Review's	 (GCR)	 raw	 data	 set,	 'GCR	 EU	 Cartel	 Survey',	 which	
contains	 information	 on	 cartels	 from	 January	 2005	 -	 July	 2012.42	However,	 it	
also	 consults	 the	 Commission's	 non-official	web	 versions	 of	 the	 decisions	 and	
GC	and	European	Court	of	Justice	(ECJ)	decisions.	Additionally,	as	Article	7	of	the	
ECHR	 is	 being	 considered,	 cases	 from	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights	
(ECtHR)	will	be	assessed	alongside	other	national	cases	that	consider	the	ECHR	
or	the	national	legislative	equivalent.	
	
3.2.1	The	use	of	non-exhaustive	lists	
Within	 its	 fining	 process,	 the	 Commission	 utilises	 a	 non-exhaustive	 list	 of	
aggravating43	and	mitigating44	factors	that	can	lead	the	Commission	to	increase	
or	reduce	the	fine	it	imposes	on	an	undertaking.45		
																																																								
42	GCR,	'GCR	EU	Cartel	survey'	<http://globalcompetitionreview.com/indepth/444/eu-cartel-
survey/>	accessed	12	July	2013.	
43	The	aggregating	factors	listed	in	the	Guidelines	include	the	following:	where	an	undertaking	
continues	or	repeats	the	same	or	similar	infringement,	where	an	undertaking	refuses	to	
cooperate	or	is	obstructive	and,	finally,	where	the	undertaking	was	the	leader/instigator	or	was	
a	coercer	in	the	cartel.	
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Non-exhaustive	 lists	 by	 their	 very	 nature	 allow	 other	 factors	 –	which	 are	 not	
listed	–	to	be	considered,	owing	to	the	fact	that	the	list	does	not	contain	all	the	
potential	 factors	 that	 can	be	 considered	by	 the	Commission.	 Therefore,	 these	
lists	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 form	 of	 guidance	 on	 likely	 (aggravating	 or	 mitigating)	
factors	 that	 the	 Commission	 can	 or	 could	 consider	 in	 its	 fining	 decision.	 By	
utilising	a	non-exhaustive	list,	it	allows	the	Commission	a	degree	of	flexibility	in	
its	 fining	 process	 so	 that	 they	 can	 consider	 factors	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis,	
which	 would	 not	 be	 possible	 if	 these	 lists	 were	 exhaustive.	 This	 flexibility	 is	
important,	 as	 each	 cartel’s	 situation	 and	 circumstances	 can	 be	 very	 different,	
and	 what	 may	 need	 to	 be	 considered	 in	 one	 cartel	 may	 not	 be	 relevant	 or	
important	in	another	cartel	decision.	
	 	
From	 a	 legal	 certainty	 perspective,	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 two	 predominant	
concerns	here.	Firstly,	does	a	non-exhaustive	 list	provide	enough	certainty	 for	
an	 undertaking	 so	 as	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 requirements	 of	 legal	 certainty?	
Secondly,	 does	 the	 lack	 of	 specific	 guidance	 on	 how	 much	 the	 increase	 or	
decrease	 in	 fine	will	be	 from	the	aggravating	or	mitigating	 factor	comply	with	
Article	7	of	the	ECHR?						
	
The	 benefits	 to	 the	 Commission	 and	 undertakings	 of	 the	 use	 of	 flexible	 non-
exhaustive	 lists	 were	 highlighted	 above.	 This	 chapter	 shall	 now	 analyse	 the	
concerns	that	arise	out	of	the	utilisation	of	such	lists.	The	flexibility,	which	was	
highly	praised	in	the	above	discussion	as	a	benefit,	may	also	act	as	a	detriment	
in	 allowing	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 factors	 to	 be	 considered.	 This	 means	 that	
undertakings	 cannot	 be	 certain	 of	 what	 factors	 will	 be	 considered	 by	 the	
Commission	 as	 the	 list	 is	 not	 completely	 exhaustive.	 This	 flexibility	 can	 also	
potentially	allow	impartiality	and	unequal	treatment	to	enter	the	Commission’s																																																																																																																																																							
44	Mitigating	factors	listed	include:	where	an	undertaking	terminated	the	agreement	as	soon	as	
the	Commission	intervened,	where	the	undertaking	can	show	that	the	infringement	occurred	
because	of	negligence	on	its	behalf,	where	the	undertaking	shows	that	their	involvement	in	the	
infringement	was	substantially	limited,	where	the	undertaking	effectively	cooperates	with	the	
Commission	or	where	the	conduct	was	encouraged	by	legislation	or	public	authorities.	
45	Step	four	of	the	Commission’s	fining	process	allows	for	aggravating	factors	to	be	considered	
and	step	five	allows	for	the	consideration	of	mitigating	factors.	
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decisions,	 as	 they	 can	 decide	 to	 consider	 other	 factors,	 as	 the	 lists	 are	 non-
exhaustive	 and	 therefore	 flexible.	 This	 could	 mean	 that	 the	 Commission	
considers	erroneous	and	irrelevant	factors	in	their	fining	decisions.	This	lack	of	
certainty	shall	now	be	assessed	by	utilising	the	relevant	jurisprudence.	
	
Upon	examination	of	 the	relevant	case	 law,	we	see	that	when	non-exhaustive	
lists	are	discussed	the	Courts	do	not	point	to	any	ability	of	a	non-exhaustive	list	
to	raise	a	challenge	on	legal	certainty	grounds.	For	example,	in	the	ECtHR	Grand	
Chamber	 decision	 of	 Kononov	 v	 Latvia,46	the	 Charter	 annexed	 to	 the	 London	
Agreement	was	discussed.47	This	 contained	 a	 ‘non-exhaustive	 list	 of	 violations	
of	 the	 laws	and	customs	of	war’.48	During	 this	 case,	 the	Grand	Chamber	were	
addressing	 concerns	 the	 applicant	 raised	 in	 regards	 to	 legal	 certainty;	 yet	 the	
Court	at	no	point	suggested	that	a	non-exhaustive	list	was	insufficient	for	legal	
certainty	 to	 stem	 from	 that	 list.	 Similarly,	 in	 the	 UK	 case	 of	Regina	 (Purdy)	 v	
Director	 of	 Public	 Prosecutions	 (Society	 for	 the	 Protection	 of	 Unborn	 Children	
intervening) 49 	when	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 discussed	 assisted	 suicide	 they	
considered	the	guidance	that	was	given	in	the	‘Code	for	Crown	Prosecutors’	for	
determining	whether	to	prosecute	a	case	or	not.	This	Code	included	a	 list	of	a	
variety	of	non-exhaustive	factors.50	The	Court	of	Appeal	explained	that	this	 list	
was	cited	to	illustrate	‘the	breadth	of	criteria	that	play	a	part	depending	on	the	
particular	crime	concerned’.51	Given	the	comments	made	here	one	can	see	that	
the	Court	of	Appeal	do	not	feel	 that	by	merely	having	a	potentially	 large	non-
exhaustive	list	of	criteria	that	it	automatically	causes	concerns	on	legal	certainty	
grounds.	Indeed,	it	seems	from	the	comments	made	in	this	case	that	the	Courts	
value	the	flexibility	a	list	like	this	offers.	
																																																								
46	(2010)	ECHR	667.	
47	The	Charter	annexed	to	the	London	Agreement	that	was	discussed	in	this	case	was	the	
Charter	of	the	International	Military	Tribunal	–	Annex	to	the	Agreement	for	the	prosecution	and	
punishment	of	the	major	war	criminals	of	the	European	Axis,	often	referred	to	as	the	
‘Nuremberg	Charter’.	It	sets	down	the	procedures	and	laws	by	which	the	Nuremberg	trials	were	
to	be	conducted.			
48	Kononov	v	Latvia	(2010)	ECHR	667	para	117.	
49	[2009]	UKHL	45.	
50	ibid	para	16.	
51	ibid	para	17.	
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Based	on	 these	decisions,	 it	 seems	 implicit	 that	 the	Courts	 are	 accepting	 that	
non-exhaustive	lists	provide	–	at	least	in	principle	–	enough	certainty	to	comply	
with	 the	 necessary	 requirements	 of	 legal	 certainty.	 Therefore,	 it	 seems	
reasonable	 to	 conclude	 that,	 by	merely	 utilising	 a	 non-exhaustive	 list,	 it	 does	
not	 mean	 that	 uncertainty	 will	 ensue	 for	 undertakings.	 Indeed,	 we	 find	
numerous	 pieces	 of	 legislation	 and	 guidance	 which	 do	 in	 fact	 contain	 non-
exhaustive	lists.	Therefore,	the	question	that	needs	to	be	considered	is	one	on	
the	 nature	 of	 guidance	 given	 by	 the	 Commission.	 This	 is	where	 our	 attention	
shall	now	turn	in	our	analysis,	considering	the	implications	of	this	lack	of	specific	
guidance	on	how	much	the	increase	or	decrease	in	fine	will	be	on	the	certainty	
of	fines	for	undertakings.	
	
One	may	 instinctively	believe	 that,	given	 the	 lack	of	 specific	guidance	on	how	
much	 of	 an	 increase/decrease	 in	 the	 fine	 that	 the	 Commission	 may	 impose	
when	 considering	 an	 aggravating/mitigating	 factor,	 that	 it	 means	 that	 the	
process	 is	 uncertain.	 This	 is	 owing	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 an	 undertaking	 cannot	 be	
sure	 which	 factors	 the	 Commission	 will	 consider	 to	 be	 relevant	 for	 fining	
purposes.	Therefore,	it	could	be	argued	–	and	it	would	appear	logical	to	believe	
–	that	the	use	of	non-exhaustive	lists	(specifically	within	the	Commission’s	fining	
process)	 will	 fall	 foul	 of	 Article	 7	 ECHR.52	However,	 this	 is	 too	 superficial	 an	
analysis	 to	base	a	 full	and	thorough	conclusion	on	and,	 therefore,	we	need	to	
consider	 what	 the	 Courts	 have	 said	 when	 considering	 guidance	 and	 legal	
certainty.	
	
To	 begin	 with,	 we	 see	 that	 when	 the	 ECtHR	 discusses	 legal	 certainty	 they	
highlight	that	it	is	not	necessary	for	the	law	to	be	prescribed	in	such	a	way	as	to	
ensure	complete	certainty,	as	 this	 is	unobtainable	 in	practice.	For	example,	 in	
The	Sunday	Times	v	UK,	the	Court	stated	that	the	law	must	be	formulated:	
																																																									
52	Similarly,	one	could	also	raise	potential	concerns	here	about	equal	treatment,	as	without	
detailed	guidance	on	how	much	of	an	increase	or	decrease	will	ensue	from	the	consideration	of	
these	factors	the	Commission	could	apply	this	part	of	the	analysis	unequally.		
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‘with	 sufficient	 precision	 to	 enable	 the	 citizen	 to	 regulate	 his	
conduct:	he	must	be	able	–	if	need	be	with	appropriate	advice	–	
to	 foresee	 to	a	degree	 that	 is	 reasonable	 in	 the	 circumstances,	
the	 consequences	 which	 any	 given	 action	 may	 entail.	 Those	
consequences	need	 not	 be	 foreseeable	with	 absolute	 certainty:	
experience	shows	this	to	be	unobtainable.’53	
	
Interestingly,	this	is	something	that	the	EU	Courts	have	similarly	held	when	they	
discuss	 legal	 certainty.	 They	 acknowledge	 that	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 attain	
complete	certainty	and	that	a	degree	of	unforeseeability	 is	 important	so	as	to	
allow	flexibility	within	decisions.	 In	Jungbunzlauer	v	Commission	the	court	said	
that:	
	
‘To	avoid	excessive	prescriptive	 rigidity	and	 to	enable	a	 rule	
of	 law	to	be	adapted	to	the	circumstances,	a	certain	degree	
of	unforeseeability	as	to	the	penalty	which	may	be	 imposed	
for	a	given	offence	must	be	permitted.’54	
	
The	 ECtHR	 has	 also	 acknowledged	 that,	 however	 clearly	 drafted	 a	 legal	
provision	 or	 guidance	 may	 be,	 there	 is	 an	 ‘inevitable	 element	 of	 judicial	
interpretation’.55	In	addition,	the	Court	has	also	stated	that	‘there	will	always	be	
a	 need	 for	 elucidation	 of	 doubtful	 points	 and	 for	 adaptation	 to	 changing	
circumstances’	 by	 the	 Courts.56	Moreover,	 the	 ECtHR	 has	 stated	 that	 the	 fact	
that	a	 legal	provision	can	be	construed	 in	more	 than	one	way	does	not	mean	
‘that	 it	does	not	meet	 the	requirement	 implied	 in	 the	notion	of	prescribed	by	
law’57	or	 that	 this	 means	 that	 the	 legal	 provision	 will	 fail	 ‘to	 meet	 the	
requirement	of	foreseeability	for	the	purposes	of	the	Convention’.58		
																																																									
53	The	Sunday	Times	v	UK	(1979)	2	EHRR	245	para	49	emphasis	added.		
54	Case	T-43/02	Jungbunzlauer	v	Commission	[2006]	ECR	II-3435,	para	84.	
55	See	Del	Rio	Prada	v	Spain	(2012)	App	no	42750/09		para	47.	
56	ibid.	
57	Vogt	v	Germany	(1995)	21	EHRR	205	para	48.	
58	Sahin	v	Turkey	(2005)	44	EHRR	99	para	91.	
	125	
So,	what	does	 this	mean	 for	 the	Commission’s	Guidelines	when	 they	utilise	 a	
non-exhaustive	list	and	the	examples	given	contain	no	guidance	as	to	what	the	
increase/decrease	will	be?	
	
What	we	see	is	that	the	lack	of	specific	guidance	on	how	much	of	an	increase	or	
decrease	will	result	from	these	factors	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	a	breach	
of	Article	7	ECHR	will	ensue.	The	ECtHR	allows	for	a	degree	of	uncertainty	and	
unforeseeability	to	occur	in	Guidelines.59	If	we	consider	the	Commission’s	Fining	
Guidelines,	 the	 examples	within	 the	 list	 of	 potential	 aggravating	 or	mitigating	
factors	 helps	 make	 the	 Commission’s	 decision	 less	 unforeseeable,	 as	
undertakings	can	foresee	what	 factors	are	 likely	to	 influence	the	fine	 imposed	
upon	 them.	 	 However,	 they	 cannot	 tell	 exactly	 what	 –	 for	 example	 –	 the	
increase	 in	 fine	 for	 an	 aggravating	 factor	 will	 mean	 for	 them.	 Although,	 the	
undertaking	does	have	an	 indication	of	 likely	 factors	 to	 lead	 to	an	 increase	or	
decrease	in	the	fine,	and	that	the	total	overall	fine	is	 limited	to	ten	percent	of	
the	undertaking’s	previous	year’s	 turnover.	This	 fact,	 alongside	 the	comments	
made	by	the	ECtHR	in	the	Del	Rio	Prada	judgment	–	which	allows	for	an	element	
of	 judicial	 interpretation	 and	 uncertainty	 –	 means	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 specific	
guidance	 on	 how	 much	 of	 an	 increase	 or	 decrease	 in	 fine	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	
sufficient	to	breach	Article	7	ECHR.	
	
However,	 what	 if	 the	 Commission	 were	 to	 apply	 different	 percentage	 fines	
based	on	these	aggravating	and	mitigating	factors;	does	this	then	mean	that	the	
fining	process	could	be	held	to	be	uncertain?		
	
The	ECtHR	have,	in	an	analogous	situation,	stated	that	although	‘tribunals	may	
reach	 different	 conclusions,	 even	 when	 applying	 the	 same	 laws	 to	 the	 same	
facts,	 this	 does	 not	 necessarily	 mean	 that	 the	 laws	 are	 inaccessible	 or	
unforeseeable.’60	The	 practical	 application	 of	 these	 comments	 can	 be	 seen	 in	
																																																								
59	The	Sunday	Times	(n	53),	for	example.	
60	Wingrove	v	UK	(1996)	24	EHRR	1	para	38.	
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the	ECtHR	case	of	Handyside	v	UK.61	Therefore,	we	can	see	by	analogy	that	it	is	
likely	 that	 this	 stage	 in	 the	Commission’s	 fining	process	would	be	held	by	 the	
ECtHR	to	be	sufficiently	certain	for	compliance	with	Article	7	of	the	ECHR	even	if	
the	Commission	were	 to	award	varying	percentages	based	on	 the	aggravating	
and	mitigating	circumstances	in	the	cartel.	
	
This	section	of	analysis	has	shown	that	to	meet	the	necessary	standards	of	legal	
certainty	 ‘absolute	 certainty’	 is	 not	necessary.	We	 found	 that	what	 is	 actually	
necessary	 is	 what	 is	 reasonable	 given	 the	 circumstances.	 It	 has	 also	 been	
illustrated	that	when	non-exhaustive	lists	have	been	referenced	in	cases,	courts	
–	 from	 a	 variety	 of	 jurisdictions	 –	 have	 not	 suggested	 that	 they	 are	 legally	
uncertain.	Thus,	based	on	 this	analysis,	one	can	deduce	 that	 the	utilisation	of	
non-exhaustive	 lists	 by	 the	 Commission	 would	 be	 unlikely	 to	 amount	 to	 a	
breach	of	Article	7	of	the	ECHR.	However,	what	has	also	been	seen	is	that	there	
is	room	for	improvement	within	these	two	stages	of	the	Guidelines,	particularly	
with	 regards	 to	 the	 percentage	 increase	 or	 decrease	 to	 the	 fine	 that	 an	
aggravating	or	mitigating	factor	will	result	in.	This	is	something	that	is	discussed	
again	and	addressed	later	in	the	chapter.	
	
3.2.2	‘Specific	deterrence’		
The	next	 stage	 in	 the	Commission’s	 fining	process	 that	 is	 assessed	 to	 identify	
whether	the	Commission’s	fining	process	is	in	compliance	with	legal	certainty	is	
the	 sixth	 stage.	 This	 stage	 allows	 for	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 fine	 imposed	 on	
undertakings	for	‘specific	deterrence’	and	has	been	chosen	as	it	builds	upon	the	
issues	 identified	 within	 the	 non-exhaustive	 lists	 stages	 of	 the	 Commission’s	
fining	process,	as	 it	appears	to	allow	the	Commission	an	even	wider	margin	of	
discretion.	 Particularly,	 the	 content	 and	 wording	 of	 this	 stage	 appear	 to	 be	
rather	 encompassing	 and	 drafted	 in	 somewhat	 vague	 terms.	 The	 Commission	
defines	this	stage	in	its	Guidelines	as	follows:62	
																																																										
61	(1974)	17	YB	228.	
62	Commission	(n	14)	Recital	30,	emphasis	added.	
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‘The	Commission	will	pay	particular	attention	to	the	need	to	
ensure	that	 fines	have	a	sufficiently	deterrent	effect;	 to	 that	
end,	 it	may	 increase	the	fine	to	be	imposed	on	undertakings	
which	have	a	particularly	 large	turnover	beyond	the	sales	of	
goods	or	services	to	which	the	infringement	relates.’	
	
Therefore,	 it	 appears	 to	 allow	 for	 a	 large	 degree	 of	 uncertainty	 to	 enter	 the	
Commission’s	fining	decision.	There	appears	to	be	three	key	issues	here.	First,	it	
is	 unclear	what	 is	meant	by	 the	need	 to	ensure	 that	 fines	have	a	 ‘sufficiently	
deterrent	 effect’.	 This	 is	 not	 defined	within	 the	 guidance	 or	 explained	 in	 any	
greater	 depth	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 policy	 documents.	 Recital	 31	 of	 the	 Fining	
Guidelines	does	explain	that	the:	
	
‘Commission	will	also	take	into	account	the	need	to	increase	
the	 fine	 in	order	 to	 exceed	 the	amount	of	 gains	 improperly	
made	as	a	result	of	the	infringement.’		
	
However,	it	is	not	clear	if	this	is	what	the	Commission	means	as	to	‘sufficiently	
deter’	 or	 whether	 they	 mean	 something	 different.	 More	 generally,	 there	 is	
much	 debate	 about	 how	 high	 fines	 need	 to	 be	 to	 ‘sufficiently	 deter’	 cartel	
conduct.	In	fact,	some	have	suggested	that	it	would	need	to	be	so	high	that	it	is	
unachievable,	 as	 it	 would	 effectively	 need	 to	 bankrupt	 an	 undertaking;	 they	
have	 therefore	 advocated	 for	 the	 criminalisation	 of	 cartels	 to	 achieve	 this	
‘sufficient	 deterrent’	 effect.63	Wils’	 analysis	 on	 this	 issue	 identified	 that	 the	
minimum	level	of	fines	required	to	achieve	this	deterrent	effect	would	‘be	in	the	
order	 of	 150	 percent	 of	 the	 annual	 turnover	 in	 the	 products	 concerned	
violation.’64	Wils	determines	this	by	assuming	that	a	cartel	increases	the	selling	
price	 by	 ten	 percent,	 leading	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 profits	 of	 five	 percent	 for	 the	
cartelised	firms,	that	the	average	cartel	would	last	five	years	and	the	probability																																																									
63	Wouter	P	Wils,	‘Is	criminalization	of	EU	competition	law	the	answer?’	(2005)	28(2)	World	
Competition	117,	138.		
64	ibid.	The	calculation	of	this	figure	is	in	the	context	of	economic	deterrence	theory.		
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of	 detection	 and	 punishment	 of	 that	 firm	 would	 be	 only	 sixteen	 percent.	
However,	 when	 we	 consider	 Connor’s	 2004	 study, 65 	he	 finds	 that	 the	
overcharge	 is	 much	 higher	 than	 what	 Wils	 has	 allocated	 for,66	therefore	
meaning	 that	 the	 fine	would	need	 to	be	even	 greater	 to	 act	 as	 a	 deterrence.	
These	two	studies	illustrate	effectively	the	difficulty	in	determining	a	fine	which	
would	 ‘sufficiently	 deter’	 an	 undertaking	 in	 practice.	 This	 problem	 is	 further	
exacerbated	as	the	Commission	has	provided	a	 lack	of	guidance	as	to	what	 its	
intended	meaning	of	this	is.		
	
Second,	 the	 Guidelines	 state	 that	 the	 fine	may	 be	 increased	 to	 achieve	 this	
deterrence	but	provide	no	guidance	as	to	how	much	of	an	increase	in	fine	this	
could	be.	This	is	perhaps	because	it	will	depend	on	the	specific	circumstances	of	
each	case	as	to	how	much	of	an	additional	increase	is	necessary	to	sufficiently	
deter.	 But	 this	 does	 not	 prevent	 the	 lack	 of	 clarification	 or	 identification	 of	
when	 this	may	occur	 from	causing	uncertainty	 for	undertakings.	 Indeed,	even	
consulting	Commission	decisions	where	this	stage	has	been	applied	offers	little	
assistance	in	identifying	how	much	of	an	increase	in	fine	this	stage	will	lead	to.	
The	fine	increases	at	this	stage	can	be	significant	and	can	vary	greatly.	In	some	
cases	the	increase	has	been	as	low	as	ten	percent,67	others	twenty-five	percent	
to	 one	 hundred	 percent,68 	and	 at	 the	 most	 severe	 one-hundred-and-fifty	
percent.69	As	one	can	see,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	 identify	how	much	of	an	 increase	 in	
																																																								
65	John	Connor,	‘Price-Fixing	Overcharges:	Legal	and	Economic	Evidence’	(2004)	AAI	Working	
Paper	No.	04-05.	
66	He	identified	that	the	overcharge	was	in	fact	nearer	twenty	percent.		
67	In	the	Professional	Videotapes	(Case	COMP	38.432)	Commission	Decision	2008/C57/08	[2007]	
OJ	C57/10	Sony	received	a	ten	percent	increase	in	its	fine	at	this	stage.	
68	Some	of	the	undertakings	in	the	PO/Hard	Haberdashery:	Fasteners	(Case	COMP	39.168)	
Commission	Decision	2009/C47/08	[2007]	OJ	C47/8	cartel	received	a	25	percent	increase.	In	the	
Sodium	Chlorate	(Case	COMP	38.695)	Commission	Decision	2009/C137/06	[2008]	OJ	C137/6	
cartel	some	members	saw	a	70	percent	increase.	Similarly,	in	the	Elevators	and	Escalators	(Case	
COMP	38.823)	Commission	Decision	2008/C75/10	[2007]	OJ	C75/19	some	undertakings	
received	a	70	percent	increase	with	others	receiving	a	100	percent	increase.	
69	In	the	Dutch	beer	market	(Case	COMP	37.766)	Commission	Decision	2008/C122/01	[2007]	OJ	
C122/1	various	undertakings	received	a	150	percent	increase	in	fine.	
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fine,	having	 this	 stage	applied,	will	 lead	 to	 for	an	undertaking,	even	when	we	
consider	Commission	decisions.70		
	
Third,	one	can	ask	what	 is	meant	by	a	 ‘particularly	 large	 turnover	beyond	 the	
sales	of	goods	or	services	to	which	the	 infringement	relates’,	as	again	this	has	
not	 been	 defined.	 ‘Particularly	 large’	 implies	 that	 a	 comparison	 needs	 to	 be	
made	between	undertakings’	turnovers,	but	yet	no	indication	is	given	as	to	how	
this	comparison	will	be	calculated	or	how	it	will	be	conducted.	The	Guidelines	
appear	 to	 imply	 that,	 if	 an	undertaking	 sells	goods	and	services	beyond	 those	
which	 have	 been	 cartelised	 and	 that	 said	 undertaking	 can	 be	 defined	 as	
‘particularly	 large’,	 then	 they	shall	be	 fined	higher	 to	act	as	a	deterrence.	The	
uncertainty	here	stems	from	the	language	used	within	the	guidance	document,	
and	the	lack	of	guidance	given	on	the	actual	application	of	this	‘specific	increase	
for	deterrence’.	 It	may	be	presumed	 that	what	 the	Commission	means	 in	 this	
stage,	 refers	 to	the	ability	of	 the	undertaking	to	absorb	the	fine	and,	where	 it	
can	do	so	easily	then	the	fine	will	need	to	be	increased	so	as	to	ensure	that	the	
fine	has	a	deterrent	effect.	However,	it	is	unclear	from	the	guidance	provided	if	
this	is	actually	what	is	meant.	The	notion	of	imposing	a	harsher	punishment	on	
an	 undertaking	 that	 has	 a	 particularly	 large	 turnover	 as	 compared	 to	
undertakings	with	smaller	turnovers	is	by	no	means	a	unique	characteristic	that	
is	only	found	within	the	Commission’s	Fining	Guidelines.	We	find,	for	example,	
that	 individuals	 who	 are	 wealthier	 are	 often	 given	 larger	 fines	 by	 the	 courts	
when	they	commit	a	breach	of	the	law	so	as	to	ensure	that	the	fines	themselves	
have	 an	 effect	 on	 that	 individual’s	 behaviour	 and	 deter	 them	 from	breaching	
the	 law	 again.	 Indeed,	 it	would	 seem	unfair	 to	 fine	 the	 same	 amount	 to	 two	
individuals	 if	 one	 of	 them	 is	 significantly	 ‘better	 off’	 than	 the	 other,	 as	 the	
individual	 in	the	better	financial	position	would	not	truly	feel	the	effect	of	the	
fine.		
	
																																																								
70	Scordamaglia-Tousis	(n	21)	at	368,	has	similarly	noted	that	there	is	no	consistency	in	how	the	
Commission	is	increasing	the	fine	at	this	stage.	
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Nevertheless,	there	is	a	question	to	be	considered	here	within	this	stage	of	the	
Commission’s	 Fining	 Guidelines.	 This	 stage	 of	 the	 Guidelines	 appears	 to	 only	
apply	 to	 undertakings	 that	 have	 a	 large	 turnover	 beyond	 the	 market	 in	
question.	Therefore,	this	stage	would	not	apply	to	an	undertaking	that	operates	
only	within	the	cartelised	market.	So	the	hypothetical	one	needs	to	consider	is	a	
situation	where	an	undertaking	is	a	very	large	player	in	a	cartelised	market	but,	
because	it	only	operates	in	the	cartelised	market	and	no	other,	it	avoids	having	
this	stage	of	the	fining	procedure	applied	to	it.	Given	this,	would	the	rest	of	the	
fining	procedure	accurately	reflect	the	breach	of	the	law	when	compared	to	an	
undertaking	which	operates	 in	multiple	markets	 and	has	 this	 stage	applied	 to	
them?	Considering	the	Fining	Guidelines,	we	can	see	that	the	first	stage	within	
the	fining	process	takes	into	account	the	amount	of	sales	and	goods	involved	in	
the	 infringement	 and	 latter	 stages	 allow	 for	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 fine	 for	
aggravating	 factors.	 However,	 the	 difficulty	 here	 is	 that	 the	 first	 stage	 in	 the	
fining	procedure	is	capped	at	thirty	percent,	so	although	this	stage	would	reflect	
the	 undertaking’s	 larger	 status	 in	 the	 cartelised	market,	 it	 is	 limited	 to	 thirty	
percent.	Therefore,	when	we	consider	the	application	of	stage	six,	where	there	
is	no	guidance	on	the	percentage	 increase	and	thus	no	cap	on	the	percentage	
increase,	it	is	questionable	how	reflective	the	fine	can	be	at	stage	one	as	stage	
six	 can	 allow	 for	 a	 much	 greater	 increase	 in	 the	 fine.	 This	 could	 lead	 to	
undertakings	raising	legitimate	questions	about	the	application	of	this	stage	and	
the	 differences	 in	 fining	 of	 the	 two	 undertakings,	 particularly	 when	 the	 firm,	
which	is	larger	in	the	cartelised	market,	cannot	have	this	stage	applied	to	it	as	it	
only	operates	in	the	cartelised	market.		
	
This	 stage	 of	 the	 fining	 procedure	 also	 leads	 to	 a	 further	 intriguing	 issue,	
namely,	 if	an	undertaking	operates	 in	multiple	markets	 it	 is	 likely	 to	have	 this	
stage	included	in	any	fines	it	receives	for	being	involved	in	a	cartel.	This	means	
this	 stage	 actually	 acts	 as	 an	 incentive	 for	 that	 undertaking	 to	 ensure	 that	 it	
cartelises	in	all	of	its	markets	so	that,	if	it	receives	a	fine,	this	stage	of	the	fine	is	
accurately	costed	and	minimised	through	the	cartelisation	of	all	of	 its	markets	
because	it	will	be	fined	based	on	its	operation	in	multiple	markets.		
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There	 is	 no	 further	 guidance	 provided	 in	 any	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 publicly	
accessible	documentation	on	the	‘specific	increase	for	deterrence’	stage.		
	
To	begin	the	examination	of	this	section	of	the	Commission’s	fining	process,	we	
need	to	revisit	the	case	law	discussed	in	the	previous	section’s	analysis.	In	that	
section,	 the	 case	 law	highlighted	 that	 the	ECtHR	and	 the	EU	Courts	 recognise	
that	 a	 degree	 of	 unforeseeability	 is	 inevitable	 and	 unavoidable.71	One	 of	 the	
questions	 identified	 in	 the	 current	 section	 is	 whether	 this	 stage	 within	 the	
Guidelines	is	encroached	in	terms	that	are	too	vague	and	broad.		
	
The	ECtHR	has	held	 that	 ‘the	 law	must	be	adequately	accessible’	and	 that	 ‘an	
individual	must	have	an	indication	of	the	legal	rules	applicable	in	a	given	case	–	
and	 he	 must	 be	 able	 to	 foresee	 the	 consequences	 of	 his	 actions.’72	The	 EU	
Courts	 have	 also	 acknowledged	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 legal	 situation	 being	
‘sufficiently	precise,	clear	and	foreseeable’.73		
	
Taking	 these	statements	at	 face	value	may	 lead	one	 to	believe	 that	 this	 stage	
within	the	Commission’s	Guidelines	would	not	allow	an	undertaking	to	be	able	
to	adequately	 foresee	the	consequences	of	 its	actions;	as	 it	 is	uncertain	when	
this	 stage	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 procedure	 will	 apply.	 Nonetheless,	 one	
needs	to	remember	that	an	undertaking	is	still	aware	that	the	action	of	being	in	
a	cartel	breaches	Article	101	TFEU	and	that	 the	potential	punishment	 for	 that	
breach	is	a	fine	of	up	to	ten	per	cent	of	its	total	turnover	in	the	previous	year.	
Additionally,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 these	 statements	 should	not	 be	 read	 at	
face	value	and	that	they	should	be	read	alongside	other	case	law.	For	example,	
in	a	recent	appeal	in	the	UK,	the	Supreme	Court	held	that	there	was	no	failure	
to	 comply	 with	 the	 European	 principle	 of	 legal	 certainty.74	This	 case	 involved	
the	 limitation	period	 for	bringing	 a	damages	 claim	 in	 a	 competition	 case.	 The																																																									
71	The	Sunday	Times	(n	53).	
72	SW	v	UK	and	CR	v	UK	(1995)	21	EHRR	363.	
73	For	example	see,	Case	C-361/88	Commission	v	Germany	[1991]	ECR	1-2567	para	24	and	Case	
C-221/94	Commission	v	Luxembourg	[1996]	ECR	1-5669	para	22.	
74	BLC	Old	Co	Ltd	&	Others	v	BASF	Plc	&	Ors	[2012]	UKSC	45.		
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Supreme	Court	felt	that	the	limitation	period	was	sufficiently	clear,	foreseeable	
and	 precise	 so	 as	 to	 allow	 the	 individuals	 to	 ascertain	 their	 rights	 and	
obligations.	 The	 Supreme	Court	 highlighted	 that	 the	 law	does	not	need	 to	be	
clear	beyond	doubt	and	that	the	‘true	test	is	more	flexible	and	[…]	reflective’.75	
This	 case	highlights	 the	 importance	of	 not	 taking	 a	 statement	 from	 the	Court	
out	 of	 context	 and	 that	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 considered	 alongside	 the	 other	
jurisprudence.	
	
Another	example	can	be	seen	from	the	ECtHR,	where	they	have	stated	that	for	
the	law	to	meet	the	requirements	of	accessibility	and	foreseeability	it	must:	
	
‘Afford	 a	 measure	 of	 legal	 protection	 against	 arbitrary	
interferences	 by	 public	 authorities	 […]	 in	 matters	 affecting	
fundamental	 rights	 it	would	 be	 contrary	 to	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	
[…]	 for	 a	 legal	 discretion	 granted	 to	 the	 executive	 to	 be	
expressed	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 unfettered	 power.	 Consequently,	
the	law	must	indicate	with	sufficient	clarity	the	scope	of	any	
such	discretion	conferred	on	 the	competent	authorities	and	
the	manner	of	its	exercise.	The	level	of	precision	required	of	
domestic	 legislation	 –	which	 cannot	 in	 any	 case	 provide	 for	
every	eventuality	–	depends	to	a	considerable	degree	on	the	
content	of	the	instrument	in	question,	the	field	it	is	designed	
to	 cover	 and	 the	number	 and	 status	of	 those	 to	whom	 it	 is	
addressed.’76	
	
This	statement	highlights	the	necessity	for	guidance	to	be	given	when	there	is	a	
wide-ranging	 discretion.77	However,	 the	 ECtHR	 statement	 also	 shows	how	 the	
Court	 acknowledges	 that	 there	 will	 be	 instances	 where	 parts	 of	 guidance	 or	
legislation	do	not	provide	detail	on	every	eventuality	and	that	a	lot	will	depend																																																									
75	ibid	para	24.	
76	Hasan	and	Chaush	v	Bulgaria	(2000)	34	EHRR	1339	para	84	emphasis	added.		
77	This	is	something	which	has	also	been	highlighted	in	the	ECtHR	decision	in	Liberty	v	UK	(2009)	
48	EHRR	1	para	69.	
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on	the	content	of	the	‘instrument	in	question’.78	This	illustrates	the	flexible	way	
in	which	the	Convention	operates	and	that	there	 is	no	hard	and	fast	rule	with	
regards	to	legal	certainty;	indeed,	we	see	it	is	flexible	and	affected	by	a	variety	
of	 factors.	When	this	 statement	 is	considered	alongside	 the	sixth	stage	within	
the	Commission’s	fining	process,	which	aims	to	allow	for	sufficient	deterrence	–	
one	of	 the	key	aims	of	 cartel	enforcement	–	 it	 is	 accepted	 that,	 although	 this	
stage	in	the	Guidelines	is	worded	in	vague	terms,	the	ECtHR	would	accept	and	
allow	the	Commission	this	flexibility.	This	is	because	it	permits	for	the	necessary	
deterrence	of	 undertakings	who	may	otherwise	not	 feel	 the	 impact	 of	 a	 fine.	
Indeed,	when	we	consider	the	decision	of	the	ECtHR	in	Del	Rio	Prada	v	Spain,79	
where	it	was	stated	that	‘many	laws	are	inevitably	couched	in	terms	which,	to	a	
greater	or	lesser	extent,	are	vague	and	whose	interpretation	and	application	are	
questions	 of	 practice’,	 we	 can	 see	 that	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 ECtHR	would	 hold	
that,	 although	 the	 language	 is	 vague	 in	 the	 Guidelines,	 it	 is	 still	 sufficient	 to	
comply	with	Article	7	ECHR.	However,	one	needs	to	ask	the	question	as	to	why	
the	 Commission	 would	 wish	 to	 provide	 Guidelines.	 Rather	 self-evidently	
Guidelines	 are	 provided	 to	 offer	 guidance,	 i.e.	 to	 assist	 in	 clarifying	 the	
procedure/process	or	application	of	the	law.	In	this	case	does	the	Commission’s	
Fining	Guidelines	really	achieve	this	aim?	The	sixth	stage	in	the	fining	process	is	
defined	with	 incredible	 ambiguity,	with	 there	being	no	explanation	of	what	 it	
means	 to	 ‘sufficiently	deter’	an	undertaking	or	how	 this	 stage	will	be	applied,	
when	it	will	be	applied	or	even	how	it	is	to	be	calculated.	Therefore,	one	has	to	
ask	why	half-hearted	and	indeed	unclear	Guidelines	are	being	provided	by	the	
Commission.	 There	 is	 ample	 room	here	 for	 improvement	of	 these	Guidelines,	
particularly	 with	 regards	 to	 this	 stage	 so	 as	 to	 remove	 some	 of	 these	
ambiguities	and	uncertainties.	This	 is	something	that	 is	addressed	in	the	 latter	
part	of	this	section	in	the	chapter.		
	
																																																								
78	Similarly	in	Regina	(Purdy)	v	Director	of	Public	Prosecutions	(Society	for	the	Protection	of	
Unborn	Children	intervening)	[2009]	UKHL	45	para	101	the	UK	Court	noted	that	it	was	
impossible	for	there	to	be	an	exhaustive	list	of	every	eventuality.		
79	(2012)	Application	no	42750/09	para	47.	
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Both	of	 the	preceding	parts	 of	 this	 section	have	discussed	 legal	 certainty	 and	
the	Commission’s	fining	process.	This	part	has	highlighted	that	even	Guidelines	
that	are	drafted	in	vague	terms	can	still	allow	for	sufficient	certainty	to	occur	for	
compliance	 with	 Article	 7	 ECHR	 to	 ensue.	 What	 is	 important	 is	 that	 the	
Guidelines	are	taken	as	a	whole.	What	has	been	 identified	thus	 far	 is	 that	 the	
Commission	has	a	wide	range	of	discretion	within	its	fining	procedure.	The	next	
part	of	this	section	shall	assess	the	limiting	factor	on	this	discretion;	namely,	the	
ten	percent	turnover	cap	and	also	consider	the	Commission’s	discretion	in	more	
detail.	
	
3.2.3	The	ten	percent	cap	
The	final	amount	of	the	fine	that	the	Commission	can	impose	on	an	undertaking	
is	limited	to	ten	percent	of	the	total	turnover	of	the	undertaking	in	the	previous	
year.80	One	may	assume	that	this	provides	an	undertaking	with	clear	certainty,	
as	 the	 undertaking	 will	 know	 that	 any	 fine	 imposed	 on	 itself	 for	 a	 cartel	
infringement	 cannot	exceed	 ten	percent	of	 the	 firm’s	 total	 turnover	 from	 the	
previous	 year.	 Indeed,	 there	 is	 certainty	 here	 because	 of	 the	 ten	 percent	
restriction	as	the	undertaking	knows	what	its	turnover	was	for	the	previous	year	
and	can	calculate	ten	percent	of	this.		
	
There	are,	however,	 two	areas	of	 concern	with	 regards	 to	 legal	 certainty	 that	
could	be	raised	here.	Firstly,	how	an	undertaking	is	defined	can	affect	the	size	of	
the	 fine	 imposed	 by	 the	 Commission	 as	 the	 ten	 percent	 cap	 applies	 to	 the	
undertaking’s	 total	 turnover.	 Secondly,	 the	 discretion	 the	 Commission	 has	
within	 the	 fining	 procedure	 –	with	 the	 only	 real	 limiting	 factor	 being	 the	 ten	
percent	cap	–	and	whether	this	cap	is	sufficient	to	comply	with	Article	7	ECHR.	
	
How	the	Commission	defines	control	of	an	undertaking	is	important	because	a	
parent	company	can	be	liable	for	a	subsidiary	company,	where	it	is	held	that	the	
parent	 company	 exercises	 a	 ‘decisive	 influence’	 over	 the	 conduct	 of	 its	
																																																								
80	Article	23(2)	Regulation	No1/2003	(n	51).	
	135	
subsidiary	company.81	In	fact,	where	a	parent	company	owns	a	hundred	percent	
of	 the	 subsidiary	 there	 is	 a	 rebuttable	 presumption	 that	 it	 exercises	 ‘decisive	
influence’	 over	 its	 subsidiary.82	This	 creates	 a	 problem	 for	 certainty	 for	 an	
undertaking	if	it	has	a	parent	company.	This	is	because	the	ten	percent	cap	on	
the	 fine	 imposed	 by	 the	 Commission	 relates	 to	 the	 total	 turnover;	 if	 this	
turnover	were	to	be	that	of	a	parent	company	 it	would	be	much	greater	than	
that	of	just	the	subsidiary.	If	an	undertaking	cannot	be	sure	of	whether	the	cap	
will	 be	 applied	 to	 its	 total	 turnover	 or	 that	 of	 its	 parent,	 this	 will	 lead	 to	 a	
degree	of	uncertainty	as	the	potential	cap	on	the	fine	will	be	significantly	higher	
than	expected	if	the	parent	company’s	annual	turnover	is	used.		
	
This	can	also	lead	to	other	issues	arising.	Let	us	consider	a	hypothetical	example	
to	illustrate	these	issues.	Consider,	if	you	will,	a	parent	company	that	has	many	
small	 subsidiary	 companies,	which	means	 that	 it	 is	 very	 active	 in	 a	 variety	 of	
markets	and	 thus	has	a	very	 large	overall	 turnover.	 Let	us	also	assume	that	 it	
would	 be	 held	 that	 it	 exercises	 a	 ‘decisive	 influence’	 over	 these	 subsidiaries;	
although,	it	is	not	in	fact	aware	of	the	cartelisation	of	a	small	market	by	one	of	
its	subsidiary	companies.	If	the	subsidiary	company	is	found	guilty	of	price	fixing	
and	the	Commission	 issues	fines	against	 it	and	decides	to	base	the	cap	on	the	
annual	 turnover	 of	 the	 parent	 company,	 this	will	mean	 that	 the	 fines	 can	 be	
much	 larger	 than	 they	 would	 be	 for	 another	 undertaking	 in	 the	 cartelised	
market	which	was	not	a	 subsidiary	company	of	a	 larger	parent	company.	This	
could	 lead	 to	 one	 questioning	 whether	 the	 fines	 are	 proportionate,	 fair,	
reflective	 and	 based	 on	 the	 infringement	 as	 the	 parent	 company	 was	 not	
involved	in	the	infringement,	and	yet	its	much	greater	annual	turnover	is	being	
considered	 to	 increase	 the	 cap	 on	 the	 fine.	 This	 could	 even	 lead	 to	 some	
wishing	 to	 question	 whether	 the	 fines	 in	 this	 case	 are	 just	 being	 used	 as	 a	
‘money	making	 exercise’	 as	 they	 are	 not	 representative	 of	 the	 infringement.																																																									
81	For	example	see	Case	107/82	AEG-Telefunken	v	Commission	[1983]	ECR	3151	para	50.	
82	For	example	see	Case	T-112/05	Akzo	Nobel	NV	v	Commission	[2007]	para	4.	The	importance	
of	the	ability	of	an	undertaking	to	be	able	to	rebut	this	presumption	can	be	illustrated	by	Case	T-
234/07	Koninklijke	Grolsch	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	11-6169.	
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That	said,	one	could	challenge	this	claim	and	argue	that	the	fines	should	still	be	
reflective	of	 the	 infringement	as	 the	 first	 stage	 in	 the	 fining	procedure	relates	
specifically	to	the	infringed	product	market	and	this	will	therefore	prevent	other	
product	markets	being	considered.	However,	this	misunderstands	the	potential	
problem	and	issues	here,	as	the	other	stages	within	the	fining	procedure	do	not	
relate	to	the	specific	cartelised	market.	Indeed,	if	there	are	multiple	aggravating	
factors	and	the	specific	deterrence	stage	is	applied	in	the	fining	procedure,	this	
could	 raise	 the	 fine	 above	 the	 ten	 percent	 annual	 turnover	 of	 the	 subsidiary	
company,	 but	 as	 the	 Commission	 is	 using	 the	 parent	 company’s	 turnover	 it	
would	 not	 be	 over	 the	 ten	 percent	 cap.	 Therefore,	 as	 the	 upper	 cap	 is	much	
greater	it	means	that	the	fine	can	be	much	higher	than	it	would	be	for	the	other	
firms	 in	 the	market	 that	are	not	 subsidiaries	of	a	 larger	parent	company.	This	
raises	a	serious	legal	certainty	issue	from	a	parent	company’s	perspective	with	
regards	to	how	it	will	know	about	its	liability	if	it	is	not	controlling	the	subsidiary	
company,	and	yet	is	still	held	to	have	a	‘decisive	influence’	over	it.	This	means	in	
practice	 it	 will	 be	 necessary	 for	 a	 parent	 company	 to	 ensure	 that	 it	 carefully	
monitors	 its	 subsidiary	 company	 to	 ensure	 that	 it	 is	 complying	with	 the	 legal	
requirements	of	Article	101	TFEU.	
	
The	 significance	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 parent	 and	 subsidiary	 control	 is	 becoming	
increasingly	 important	 as,	more	 recently,	 the	 issue	 of	 ‘decisive	 influence’	 has	
been	 raised	 in	 cartel	 cases	 involving	 joint	 ventures.	 Indeed,	 where	 a	 joint	
venture	 undertaking	 engages	 in	 a	 collusive	 practice,	 it	 now	 appears	 that	 the	
Commission	 is	 prepared	 to	 attribute	 liability	 to	 the	 controlling	 parent	
firms.83	This	 means	 that,	 in	 future	 cartel	 fining	 decisions	 that	 involve	 parent	
company	liability,	we	may	find	appeals	going	to	the	European	Courts	based	on	
this	 problem	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 certainty	 here.	 With	 regards	 to	 legal	 certainty,	
parent	company	 liability	appears	 to	 raise	concerns,	particularly	with	 regard	 to	
																																																								
83	Laura	Atlee,	‘Joint	Venture…	Subsidiary…	What’s	the	Difference	for	Cartel	Liability	and	Fines?’	
(2012)	1	CPI	Antitrust	Chronicle	<www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/joint-venture-
subsidiary-what-s-the-difference-for-cartel-liability-and-fines-2/>	accessed	27	May	2013.	
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whether	 a	 parent	 company	 will	 be	 aware	 of	 the	 cartelisation	 by	 one	 of	 its	
subsidiaries	and	the	level	of	fine	that	can	then	ensue	from	this.	
	
As	was	noted	at	the	beginning	of	this	section,	the	Commission	has	a	great	deal	
of	discretion	 in	 the	setting	of	a	 fine.	 Indeed,	 the	Fining	Guidelines	 themselves	
clearly	state	that	‘in	exercising	its	power	to	impose	such	fines,	the	Commission	
enjoys	 a	 wide	 margin	 of	 discretion	 within	 the	 limits	 set	 by	 Regulation	 No	
1/2003.'84	This	 chapter	has	 identified	 reasons	as	 to	why	 it	 is	beneficial	 for	 the	
Commission	 to	 have	 this	 discretion,	 but	 has	 also	 highlighted	 the	 ‘costs’	 of	
allowing	 the	 Commission	 to	 retain	 this	 discretion	 with	 specific	 regards	 to	
certainty	for	undertakings.	The	key	question	is	whether	the	discretion	that	the	
Commission	retains	under	the	ten	percent	cap	to	fine	an	undertaking	however	
it	 decides,	 is	 too	 uncertain	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 legal	 certainty	 requirements	
protected	 by	 Article	 7	 ECHR.	 The	 European	 Courts	 have	 stated	 that	 the	
Commission,	 by	 adopting	 and	 implementing	 the	 Fining	 Guidelines,	 has	
‘impose[d]	 a	 limit	 on	 the	 exercise	 of	 [its]	 discretion’.85	This	 is	 important	 as	
unfettered	discretion	with	no	Guidelines	would	lead	to	the	Commission’s	fining	
process	breaching	legal	certainty.	For	example,	the	ECtHR	has	stated	in	Liberty	v	
UK86	that:	
	
‘The	 law	 must	 indicate	 the	 scope	 of	 any	 such	 discretion	
conferred	 on	 the	 competent	 authorities	 and	 the	manner	 of	
its	 exercise	 with	 sufficient	 clarity	 to	 give	 the	 individual	
adequate	protection	against	arbitrary	interference.’		
	 	
Similarly,	 in	 the	 UK	 case	 of	 Regina	 (Purdy)	 v	 Director	 of	 Public	 Prosecutions	
(Society	 for	 the	Protection	of	Unborn	Children	 intervening)87	it	was	highlighted	
that	 discretion	 itself	 is	 not	 inconsistent	 with	 legal	 certainty	 as	 long	 as	 it	 ‘is	
																																																								
84	Commission,	(n	14)	Recital	2,	emphasis	added.		
85	Case	C-213/02	P,	Dansk	Rorindustri	and	Others	v	Commission	[2005]	ECR	I-5425	para	211.	
86	(2009)	48	EHRR	1	para	62.	
87	[2009]	UKHL	45.	
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exercised	and	indicated	with	sufficient	clarity’.88	This	case	discussed	the	concept	
of	discretion	in	great	depth	and	provides	us	with	some	important	information	to	
consider	with	regards	to	our	questions	about	discretion.	The	Court	in	this	case	
noted	the	importance	of	adequate	guidance	being	given	to	those	who	have	to	
enforce	the	law	so	as	to	ensure	that	they	‘avoid	the	criticism	that	their	decision	
taking	 is	arbitrary’.89	Without	 this	guidance,	 it	 is	difficult	 for	 the	Court	 to	hold	
that	 the	 provision	 complies	 with	 the	 necessary	 requirements	 under	 legal	
certainty	of	accessibility	and	foreseeability.90	Indeed,	in	this	case	the	judge	held	
that:		
	
‘In	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 such	 statement	 of	 policy,	 there	 is	
simply	no	sufficiently	clear	or	 relevant	guidance	available	as	
to	how	the	very	widely	expressed	discretion	accorded	to	the	
Director	in	section	2(4)	of	the	1961	Act	will	be	exercised.’91	
	
This	 case	 and	 analysis	 therein	 highlights	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 wide	 ranging	
discretion	 is	 not	 automatically	 at	 odds	 with	 Article	 7	 ECHR,	 providing	 that	
adequate	guidance	is	given	by	the	Commission	in	the	use	of	this	procedure	and	
the	Guidelines	are	adequate.		
	
The	 EU	 Courts	 have	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 Guidelines	 were	 adopted	 by	 the	
Commission	 to	 help	 increase	 legal	 certainty	 for	 undertakings.92	Although,	 it	 is	
worth	noting	that	the	ECJ	has	held	that	the	Commission’s	Fining	Guidelines	are	
not	 to	be	 taken	as	 ‘rules	of	 law’	 that	must	be	 followed	by	 the	Commission	 in	
every	given	 instance.93	Therefore,	we	must	 remember	 that	Guidelines	are	 just	
that,	a	guide,	and	that	by	having	Guidelines	it	does	not	mean	that	this	is	exactly	
what	 will	 happen	 in	 every	 given	 instance.	 It	 is,	 however,	 necessary	 that																																																									
88	ibid	para	41.	This	has	also	been	confirmed	in	ECHR	jurisprudence:	Goodwin	v	UK	(1996)	EHRR	
123,	para	31	and	Sorvisto	v	Finland	(2009)	App	no	19348/04	(ECtHR,	13	January	2009)	para	112.	
89	Purdy	(n	78)	para	46.	
90	ibid	para	85.	
91	ibid	para	102.	
92	See	Case	T-43/02	Jungbunzlauer	(n	54)	para	89.	
93	See	Case	C-397/03	P,	Archer	Daniels	Midland	v	Commission	[2006]	ECR	1-4429	para	91.	
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Guidelines	 are	 at	 least	 consulted	 and	 that	 they	 are	 representative	 of	 the	
Commission’s	fining	decision	process	as,	 if	they	are	ignored	or	not	followed	all	
of	 the	time	or	are	not	representative,	 then	there	would	be	 little	point	 in	their	
existence.	Indeed,	the	ECJ	has	stated	that	the	Commission	must	not	depart	from	
the	Guidelines	without	giving	reasons	that	are	compatible	with	the	principle	of	
equal	 treatment.94 	This	 shows	 that,	 although	 the	 Guidelines	 may	 not	 be	
followed	in	every	instance,	they	should	give	a	clear	indication	to	an	undertaking	
of	the	likely	fining	decision	process	in	the	vast	majority	of	cases.	
	
The	 EU	Courts	 have	 stated	 that	 the	 Commission’s	Guidelines	 do	 not	 bind	 the	
Court	 and	 that	 they	 are	 free	 to	 consider	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 fine	 and	 make	
adjustments	 where	 necessary	 as	 they	 have	 ‘unlimited	 jurisdiction’. 95 	The	
importance	and	necessity	of	the	Courts	to	actually	consider	all	parts	of	the	fine	
and	 to	 conduct	 a	 thorough	 analysis	 can	 be	 highlighted	 by	 the	 recent	 opinion	
(26th	September	2013)	of	Advocate	General	Wathelet’s	on	the	appeal	brought	
by	 Telefonica	 against	 the	 GC	 judgment.96	Here,	 Advocate	 General	 Wathelet	
opined	that	the	case	should	be	referred	back	to	the	General	Court	for	its	failure	
to	 carry	 out	 an	 in-depth	 analysis	 into	 the	 calculation	 of	 the	 fine	 by	 the	
Commission.97		
	
Normally,	when	the	EU	Courts	do	consider	and	discuss	legal	certainty,	they	refer	
to	the	method	in	which	the	Commission	has	set	the	fine,	not	the	actual	level	of	
the	 fine	 itself.98	This	 decision	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 influenced	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
Commission	needs	 to	 assess	 a	wide	 range	of	 considerations	 and,	 therefore,	 a	
degree	 of	 discretion	 within	 the	 fining	 procedure	 is	 needed.	 Hence,	 it	 is	
impossible	 for	 the	 Commission	 to	 provide	 complete	 foreseeability	 of	 the	
amount	of	fines	to	be	imposed.	Indeed,	this	 is	something	which	the	EU	Courts	
																																																								
94	ibid.	
95	Case	C-338/00	P,	Volkswagen	v	Commission	[2003]	ECR	I-9189	para	147.	
96	Case	C-296/12	P,	Telefónica	de	España	v	Commission	[2013]	Opinion	of	AG	Wathelet.		
97	ibid.	
98	For	examples,	please	see	the	following	cases:	Case	T-43/02	Jungbunzlauer	(n	54)	para	89	and	
Case	C-213/02	P,	Dansk	Rorindustri	and	Others	v	Commission	[2005]	ECR	I-5425	para	213.		
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have	 acknowledged	 themselves.99	From	 a	 competition	 law	 point	 of	 view	 we	
would	not	want	 the	 fines	 to	be	completely	 foreseeable,	as	 some	ambiguity	 in	
the	calculation	of	the	fine	is	important	to	ensure	the	necessary	deterrent	effect.	
Again,	 the	 issue	we	are	observing	here	 is	one	of	balancing	 the	 two	conflicting	
objectives.	 On	 the	 one	 hand	we	 have	 the	 need	 for	 effective	 competition	 law	
enforcement	and,	on	the	other,	we	have	the	requirement	for	the	programme	to	
conform	to	the	needs	of	rights	protection	and	compliance.	
	
What	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 this	 part	 of	 the	 chapter	 is	 that	 the	 Commission’s	
discretion	 is	 predominantly	 limited	 by	 the	 ten	 percent	 cap	 on	 fines	 under	
Regulation	 No1/2003.100	This	 ten	 percent	 cap	 may	 enable	 the	 Commission’s	
fining	procedure	to	comply	with	Article	7	of	the	ECHR,	but	this	can	still	leave	a	
lot	to	be	desired	from	an	undertaking’s	and	citizen’s	perspective.	Indeed,	what	
has	 been	 identified	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 that	 there	 are	 many	 areas	 within	 the	
Commission’s	 Fining	 Guidelines	 that	 are	 unclear	 and	 ambiguous.	 This	 is	
something,	 which	 the	 author	 believes	 needs	 addressing,	 as	 Guidelines	 are	
designed	 to	 clarify	 the	 procedures	 and	 rules	 and	 should	 not	 cause	 further	
confusion	or	unnecessary	uncertainty.	By	reducing	the	Commission’s	discretion	
further,	 clarity	 could	be	enhanced	 in	 the	 fining	procedure,	which	would	bring	
additional	benefits	alongside	 improved	certainty	 for	an	undertaking	whilst	still	
encouraging	 competition	 compliance.	 These	 benefits,	 for	 example,	 could	
include	a	 reduction	 in	potential	over-deterrence	of	pro-competitive	behaviour	
and	reduce	the	potential	legal	costs	for	undertakings.	101		
	
3.2.4	 So	 how	 could	 the	 Commission’s	 discretion	 be	 limited	 to	 allow	 these	
potential	benefits	to	be	realised?	
These	benefits	 could	be	achieved	by	 reducing	or	 further	 limiting	 the	 scope	of	
the	discretion	afforded	to	the	Commission	through	various	stages	of	the	fining	
process	and	by	providing	enhanced	guidance.	One	area	 that	would	be	greatly																																																									
99	See	Case	T-15/02	BASF	v	Commission	[2006]	ECR	II-497	para	226.		
100	Article	23(2).	
101	All	of	these	areas	were	discussed	in	detail	in	section	two	of	Chapter	2.	
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improved	is	the	objective	legitimacy	of	the	Commission	as,	with	more	detailed	
guidance,	undertakings	would	understand	why	 the	 fine	was	 imposed	on	 them	
and	 EU	 citizens	would	 not	 see	 the	 Commission’s	 fines	 as	 being	 decided	 in	 an	
arbitrary	way.		
	
On	the	other	hand,	one	may	wish	to	suggest	that	there	are	good	reasons	for	the	
Commission	 to	 retain	 its	 wide	 range	 of	 discretion;	 for	 example,	 it	 could	 be	
justified	 to	 enable	 the	 Commission	 to	 have	 flexibility	 in	 the	 application	 of	 its	
fines.	However,	what	has	to	be	remembered	is	that	the	Guidelines	do	not	bind	
the	Commission,102	they	provide	guidance	and	the	Commission	can	depart	from	
them	where	 it	 is	 reasonable	 and	 necessary	 to	 do	 so.	 Therefore,	 by	 providing	
more	 detailed	 Guidelines,	 undertakings	 would	 benefit	 as	 they	 have	 further	
certainty.	But	the	Commission	also	benefits,	as	they	still	retain	their	discretion,	
and	the	offence	and	procedure	gains	additional	legitimacy.		
	
When	 one	 considers	 the	 fourth	 and	 fifth	 stages	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	
process,	 certainty	 could	 be	 further	 enhanced	 if	 the	 Commission	were	 to	 give	
examples	 of	 how	 much	 the	 likely	 increase	 or	 decrease	 in	 fine	 might	 be.	
Currently	 an	 undertaking	 cannot	 be	 sure	what	 sort	 of	 percentage	 increase	 or	
decrease	it	will	receive	for	an	aggravating	or	mitigating	factor.103	By	doing	this	it	
would	 also	 enhance	 transparency	 and	 help	 facilitate	 the	 equal	 treatment	 of	
fining	amongst	undertakings,	because	 it	would	be	clearly	 identifiable	when	an	
reduction	or	increase	is	above	the	‘standard	percentage’	to	be	awarded.	In	this	
case,	the	Commission	could	simply	explain	what	factors	and	reasons	have	led	it	
to	 increase	 or	 decrease	 the	 percentage	 fine	 it	 awards.	 It	 is	 acknowledged,	
however,	that	the	Fining	Guidelines	are	not	binding	on	the	Commission	so	they	
may	 award	 higher	 or	 lower	 percentage	 fines	 based	 on	 the	 specific	
circumstances	 before	 them,	 but	 it	 does	 give	 an	 undertaking	 an	 illustration	 of																																																									
102	See	Case	C-397/03	P,	Archer	Daniels	Midland	v	Commission	[2006]	ECR	1-4429	para	91.	
103	The	only	way	to	try	to	identify	this	at	the	moment	is	to	find	the	Commission’s	previous	
decisions	and	then	attempt	to	identify	what	the	average	percentage	figure	is	for	the	aggravating	
or	mitigating	factor.	Unfortunately,	there	are	cases	where	this	information	is	redacted	or	not	
provided	making	this	analysis	difficult	for	the	undertaking.	
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the	 likely	 increase	 or	 decrease	 based	 on	 that	 aggravating	 or	mitigating	 factor	
and	help	to	enhance	the	transparency	of	the	enforcement	of	the	Guidelines.		
	
When	the	sixth	stage	of	the	fining	process	(specific	deterrence)	was	analysed,	it	
was	 identified	 that	 there	 was	 a	 lack	 of	 guidance	 on	 what	 constituted	 a	
‘sufficiently	 deterrent	 effect’	 and	 ‘a	 particularly	 large	 turnover’.	 Therefore,	
guidance	 such	 as	 examples	 on	 what	 constitutes	 each	 of	 these	 would	 allow	
undertakings	 to	 identify	 in	which	 situations	 this	 stage	 of	 the	 fining	 process	 is	
likely	 to	 apply	 to	 them.	 Alongside	 this,	 illustrations	 of	 the	 likely	 percentage	
increase	 in	 the	 fines	 could	 be	 given	 for	 this	 stage,	 as	 currently	 there	 is	 no	
information	 available	 regarding	 the	 possible	 increase.	 By	 providing	 this	
guidance	 it	 would	 also	 offer	 transparency	 so	 that	 ‘outsiders’	 do	 not	 see	 the	
application	of	 this	 stage	of	 the	 fining	process	as	a	mere	arbitrary	and	random	
punishment	of	certain	undertakings.104		
	
Another	potential	way	the	specific	deterrence	stage	could	be	enhanced	is	to	set	
a	 minimum	 amount,	 a	 threshold	 (if	 you	 will),	 to	 which	 the	 Commission	 will	
apply	 this	 stage	 in	 the	 fining	 procedure.	 This	 would	 mean	 that	 when	 an	
undertaking	has	a	certain	market	share	and	if	turnover	in	other	markets	outside	
the	effected	market	of	the	cartel	are	over-and-above	the	set	market	share	and	
turnover,	 then	 the	undertaking	will	automatically	have	 this	 stage	of	 the	 fining	
procedure	 applied	 to	 it.105	This	 would	 reduce	 uncertainty	 because	 it	 would	
clearly	 set	 out	 when	 this	 stage	 would	 apply	 and,	 as	 it	 is	 automatic,	 it	 would	
mean	 concerns	 regarding	 equal	 treatment	 between	 undertakings	 should	 not	
arise	 (unless	 there	 are	 differences	 in	 the	 chosen	 percentage	 increases	 in	 the	
cases	 where	 it	 is	 applied).	 If	 the	 Guidelines	 also	 specify	 the	 range	 that	 the	
percentage	increases	will	run	from-and-to,	this	should	again	reduce	uncertainty,	
																																																								
104	When	‘outsiders’	are	referred	to	in	this	chapter	what	is	meant	is	individuals	who	are	not	
privy	to	all	of	the	Commission’s	information	or	decision-making	process.	
105	This	would	not	be	a	turnover	figure,	as	this	could	not	accurately	capture	other	market	shares,	
it	would	need	to	be	based	on	the	undertakings	market	share	in	other	markets	that	are	outside	
the	cartelised	one	and	thus	would	need	to	be	a	percentage	figure.	
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claims	 of	 favouritism	 and	 the	 potential	 issues	 of	 unequal	 application	 of	 this	
stage.			
	
However,	 there	are	some	 issues	with	adopting	 this	approach.	This	would	 limit	
the	Commission’s	discretion	in	the	application	of	this	stage,	as	the	stage	would	
become	automatic	when	a	 certain	 threshold	 is	met,	meaning	 the	Commission	
would	be	more	restrained	as	to	when	it	has	to	apply	it.	Although,	from	a	legal	
certainty	perspective,	surely	this	 is	positive,	as	 it	 removes	the	potential	claims	
of	arbitrary	application	of	the	stage	and	in	any	case,	this	stage	should	be	applied	
in	 circumstances	 that	 are	 similar	 in	 each	 of	 the	 fining	 decisions	 anyway,	 i.e.	
when	 an	 undertaking	 has	 certain	 market	 shares	 and	 turnover	 outside	 of	 the	
cartelised	market.	 One	 concern	with	 this	 is	 at	what	 percentage	market	 share	
outside	of	the	cartelised	market	and	turnover	should	this	stage	be	set	at.	Even	
once	 this	 is	 decided	 it	 could	 lead	 to	 appeals	 to	 the	 court	where	undertakings	
argue	that	the	Commission	has	in	fact	assessed	their	market	shares	incorrectly	
and	thus	this	stage	of	 the	 fining	procedure	should	not	be	applied	to	them.	To	
effectively	 attempt	 to	 calculate	 at	 what	 level	 this	 threshold	 could	 be	 set	 is	
beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 research	 and	 would	 require	 specialist	 economic	
analysis.	Nonetheless,	 it	 is	 something	 that	could	be	achieved	 in	practice	 if	 the	
Commission	were	wishing	to	adopt	this	recommendation.	
	
There	are	other	areas	within	the	Commission’s	fining	process	which	could	have	
increased	certainty	by	further	limiting	the	discretion	or	by	providing	additional	
guidance.106	This	reduction	in	discretion	and	improved	guidance	would	improve	
certainty,	limit	bias	and	the	potential	for	over-deterrence,	as	well	as	enhancing	
the	legitimacy	of	the	offence	and	the	Commission.	
	
If	we	apply	the	analysis	and	above	discussion	to	the	Commission’s	fining	process	
in	its	entirety,	it	would	appear	that	the	requirements	of	legal	certainty	are	met.	
This	 is	 owing	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 an	 undertaking	 can	 foresee	 sufficiently	 that	 by	
																																																								
106	Such	as	stage	one.	
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engaging	 in	a	cartel	 it	 could	be	 fined	by	 the	Commission	up	 to	 ten	percent	of	
their	annual	turnover.	It	is	acknowledged	that	there	are	elements	of	uncertainty	
within	the	Commission’s	Fining	Guidelines	as	to	what	effects	certain	stages	will	
have	on	an	undertaking’s	fine.	 	However,	there	is	a	high	degree	of	certainty	in	
the	 ten	 percent	 limiting	 cap	 on	 the	 fines	 itself,	 bar	 the	 concerns	 raised	 in	
relation	to	parent	firm	liability.	 It	 is	accepted	that	courts	such	as	the	House	of	
Lords	in	the	UK	have	stated	that	‘it	is	important	to	have	clarity	and	certainty.’107		
Yet	this	requirement	of	certainty	is	not	absolute,	indeed	‘the	requirement	is	for	
sufficient	 rather	 than	 absolute	 certainty’.108	Thus,	when	 considering	 the	 fining	
process	 itself,	 the	 undertaking	 may	 not	 have	 absolute	 certainty	 but	 they	 do	
appear	 to	 have	 sufficient	 certainty	 when	 the	 Guidelines	 are	 considered	 as	 a	
whole	 entity.	 Therefore,	 the	 current	 Commission	 Fining	 Guidelines	 are	
compliant	with	Article	7	of	the	ECHR.	However,	as	advocated	in	the	discussion	
above,	 with	 improvements	 certainty	 could	 be	 further	 enhanced	 for	
undertakings	without	the	loss	of	the	Commission’s	flexibility.		
	
3.2.5	 Conclusions	 on	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 policy’s	 compliance	with	 legal	
certainty		
In	 this	 section	 of	 the	 chapter,	 various	 stages	 within	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	
process	have	been	analysed.	It	has	been	shown,	through	the	case	law	–	of	the	
EU	courts,	the	ECtHR	and	national	courts	–	and	the	application	and	analysis	of	
that	 case	 law	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process	 does	 comply	 with	 the	
requirement	 of	 Article	 7	 ECHR.	 Yet,	what	 has	 also	 been	 identified	 is	 that	 the	
Commission	 has	 a	 very	 wide	 range	 of	 discretion	 under	 the	 ten	 percent	 cap	
when	 it	 applies	 its	 policy,	 and	 therefore	 if	 the	 Commission	 were	 to	 limit	 its	
discretion	 further	 –	 through	 more	 restrictive	 guidance	 –	 this	 should	 enable	
enhanced	 certainty	 and	 transparency	 in	 the	 fining	 procedure. 109 	This	 is	
important	because	greater	certainty	and	transparency	within	the	fining	process																																																									
107	Warner	v	Commissioner	of	Police	for	the	Metropolis	[1969]	2	AC	256	at	p296,	Lord	Morris.		
108	R	v	Misra	&	Anor	[2004]	EWCA	Crim	2375	para	34.	
109	This	chapter	has	identified	a	variety	of	measures	that	will	enhance	the	Guidelines	by	making	
them	more	restrictive.	For	instance,	by	providing	examples	of	factors	or	increases	and	
decreases,	and	proving	clearer	definitions	and	guidance	of	the	various	stages,	particularly	the	
‘specific	deterrence’	stage.				
	145	
allows	 for	 the	 observance	 of	 fairer	 enforcement	 of	 the	 law.	 Given	 the	
identification	 of	 this	 current	wide	 ranging	 enforcement	 discretion	 afforded	 to	
the	Commission,	it	is	important	to	proceed	to	assess	whether	the	Commission	is	
applying	its	fining	policy	fairly	and	consistency	to	all	undertakings	involved	in	a	
given	cartel.	This	is	examined	in	the	next	section	of	this	chapter.	
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3.3	 Equal	 treatment	 within	 the	 application	 of	 the	 Commission’s	
Fining	Guidelines?	
	
Now	 that	 the	 previous	 section	 has	 identified	 and	 analysed	 the	 legal	 certainty	
concerns	 within	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process	 the	 chapter	 can	 proceed	 to	
analyse	whether	the	Commission	applies	its	Fining	Guidelines	equally	between	
undertakings.	Equal	treatment	becomes	a	particular	issue	at	a	variety	of	stages	
in	 the	 fining	 process.	 This	 is	 particularly	 true	 in	 the	 instances	 of:	 the	 ITP,	 the	
nationality	of	an	undertaking	and	NC.	This	 section	of	 the	 chapter	proceeds	 to	
consider	each	of	these	in	turn.		
	
3.3.1	ITP	discount	
The	first	potential	issue	of	equal	treatment	that	shall	be	analysed	is	stage	ten	of	
the	 fining	 process	 where	 an	 undertaking’s	 ITP	 may	 be	 considered	 at	 the	
Commission’s	 discretion.	 Until	 Joaquin	 Almunia	 acceded	 to	 role	 of	 European	
Competition	 Commissioner,	 the	 Commission	 had	 taken	 a	 very	 strict	 line	with	
the	 ITP,	whereby	former	Commissioner	Neelie	Kroes	had	advocated	for	a	zero	
tolerance	 policy	 against	 cartels.110	In	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 current	 economic	 crisis	
Commissioner	 Almunia	 has	 taken	 a	 softer	 approach	 towards	 the	 ITP	 of	 an	
undertaking.111		
	
So	 why	 should	 it	 be	 the	 case	 that	 the	 Commission	worries	 if	 an	 undertaking	
becomes	 insolvent?	 Generally	 speaking,	 the	 consequences	 of	 an	 undertaking	
experiencing	bankruptcy	can	be	far	worse	for	the	industry	–	and	moreover	the	
economy	–	than	when	compared	with	offering	a	reduction	in	fine	to	allow	the	
undertaking	 to	 continue	 to	operate.	The	concerns	 that	 can	be	 raised	here	 fall																																																									
110	Neelie	Kroes,	‘Taking	Competition	Seriously	–	Anti-trust	Reform	in	Europe’	(IBA	and	European	
Commission	Conference	on	‘Anti-trust	reform	in	Europe:	a	year	in	practice’,	Brussels,	March	
2005)	<europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-05-157_en.pdf>	accessed	1	July	2013.	
111	See	for	example,	James	Kanter,	‘Europe’s	Antitrust	Chief	Shows	Leniency	on	Fines’	New	York	
Times	(New	York,	23	June	2010)	
<www.nytimes.com/2010/06/24/business/global/24cartel.html?_r=0>	accessed	1	July	2013.	In	
truth,	the	global	financial	crisis	can	be	seen	to	have	forced	Almunia’s	hand	to	some	extent,	with	
many	EU	firms	facing	dire	economic	plight.	Thus,	we	can	see	why	a	softer	approach	has	had	to	
be	taken	by	Almunia.	
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broadly	 into	 four	 categories.112	The	 first	 is	 that	 the	 anticompetitive	 industry	
becomes	 even	 more	 concentrated	 by	 the	 subsequent	 departure	 of	 an	
undertaking	from	the	market,	which	means	that	there	is	even	less	competitive	
pressure	within	the	market	and,	thus,	an	increased	likelihood	of	collusion	in	the	
future.	Secondly,	 the	social	and	economic	costs	 that	emanate	 from	forcing	an	
undertaking	into	bankruptcy	can	be	exceedingly	high.	For	example,	bankruptcy	
may	 lead	 to	a	 loss	of	 jobs,	 skills	 and	assets	of	material	economic	and	 societal	
worth.	Thirdly,	it	makes	it	harder	for	third	parties	who	purchase	goods	from	the	
undertaking	 to	 claim	 damages	 from	 the	 cartel,	 as	 the	 undertaking	 no	 longer	
exists	in	the	wake	of	its	bankruptcy.	Fourthly,	bankrupting	undertakings	is	likely	
to	 lead	 to	 large	 political	 pressure	 being	 placed	 on	 the	 Commission	 from	
business	 lobbying.	 In	 light	 of	 these	 potential	 issues	 and	 costs	 associated	with	
bankrupting	an	undertaking,	one	can	infer	strong	evidence	to	support	the	claim	
that	it	is	disproportionate	to	bankrupt	an	undertaking	when	the	alternative	–	a	
reduction	 in	 fine	–	will	mean	 the	undertaking	 can	 still	 compete	 in	 the	market	
and,	yet,	also	be	punished	for	its	infringement.	
	
Now	that	 the	Commission	takes	a	softer	approach	to	 the	consideration	of	 the	
ITP,	 it	 leads	 to	 greater	 concerns	 about	 equality	 in	 the	 fining	process,	 because	
undertakings	may	receive	discounts	in	their	fines	simply	based	on	their	financial	
circumstances.	 This	 can	 be	 best	 analysed	 by	 separating	 the	 issues	 into	 two	
separate	categories,	namely,	‘internal	problems’	and	‘external	problems’.		
To	begin	with,	the	internal	problems	shall	be	discussed.	Consider	the	following	
hypothetical	scenario:	
	
To	make	things	simple	there	are	three	firms	operating	 in	a	
cartel:	Firm	A,	Firm	B	and	Firm	C.	Firm	A	can	be	seen	as	the	
more	delinquent	firm,	as	it	is	the	cartel	ringleader,	has	been	
a	 member	 throughout	 the	 duration	 of	 the	 cartel	 and	 has	
committed	many	 instances	 of	 aggravating	 conduct.	 Firm	B	
																																																								
112	Stephan	(n	25)	519-522.	
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joined	 the	 cartel	 midway	 through	 and	 was	 coerced	 into	
joining	 by	 Firm	 A.	 Firm	 C	 has	 been	 a	member	 throughout	
the	cartel	with	Firm	A,	but	has	not	coerced	other	members	
to	join	or	been	the	ringleader.	The	Commission	detects	the	
cartel	 and	 issues	 fines	 against	 all	 of	 the	 firms.	 Firm	 A	 is	
facing	 potential	 insolvency	 by	 the	 fines,	 and	 thus	 the	
Commission	 grant	 them	an	 ITP	 discount	 on	 their	 fine.	 The	
discount	 Firm	 A	 receives	 –	 because	 it	 is	 in	 such	 poor	
financial	 standing	–	 is	 70%	off	 the	original	 fine,	which	was	
set	 by	 the	 Commission	 at	 5%.	 Therefore,	 Firm	 A’s	 overall	
fine	equates	to	1.5%	of	 its	total	turnover.	Firm	B	was	fined	
considerably	 beneath	 the	 10%	 turnover	 cap	 as	 it	 had	
mitigating	 circumstances	 and	 received	 a	 3%	 overall	 fine.	
Firm	C	also	received	a	fine	that	was	set	at	5%	of	their	total	
turnover.	We	now	have	the	situation	that	Firm	A	 the	most	
delinquent	firm	is	fined	significantly	 less	than	Firm	B	and	C	
who	both	have	to	pay	a	substantially	higher	fine	than	Firm	A	
simply	 because	 Firm	 A	 is	 currently	 in	 a	 poor	 financial	
situation.						
	
This	 hypothetical	 scenario	 raises	 the	 internal	 problems	 relating	 to	 equal	
treatment,	namely	that	undertakings	are	treated	differently	solely	on	the	basis	
of	their	financial	stability.	Firm	B	and	Firm	C	would	rightfully	be	questioning	the	
logic	behind	 the	Commission’s	decision	 to	 fine	 them	more	 than	Firm	A,	 given	
that	Firm	A	was	the	most	delinquent	undertaking.	At	no	stage	did	Firm	A’s	final	
plight	detract	 from	 its	ability	 to	engage	 in	 the	cartel	and	yet	 it	 is	 this	 that	has	
determined	its	eventual	fine.	This	problem	is	amplified	here	because	of	the	lack	
of	guidance	given	by	the	Commission	that	clearly	explains	how	these	decisions	
are	 made.113	The	 question	 here	 is	 how	 much	 of	 a	 concern	 this	 is,	 as	 each	
undertaking	has	the	potential	to	receive	a	reduction	in	fine	if	it	is	unable	to	pay;	
																																																								
113	These	concerns	were	similarly	made	in	regards	to	legal	certainty	in	section	one.	
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this	potential	 reduction	would	have	been	available	to	Firm’s	B	and	C	had	they	
have	 had	 severe	 financial	 problems.	 Moreover,	 it	 is	 objectively	 justifiable	 to	
allow	for	an	ITP	reduction	to	prevent	the	bankruptcy	of	an	undertaking	and	the	
negative	consequences	which	would	stem	from	this,	such	as	the	exiting	of	the	
firm	 from	 the	 market	 and	 the	 loss	 of	 jobs.	 However,	 one	 has	 to	 consider	
whether	 Firm	 A	 is	 actually	 just	 an	 inefficient	 firm	 and	 by	 it	 being	 awarded	 a	
reduction	 in	 fine	 it	 is	 actually	 allowing	 an	 uneconomical	 firm	 to	 stay	 in	 the	
market	and	gain	a	potentially	unfair	competitive	advantage	over	Firms	B	and	C.	
Indeed,	in	practice	this	is	something	the	EU	courts	have	noted	and	thus,114	have	
held	 that	 the	 Commission	 is	 not	 required	 to	 take	 account	 of	 an	 undertakings	
poor	financial	standing	in	the	calculation	of	the	fine.	
	
It	 is	 imperative	 that	 there	 is	 equality	 in	 the	 application	 of	 this	 stage	 when	
undertakings	 are	 in	 the	 same	 situation	 and	 have	 identical	 circumstances.	
Indeed,	there	exists	a	need	for	some	form	of	transparency	in	regards	to	the	way	
in	which	the	Commission	applies	this	stage	within	the	fining	process.		
	
We	now	need	to	consider	the	external	problems,	which	relate	to	(a)	when	the	
Commission	will	offer	an	 ITP	discount	 (i.e.	under	what	circumstances),	and	(b)	
how	much	of	a	discount	they	will	offer.		
3.3.1(a)	When	the	Commission	will	offer	an	ITP	discount	
What	 we	 need	 to	 identify	 with	 this	 first	 external	 problem	 is	 the	 criteria	 the	
Commission	bases	its	decisions	on.	For	example,	is	the	decision	based	purely	on	
the	financial	stability	of	an	undertaking,	or	does	the	Commission	consider	wider	
issues	such	as	the	economic	climate,	employment	or	even	the	nationality	of	the	
undertaking?		
	
To	begin	to	attempt	to	answer	this	question,	it	is	important	to	look	at	what	the	
Commission’s	 guidance	 states	 about	 what	 it	 will	 consider	 when	 making																																																									
114	Case	T-384/06	IBP	and	International	Building	Products	France	v	Commission	[2011]	para	120.		
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decisions.	Unfortunately,	the	Commission’s	Guidelines	provide	little	clarification	
on	what	the	Commission	shall	consider.	They	do,	however,	make	reference	to	
the	 consideration	 of	 the	 ‘specific	 social	 and	 economic	 context’	 of	 the	
undertaking’s	ITP	and	whether	the	initial	fine	would	‘irretrievably	jeopardise	the	
economic	viability	of	the	undertaking’.115		
	
In	 relation	 to	 considering	 the	 ‘specific	 social	 and	 economic	 context’	 of	 the	
undertaking’s	 ITP,	 a	 lack	 of	 clarity	 is	 a	 concern	 that	 has	 been	 raised	 before	
under	 the	 now	 obsolete	 1998	 Fining	 Guidelines.116	Stephan	 noted	 that	 this	
consideration	would	 require	a	 thorough	 review	of	 the	wider	policies	 specified	
under	the	Treaty,	including	those	relating	employment	and	social	protection.117	
This	would	allow	the	Commission	to	consider	a	much	broader	range	of	criteria	
and	 provides	 limited	 clarity	 for	 us	 to	 assess	whether	 the	 ITP	 is	 being	 applied	
equally	 to	 all	 undertakings,	 as	 it	 can	 be	 difficult	 to	 determine	 what	 the	
Commission	 is	 considering	 in	 its	 decision	 making	 process.118	Indeed,	 little	
clarification	is	offered	under	the	2006	Guidelines.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	2006	
Guidelines	amend	the	criteria	from	a	‘specific	social	context’	to	a	‘specific	social	
and	economic	 context’	 this	does	 little	 to	alleviate	 the	ambiguities	 surrounding	
when	the	Commission	will	grant	an	ITP	reduction.	In	fact,	this	could	actually	be	
seen	to	have	the	effect	of	widening	the	scope	of	 the	criteria	 that	Commission	
can	 consider.119	The	 EU	 courts	 however,	 can	 offer	 us	 some	 limited	 guidance	
through	their	case	law	here	on	part	of	the	criteria.	In	the	Tokai	Carbon	case	the	
Court	 stated	 that	 the	 criterion	 of	 the	 ‘specific	 social	 context’	 consists	 of	
situations	 where	 the	 undertaking	 having	 to	 pay	 the	 fine	 would	 lead	 to	 an	
																																																								
115	Commission	(n	14)	para	35.	
116	Commission,	(n	36).	The	ITP	provision	in	these	Guidelines	referred	to	the	‘specific	social	
context’	of	an	undertakings	ITP.	
117	Stephan	(n	25)	525.	
118	Indeed,	Stephan’s	analysis	of	cases	under	the	1998	Guidelines	shows	numerous	
inconsistencies	in	the	Commission’s	application	of	ITP	requests.	ibid	527.	
119	The	term	‘economic’	could	equally	apply	to	the	economic	conditions	of	the	undertaking,	as	
well	as	the	market	that	it	is	in.	
	151	
increase	 in	 ‘unemployment	or	deterioration	 in	the	economic	sectors	upstream	
and	downstream	of	the	undertaking	concerned’.120	
	
In	relation	to	considering	the	‘irretrievably	jeopardise	the	economic	viability	of	
the	 undertaking’	 criterion,	 the	 wording	 within	 the	 Commission’s	 guidance	
makes	 it	 appear	 that	 ITPs	 shall	 only	 be	 granted	 in	 exceptional	 circumstances.	
Indeed,	the	Guidelines	expressly	state	that	a	reduction	will	not	be	granted	for	a	
‘mere	finding	of	an	adverse	or	loss-making	financial	situation’.121	Taking	a	literal	
interpretation,	 it	seems	that	an	ITP	will	only	be	granted	where	an	undertaking	
may	 go	bankrupt	 or	where	 the	 fine	will	 cause	 the	undertaking	 to	 be	put	 in	 a	
position	where	it	will	become	insolvent.	This	point	within	the	guidance	appears	
to	offer	some	partial	clarity	as	to	when	the	Commission	should	be	awarding	an	
ITP.	Owing	to	the	economic	crisis,	the	then	Competition	Commissioner	Joaquín	
Almunia	 and	 Commissioner	 Janusz	 Lewandowski	 published	 an	 ‘Information	
Note’	offering	some	further	limited	information	on	the	application	of	an	ITP	and	
when	the	Commission	will	award	an	ITP	discount.122	
	
When	 the	 Commission	 considers	 the	 criterion	 of	 whether	 the	 fine	 will	
‘irretrievably	 jeopardise	the	economic	viability	of	the	undertaking’	 it	will	make	
this	 assessment	 based	 on	 a	 number	 of	 indicators	 derived	 from	 the	Altman	 Z-
score	 test.123	The	 Commission	 will	 give	 more	 emphasis	 to	 the	 solvency	 and	
liquidity	 relative	 to	 capitalisation	 and	 profitability	 of	 the	 company;	 consider	
whether	and	how	the	fine	would	cause	the	aforementioned	financial	indicators	
to	deteriorate;	and,	the	Commission	will	examine	historical	financial	data	of	the	
undertaking	alongside	two-year	future	predicted	financial	data.124	With	regards	
to	 the	 ‘specific	 social	 and	 economic	 context’	 the	 Note	 provides	 that	 the	
																																																								
120	Case	T-236/01	Tokai	Carbon	v	Commission	[2004]	ECR	II-1181	paras	370-371.	Note	that	this	
was	with	regards	to	the	1998	Fining	Guidelines	criteria.		
121	Commission	(n	14)	para	35.	
122	European	Commission,	‘Information	Note	-	Inability	to	pay	under	paragraph	35	of	the	2006	
Fining	Guidelines	and	payment	conditions	pre-	and	post-decision	finding	an	infringement	and	
imposing	fines’,	12	June	2010	OJ	1922.	
123	ibid	para	7.	
124	ibid.	
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Commission	 will	 interpret	 these	 criteria	 broadly. 125 	Similarly,	 with	 the	
requirement	that	assets	have	to	 lose	 ‘all	of	 their	value’	 the	Note	explains	that	
the	 Commission	will	 take	 a	 wider	 approach	 and	 not	 interpret	 this	 literally.126	
The	 Commission	 interprets	 this	 criterion	 to	 mean	 that	 the	 undertaking’s	
productive	assets	‘significantly’	lose	their	value.127		
	
Whilst	the	Information	Note	does	provide	further	transparency	to	the	awarding	
of	 an	 ITP	 discount,	 it	 leaves	 a	 lot	 of	 ambiguity	 and	 potential	 for	 unequal	
treatment	to	occur	in	this	stage.	For	example,	how,	and	what	assessments	will	
the	 Commission	 make	 with	 the	 future	 financial	 data	 they	 assess?	 The	
information	provided	within	the	Note	does	little	to	assist	in	understanding	with	
clarity	 what	 will	 suffice	 to	 meet	 the	 requirement	 of	 the	 	 ‘specific	 social	 and	
economic	 context’,	 especially	 as	 the	 Commission	 is	 interpreting	 this	 broadly.	
Equally,	 the	 Note	 seems	 to	 make	 a	 somewhat	 arbitrary	 distinction	 in	 the	
consideration	 of	 the	 ‘significantly	 loses	 value’	 interpretation;	 between	 where	
assets	are	sold	off,	jobs	are	lost	and	the	undertaking	goes	bankrupt,	compared	
to	where	another	undertaking	 is	 set	 to	purchase	 these	assets	and	employ	 the	
staff.	Why	should	the	Commission	make	this	distinction	here?	What	if	the	other	
undertaking	 purchases	 the	 assets	 and	 then	 sells	 them	 off	 or	 still	 closes	 the	
business	 and	 jobs	 are	 lost?	 The	 Note	 ignores	 these	 potential	 questions	
completely.	 Additionally,	 the	 Note	 provides	 no	 information	 on	 the	 likely	 or	
possible	reduction	that	would	be	awarded.	Finally,	it	is	questionable	as	to	what	
importance	 and	 value	 one	 can	 attribute	 to	 an	 Information	 Note.	 If	 it	 should	
form	part	of	the	guidance	for	the	method	of	calculating	and	awarding	an	ITP	it	
seems	 more	 coherent	 for	 this	 information	 to	 be	 contained	 within	 the	 main	
Guidelines	 and	 not	 in	 a	 separate	 document	 which	 is	 tucked	 away	 on	 the	
Commission’s	website.		
	
																																																								
125	ibid	para	8.	
126	ibid	para	9.	
127	ibid.	
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So	where	does	 this	 leave	 the	application	of	 the	 ITP	provision	 in	practice?	 In	a	
recent	 case,	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 (CJEU)	 dismissed	 an	
appeal	 by	 Ziegler	 SA	 that	 was	 partially	 based	 on	 an	 alleged	 breach	 of	 the	
principle	of	equal	 treatment	 in	 relation	 to	an	 ITP	 request.128	Ziegler	 submitted	
an	 ITP	request	 to	the	Commission	after	 receiving	a	 fine	of	3.76%	of	 its	annual	
turnover	 imposed. 129 	The	 Commission	 refused	 Ziegler’s	 request	 but	 then	
proceeded	to	grant	an	ITP	reduction	of	70	percent	to	Interdean	NV,	which	was	a	
fellow	member	of	the	cartel.130	Ziegler	appealed	to	the	GC	on	the	grounds	that	
the	 Commission	 had	 failed	 to	 consider	 its	 specific	 social	 and	 economic	
circumstances,	 in	 accordance	 with	 paragraph	 35	 of	 the	 2006	 Fining	
Guidelines.131	Ziegler	 believed	 that	 its	 financial	 circumstances	 were	 similar	 to	
that	 of	 Interdean	 that	 had	 received	 the	 ITP	 discount.	 Despite	 confirming	 that	
the	Commission	had	failed	to	afford	consideration	to	Ziegler’s	specific	social	and	
economic	 context,	 the	 GC	 ruled	 that	 Ziegler’s	 circumstances	 were	 not	
comparable	with	those	of	 Interdean’s	and,	thus,	Ziegler	was	not	entitled	to	an	
ITP	discount.132	Ziegler	 then	appealed	the	GC	decision	to	the	CJEU	and	argued	
that	–	given	the	GC’s	finding	that	the	Commission	had	made	an	error	by	failing	
to	 consider	 Ziegler’s	 specific	 social	 and	 economic	 context	 –	 the	GC	 could	 not	
legitimately	conclude	that	Interdean	was	entitled	to	an	ITP	discount	when	it	did	
not	 assess	 Ziegler’s	 own	 ITP	 request	 on	 the	 same	 basis.	 Ziegler	 argued	 that	
reaching	such	a	conclusion	would	infringe	the	principle	of	equal	treatment.133		
	
The	 Commission	 countered	 Ziegler’s	 accusation	 of	 unequal	 treatment	 by	
insisting	that	the	specific	circumstances	of	Interdean	were	‘wholly	exceptional’	
and	‘entirely	special,	for	reasons	which	cannot	be	disclosed	to	Ziegler	but	which	
the	GC	was	aware	of.’134	Therefore,	these	exceptional	circumstances	warranted																																																									
128	Case	C-439/11	P	Ziegler	v	Commission	(CJEU,	11	July	2013).	
129	International	Removal	Services	(Case	COMP/38.543)	Commission	Decision	2009/C	199/07	
[2008]	OJ	C188/16.	
130	The	CJEU	judgment	is	silent	on	the	name	of	this	party,	but	the	GC	openly	refers	to	Interdean	
in	relation	to	the	ITP	elements	of	the	original	appeal.	
131	Case	T-199/08	Ziegler	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-3507	para	79.	
132	ibid	para	171.	
133	Ziegler	v	Commission	(CJEU)	(n	128)	para	163.	
134	ibid	para	165.	
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the	Commission	to	depart	from	its	general	practice	with	regards	to	ITP	requests,	
in	 accordance	 with	 the	 discretion	 it	 has	 under	 paragraph	 37	 of	 the	 2006	
Guidelines.	In	dismissing	the	appeal,	the	CJEU	stated	that,	although	the	GC	had	
found	the	Commission	had	failed	to	give	full	consideration	to	Ziegler’s	financial	
circumstances,	the	GC	had	not	established	whether	or	not	Ziegler	was	unable	to	
pay	 its	 fine.	 As	 such,	 the	 CJEU	 ruled	 that	 Ziegler’s	 allegation	 that	 the	GC	 had	
applied	unequal	treatment	was	unfounded.135	
	
This	 case	 is	 interesting	 because	 of	 the	 confidentiality	 behind	 the	 awarding	 of	
Interdean’s	ITP	discount.	In	this	case,	the	CJEU	reiterated	that	‘the	principle	of	
equal	 treatment	 requires,	 inter	 alia,	 that	 comparable	 situations	 must	 not	 be	
treated	differently,	unless	such	treatment	is	objectively	justified.’136	However,	if	
something	 is	 objectively	 justified	 on	 grounds	 which	 are	 kept	 confidential	 to	
other	cartel	members	and	the	general	public	at	 large,	 it	 is	 impossible	for	us	to	
say	whether	it	 is	objectively	justifiable	or	not.	Moreover,	how	can	one	see	the	
application	of	equal	treatment	when	it	appears	to	all	those	outside,	that	are	not	
privy	 to	 the	 information,	 that	 this	 is	 unequal	 treatment.	 It	 is	 hoped	 that	 the	
Commission’s	policy	 in	this	case	has	been	applied	fairly	and	equally.	However,	
because	we	are	not	privy	 to	all	 the	 information	we	cannot	be	sure	 that	 it	has	
and	 given	 such	wide	 discretion	 and	 the	 secretive	 nature	 of	 the	way	 this	 case	
was	decided,	it	is	difficult	to	see	for	certain	how	equal	treatment	has	been	given	
in	this	case.	Thus,	some	may	sympathise	with	Ziegler	who	made	a	challenge	to	
the	decision	on	equal	treatment	grounds	but	ended	up	with	no	ITP,	left	having	
to	 pay	 legal	 costs	 and	 no	 real	 explanation	 as	 to	why	 it	was	 not	 the	 victim	 of	
unequal	treatment	here.		Admittedly	there	are	issues	if	too	much	information	is	
shared	by	 the	Commission,137	such	as	 the	prospect	of	undertakings	 relying	on	
information	in	an	attempt	to	align	itself	into	a	position	where	the	Commission	is	
likely	to	award	it	an	ITP.	However,	it	is	important	that	the	Commission	divulges	
at	 least	 some	 of	 the	 facts	 and	 circumstances	 of	 its	 decision	 so	 that	 the																																																									
135	ibid	para	170.	
136	ibid	para	166.	
137	Which	have	been	noted	in	the	previous	discussion.	
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undertakings	–	and	more	widely	the	general	public	at	large	–	can	observe	that	
the	law	and	the	enforcement	of	the	law	is	being	conducted	fairly	and	correctly	
to	all	undertakings	which	have	contravened	it.				
3.3.1(b)	How	much	of	a	discount	they	will	offer		
The	next	 important	 consideration	with	 regards	 to	 ITPs	and	equal	 treatment	 is	
how	much	 discount	 the	 Commission	will	 afford	 an	 undertaking.	 There	 is	 very	
little	 clarity	 as	 to	how	 the	Commission	decides	 the	 size	of	 a	discount	offered.	
Indeed,	 one	 can	 see	 the	 Guidelines	 make	 no	 mention	 as	 to	 the	 size	 of	 the	
discount	and,	as	such,	an	analysis	of	whether	the	Commission	applies	its	policy	
equally	is	difficult.	Consequently,	we	must	turn	to	the	Commission’s	decisions	to	
attempt	 to	 identify	 the	 level	 of	 discounts	 awarded	 by	 the	 Commission	 and	
whether	the	policy	is	applied	equally	to	all	undertakings.138	
	
The	Commission	is	willing	to	offer	a	wide	range	of	discounts	when	it	comes	to	a	
reduction	for	an	ITP.	When	we	look	at	the	decisions	by	the	Commission	we	can	
see	that	this	reduction	ranges	from	20	percent,139	right	up	to	96	percent.140	The	
Commission	 is	 willing	 to	 offer	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 discounts	 within	 this	 range.	
However,	when	we	take	the	ITP	raw	data	from	the	GCR	data	set,141	we	can	see	
that	the	mean	average	discount	for	a	successful	undertaking	is	46.2	percent	(to	
one	decimal	place),	and	the	modal	and	median	averages	are	both	50	percent.	
These	 findings	are	very	similar	 to	what	Veljanovski	 found	 in	his	2010	study.142	
He	identified	that,	of	the	46	ITP	applications	considered	in	his	study,	only	12	of	
these	were	granted	and	the	successful	applicants	received	an	average	reduction	
in	fine	of	51	percent.																																																										
138	Kienapfel	and	Wils	have	previously	examined	some	of	the	first	cases	where	the	ITP	discount	
has	been	awarded:	Philip	Kienapfel	and	Geert	Wils,	‘Inability	to	Pay	–	First	cases	and	practical	
experiences’	(2010)	3	Competition	Policy	Newsletter	3.	
139	Received	by	Almamet	in	the	Calcium	Carbide	and	Magnesium	based	reagents	for	the	steel	
and	gas	Industries	cartel.	Calcium	Carbide	and	magnesium	based	reagents	for	the	steel	and	gas	
industries	(Case	COMP	39.396)	Commission	Decision	2009/C301/14	OJ	C301/18.	
140	Received	by	Baerlocher	in	the	Heat	Stabilisers	(Tin	Stabilisers)	cartel.	Heat	Stabilisers	(Case	
COMP	38.589)	Commission	Decision	2010/C307/05	OJ	C307/9.	
141	GCR	(n	42).	
142	Veljanovski	(n	15).	
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With	such	a	wide	range	of	reductions	being	offered	and	no	express	mention	of	
how	or	why	in	a	particular	instance	the	Commission	offers	such	a	discount,	it	is	
difficult	to	see	how	the	Commission	is	applying	its	policy	equally.	The	arbitrary	
nature	of	these	adjustments	appears	to	make	effective	scrutiny	impossible	and	
inconsistencies	inevitable	and,	hence,	unequal	treatment	likely.		
	
Considering	 the	granting	of	 ITP	 requests	 in	 the	 future,	 it	will	be	 interesting	 to	
see	whether	–	in	addition	to	appeals	based	on	an	undertaking	not	being	granted	
an	ITP	discount	–	appeals	may	also	be	based	upon	the	amount	of	ITP	discount	
awarded	to	an	undertaking;	particularly	where	varying	discounts	are	awarded	in	
the	same	cartel.	Given	 the	 flexibility	 that	 the	Commission	has	exercised	when	
awarding	discounts	in	the	past,	some	undertakings	may	be	expectant	of	 larger	
percentage	 discounts	 and,	 as	 such,	 base	 an	 appeal	 to	 the	 court	 when	 the	
amount	granted	is	perceived	by	the	undertaking	to	be	too	low	relative	to	other	
undertakings	within	the	cartel.143	
	
One	can	see	within	 the	 ITP	provision	 that	 there	 is	 such	a	degree	of	discretion	
attributed	 to	 the	Commission	 that	unequal	 treatment	seems	 likely	 to	occur	 in	
practice	or	at	least	has	the	potential	to	do	so.	Indeed,	from	the	data	we	can	see	
that	undertakings	in	similar	financial	circumstances	have	been	offered	a	diverse	
range	 of	 discounts.	 However,	 because	 of	 the	 arbitrary	 nature	 and	 the	
confidential	 way	 in	 which	 the	 Commission	 decides	 to	 offer	 an	 ITP,	 it	 is	
impossible	 to	 say	 for	 certain	 that	 there	 is	 unequal	 treatment.	However,	what	
one	can	 say	 for	 certain	 is	 that	 the	Commission	 is	prepared	 to	be	very	 flexible	
with	the	discounts	they	offer	undertakings	for	ITPs,	and	this	flexibility	is	so	great	
unequal	 application	 is	 a	 real	 probability.	 This	 means	 that	 this	 stage	 in	 the	
Commission’s	 fining	 procedure	 could	 be	 greatly	 enhanced	 if	 the	 Commission	
were	to	introduce	more	transparency	in	the	application	of	this	stage	and	within	
the	guidance	documentation,	as	it	will	allow	undertakings	(as	well	as	others)	to																																																									
143	Although,	to	an	extent,	financially	unstable	undertakings	may	be	deterred	from	making	an	
appeal	on	these	grounds,	given	that	they	will	be	liable	for	the	costs	incurred	from	making	an	
unsuccessful	appeal.	
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see	that	the	Commission	is	applying	this	stage	in	its	fining	procedure	fairly	and	
indiscriminately.144	Indeed,	 this	 is	 important	 because	 in	 its	 current	 guise	 with	
the	lack	of	information	being	provided	by	the	Commission,	and	guidance	on	the	
likely	reductions,	we	are	seeing	undertakings	challenging	the	Commission	on	its	
application	of	this	stage	in	the	fining	procedure.145	This	 inevitably	entails	 legal,	
social	and	economic	costs	for	society	that	could	be	reduced	or	minimised	with	
more	 transparency.	With	 regards	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 Information	 Note,	 the	
information	contained	within	this	does	offer	partial	guidance,	but	 it	 is	unclear	
as	 to	 the	 relevance	 and	 indeed	 importance	 of	 this	 information	 now	 that	 the	
Competition	Commissioner	has	changed.	If	these	practices	are	to	be	followed	in	
the	 future	 it	would	be	beneficial	–	 for	clarity	and	completeness	purposes	–	 to	
incorporate	 the	 information	 in	 the	 Information	 Note	 into	 the	 Commission’s	
main	 Guidelines	 for	 the	 method	 of	 setting	 the	 fine.	 Nonetheless,	 it	 is	 still	
important	 to	 ensure	 that	 this	 stage	 is	 not	made	unduly	 or	 overly	 transparent	
because	of	the	potential	concern	that	an	undertaking	may	attempt	to	align	itself	
and	represent	 its	 financial	position	 in	a	way	 that	will	enable	 it	 to	qualify	 for	a	
reduction	in	fine,	which	would	mean	some	of	the	deterrence	effect	of	the	fine	
would	 be	 lost.146	Therefore,	 it	 is	 important	 that	 the	 Commission	 ensures	 its	
strike	the	right	balance	between	transparent	application	and	clear	guidance,	on	
the	one	hand,	and	non-disclosure	and	discretion,	on	the	other,	is	facilitated.	
	
3.3.2	Nationality	of	an	undertaking	
The	next	area	considered	in	regards	to	the	application	of	equal	treatment	is	that	
of	 an	 undertaking’s	 nationality.	 This	 part	 will	 assess	 and	 analyse	 whether	 an	
undertaking’s	 nationality	 has	 an	 effect	 on	 the	 fine	 imposed	 on	 it	 by	 the	
																																																								
144	The	difficulty	that	may	be	faced	here	will	be	with	regards	to	the	publishing	of	confidential	
business	information.	However,	if	the	Commission	redacts	the	most	sensitive	information	and	
data	it	will	be	possible	to	enhance	transparency	and	balance	the	needs	of	confidentiality.	
Indeed,	it	is	worth	noting	that	some	of	the	financial	data	may	already	be	in	the	public	domain.	
Companies	are	required	to	file	financial	records	publically	in	most	EU	Member	States.	
145	For	example	see,	Case	C-439/11	P	Ziegler	v	Commission	(CJEU,	11	July	2013).	
146	It	is	worth	noting	though,	that	as	this	reduction	in	fine	for	ITP	is	completely	discretionary	and	
not	guaranteed.	If	the	Commission	feels	an	undertaking	is	attempting	to	misrepresent	its	
financial	position	it	can	decide	to	not	allow	or	award	a	reduction	in	fine	because	of	an	
undertakings	ITP.	
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Commission.	 Specifically,	 this	 section	 shall	 focus	 on	 the	 comparison	 of	 the	
treatment	 of	 an	 undertaking	 of	 non-EU	 nationality	 against	 those	 of	 an	 EU	
nationality.	To	be	clear,	in	this	context	when	the	nationality	of	an	undertaking	is	
referred	 to,	 what	 is	 meant	 is	 ‘the	 country	 of	 the	 undertaking	 or	 group	 of	
undertakings	involved	in	the	cartel’.		
	
The	data	utilised	for	the	following	empirical	analysis	and	the	proceeding	section	
of	 the	chapter	 is	drawn	from	the	previously	discussed	and	employed	GCR	raw	
data	 set,147	with	 the	percentage	 fines	 imposed	against	 the	undertakings	being	
consulted.	These	percentage	fines	are	based	on	the	worldwide	market	turnover	
of	 the	 undertakings.	 This	 data	 was	 chosen	 to	 be	 utilised	 as	 it	 allows	 a	
straightforward	and	direct	comparison	to	be	made	of	the	fines	within	a	specific	
cartel	 and	 the	 percentage	 fines	 imposed	 in	 other	 separate	 cartels	 on	
undertakings.	
	
There	 are	 three	 possible	 approaches	 the	 Commission	 could	 adopt	 in	 the	
application	of	its	fining	policy	with	regards	to	an	undertaking’s	nationality.	First,	
the	Commission	could	apply	its	fining	policy	in	the	same	way	to	all	undertakings	
no	 matter	 what	 their	 nationality.	 Second,	 they	 could	 apply	 favourable	
treatment	 to	 an	 undertaking	 based	 on	 their	 nationality	 or,	 finally,	 they	 could	
apply	less	favourable	treatment	to	an	undertaking	based	on	their	nationality.	
	
Of	course	one	would	hope	 to	see	 that	 the	Commission	applies	 its	policy	 fairly	
and	equally	to	all	undertakings	regardless	of	their	nationality.	If	it	does	not,	the	
punishment	and	decision	that	the	Commission	enforces	would	be	arbitrary	and	
unfair.	When	a	policy	is	not	applied	fairly	it	can	lead	to	economic	costs,	such	as	
undertaking’s	 appealing	 the	 Commission’s	 decisions	 due	 to	 procedural	
impropriety	and	unfairness	alongside	the	cost	of	the	Commission	losing	part	of	
its	apparent	legitimacy	to	be	the	enforcer	of	Article	101	TFEU.	However,	there	
are	a	variety	of	reasons	why	the	Commission	may	seek	to	treat	an	undertaking																																																									
147	GCR	(n	42).	
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differently.	For	example,	one	may	expect	 the	Commission	to	protect	or	afford	
favourable	 treatment	 towards	 EU	 undertakings	 and	 therefore	 be	 harsher	 on	
undertakings,	which	are	of	a	non-EU	nationality.	The	benefit	of	the	Commission	
adopting	such	an	approach	for	EU	national	undertakings	 is	that	they	would	be	
better	 off	 than	 non-EU	undertakings	 as	 the	 fines	would	 be	 less	 for	 them	and	
therefore	 they	may	be	able	 to	gain	a	 competitive	advantage,	 as	 the	 fine	 they	
receive	is	less.	Additionally,	the	higher	the	fines	the	greater	the	benefits	for	the	
EU	as	the	fines	are	absorbed	into	the	EU’s	budget.	However,	it	could	be	that	the	
Commission	 wishes	 to	 make	 an	 example	 of	 a	 non-EU	 undertaking,	 which	
commits	a	competition	 law	breach,	 so	as	 to	deter	other	non-EU	national	 (and	
EU)	 undertakings	 from	 committing	 similar	 competition	 law	 breaches	 and,	
therefore,	the	Commission	imposes	larger	fines	on	those	undertakings.	On	the	
other	 hand,	 it	 may	 be	 that	 the	 Commission	 wishes	 to	 show	 that	 EU	
undertakings	do	not	get	preferential	treatment	over	non-EU	undertakings	and,	
thus,	 they	 seek	 to	 redress	 this	 notion	 by	 positively	 discriminating	 against	 EU	
undertakings.	
	
Given	 these	 different	 approaches	 the	 Commission	 could	 adopt	 to	 the	
consideration	of	an	undertaking’s	nationality	and	the	wide-ranging	discretion	it	
has	in	its	application	of	the	fining	process,	this	chapter	proceeds	to	analyse	the	
empirical	data	 to	discover	whether	 the	Commission’s	 fining	process	 is	applied	
equally	based	on	the	nationality	of	an	undertaking.		
	
Of	 the	 forty-three	 cartels	 reported	 in	 the	 GCR	 data	 set,	 thirty-four	 of	 these	
contained	 non-EU	 national	 undertakings.	 The	 majority	 of	 the	 non-EU	 firms	
comprised	 of	 undertakings	 from	 the	 following	 nationalities:	 Switzerland,	 the	
USA	and	Japan.	In	some	of	the	Commission’s	decisions,	information	on	the	fines	
was	redacted	or	not	disclosed	and,	thus,	in	some	decisions,	information	on	the	
percentage	fine	given	by	the	Commission	is	missing.	What	we	can	see	from	the	
information	 that	 has	 been	 disclosed	 is	 that	 there	 was	 a	 wide	 variety	 in	 the	
percentage	of	fines	imposed	on	undertakings	of	both	EU	nationality	and	of	non-
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EU	 nationality.	 In	 some	 instances,	 EU	 undertakings	 received	 the	 lowest	 fines,	
and	in	others	the	highest.	
	
For	 example,	 in	 the	 ‘MCAA’	 cartel,148	‘PO	 Thread’	 cartel,149	‘Butadiene	Rubber	
and	 Emulsion	 Styrene	 Butadiene	 Rubber’	 cartel	 and, 150 	the	 ‘International	
Removal	 Services’	 cartels,151	the	 percentage	 fines	 given	 to	 non-EU	 national	
undertakings	were	lower	than	that	given	to	the	EU	national	undertakings	within	
the	same	cartel.152	In	contrast,	the	decisions	in	the	‘Rubber	Chemicals’	cartel,153	
‘Flat	 Glass’ 154 	and	 ‘Consumer	 Detergents’	 cartels, 155 	saw	 the	 Commission	
attribute	a	higher	percentage	fine	to	non-EU	national	undertakings	than	the	EU	
national	 undertakings	 in	 the	 same	 cartel.	We	 also	 find	 that,	 within	 the	 same	
cartel,	 some	non-EU	undertakings	receive	the	 lowest	 fines	whereas,	 in	others,	
they	 receive	higher	 fines;	 for	 example	 this	was	 the	 case	 in	 the	 ‘Gas	 Insulated	
Switchgear’156	and	 ‘Elevators	and	Escalators	 (Belgium)’	 cartel.157	Owing	 to	 this	
range	 in	 fining,	 all	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 Commission	 decisions	 highlight	 the	
Commission’s	 non-discriminatory	 approach	 in	 fining	 an	 undertaking	 with	
regards	to	the	consideration	of	the	undertaking’s	nationality.		
	
This	section	shall	now	analyse	a	selection	of	the	Commission’s	fining	decisions	
to	 ensure	 this	 procedure	 is	 applied	 fairly	 in	 practice.	 It	 begins	 by	 considering	
three	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 decisions,	 then	 it	 examines	 two	 of	 these	 in	 great	
detail.	These	decisions	were	chosen	as	they	are	a	representative	sample	of	the	
Commission’s	 practices	 and	 some	 have	 unique	 and	 interesting	 factors																																																									
148	MCAA	(Case	COMP/37.773)	Commission	Decision	2006/897/EC	[2005]	OJ	L	353/12.	
149	PO	Thread	(Case	COMP/38.337)	Commission	Decision	2008/C21/08	[2005]	OJ	C21/10.	
150	Butadiene	Rubber	and	Emulsion	Styrene	Butadiene	Rubber	(Case	COMP/38.638)	Commission	
Decision	2008/C7/07	[2006]	OJ	C7/11.		
151	International	Removal	Services	(Case	COMP/38.543)	Commission	Decision	2009/C188/07	
[2008]	OJ	C188/16.	
152	This	is	a	selection	of	the	Commission	decisions;	there	are	others.	
153	Rubber	Chemicals	(Case	COMP	38.443)	Commission	Decision	2006/C353/50	[2005]	OJ	
C353/50.	
154	Flat	Glass	(Case	COMP	39.165)	Commission	Decision	2008/C127/11	[2007]	OJ	C127/9.	
155	Consumer	Detergents	(Case	COMP	39.579)	Commission	Decision	2011/C193/06	[2011]	OJ	
C193/14.	
156	Gas	Insulated	Switchgear	(Case	COMP	38.899)	Commission	Decision	2008/C5/07	[2007]	OJ	
C5/7.	
157	Elevators	and	Escalators	(n	68).	
	161	
concerning	the	composition	of	the	nationality	of	the	undertakings	and	the	way	
in	which	the	Commission	awarded	fines	within	the	decision.	
	
In	the	‘DRAMS’	cartel	there	were	ten	undertakings	involved,158	but	only	one	of	
the	undertakings	was	of	EU	nationality.	In	this	cartel,	the	Commission	fined	the	
EU	undertaking	–	which	was	from	Germany	–	the	highest	percentage	fine	of	all	
of	the	cartel	members.159	Interestingly,	the	other	non-EU	national	undertakings	
in	 this	 cartel	 received	 a	 substantially	 lower	 percentage	 fines.	 The	majority	 of	
these	 percentage	 fines	 were	 under	 0.24%,	 with	 only	 one	 non-EU	 national	
undertaking	receiving	a	higher	percentage	fine	than	0.24%:	Hynix.160	This	is	true	
even	 when	 the	 non-EU	 undertaking	 has	 a	 similar	 annual	 turnover	 to	 the	 EU	
national	undertaking.161	
	
The	next	cartel	to	be	discussed	is	the	‘Chloroprene	Rubber’	cartel.162	This	cartel	
involved	 six	 undertakings,	 four	 of	 which	 were	 of	 non-EU	 nationality.	 In	 this	
cartel,	 Bayer	 –	 an	 undertaking	 from	Germany	 –	 received	 complete	 immunity,	
with	 the	 other	 EU	 undertaking	 (Eni	 /	 Polimeri	 Europa)	 receiving	 one	 of	 the	
lowest	percentage	fines.	The	highest	percentage	fine	 in	this	case	was	received	
by	one	of	the	non-EU	undertakings	–	Denki	Kagaku	Kogyo	/	Denka	–	who	were	
fined	2.14%.	
	
In	the	‘PO/Hard	Haberdashery:	Fasteners’	cartel,163	thirteen	undertakings	were	
involved	and	four	of	these	undertakings	were	of	non-EU	nationality.	In	this	case,	
the	joint	highest	percentage	fines	(10%)	were	awarded	by	the	Commission	to	an	
EU	undertaking	and	a	non-EU	undertaking.	This	case,	again,	appears	to	highlight	
the	 Commission’s	 impartial	 approach	 to	 fining	 based	 on	 nationality,	 as	 two	
undertakings	from	different	nationalities	were	awarded	the	joint	highest	fines.																																																									
158	DRAMs	(Case	COMP	38.511)	Commission	Decision	2011/C180/09	[2010]	OJ	C180/15.	
159	Infineon	received	a	fine	percentage	of	1.87%.	
160	Hynix	received	a	fine	of	1.14%.	
161	See	Elpida’s	turnover	compared	to	that	of	Infineon,	where	Elpida	received	0.24%	fine	and	
Infineon	1.87%	fine.	
162	Chloroprene	Rubber	(Case	COMP	38.629)	Commission	Decision	2008/C251/07	[2007]	OJ	
C251/11.	
163	PO/Hard	Haberdashery:	Fasteners	(n	68).	
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The	next	 two	Commission	 fining	decisions	 to	be	discussed	shall	consider	all	of	
the	stages	of	 the	Commission’s	 fining	procedure	to	help	 identify	and	 illustrate	
how	 the	Commission	applies	 its	 fining	procedure	 to	undertakings	of	a	non-EU	
nationality	in	practice,	and	so	that	any	discrepancies	within	its	approach	can	be	
highlighted	and	analysed.	
	
The	 ‘RAW	 Tobacco	 Italy’	 cartel	 involved	 six	 undertakings,164	three	 of	 whom	
were	of	EU	nationality	and	three	who	were	of	non-EU	nationality.	In	this	cartel,	
the	Commission	proceeded	 to	 fine	Romana	Tabacchi,	who	was	one	of	 the	EU	
national	undertakings,	with	the	highest	percentage	fine;	whereas	the	three	USA	
undertakings	were	given	the	 lowest	percentage	fines.165	The	fining	 in	this	case	
was	assessed	under	the	now	obsolete	1998	Fining	Guidelines,	but	offers	a	good	
insight	into	the	way	the	Commission	conducts	a	fining	assessment	with	regards	
to	the	treatment	of	EU	and	non-EU	undertakings,	with	much	of	the	information	
being	 disclosed.	 The	 Commission	 began	 by	 assessing	 the	 gravity	 of	 the	
infringement	and	noted	that	the	production	of	raw	tobacco	 in	 Italy	accounted	
for	 38%	 of	 the	 Community	 in-quota	 production.166	It	 was	 also	 noted	 that	 the	
processors’	 infringement	 was	 considered	 very	 serious	 as	 they	 fixed	 purchase	
prices	and	shared	purchased	quantities.167		
	
As	 Deltafina	 appeared	 to	 be	 the	 biggest	 purchaser,	 the	 Commission	 felt	 the	
starting	 amount	 of	 the	 fine	 to	 be	 imposed	on	 this	 undertaking	 should	 be	 the	
highest.	 Equally,	 as	 Transcatab,	 Dimon	 and	 Romana	 Tabacchi	 had	 smaller	
market	shares,	the	Commission	felt	they	should	be	grouped	together	and	given	
the	same	size	starting	amount.168	It	was	held	that	merely	reflecting	the	market	
position	would	 not	 be	 sufficient,	 thus	 a	 1.5	multiplying	 factor	was	 applied	 to	
Deltafina	 and	 a	 1.25	 multiplying	 factor	 was	 imposed	 to	 Dimon	 and																																																									
164	Raw	Tobacco	Italy	(Case	COMP	38.281)	Commission	Decision	2006/901/EC	[2005]	OJ	
L353/45.	
165	It	is	worth	noting	here	that	the	other	two	EU	national	undertakings’	fines	were	non-
disclosed.	
166	Raw	Tobacco	Italy	(Case	COMP	38.281)	Commission	Decision	[2005]	366.	
167	ibid	367.	
168	ibid	372-373.	
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Transcatab.169	Therefore,	the	Commission	set	the	starting	amounts	of	the	fines	
as	 follows:	 Deltafina	 €37,500,000,	 Transcatab	 €12,500,000,	 Dimon	 (Mindo)	
€12,500,000	 and	 Romana	 Tabacchi	 €10,000,000.	 The	 infringement	 lasted	 six	
years	 and	 four	 months	 for	 Deltafina,	 Dimon	 (Mindo)	 and	 Transcatab,	 so	 the	
Commission	 increased	 the	 fines	 by	 60%.170	Romana	 Tabacchi	 was	 involved	 in	
the	infringement	for	two	years	and	eight	months	and,	as	such,	the	Commission	
decided	 that	 the	 fine	 should	 be	 increased	 by	 25%.171	This	 meant	 the	 basic	
amounts	 of	 the	 fines	 were	 as	 follows:	 Deltafina	 €60,000,000,	 Transcatab	
€20,000,000,	Dimon	(Mindo)	€20,000,000	and	Romana	Tabacchi	€12,500,000.	
	
The	 Commission	 next	 considered	 attenuating	 circumstances.	 As	 Romana	
Tabacchi	 did	 not	 take	 part	 in	 certain	 aspects	 of	 the	 cartel,	 had	 disrupted	 the	
purpose	of	 the	cartel	and	had	a	weak	market	 share,	 the	Commission	 reduced	
the	basic	amount	of	the	fine	by	30%.172		Deltafina	was	the	first	undertaking	to	
apply	 for	 leniency	 and	 had	 substantially	 contributed	 to	 the	 Commission’s	
investigation	by	coordinating	the	submission	of	evidence	to	the	Commission,	so	
the	Commission	felt	the	basic	amount	should	be	reduced	by	50%.173	Therefore,	
the	 fines	 were	 amended	 as	 follows:	 Deltafina	 €30,000,000,	 Transcatab	
€20,000,000,	 Dimon	 (Mindo)	 €20,000,000	 and	 Romana	 Tabacchi	 €8,750,000.	
The	 fines	were	then	assessed	to	ensure	that	 they	complied	with	the	10%	cap.	
Romana	 Tabacchi’s	 fine	 had	 to	 be	 reduced	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 cap. 174	
Additionally,	as	Mindo	was	originally	part	of	the	Dimon	group,	it	was	felt	that	it	
should	be	apportioned	within	the	10%	of	its	turnover	in	its	most	recent	business	
year.175	Thus,	 the	 final	 fines	 imposed	 were	 as	 follows:	 Deltafina	 €30,000,000,	
Transcatab	 €14,000,000,	 Dimon	 (Mindo)	 €10,000,000	 and	 Romana	 Tabacchi	
€2,050,000.																																																									
169	ibid	374-375.	
170	ibid	377.	
171	ibid	378.	
172	ibid	380.	
173	ibid	385-398.	
174	ibid	402.	
175	ibid	404.	
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This	 case	highlights	how	 the	Commission	 takes	 into	 consideration	 the	 specific	
factors	of	the	case	before	it.	For	example,	we	can	see	that	when	undertakings	
have	been	involved	in	the	infringement	for	longer	periods	of	time,	the	fines	will	
represent	that	figure.		
	
By	 looking	at	the	reasons	why	the	Commission	 imposed	the	fines	 it	did	 in	this	
case,	we	can	see	that	the	Commission	did	not	treat	the	three	US	undertakings	
prejudicially	and	that	the	percentage	fines	which	were	awarded	throughout	the	
various	 stages	 of	 the	 fining	 process	 were	 based	 on	 legitimate	 factors	 and	
considerations.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	worth	noting	 that,	although	Romana	Tabacchi	 (an	
EU	undertaking)	received	the	highest	percentage	fine,	it	actually	received	one	of	
the	 lowest	monetary	fines,	due	to	 its	turnover.	This	again	appears	to	 illustrate	
that	the	Commission	is	operating	and	applying	its	fining	policy	consistently	and	
fairly	across	the	board	irrespective	of	an	undertaking’s	nationality.	
	
The	 final	Commission	decision	to	be	examined	 is	 the	 ‘Professional	Videotapes’	
cartel.176	This	 cartel	 is	 analysed	 in	 detail,	 as	 it	 is	 a	 rather	 unique	 decision,	
because	 it	 was	 comprised	 entirely	 of	 non-EU	 undertakings.	 There	 were	 only	
three	undertakings	 involved	 in	this	cartel:	Sony,	Fuji	and	Maxwell,	all	of	which	
were	 of	 Japanese	 nationality.	 Interestingly	 not	 one	 of	 the	 undertakings	 was	
granted	complete	immunity,	owing	to	the	fact	that	the	Commission	started	the	
investigation	 on	 its	 own	 initiative.177	The	 fines	 imposed	 by	 the	 Commission	 in	
this	case	are	typical	when	compared	to	the	fines	imposed	by	the	Commission	in	
other	 cartels.	 Indeed,	 the	 fines	were	no	higher	 or	 lower	 than	 in	 other	 cartels	
from	 the	 data	 set.	 This	 helps	 illustrate	 an	 impartial	 approach	 to	 the	 fining	 of	
undertakings	based	on	their	nationality	by	the	Commission.	We	shall	now	look	
closer	 at	 the	 actual	 calculation	 of	 the	 fine	 by	 the	 Commission	 in	 this	 case	
because	of	 its	novelty	of	only	containing	non-EU	national	undertakings.178	The																																																									
176	Professional	Videotapes	(n	67).	
177	European	Commission,	‘Antitrust:	Commission	fines	professional	videotape	producers	over	
€74	million	for	price	fixing	cartel’	(European	Commission	Website)	
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-1725_en.htm?locale=en>	accessed	30	June	2014.	
178	Professional	Videotapes	(Case	COMP	38.432)	Commission	Decision	[2007].	
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Commission	followed	its	standard	2006	fining	procedure	for	calculating	the	fine	
to	impose	on	an	undertaking	that	has	committed	a	breach	of	Article	101	TFEU.	
They	began	by	setting	the	basic	amount	of	the	fines	noting	that	the	gravity	of	
the	fines	can	be	up	to	30%	of	the	value	of	sales.179	The	Commission	noted	that	
the	 cartel	 conduct	 in	 this	 case	was	 horizontal	 price-fixing	which	 is	 one	of	 the	
most	 harmful	 restrictions	 on	 competition.180	Additionally,	 it	 noted	 that	 the	
three	 undertakings	 in	 this	 cartel	 had	 a	 combined	market	 share	 of	more	 than	
85%,181	that	the	cartel’s	geographic	scope	included	at	least	the	EEA,182	and	that	
the	 infringement	 was	 generally	 implemented.183	Because	 of	 these	 factors	 the	
Commission	decided	to	set	the	basic	amount	of	the	fine	at	18%	of	the	value	of	
sales.184	The	 next	 stage	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process	 required	 it	 to	
consider	the	duration	of	the	infringement.	As	the	cartel	lasted	at	least	two	years	
and	 eight	 months,	 the	 Commission	 decided	 a	 multiplier	 of	 three	 was	 to	 be	
used.185		Finally,	the	basic	amount	of	the	fine	required	the	consideration	of	an	
additional	 deterrence	 amount.	 Here,	 the	 Commission	 felt	 that	 having	
considered:		
	
‘the	various	 factors	discussed	 in	 recitals	 (206)	 to	 (209),	particularly	 the	
nature,	 	 the	 combined	market	 share	 and	 the	 geographic	 scope	 of	 the	
infringement,	 that	 an	 additional	 17%	 of	 the	 value	 of	 sales	 would	 be	
appropriate.’186		
	
This	 meant	 that	 the	 basic	 fines	 on	 the	 undertakings	 were	 as	 follows:	 Sony	
€33,000,000,	 Fuji	 €22,000,000	 and	Maxell	 €18,000,000.	 The	 Commission	 then	
had	to	consider	whether	there	were	any	aggravating	or	mitigating	factors	in	the	
case.	 The	 Commission	 stated	 in	 its	 decision	 that	 Sony	 representatives	 had																																																									
179	ibid	205.	
180	ibid	206.	
181	ibid	207.	
182	ibid	208.	
183	ibid	209.	
184	ibid	215.	
185	ibid	216.	
186	ibid	217.		
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refused	 to	 answer	 oral	 questions	 and	 that	 one	 employee	 had	 shredded	
documents	 from	a	 file	 labeled	“Competitors	Pricing”.187	Therefore,	 it	was	held	
that	 Sony’s	 behavior	 had	 ‘necessarily	 disrupted	 the	 proper	 conduct	 of	 the	
investigation	and	hindered	the	Commission’s	inspectors	in	the	exercise	of	their	
investigative	powers.’188	
	
Because	 of	 this,	 Sony	 received	 a	 30%	 increase	 to	 the	 basic	 amount	 of	 fine	
imposed	on	them.189	The	Commission	held	that	there	were	no	mitigating	factors	
in	this	case.190	The	Commission	then	needed	to	assess	whether	there	should	be	
a	specific	increase	for	deterrence.	It	was	noted	that	Sony	had	a	particularly	large	
turnover	 beyond	 the	 sales	 of	 goods	 or	 services	 to	 which	 the	 infringement	
relates	and,	in	order	to	ensure	that	the	fines	had	a	sufficiently	deterrent	effect,	
the	fines	were	increased	by	a	further	10%.191	
	
The	next	stage	of	the	fining	process	required	the	Commission	to	ensure	that	the	
fines	did	not	exceed	10%	of	the	undertaking’s	total	turnover	from	the	preceding	
business	year.	The	ceiling	was	not	attained	 in	 this	case,	which	meant	 that	 the	
basic	 fines	 on	 the	 undertakings	 were:	 €47,190,000	 for	 Sony,	 €22,000,000	 for	
Fuji	and	€18,000,000	for	Maxell.	The	Commission	next	considered	the	potential	
reductions	 for	 leniency	applications.	 The	Commission	granted	Fuji	 a	 reduction	
of	 40%	 and	 Maxell	 20%	 of	 the	 fine	 for	 the	 information	 and	 assistance	 they	
provided	in	the	case.192	There	were	no	settlements	or	considerations	of	ITPs	in	
this	 decision	 so	 the	 final	 fines	 imposed	 on	 the	 undertakings	 were:	 Sony	
€47,190,000,	Fuji	€13,200,000	and	Maxell	€14,400,000.	
																																																									
187	ibid	219.	
188	ibid	221.	
189	ibid	227.	
190	Interestingly	Sony	tried	to	argue	that	the	implementation	of	a	compliance	programme	after	
the	breach	of	Article	101	TFEU	should	be	seen	as	a	mitigating	factor.	The	Commission	did	not	
agree	with	this	argument,	although	they	did	welcome	the	introduction	of	a	compliance	
programme	by	Sony,	ibid	241.	
191	ibid	243-246.	
192	ibid	256	and	261.	
	167	
What	 this	 decision	 illustrates	 is	 that	 the	 Commission	 imposed	 the	 same	
percentage	 fine	 on	 all	 undertakings	 in	 this	 cartel	 in	 the	 first	 instance.	 The	
difference	 in	percentage	 fines	occurred	when	the	aggravating,	deterrence	and	
leniency	 factors	 were	 considered.	 There	 were	 legitimate	 reasons	 for	 the	
Commission	 to	 treat	 the	 undertakings	 differently	 here;	 namely,	 owing	 to	 the	
differences	 between	 the	 undertakings’	 behaviour	 and	 conduct.	 When	 we	
consider	this	case	broadly	among	the	other	fining	decisions	from	the	GCR	data	
set,	we	see	that	the	basic	amount	of	the	fine	is	relative	to	what	the	basic	fines	
of	other	undertakings	were	 set	at;	 the	majority	 in	 these	 cases	being	between	
16-19%.193	This	case	is	 important	as	if	unequal	treatment	were	to	occur	within	
the	Commission’s	fining	procedure,	this	would	have	been	the	ideal	case	for	it	to	
occur	 in	as	all	of	 the	undertakings	were	of	a	non-EU	nationality.	 Yet	what	we	
find	 is	 no	 departure	 from	 the	 standard	 norm	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	
procedure.	 This	 is	 the	 case	 throughout	 the	 whole	 fining	 procedure	 decision,	
with	none	of	the	stages	being	applied	differently	to	how	they	are	in	other	cartel	
fining	decisions	by	the	Commission.	Again	this	case	strengthens	the	belief	that	
the	 Commission	 does	 not	 discriminate	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 an	 undertaking’s	
nationality.	
	
From	 the	 empirical	 data	 that	 is	 available	 to	 be	 analsyed	 and	 the	 comparison	
undertaken	 above,	 one	 can	 see	 that	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 of	 the	 Commission	
applying	 favorable	 treatment	 to	 an	 EU	 or	 a	 non-EU	 national	 undertaking.	
Indeed,	from	the	above	analysis,	one	can	see	that	the	Commission	is	applying	its	
fining	 policy	 fairly	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 consideration	 of	 an	 undertaking’s	
nationality.		
	
What	 has	 been	 illustrated	 is	 that	 the	 Commission	 takes	 a	 very	 much	 ‘mixed	
approach’	 to	 the	 fining	of	undertakings	with	 regards	 to	 their	 nationality;	with	
there	 being	 some	 instances	 of	 the	 undertaking	 being	 fined	 highly	 but	 other																																																									
193	There	was	one	that	was	widely	out	of	this	range:	Marine	Hoses	Cartel	[Marine	Hoses	(Case	
COMP	39.406)	Commission	Decision	2009/C168/05	[2009]	OJ	C168/6]	at	25%.	See	Table	4.2	
‘Selected	Fining	Cases	Table’.	
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instances	of	the	undertaking	being	fined	to	a	lesser	degree.	Further	to	this,	we	
have	seen	that	even	cartels	which	contain	no	EU	national	undertakings	are	not	
fined	 more	 leniently	 or	 harshly.	 When	 one	 looks	 at	 the	 calculation	 of	 the	
starting	 amount	 of	 the	 fine	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 that,	 across	 multiple	 cartels,	 the	
starting	 point	 is	 always	 around	 the	 16%	 figure,	 and	 this	 is	 irrespective	 of	 the	
nationality	of	 the	undertakings	 involved	 in	 the	 cartel,	 even	 if	 they	are	all	 of	 a	
non-EU	nationality.194	We	also	see	that	when	aggravating	or	mitigating	 factors	
are	considered,	the	percentage	increases	for	these	across	the	various	cartels	is	
often	the	same	and,	if	not,	it	is	very	similar.195	We	can	therefore	see	that	there	
is	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	Commission	is	applying	its	policy	unfairly	to	
undertakings	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 nationality.	 Indeed,	 when	 considering	 the	
calculation	 of	 the	 fine	 by	 the	 Commission,	 we	 see	 that	 it	 applies	 similar	
percentage	 fines	 to	 undertakings	 in	 analogous	 circumstances	 with	 very	 few	
deviations	 from	 the	 norm.196	Whenever	 these	 deviations	 do	 occur,	 there	 are	
legitimate	 reasons	 for	why	 the	 Commission	 has	 departed	 from	 the	 norm;	 for	
example,	because	the	conduct	of	the	undertaking	involved	necessitates	it.197		
	
Additionally	 we	 can	 see	 that	 when	 the	 Commission	 imposes	 fines	 on	
undertakings,	 it	 follows	 the	 fining	procedures	 laid	down	 in	 the	Guidelines	and	
determines	a	fine	for	an	undertaking	 in	 line	with	these	procedures.	Further	to	
this,	 when	 we	 consider	 the	 awarding	 of	 leniency	 by	 the	 Commission,	
particularly	the	awarding	of	full	immunity,	we	find	from	the	empirical	data	that	
the	Commission	is	willing	to	grant	non-EU	national	undertakings	leniency	as	well	
as	 EU	 national	 undertakings.198	This	 appears	 to	 reiterate	 the	 idea	 that	 the	
																																																								
194	See	Table	4.2	‘Selected	Fining	Cases	Table’.	
195	ibid.	
196	This	is	across	the	Commission’s	whole	fining	process,	whether	it	be	the	calculation	of	the	
basic	amount,	aggravating	or	mitigating	circumstances	or	additional	deterrence.	
197	For	example,	the	undertaking	in	question	may	have	cooperated,	assisted	or	obstructed	the	
Commission’s	investigation.	
198	For	example,	in	the	‘MCAA	(Monochloroacetic	Acid)’	cartel	[MCAA	(Case	COMP/37.773)	
Commission	Decision	2006/897/EC	[2005]	OJ	L	353/12],	Clariant	–	who	were	from	Switzerland	–	
were	awarded	complete	immunity.	Similarly,	in	the	‘Fittings’	cartel	[Fittings	(Case	COMP	38.121)	
Commission	Decision	2007/691/EC	[2006]	OJ	L283/63]	a	non-EU	undertaking,	Mueller,	was	also	
awarded	full	immunity.		
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Commission	will	not	be	prejudicial	to	an	undertaking	based	on	their	nationality	
when	they	apply	the	fining	procedure	to	a	cartel.		
	
Owing	 to	 this	 and	 the	 aforementioned	 discussion,	 it	 is	 forwarded	 that	 the	
nationality	of	an	undertaking	 is	not	a	 factor	 that	 the	Commission	considers	 in	
the	calculation	of	an	undertaking’s	fine	or	in	the	awarding	of	leniency.	Because	
of	 this,	 what	 we	 see	 is	 that,	 out	 of	 the	 three	 suggested	 hypotheses	 at	 the	
beginning	 of	 this	 section	 on	 the	 way	 the	 Commission	 could	 apply	 its	 fining	
policy,	we	find	that	Option	One	is	the	one	that	occurs	 in	practice,	 i.e.	that	the	
Commission	 applies	 its	 fining	 policy	 in	 the	 same	 way	 to	 all	 undertakings	 no	
matter	what	their	nationality.	
	
3.3.3	National	Champions		
The	final	potential	 issue	of	equal	treatment	that	this	chapter	shall	analyse	will	
assess	the	application	of	the	fining	process	to	undertakings	that	are	classified	as	
NCs.	 In	 this	 context,	 an	 NC	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 an	 undertaking	 which	 has	 a	
turnover	of	more	than	ten	billion	Euros.	It	should	be	noted	that	NCs	analysed	in	
this	chapter	can	take	the	form	of	an	EU	Member	State	NC	or	that	of	a	non-EU	
Member	States	NC.		
	
There	are	three	potential	hypotheses	relating	to	how	NCs	could	be	treated	by	
the	Commission:	First,	NCs	are	treated	the	same	as	any	other	undertaking	in	the	
cartel;	second,	they	are	treated	more	harshly	in	comparison	to	other	non-NCs;	
or	 finally,	 they	 are	 treated	 more	 leniently	 in	 comparison	 with	 other	 cartel	
members	that	are	not	NCs.	
	
So	why	would	 the	 Commission	wish	 to	 treat	 an	NC	 harshly	 or	more	 leniently	
than	another	non-NC?199	
	
																																																								
199	It	could	also	be	the	case	that	the	Commission	does	not	realise	that	it	is	being	more	lenient	or	
harsh	on	an	NC.	
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The	Commission	may	wish	to	do	this	for	a	variety	of	reasons.	For	example,	with	
regards	to	treating	an	NC	more	harshly,	it	could	be	that	the	Commission	seeks	
to	 make	 an	 example	 of	 the	 NC	 to	 help	 deter	 other	 undertakings	 from	
committing	competition	law	breaches.	Indeed,	because	the	undertaking	is	likely	
to	be	 larger	and	more	 important	within	the	product	market,	making	a	specific	
example	 of	 them	 may	 reduce	 the	 risks	 of	 other	 undertakings	 committing	
competition	 law	 breaches,	 as	 they	 fear	 that	 if	 the	 Commission	 is	 willing	 to	
impose	a	high	fine	on	an	important	NC	they	will	also	do	so	to	them.		
	
On	the	other	hand,	the	Commission	may	wish	to	be	more	lenient	in	the	fining	of	
an	NC	because	they	are	so	important	within	the	product	market	and	that	over-
fining	 them	could	be	detrimental	 for	 the	product	market	and	may	have	other	
social	and	economic	implications,	such	as	an	effect	on	employment.		
	
Given	 the	 different	 approaches	 the	 Commission	 could	 potentially	 adopt,	 this	
chapter	now	proceeds	to	analyse	the	empirical	data	to	discover	whether	there	
is	equal	treatment	within	the	Commission’s	treatment	of	NCs	and	non-NCs.200		
	
Of	 the	 forty-three	 cartels	 reported,	 twenty-five	of	 these	 involved	at	 least	one	
NC.	 In	 many	 of	 the	 cartels,	 one	 of	 the	 NCs	 received	 complete	 immunity.201	
Often	NCs	 received	 the	 lowest	 or	 some	 of	 the	 lowest	 percentage	 fines	when	
compared	to	non-NCs.	For	example,	in	the	‘Rubber	Chemicals’	cartel	there	were	
four	cartel	members,202	two	of	which	were	NCs.	 	Both	of	the	NCs	received	the	
lowest	percentage	fines	with	the	other	non-NCs	receiving	the	highest	fine	and	
one	 receiving	 complete	 immunity.	 In	 the	 ‘Bitumen	Spain’	 cartel,203	there	were	
five	undertakings	 involved,	with	 four	of	 them	being	NCs.	One	of	 the	NCs	was	
granted	 complete	 immunity	 and	 the	 other	 three	 got	 the	 lowest	 fines.	 The																																																									
200	Similarly,	as	with	regards	to	the	nationality	of	an	undertaking,	the	empirical	data	consulted	in	
this	section	will	be	the	percentage	fines	the	undertakings	received.	The	percentage	fines	were	
based	on	the	relevant	worldwide	market	turnover.	
201	This	was	the	case	in	thirteen	of	the	twenty-five	cartels.	It	should	be	noted	that	in	some	
cartels	information	was	not	disclosed	or	was	redacted,	meaning	it	was	impossible	to	identify	
which	applicant	was	granted	complete	immunity.	
202	Rubber	Chemicals	(Case	COMP	38.443)	Commission	Decision	(n	153).	
203	Bitumen	Spain	(Case	COMP	38.710)	Commission	Decision	2009/C321/08	[2007]	OJ	C321/15.	
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‘Methacrylates’	 cartel	 contained	 two	 NCs; 204 	one	 was	 granted	 complete	
leniency	 by	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	 other	 received	 a	 substantially	 lower	
percentage	 fine	 than	 the	 other	 nearest	 cartel	 participant’s	 lowest	 percentage	
cartel	fine	(0.15	to	1.08	percent).205		
	
There	were	many	other	 instances	of	 lower	percentage	fines	being	 imposed	on	
NCs	 than	 non-NCs.	 However,	 there	 were	 two	 cartels	 where	 the	 Commission	
fined	NCs	more	harshly	than	non-NCs.	The	first	of	these	was	the	‘Gas	Insulated	
Switchgear’	 cartel.206	This	 cartel	 had	 five	 NCs;	 one	 of	 which	 gained	 complete	
immunity,	and	another	which	was	given	the	joint	 lowest	percentage	fine	(with	
another	 non-NC).	 The	 other	 three	 NCs	 were	 attributed	 some	 of	 the	 highest	
percentage	 fines	 in	 this	 cartel.	 The	 second	 cartel	 –	which	 bucks	 the	 trend	 of	
lower	 fines	 being	 given	 to	 NCs	 –	was	 the	 ‘Power	 Transformers’	 cartel.207	This	
cartel	had	 three	NCs;	 again,	one	of	 the	NCs	was	awarded	 complete	 immunity	
with	the	other	two	receiving	the	highest	fines	within	the	cartel.				
	
What	 the	 empirical	 data	 appears	 to	 show	 is	 that	 the	 Commission,	 in	 many	
instances,	 offers	 favourable	 treatment	 to	 an	NC	over	 that	 of	 a	 non-NC	 in	 the	
same	cartel.	This	would	appear	to	be	unequal	treatment	as	the	undertakings	in	
question	 are	 in	 the	 same	 position,	 apart	 from	 one	 being	 classified	 as	 an	 NC.	
Indeed,	 as	 is	 evident	 from	 some	 of	 the	 cases	 above,	 the	 discrepancy	 of	 fines	
between	NCs	and	non-NCs	 in	some	instances	 is	 far	 from	negligible,	with	some	
having	 around	 a	 four	 percent	 difference.	 However,	 one	may	 wish	 to	 suggest	
that	 this	 is	 to	be	expected,	as	NCs	are	 likely	 to	be	the	biggest	undertakings	 in	
the	cartel	and	thus	active	 in	many	markets	and	therefore	have	a	considerably	
larger	annual	turnover	than	non-NCs	which	means	that	the	percentage	fine	will	
indeed	be	noticeably	less.	Nevertheless,	this	is	a	flawed	argument	for	a	variety																																																									
204	Methacrylates	(Case	COMP	38.645)	Commission	Decision	2006/793/EC	[2006]	OJ	L322/20.	
205	Again,	a	similar	situation	occurred	in	the	‘Sodium	Chlorate’	cartel	[Sodium	Chlorate	(n	68)]	
(0.03	to	0.90	percent)	and	the	‘Dutch	beer	market’	cartel	[Dutch	beer	market	(n	69)]	(1.85	to	
5.70	percent).	
206	Gas	Insulated	Switchgear	(Case	COMP	38.899)	Commission	Decision	(n	156).	
207	Power	Transformers	(Case	COMP	39.129)	Commission	Decision	2009/C296/08	[2009]	OJ	
C296/21.	
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of	 reasons	 which	 shall	 now	 be	 explained.	 Firstly,	 the	 cap	 on	 the	 fine	 is	 ten	
percent	of	 the	worldwide	annual	 turnover	of	 the	undertaking	 in	question,	not	
the	affected	product	market.	Therefore,	the	fine	can	be	significantly	higher	than	
of	 just	 including	 the	 affected	 market.	 Secondly,	 the	 Commission’s	 Fining	
Guidelines	specifically	attempt	to	address	this	problem	via	the	sixth	stage	where	
an	 undertaking,	 which	 is	 considered	 to	 have	 a	 significantly	 large	 turnover	
outside	 the	 effected	market,	 can	 have	 its	 fine	 increased	 to	 address	 this.	 This	
means	that	the	fines	in	the	cartel	should	effectively	be	similar	percentages	for	
NCs	as	to	non-NCs.	Yet,	this	appears	not	to	be	the	case	currently	as	the	fines	on	
the	NC	undertakings	are	of	a	significantly	less	percentage	value,	such	as	in	the		
‘Bitumen	Spain’	cartel208	and	the	 ‘Methacrylates’	cartel.209	It	 is	observable	that	
NC	are	being	fined	less	but	the	reasoning	for	this	is	unclear,	but	may	well	relate	
to	the	aforementioned	factors	above.	
	
In	 the	 future	 this	 research	 could	 be	 further	 expanded	 upon	 to	 try	 to	 identify	
why	the	NCs	received	more	lenient	treatment.	For	example,	one	could	analyse	
whether	there	were	mitigating	factors	which	resulted	in	the	imposition	of	lower	
fines	than	that	received	by	non-NCs.	Mitigating	factors	aside,	however,	it	would	
appear	clear	that	the	Commission	is	actively	protecting	–	and,	as	such,	affording	
unequal	 treatment	 –	 to	 a	 select	 group	 of	 undertakings;	 namely,	 NCs.	 On	 the	
face	 of	 it,	 the	 Commission	 could	 also	 be	 seen	 to	 be	 applying	 a	 universal	
protectionist	policy	to	all	NCs,	regardless	of	whether	they	are	NCs	within	the	EU	
or	outside	of	it.	One	would,	however,	question	the	motives	of	the	Commission	
in	protecting	non-EU	NCs	when	 these	are	often	 in	direct	 competition	with	EU	
NCs.210	Perhaps	this	may	be	attributed	to	other	external	factors	such	as	political	
influence;	namely,	lobbying	from	the	governments	of	large	trade	partners.		
	
It	is	difficult	to	say	with	clarity	that	unequal	treatment	is	definitely	occurring,	as	
we	 are	 not	 privy	 to	 all	 the	 information	 and	 data	 that	 is	 available	 to	 the																																																									
208	Bitumen	Spain	(Case	COMP	38.710)	Commission	Decision	(n	203).	
209	Methacrylates	(Case	COMP	38.645)	Commission	Decision	(n	204).	
210	However,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	Commission	has	continuously	reiterated	its	stance	
against	adopting	a	protectionist	culture	within	the	EU.	For	example,	Kroes	(n110).		
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Commission.	This	issue	is	further	compounded	by	the	fact	that	the	Commission	
has	 a	 wide-ranging	 discretion	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 application	 of	 its	 fining	
policy	to	undertakings.	However,	the	empirical	data	clearly	shows	that	–	in	the	
twenty-five	 cartels	 that	 involved	NCs	 –	 only	 two	of	 these	 resulted	 in	 the	NCs	
receiving	 the	 highest	 percentage	 fines	 in	 the	 cartel.	 This	 would	 appear	 to	
suggest	unequal	treatment	in	the	application	of	the	Commission’s	fining	process	
to	 undertakings.	 Thus,	 what	 we	 find	 is	 that	 the	 third	 potential	 hypothesis	
forwarded	at	the	beginning	of	this	section	occurs;	namely,	NCs	are	treated	more	
leniently	in	comparison	to	other	non-NCs.		
	
3.3.4	Conclusions	on	equal	treatment	
This	second	section	of	the	chapter	has	analysed	the	potential	equal	treatment	
concerns	 with	 regards	 to	 three	 factors	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process.	
Firstly,	 ITP	discounts	were	analysed	and	we	 see	 that	because	of	 the	 secretive	
nature	of	 the	way	 they	are	awarded	 it	 is	difficult	 to	determine	whether	equal	
treatment	is	occurring.	However,	from	an	‘outsider’s	view’,	 it	appears	that	the	
calculations	 are	 not	 necessarily	 applied	 equally,211	and	because	 of	 the	 flexible	
and	 wide-ranging	 reductions	 in	 fines,	 it	 is	 highly	 likely	 that	 they	 are	 being	
applied	 unequally.	 Secondly,	 the	 nationality	 of	 the	 undertakings	 and	 the	
percentage	of	fine	they	received	were	assessed.	We	see	that	the	empirical	data	
shows	that	 the	Commission’s	policy	seems	to	be	being	applied	 fairly	and	non-
discriminatory	with	 regards	 to	 an	 undertaking’s	 nationality.	 Thirdly,	NCs	were	
discussed	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 percentage	 fine	 they	 received	 compared	 to	 non-
NCs.	What	the	data	shows	in	most	instances	is	that	an	NC	receives	a	lower	fine	
than	a	non-NC	in	the	same	cartel.	Therefore,	in	this	instance,	there	appears	to	
be	 unequal	 treatment	 afoot.	 Hence,	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	 a	 greater	 degree	 of	
transparency	 within	 Commission	 decisions	 would	 be	 beneficial	 to	 prevent	
unequal	treatment.	It	is	believed	that	by	being	more	transparent,	it	would	help	
prevent	 unequal	 treatment	 or	 the	 perception	 of	 it	 as	 it	 would	 be	 easier	 to	
identify	when	 equal	 treatment	 is	 not	 occurring	 and,	 thus,	 this	would	 act	 as	 a	
																																																								
211	The	Ziegler	case	being	a	potential	example	here.	
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tool	 for	 preventing	 unequal	 treatment.	 	 As	 was	 noted	 above	 in	 the	
Commission’s	differential	treatment	of	Ziegler	to	Interdean	in	the	application	of	
the	ITP	discount,	 it	seems	hard	to	justify	this	differential	treatment	of	the	two	
cartelists,	 but	 if	 more	 information	 were	 to	 be	 disclosed	 –	 even	 if	 just	 to	 the	
parties	involved	–	it	would	help	quell	this	perception.		
The	final	section	of	this	chapter	will	now	proceed	to	conclude	the	analysis	of	the	
Commission’s	fining	process	by	discussing	the	research	findings.	 	
	175	
3.4	Conclusion	
	
It	is	important	that	the	Commission’s	fining	process	is	legally	certain	and	applied	
equally	 to	 undertakings.	 This	 chapter	 analysed	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	
procedure	to	ensure	that	it	complies	with	the	requirements	of	legal	certainty.	It	
achieved	 this	 by	 assessing	 the	 potential	 legal	 certainty	 concerns	 within	 the	
Commission’s	 fining	process	 in	relation	to	three	areas.	 It	was	shown	that	non-
exhaustive	 lists	 comply	with	Article	 7	 ECHR	 as	 does	 the	 Commission	 having	 a	
stage	 within	 the	 fining	 process	 which	 allows	 for	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 fine	
specifically	 for	deterrence	purposes.	 	What	was	 found	 from	the	application	of	
the	relevant	ECtHR	and	EU	case	 law	was	that	by	the	Commission	having	a	ten	
percent	cap	imposed	on	them	–	and	the	fact	that	they	produce	a	set	of	Fining	
Guidelines	 –	 that	 the	 process	 meets	 the	 required	 legal	 standard	 of	 certainty	
under	Article	7	ECHR.	What	was	also	noted	 in	 this	 section	of	analysis	was	 the	
amount	 of	 discretion	 the	 Commission	 has	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	 fining	
process.	The	benefits	of	this	discretion	were	considered	alongside	the	potential	
advantages	of	 further	 limiting	 this	discretion	 through	guidance.	As	was	 stated	
above,	 it	was	felt	that	the	Commission’s	 fining	process	complies	with	Article	7	
ECHR.	 Nonetheless,	 it	 was	 also	 proposed	 that	 if	 the	 Commission	 were	 to	
provide	further	guidance	–	and	limit	its	discretion	further	through	this	guidance	
–	this	would	be	more	beneficial	for	certainty	in	its	fining	procedure	and	produce	
much	needed	guidance.	 Indeed,	examples	of	 factors	 considered	 for	mitigating	
and	aggravating	circumstances,	and	increases	and	decreases	in	the	fines	can	be	
provided	for	within	the	Commission’s	Guidelines.	Additionally,	further	guidance	
defining	 what	 is	 meant	 by	 ‘specific	 deterrence’	 in	 the	 sixth	 stage	 of	 the	
Commission’s	fining	process	should	be	provided.		
	
The	chapter	then	proceeded	to	analyse	the	Commission’s	decisions	to	ascertain	
whether	the	Commission	applied	its	fining	policy	and	process	fairly,	equally	and	
consistently	 to	 undertakings.	 Three	 specific	 areas	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	
process	were	examined.	What	was	identified	from	this	analysis	is	that	because	
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of	the	lack	of	transparency	regarding	the	ITP	discount	it	is	difficult	to	ascertain	
for	 certain	 how	 the	 Commission	 is	 applying	 this	 policy.	 It	 was	 noted	 that	 it	
seemed	 likely	 –	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 transparency	 and	 such	 wide-ranging	
imposition	of	 reductions	–	 that	 this	 stage	was	being	applied	unequally.	 It	was	
identified	that	the	Commission	is	applying	its	policy	equally	with	regards	to	the	
consideration	of	an	undertaking’s	nationality.	However,	 it	was	 identified	when	
NC	percentage	fines	were	compared	to	those	of	non-NCs	that	the	NC	receives	a	
lower	percentage	 fine	 than	 that	 of	 non-NCs	 in	 the	 same	 cartel.	 This	 indicates	
that	the	Commission	may	be	applying	its	fining	policy	preferentially	to	NCs.	The	
issue	 this	 chapter	 has	 highlighted	 is	 that	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 effectively	 analyse	
Commission	decisions	for	equal	treatment,	as	the	decisions	are	reached	in	such	
a	secretive	way,	with	not	all	information	being	disclosed.	Additionally,	because	
the	Commission	retains	such	a	wide	discretion	under	the	ten	percent	cap	–	in	its	
application	 of	 the	 fining	 procedure	 –	 it	 is	 difficult	 for	 anyone	 outside	 the	
Commission	to	ascertain	how	the	policy	is	actually	being	applied.	Owing	to	this,	
the	chapter	 identified	 that	more	 transparency	and	clarity	 in	 the	Commission’s	
decisions	 could	 ensure	 equal	 treatment	 of	 undertakings	 or	 at	 least	 the	
reduction	in	the	perception	of	unequal	treatment	in	some	instances.	
	
As	has	been	shown,	it	is	important	for	the	Commission	to	retain	legitimacy	and	
to	prevent	possible	legal	problems	by	ensuring	that	their	processes	comply	with	
legal	certainty,	and	that	any	policies	that	they	operate	are	applied	equally	and	
fairly.	 Currently,	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 policy	 appears	 to	 comply	 with	 the	
necessary	 legal	 requirements	 of	 legal	 certainty.	 It	 is,	 however,	 difficult	 to	
ascertain	 whether	 the	 fining	 procedure	 is	 being	 applied	 equally	 and	 fairly.	
Nevertheless,	it	does	appear	in	some	instances	that	the	fining	policy	is	not	being	
applied	 equally	 and	 fairly.	 The	 difficulty	 here	 is	 balancing	 certainty	 and	
transparency	within	the	Commission’s	Fining	Guidelines	and	its	application,	on	
the	 one	 hand,	 with	 effective	 deterrence	 and	 enforcement	 (which	 requires	 a	
degree	of	uncertainty)	on	the	other.	Certainty	for	undertakings	could	be	further	
improved	 by	 providing	 more	 detailed	 guidance,	 examples,	 and	 limiting	 the	
Commission’s	 discretion	 further	 through	 guidance	 documents	 as	 well	 as	
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requiring	the	Commission	to	be	more	transparent	with	its	decisions.	This	should	
help	enable	the	identification	of	whether	the	Commission’s	fining	procedure	is	
being	 applied	 equally	 and	 allow	 for	 greater	 certainty	 whilst	 still	 permitting	
effective	deterrence	to	be	achieved.	
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Chapter	4:	Do	the	provisions	in	the	
Damages	Directive	on	disclosure	
adequately	balance	the	competing	
rights	and	interests	at	play?1	
	
4.1	Introduction	
	
In	the	fight	to	detect	and	uncover	secretive	cartels,	 the	European	Commission	
(hereafter,	 ‘the	 Commission’)	 operates	 a	 leniency	 policy.2	The	 Commission’s	
leniency	policy	helps	it	to	detect	cartels	by	allowing	an	undertaking	—	which	has	
participated	in	an	illegal	cartel	—	to	report	it	to	the	Commission	in	exchange	for	
a	reduction	in	fine	or	immunity.	This	policy	is	important,	as	it	is	very	difficult	for	
the	 Commission	 to	 detect	 and	 penetrate	 secretive	 cartels.	 As	 we	 noted	 in	
Chapter	 2	 there	 are	 other	 options	 for	 detecting	 cartels,	 such	 as,	 market	
inquiries,	 customer	 complaints	 and	market	 investigations.	However,	 these	are	
much	more	resource	intensive	for	the	Commission	and	are	regularly	less	fruitful	
in	detecting	cartels.3	The	Commission’s	leniency	programme	goes	much	further	
than	merely	assisting	it	in	detecting	cartels,	it	also	helps	to	destabilise	and	deter	
current	 and	 future	 cartels,	 respectively.4	Because	 of	 the	 importance	 that	 the	
																																																								
1	A	draft	of	part	of	this	chapter	was	presented	at	the	CCP	New	Researchers	Workshop	in	
Norwich	on	the	13th	June	2012,	the	International	Graduate	Legal	Research	Conference	in	
London	on	the	14th	April	2015,	and	the	Southern	Law	PhD	Conference	in	Portsmouth	on	the	1st	
May	2015.	The	feedback	and	comments	from	the	attendees	of	the	conference	is	greatly	
appreciated.	
2	Commission,	‘Commission	Notice	on	Immunity	from	fines	and	reduction	of	fines	in	cartel	cases	
(Leniency	in	cartel	cases)’	[2006]	OJ	C298/17.	
3	Indeed,	we	see	that	since	1998	when	the	first	leniency	decision	was	given,	nighty-four	percent	
of	the	cases	(eighty-three	out	of	eighty-eight)	were	adopted	on	the	basis	of	leniency	
cooperation.	As	of	the	1	February	2013,	see	Andreas	Scordamaglia-Tousis,	EU	Cartel	
Enforcement:	Reconciling	Effective	Public	Enforcement	with	Fundamental	Rights	(Wolters	
Kluwer	Law	International	2013)	11.	
4	Panayiotis	Agisilaou,	'Collusion	in	Industrial	Economics	and	Optimally	Designed	Leniency	
Programmes	–	A	Survey'	(2013)	CCP	Working	Paper	13-3	
<competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107587/13-3+Agisilaou.pdf/9b87613a-fb52-459f-
8e9c-1eea7879547f>	accessed	2nd	February	2013,	3.	
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Commission’s	 leniency	 programme	 plays	 in	 deterring	 and	 detecting	 cartels	 it	
has	been	referred	to	as	a	‘weapon	of	mass	dissuasion’.5		
	
In	order	for	an	undertaking	to	be	granted	complete	or	partial	 immunity,	there	
are	strict	requirements	placed	on	it,	necessitating	that	it	cooperates	and	assists	
the	 Commission	 in	 its	 antitrust	 investigation.6	For	 example,	 the	 undertaking	
needs	to	provide	a	corporate	statement	–	that	includes	a	detailed	description	of	
the	alleged	cartel	arrangement;7	the	name	and	address	of	the	legal	entity;8	the	
names,	positions	and	office	 locations	of	those	 involved;9	information	on	which	
other	 competition	 authorities	 it	 has	 applied	 to,10	and	 finally	 other	 evidence	
related	 to	 the	 alleged	 cartel.11	There	 are	 also	 additional	 requirements	 placed	
upon	an	undertaking	that	they	must	comply	with	for	a	reduction	in	fine.12	
	
In	 recent	 years	 there	 has	 been	 a	 line	 of	 cases	 developed	 through	 various	 EU	
Member	 States’	 national	 courts	 where	 private	 parties	 who	 are	 suing	 for	
damages	 against	 a	 cartel	 have	 sought	 access	 to	 the	 leniency	 documentation	
held	by	 the	Commission	 and	national	 competition	 authorities	 (NCAs)	 to	 assist	
with	their	damage	claim.13	This	documentation	can	assist	third	parties,	to	help	
demonstrate	 that	 the	cartel	existed	and	also	aid	 in	 the	calculation	of	 financial	
harm	and	 loss	caused	to	them	by	the	cartel.	However,	 if	 these	documents	are	
disclosed,	 it	may	discourage	undertakings	from	reporting	the	cartel	 in	the	first	
instance,	 which	 is	 a	 potential	 issue	 –	 given	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 leniency	
programme	for	the	detection	of	cartels.	What	we	therefore	see	 is	an	 inherent																																																									
5	Joan	R	Borrell,	Juan	Luis	Jimenez	and	Carmen	Garcia,	‘Evaluating	antitrust	leniency	Programs’	
(2012)	XREAP	No.	2012-0	<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1993027>	accessed	
18	September	2012,	3.	
6	Wouter	P	Wils,	‘Leniency	in	Antitrust	Enforcement:	Theory	and	Practice’	(2007)	30(1)	World	
Competition	25.		
7	Commission	Notice	(n	2)	(9)(a).	
8	ibid.	
9	ibid.	
10	ibid.	
11	ibid	(9)(b).	
12	ibid	(12).	
13	For	example,	see	National	Grid	v	Switchgear	cartel	[2009]	EWHC	1326	(Ch),	[2009]	UKCLR	838,	
Case	C-360/09	Pfleiderer	AG	v	Bundeskartellamt	[2011]	OJ	C	232/5,	Case	T-437/08	CDC	
Hydrogene	Peroxide	v	Commission	[2012]	OJ	C	32/18	and	Case	C-536/11	
Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde	v	Donau	Chemie	AG	and	others	[2013].	
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tension	within	the	law	between	the	enforcement	of	public	competition	law,	on	
the	one	hand,	and	 the	enforcement	of	private	competition	 law,	on	 the	other.	
Access	 to	 leniency	 documents	 is	 important	 for	 third	 party	 claimants	 trying	 to	
sue	for	damages	but	unlimited	disclosure	of	these	confidential	documents	may	
deter	 and	 scare	 undertakings	 from	 applying	 for	 leniency	 in	 the	 first	 instance,	
which	is	central	for	detecting	cartels.	A	recent	development	within	this	debate	
has	 been	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 Damages	 Directive.14	Contained	 within	 the	
Directive	–	under	Article	6(6)(a)	–	it	 is	stipulated	that	leniency	documents	may	
not	 be	 disclosed	 to	 third	 parties	 in	 any	 circumstances.15	This	 technically	 now	
means	that	disclosure	of	leniency	documents	cannot	happen	in	future	once	all	
Member	 States	 have	 implemented	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 Directive. 16		
However,	this	sits	in	complete	contradiction	to	what	the	European	courts	have	
repeatedly	 stated	 and	 held	 in	 its	 decisions.	 Therefore,	 given	 the	 European	
court’s	 views	 regarding	 the	 need	 for	 a	 case-by-case	 balancing	 act	 when	
disclosure	of	leniency	documents	to	third	parties	is	mooted,17	and	the	Damages	
Directive,18	taking	 the	 diametrically	 opposing	 view;	 this	 chapter	 takes	 the	
unique	opportunity	to	consider	(a)	whether	the	blanket	ban	is	necessary	(from	
the	prospective	of	 the	protection	of	an	undertaking’s	 rights)	and;	 (b)	whether	
the	 Directive	 has	 struck	 the	 right	 balance	 between	 the	 protection	 of	 a	 third	
parties	rights	and	the	undertakings	rights,	and	whether	there	may	be	a	better	
balance	 to	 be	 had.	 In	 answering	 (a)	 the	 chapter	 considers	 potential	 rights	
challenges	 that	 an	 undertaking	 could	 seek	 to	 make	 if	 confidential	 leniency	
documents	were	disclosed	 to	 third	parties.	 These	 rights	 challenges	 take	 three	
distinctive	forms.	The	first	(i)	is	an	undertaking’s	‘legitimate	expectation’	of	non-																																																								
14	Council	Directive	2014/104/EU	of	26	November	2014	on	certain	rules	governing	actions	for	
damages	under	national	law	for	infringements	of	competition	law	provisions	of	the	Member	
States	and	of	the	European	Union	[2014]	L	349/1.	
15	ibid.	Specifically,	6(6)	sets	out	that:	‘Member	States	shall	ensure	that,	for	the	purpose	of	
actions	for	damages,	national	courts	cannot	at	any	time	order	a	party	or	a	third	party	to	disclose	
any	of	the	following	categories	of	evidence:	(a)	leniency	statements;	(b)	settlement	
submissions.’	
16	All	Member	states	are	required	to	enact	legislation	to	comply	with	the	requirements	of	the	
Directive	by	the	27	December	2016.	ibid	Damages	Directive,	Article	21(1).	
17	See	Case	C-536/11	Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde	v	Donau	Chemie	AG	and	others	[2013]	and	
Case	C-360/09	Pfleiderer	(n	13).	
18	Damages	Directive	(n	14).	
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disclosure.	 Here	 the	 legislation,	 guidelines	 and	 assurances	 given	 by	 the	
Commission	against	disclosure	are	examined	to	identify	if	a	potential	claim	of	a	
breach	 of	 this	 principle	 can	 be	 made.	 Second	 (ii)	 an	 undertaking’s	 right	 to	
privacy	under	Article	8	of	the	ECHR	is	explored.	Third,	(iii)	the	unique	possibility	
of	 whether	 there	 could	 be	 a	 breach	 of	 an	 undertakings	 confidence	 is	
investigated.	 After	 this	 analysis	 has	 been	 conducted,	 the	 second	 part	 of	 the	
chapter	goes	on	to	explore	if	the	Directive	gets	the	balance	right	and	whether	
there	is	a	way	of	improving	this,	or	achieving	it	more	effectively	to	ensure	that	
both	groups	of	rights	needs	are	better	protected.	
	
Most	 of	 the	 literature	 that	 has	 considered	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	
programme	 focuses	 on	 determining	 its	 ‘optimal’	 design	 and	 structure.19	That	
said,	 some	 of	 the	 potential	 human	 rights	 concerns	 within	 the	 leniency	
programme	(in	relation	to	Article	6	of	the	ECHR)	have	been	considered.20	There	
is	 also	 significant	 literature	 discussing	 the	 disclosure	 of	 confidential	 leniency	
documents,	 particularly	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 decision	 in	 Pfleiderer	 and	 the	
potential	 implications	 of	 the	 decision	 for	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	
programme.21	However,	there	has	been	no	attention	within	the	literature	of	the																																																									
19	For	example,	Wouter	P	Wils,	‘Leniency	in	Antitrust	Enforcement:	Theory	and	Practice’	(2007)	
30(1)	World	Competition,	25,	Zhijun	Chen	and	Patrick	Rey,	‘On	the	Design	of	Leniency	Programs’	
(2007)	CCP	Working	Paper	08-18	<competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107587/ccp08-
18.pdf>	accessed	12	February	2013,	Joseph	E	Harrington	Jr,	‘Optimal	Corporate	Leniency	
Programs’	(2008)	56(2)	The	Journal	of	Industrial	Economics	215	and	Panayiotis	Agisilaou,	
'Collusion	in	Industrial	Economics	and	Optimally	Designed	Leniency	Programmes	–	A	Survey'	
(2013)	CCP	Working	Paper	13-3	<competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107587/13-
3+Agisilaou.pdf/9b87613a-fb52-459f-8e9c-1eea7879547f>	accessed	2nd	February	2013,	3.	
20	See,	for	example,	Wouter	P	Wils,	Principles	of	European	Antitrust	Enforcement	(Hart	
Publishing	2005)	140-142,	Wouter	P	Wils,	‘Self-Incrimination	in	EC	Antitrust	Enforcement:	A	
Legal	and	Economic	Analysis’	(2003)	26(4)	World	Competition:	Law	and	Economics	Review	567	
where	an	analysis	of	the	potential	self-incrimination	issues	was	undertaken	and	Imran	Aslam	
and	Michael	Ramsden,	‘EC	Dawn	Raids:	A	Human	Rights	Violation?’	(2008)	5(1)	CompLRev	61.	
21	Case	C-360/09	Pfleiderer	(n	13).	For	example,	see	Sebastian	Peyer,	‘Disclosure	of	Leniency	
Documents	in	the	United	Kingdom:	Is	the	Draft	Directive	Creating	Barriers?’	(2013)	August	(1)	
CPI	Antitrust	Chronicle	1,	Caroline	Cauffman,	‘Access	to	Leniency-Related	Documents	after	
Pfleiderer’	(2011)	34(4)	W.	Comp	597,	Gaetane	Goddin,	‘The	Pfleiderer	Judgment	on	
Transparency:	The	National	Sequel	of	the	access	to	Document	Saga’	(2012)	3(1)	Journal	of	
European	Competition	Law	and	Practice	40,	Thorsten	Mäger,	Daniel	J	Zimmer	and	Sarah	Milde,	
‘Access	to	Leniency	Documents	–	Another	Piece	in	the	Puzzle	Regarding	Public	and	Private	
Antitrust	Enforcement?	(Germany)’	(2012)	Journal	of	European	Competition	Law	and	Practice.	
Advance	Access	published	
<jeclap.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/12/23/jeclap.lps075.full>	accessed	1	March	
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potential	procedural	rights	challenges	that	could	be	made	by	an	undertaking	if	
the	Commission’s	 leniency	documentation	 is	disclosed.	Therefore,	 the	analysis	
in	 section	 (a)	 of	 the	 chapter	 is	 completely	 novel.	 Nonetheless,	 a	 few	
practitioners	have	noted	that	there	could	also	be	issues	with	regards	to	Article	8	
of	the	ECHR	and	the	right	to	private	life	but	they	have	gone	no	further	than	to	
note	this	observation.22	Scordamaglia-Tousis	has	considered	the	right	to	privacy	
in	the	context	of	 inspections;	particularly,	he	has	 looked	at	 inspections	carried	
out	on	‘business	premises’	and	‘non-business	premises’.23	However,	he	has	not	
considered	 Article	 8	 of	 the	 ECHR	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	
documents.	 With	 regards	 to	 leniency	 Scordamaglia-Tousis	 has	 broadly	
considered	it	within	his	analysis	of	cartel	fining	procedure	and	its	compatibility	
with	fundamental	rights.24	
	
As	 to	 whether	 there	 is	 a	 superior	 way	 to	 manage	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	
documents	–	prior	to	the	enactment	of	the	Damages	Directive	–	consideration	
has	 been	 had.	 Comparisons	 have	 been	 conducted	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 US	
systems	 to	 try	 to	 identify	 possible	 improvements	 and	 solutions	 to	 the	 then	
																																																																																																																																																						
2013,	Caroline	Cauffman,	‘The	Interaction	of	Leniency	Programmes	and	Actions	for	Damages’	
(2011)	7(2)	CompLRev	181	and	Michael	Sanders	and	others,	‘Disclosure	of	leniency	materials	in	
follow-on	damages	actions:	striking	“the	right	balance”	between	the	interests	of	leniency	
applicants	and	private	claimants?’(2013)	34(4)	ECLR	174.	
22	Thomas	Funke	and	Osborne	Clarke	‘EU	Overview’	in	Samantha	Mobley	(ed)	Getting	the	Deal	
Through:	Private	Antitrust	Litigation	2014	(Global	Competition	Review	2014)	59	and	Frederic	
Louis,	‘It	is	Always	Darkest	Before	the	Dawn:	Litigating	Access	to	cartel	Leniency	Documents	in	
the	EU’	in	Euan	Burrows	and	Mark	Clarke	(eds),	The	International	Comparative	Legal	Guide	to:	
Competition	Litigation	2014	(6th	edn,	Global	Legal	Group	2013)	17.	Research	has,	however,	
been	conducted	into	issues	of	confidentiality,	see	Antonio	Caruso,	‘Leniency	Programmes	and	
Protection	of	Confidentiality:	The	Experience	of	the	European	Commission’	(2010)	1(6)	Journal	
of	European	Competition	Law	and	Practice	453	and	Arianna	Andreangeli,	’The	Protection	of	
Legal	Professional	Privilege	in	EU	Law	and	the	Impact	of	the	Rules	on	the	Exchange	of	
Information	within	the	European	Competition	Network	on	the	Secrecy	of	Communications	
between	Lawyer	and	Client:	one	step	forward,	two	steps	back?’	(2005)	2(1)	CompLRev	31.	There	
has	also	been	a	a	great	deal	of	literature	on	the	Directive	itself,	for	example:	Laura	Guttuso,	‘The	
enduring	question	of	access	to	leniency	materials	in	private	proceedings:	one	draft	Directive	and	
several	court	rulings’	(2014)	7(1)	GCLR	10,	Peter	Stauber,	‘The	European	draft	Directive	on	
antitrust	damage	claims	and	its	potential	consequences	for	German	law’	(2014)	7(1)	GCLR	23	
and	Gianni	De	Stefano,	‘Access	of	damage	claimants	to	evidence	arising	out	of	EU	cartel	
investigations:	a	fast	evolving	scenario’	(2012)	5(3)	GCLR	95.	
23	Scordamaglia-Tousis	(n	3)	187	-	197.	
24	ibid	370	-	380.	
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problem	of	disclosure.25	Canenbley	and	Steivorth	asked	whether	the	EU	needs	a	
one-step	approach	–	namely,	a	single	procedure	to	deal	with	fines	and	damages	
–	 to	solve	 the	problem.26	Whereas,	Petit	has	suggested	 four	alternate	ways	of	
managing	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	 information.27	This	 literature	 shall	 be	
considered	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 section	 5	 of	 the	 chapter.	 Because	 of	 the	 lack	 of	
analysis	of	these	issues	this	chapter	has	the	unique	opportunity	to	discuss	and	
analyse	 the	 novel	 issues	 around	 the	 disclosure	 of	 confidential	 leniency	
information	and	ways	of	enhancing	the	current	system.		
	 	
																																																								
25	Piet	J	Slot,	‘Does	the	Pfleiderer	judgment	make	the	fight	against	international	cartels	more	
difficult?’	(2013)	34(4)	ECLR	197.	
26	Cornelis	Canenbley	and	Till	Steinvorth,	'Effective	enforcement	of	competition	law:	Is	there	a	
solution	to	the	conflict	between	leniency	programmes	and	private	damages	actions?'	(2011)	
2(4)	Journal	of	European	Competition	Law	and	Practice	315.	
27	Nicolas	Petit,	‘New	Challenges	for	21st	Century	Competition	Authorities’	(2013)	
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2207886	>	accessed	21	March	2013,	9.	
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4.2	The	Backdrop	to	the	‘Disclosure	Dilemma’:	The	Case	Law	and	
the	Damages	Directive		
	
Before	conducting	an	assessment	of	the	potential	procedural	rights	challenges	
that	an	undertaking	might	utilise	against	the	disclosure	of	confidential	leniency	
documents,	we	need	to	understand	what	the	courts	have	held	with	regards	to	
disclosure,	 the	 potential	 benefits	 and	 detriments	 of	 allowing	 disclosure	 and	
what	the	Damages	Directive	stipulates.		
	
The	first	case	in	which	the	European	Court	of	Justice	(ECJ)	held	that	there	was	
an	existence	–	within	EU	law	–	of	the	right	for	a	cartel	victim	to	damages	for	the	
harm	suffered	by	the	cartel	was	the	Courage	case	in	2001.28	It	was	noted	within	
this	 case	 that	 private	 damage	 actions	 help	 maintain	 ‘effective	 competition	
within	the	Community’	and,	thus	they	have	an	important	role	to	play	alongside	
the	 public	 enforcement	 of	 competition	 law.29	This	 principle	 (of	 the	 right	 to	
damages	 for	 harm	 suffered	 by	 a	 cartel)	 has	 subsequently	 been	 confirmed	 in	
latter	 decisions	 by	 the	 court.30	Indeed,	 the	 court	 noted	 in	 the	 Manfredi	
judgment	 that	 it	 is	 the	 duty	 of	 a	 Member	 State	 to	 ensure	 that	 there	 is	 an	
effective	 regime	 of	 private	 damage	 claims	 in	 cases	 of	 competition	 law	
infringements.31	
	
Whilst	 these	cases	set	out	 the	general	principle	 that	an	 individual	who	suffers	
harm	because	of	the	actions	of	a	cartel	has	a	right	to	damages	from	the	cartel,	it	
was	not	until	the	Pfleiderer	case	that	we	saw	a	significant	development	of	the	
law	 to	 potentially	 facilitate	 access	 to	 leniency	 documents	 for	 third	 parties	
bringing	follow-on	damage	claims.32	The	Pfleiderer	case	arose	in	Germany	from	
a	 request	 for	 access	 to	 leniency	 documents	 in	 a	 damages	 claim.	 Pfleiderer																																																									
28	Case	C-453/99	Courage	Ltd	v	Bernard	Crehan	[2001]	ECR	1-6297.	
29	ibid.	
30	For	example,	see	Joined	cases	C-295/04	and	C-298/04	Vincenzo	Manfredi	et	al	v	Lloyd	
Adriatico	Assicurazioni	SpA	et	al	[2006]	ECR	1-6619.	
31	ibid.	
32	Case	C-360/09	Pfleiderer	(n	13).	
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sought	 full	 access	 to	 the	 leniency	 documents	 from	 the	 Bundeskartellamt	 of	 a	
2008	 cartel	 decision	 on	 three	manufactures	 of	 decor	 paper.	 Pfleiderer	 was	 a	
customer	of	the	undertakings	that	had	formed	a	cartel	and	was	seeking	to	bring	
an	 action	 for	 damages.	 The	 NCA	 refused	 access	 to	 the	 documents;	 thus,	
Pfleiderer	took	the	Bundeskartellamt	to	court	to	gain	access	to	the	documents.	
This	led	to	an	Article	267	TFEU	reference	under	the	Treaty,	to	establish	whether	
granting	access	to	leniency	documents	was	compatible	with	EU	law.	In	its	reply	
to	 the	 reference,	 the	 ECJ	held	 that	 EU	 law	did	not	 prohibit	 third	parties	 from	
accessing	leniency	documents	when	they	are	seeking	damages,	and	that	it	is	up	
to	 national	 courts	 to	 decide	 whether	 access	 should	 be	 granted	 according	 to	
their	 national	 law.33	The	 ECJ	 specified	 that	 access	must	 be	 decided	 upon	 by	
weighing	 up	 the	 interests	 in	 favour	 and	 against	 disclosing	 the	 documents	 in	
each	 given	 instance	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis.	 The	 ECJ	 did	 however	 also	
acknowledge	 in	 response	 to	 the	Article	 267	 reference	 that	 granting	 access	 to	
leniency	documents	could	be	harmful	to	leniency	programmes,	but	that	this	in	
itself	could	not	prevent	an	individual’s	rights	to	bring	a	claim	for	damages.	Thus,	
we	 began	 to	 see	 the	 development	 of	 this	 principle	 through	 the	 courts	 as	
undertakings	harmed	by	cartels	begun	seeking	access	to	these	documents.	
	
Prior	to	the	Pfleiderer	decision,	the	UK	High	Court	–	in	the	National	Grid	case	–	
performed	 a	 balancing	 act	 regarding	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	 documents.34	
The	 High	 Court	 held	 that	 it	 was	 necessary	 to	 disclose	 selective	 parts	 of	 the	
leniency	 documents,	 as	 certain	 parts	 of	 the	 documents	 were	 relevant	 to	 the	
claimant’s	 case.	 As	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 documents	 were	 considered	 not	 to	 be	
relevant	 to	 the	 claimant’s	 case	 the	 High	 Court	 would	 not	 disclose	 them.	 To	
perform	this	balancing	act,	 the	court	used	the	principle	of	proportionality	and	
decided	 that	 documents	 should	 only	 be	 disclosed	 when	 they	 were	 of	 ‘real	
assistance’	to	the	claimants	and	when	there	is	no	other	reasonable	way	for	the	
claimant	to	obtain	that	information.35	Similar	to	the	ECJ,	the	High	Court	felt	that	
																																																								
33	Case	C-360/09	Pfleiderer	(n	13).	
34	National	Grid	v	Switchgear	cartel	[2009]	EWHC	1326	(Ch),	[2009]	UKCLR	838	para	[44].		
35	ibid.	
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a	 blanket	 restriction	 on	 access	 to	 leniency	 documents	would	 not	 be	 fair,	 but	
equally	complete	disclosure	of	documents	in	each	and	every	case	would	not	be	
appropriate.	 Thus,	 in	 this	 case	 the	 High	 Court	 went	 through	 the	 leniency	
documentation,	 paragraph-by-paragraph,	 and	 decided	 what	 the	 relevant	 and	
necessary	 information	to	disclose	was.	This	case	 illustrates	how	a	court	can	 in	
practice	perform	the	delicate	balancing	act	of	disclosure.	 It	also	highlights	one	
of	the	crucial	problems	with	this	approach,	that	of	uncertainty,	as	neither	party	
can	be	sure	in	advance	which	information	will	be	disclosed.	
	
The	case	law	regarding	disclosure	has	subsequently	been	confirmed	and	further	
developed.	 In	 the	Hydrogene	 Peroxide	 case	 it	 was	 held	 that	 the	 Commission	
may	 also	 have	 to	 disclose	 leniency	 documents, 36 	and	 that	 leniency	 and	
cooperation	 programmes	 deserved	 no	 higher	 level	 of	 protection	 than	 private	
damage	actions.37	
	
The	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	(CJEU)	has	also	held	that	an	Austrian	
law	that	prohibited	third	party	access	to	the	Cartel	Court’s	files	in	competition	
law	proceedings	was	 not	 compatible	with	 EU	 law.38	The	Court	 confirmed	 that	
when	 deciding	 whether	 to	 disclose	 leniency	 documents	 or	 not	 the	 national	
courts	were	 required	 to	weigh	 up	 the	 interests	 in	 favour	 of	 disclosure	 of	 the	
information	 and	 in	 support	 of	 the	 protection	 of	 that	 information.39	The	 Court	
stated	 that	 the	 weighing-up	 is	 necessary	 as	 any	 rule	 that	 completely	 bans	
disclosure	 is	 liable	 to	 undermine	 the	 effective	 application	 of	Article	 101	 TFEU	
and	the	rights	that	this	confers	to	individuals.	Similarly,	in	the	Kone	case	it	was	
held	 that	 Article	101	 of	 the	 TFEU	 must	 be	 interpreted	 as	 meaning	 that	 it	
																																																								
36	Case	T-437/08	CDC	Hydrogene	Peroxide	v	Commission	[2012]	OJ	C	32/18.	
37	It	should	be	noted	however,	in	this	case	access	to	leniency	documents	was	sought	under	
Council	Regulation	(EC)	No	1049/2001	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	30	May	
2001	regarding	public	access	to	European	Parliament,	Council	and	Commission	documents	(the	
Transparency	Regulation)	[2001]	OJ	L145/43.		It	should	also	be	noted	that	Article	47	of	the	
Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	of	the	European	Union	does	not	preclude	the	Commission	from	
bringing	a	damages	action	on	behalf	of	the	EU	for	damages,	in	respect	of	loss	sustained	by	an	
infringement	of	Article	101	TFEU.	See	Case	C-199/11	Otis	and	Others	[2012].	
38	Case	C-536/11	Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde	v	Donau	Chemie	AG	and	others	[2013].	
39	ibid	para	[30].		
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precludes	 the	 legislation	 enacted	 by	 a	 Member	 State	 which	 categorically	
excludes,	any	civil	liability	of	undertakings	belonging	to	a	cartel	for	loss	resulting	
from	the	fact	that	an	undertaking	not	party	to	the	cartel,	having	regard	to	the	
practices	 of	 the	 cartel,	 set	 its	 prices	 higher	 than	would	 otherwise	 have	 been	
expected	under	competitive	conditions.40	
	
Now	we	 have	 considered	 the	 developed	 case	 law	 on	 disclosure,	 the	 benefits	
and	 potential	 issues	 with	 this	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	 documents	 needs	
examining.		
	
By	a	 third	party	being	granted	access	 to	confidential	 leniency	documents,	 it	 is	
likely	to	make	it	easier	for	them	to	bring	follow-on	damage	actions,	as	they	will	
have	access	 to	 information	 they	would	be	unlikely	 to	obtain	any	other	way.41	
For	 example,	 they	may	 gain	 access	 to	 detailed	 information	 on	 the	 cartel,	 the	
markets	affected	by	the	cartel,	the	artificial	price	rise	caused	by	the	cartel	and	
the	 crucial	 documents	 pertaining	 to	 the	 cartel’s	 activity.	 This	will	 help	 enable	
the	claimant	 to	prove	 the	existence	and	harm	caused	by	 the	cartel.	Thus,	 this	
can	be	seen	as	being	beneficial	and	fairer	for	claimants,	because	it	enables	them	
financial	retribution	for	the	harm	that	the	cartel	caused	them.	In	addition,	it	 is	
likely	 to	 save	claimants	money,	as	once	 they	gain	access	 to	 the	 information	 it	
should	make	their	case	easier	to	prove,	thus	resulting	 in	 lower	 litigation	costs.	
Finally,	 it	 is	 possible	 this	 will	 lead	 to	 a	 greater	 deterrent	 effect	 on	 cartelists	
involved	 in	 a	 cartel	 (and	 those	 contemplating	 joining	 a	 cartel)	 as,	 if	 there	 are	
more	damage	claims,	undertakings	will	have	potentially	greater	costs	for	being	
involved	in	a	cartel	because	of	third	parties’	abilities	to	bring	effective	follow-on	
damage	claims.	Thus,	this	approach	also	helps	readdress	the	balance	of	welfare	
by	placing	welfare	back	in	the	hands	of	the	parties	affected	by	the	cartel.	
																																																									
40	Case	C-557/12	Kone	AG	and	Others	v	ÖBB	Infrastruktur	AG	[2014].	
41	Though	the	EU	does	have	discovery	rules,	these	are	somewhat	ineffective	for	damage	
claimants;	unlike	the	US	that	has	robust	discovery	rules.	See	Natalya	Mosunova,	‘Disclosure	of	
evidence	in	cartel	litigations	in	the	EU:	Is	balance	of	victims’	rights	and	public	interest	possible?’	
(2015)	2(1)	BRICS	Law	Journal	125	for	a	comparison	and	analysis	of	these.	
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However,	there	are	various	possible	issues	with	granting	third	parties	access	to	
leniency	documents.	By	there	being	the	potential	for	third	parties	to	be	granted	
access	 to	 leniency	documents	 it	 causes	high	 levels	 of	 uncertainty	 for	 leniency	
applicants,	as	they	may	find	that	confidential	documents	they	have	submitted	–	
to	gain	 leniency	–	are	given	 to	 third	parties.	The	uncertainty	here	 stems	 from	
the	fact	that	the	decision	on	whether	to	grant	access	or	not	to	these	documents	
is	made	by	a	court	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	Therefore,	a	leniency	applicant	can	
never	 be	 certain	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 documentation	 they	 provide	 will	 be	
disclosed	 to	 a	 third	 party	 at	 a	 later	 date.	 This	 could	 effect	 the	 reporting,	 and	
thus	detection,	of	cartels	as	undertakings	may	not	be	willing	to	come	forward	to	
report	a	cartel,	which	could	be	damaging	for	the	EU	cartel	enforcement	regime	
as	 a	 whole.	 This	 knock-on-effect	 could	 occur,	 because	 there	 would	 be	 a	
substantial	 reduction	 in	 the	 benefit	 of	 being	 the	 first	 undertaking	 to	 come	
forward	 to	 report	 the	 cartel	 and	 gain	 the	 immunity	 prize;	 as,	 although	 the	
undertaking	 may	 be	 immune	 from	 damages	 from	 the	 competition	 authority,	
private	 claimants	may	 now	 be	 granted	 access	 to	 the	 first	 leniency	 applicants	
documentation.	This	will	 increase	the	private	claimant’s	chance	of	success	in	a	
private	damages	case	against	the	undertaking.		
	
This	problem	 is	 further	exacerbated	by	 the	 fact	 that	an	undertaking	 that	does	
not	apply	for	 immunity	or	provide	documents	would	be	harder	for	the	private	
claimant	 to	 sue	 than	 the	 undertaking	 that	 has	 provided	 the	 documents.	
Therefore,	we	see	a	strange	situation	occur	that	means,	although	the	reporting	
undertaking	 is	 in	 a	 better	 position	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 Commission’s	
investigation,	 it	 is	 in	 a	 significantly	 disadvantaged	 position	 in	 relation	 to	
potential	follow-on	private	damage	claims	–	when	compared	with	undertakings	
that	 have	 not	 provided	 information	 to	 the	 Commission	 through	 its	 leniency	
programme.		
	
However,	it	could	be	contended	that	the	opposite	is	true,	and	that	because	the	
potential	 fines	 are	 so	 high	 undertakings	would	 still	 apply	 for	 leniency,	 as	 the	
possible	 damage	 suits	 would	 be	 counteracted	 by	 the	 reduction	 in	 fine	 they	
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would	 receive	 for	 a	 leniency	 application.	 Yet	 this	 argument	 assumes	 that	 the	
threat	 that	 the	 cartel	 would	 have	 been	 uncovered	 and	 detected	 without	
leniency	 is	 sufficient	 to	 encourage	 an	 undertaking	 to	 report	 the	 cartel	 even	
though	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 of	 significant	 damages	 claims.	 As	 we	 noted	 in	 the	
beginning	 of	 this	 chapter	 it	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 the	 case	 as	 the	 probability	 of	
detection	outside	of	the	 leniency	programme	is	notably	 low.	Nonetheless,	this	
argument	can	be	refuted	as	many	cartels	cross	numerous	legal	jurisdictions	and	
therefore	 it	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 detected	 or	 reported	 in	 one	 of	 these	
jurisdictions.42	Thus,	even	with	the	potential	risk	of	follow-on	damage	claims	an	
undertaking	has	a	persuasive	influence	to	report	the	cartel.		
	
The	 final	 issue	considered	with	granting	access	 to	 leniency	documents	 is	 that,	
because	 this	 decision	 is	 done	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis,	 this	 could	 lead	 to	 a	
patchwork	 approach	 developing	 across	 the	 EU,	 where	 some	 Member	 State	
courts	are	more	willing	to	grant	access	to	documents	than	others.	The	European	
Competition	Network	(ECN)	are	aware	of	this	potential	problem	and	the	other	
concerns	 that	 the	 decision	 in	 Pfleiderer	 has	 raised,	 and	 as	 such	 provided	
guidance	on	 this	matter	 through	a	Resolution,43	to	explain	 the	position	of	 the	
ECN	competition	authorities	on	this	matter.	
	
What	we	can	 identify	 from	the	aforementioned	discussion	–	of	 the	cases,	and	
the	benefits	and	detriments	of	disclosing	leniency	documents	to	third	parties	–	
is	 that	 a	 balancing	 act	 needs	 to	 be	 performed	 between	 private	 and	 public	
enforcement.	Whilst	public	enforcement	of	competition	 law	 is	of	 fundamental	
importance,	it	is	also	imperative	that	individuals	who	have	suffered	harm	from	a	
cartel	 can	 bring	 effective	 follow-on	 damage	 actions	 to	 readdress	 this	 harm.	
However,	 private	 enforcement	 must	 not	 occur	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 public	
enforcement,	 as	 it	 is	 the	main	 deterrent	 to	 cartels.	 Yet,	 private	 enforcement																																																									
42	Indeed,	Stephan	noted	how	many	of	the	EU	leniency	applications	followed	US	investigations	
(and	leniency	applications)	–	Andreas	Stephan,	‘An	Empirical	Assessment	of	the	European	
Leniency	Notice’	(2009)	5(3)	Journal	of	Competition	Law	&	Economics	537.		
43	‘Resolution	of	the	Meeting	of	Heads	of	the	European	Competition	Authorities	of	23	May	
2012:	Protection	of	leniency	material	in	the	context	of	civil	damages	actions’	
<ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/leniency_material_protection_en.pdf>	Accessed	13	June	2012.	
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must	also	not	be	discouraged	because	of	 the	key	 role	 it	plays	 in	 readdressing	
harm	suffered	to	victims.	
	
To	 address	 the	 identified	 concerns	with	 the	disclosure	of	 leniency	documents	
the	 Commission	 proposed	 a	 draft	 Damages	Directive.44	This	was	 examined	 by	
the	European	Parliament,45	and	has	now	been	enacted,	and	will	come	into	force	
on	the	27	December	2016.46		
	
The	aim	of	the	Directive	 is	 to	 ‘remove	practical	obstacles	to	compensation	for	
all	victims	of	infringements	of	EU	antitrust	law	and	to	optimise	the	relationship	
between	 private	 enforcement	 of	 EU	 antitrust	 rules	 through	 damages	 actions	
and	 public	 enforcement	 by	 the	 Commission	 and	 NCAs.’47	The	 Directive	 fell	
squarely	on	the	side	of	protecting	the	public	enforcement	of	competition	 law,	
because	of	the	view	that	the	leniency	programme	was	crucial	to	the	success	of	
public	 enforcement.	 Article	 5	 of	 the	 Directive	 sets	 out	 the	 requirements	
regarding	 the	 disclosure	 of	 evidence.48	However,	 Article	 6	 of	 the	 Directive	
discusses	the	limits	on	the	disclosure	of	evidence	from	the	file	of	a	competition	
authority.49	Specifically,	 it	 provides	 that	 leniency	 corporate	 statements	 and	
settlement	submissions	cannot,	at	anytime,	be	disclosed	by	a	national	court	for	
damage	actions.50	
	
As	we	can	see,	 this	 is	 the	diametrically	opposing	view	to	the	position	that	 the	
Court	 has	 taken	 regarding	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	 documents.	 The	 Courts																																																									
44	Commission,	Proposal	for	a	Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	on	
certain	rules	governing	actions	for	damages	under	national	law	for	infringements	of	the	
competition	law	provisions	of	the	Member	States	and	of	the	European	Union.	11.06.13	
2013/0185	(COD).	
45	European	Commission,	Proposal	for	a	Directive	–	Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	
the	Council	on	certain	rules	governing	actions	for	damages	under	national	law	for	infringements	
of	the	competition	law	provisions	of	the	Member	States	and	of	the	European	Union	
(Amendments	by	the	European	Parliament	to	the	Commission	proposal)	09.04.12	A7-0089/2.	
46	Damages	Directive	(n	14)	Article	21(1).	
47	European	Commission,	‘Directive	on	Antitrust	Damages’	
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/proposed_directive_en.html>	
accessed	13	September	2015.	
48	Damages	Directive	(n	14)	Article	5.	
49	ibid	Article	6.	
50	ibid	Article	6	(6)a.	
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have	 repeatedly	 advocated	 for	 a	 balancing	 act	 to	 be	 performed	 in	 each	 case,	
stating	 that	 a	 blanket	 ban	 would	 breach	 EU	 law.51	This	 itself	 leads	 to	 an	
interesting	 question,	 because	 the	 Courts	 have	 been	 interpreting	 the	 TFEU	
(which	 is	primary	 legislation)	 and	 stated	 that	 the	 law	 requires	 a	balancing	act	
when	it	comes	to	disclosure,	and	the	Damages	Directive	is	secondary	legislation.	
The	Damages	Directive	conflicts	with	what	the	EU	Courts	have	repeatedly	held	
and	because	of	the	supremacy	of	primary	legislation	over	secondary	legislation	
it	 is	possible	the	courts	may	hold	that	the	Damages	Directive	 is	usurped	by	 its	
own	interpretation	of	the	TFEU.	However,	examination	of	this	interesting	point	
is	outside	the	scope	of	this	chapter	and	therefore	the	potential	 implications	of	
this	 cannot	 be	 examined.	 Thus,	 this	 chapter	 will	 now	 assess	 if	 the	 Damages	
Directive	 has	 taken	 the	 correct	 approach	 by	 analysing	 if	 there	 are	 any	
procedural	rights	challenges	that	an	undertaking	could	bring	which	would	mean	
that	disclosure	of	leniency	documents	would	lead	to	a	breach	of	these	rights.	
	 	
																																																								
51	For	example,	Case	C-360/09	Pfleiderer	(n	13).	
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4.3	An	Undertaking’s	‘Legitimate	Expectations’	
	
This	section	shall	begin	the	analysis	of	the	potential	procedural	rights	challenges	
that	 an	 undertaking	 could	 make	 by	 considering	 whether	 disclosure	 of	
confidential	leniency	documents	to	third	parties	could	amount	to	a	breach	of	an	
undertaking’s	‘legitimate	expectation’.	
	
A	 legitimate	 expectation	 is	 where	 a	 constraint	 is	 placed	 on	 a	 public	 body	 –	
particularly	 when	 changing	 policies	 –	 by	 a	 legal	 duty	 to	 be	 fair.52	This	 can	
therefore	 be	 seen	 as	 part	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 natural	 justice.53	Legitimate	
expectations	 ‘is	 one	of	 the	most	 oft-invoked	 general	 principles	 of	 Community	
law’.54	However,	 a	 legitimate	 expectation	 may	 only	 be	 invoked	 when	 the	
Commission	or	Community	creates	a	 situation	which	gives	 rise	 to	a	 legitimate	
expectation.55	This	 expectation	 can	 arise	 out	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 conduct	
itself,56	or	legislation.57	Thus,	the	first	thing	that	we	need	to	establish	is	whether	
a	 legitimate	expectation	has	 arisen.	 To	achieve	 this,	we	need	 to	 identify	 if	 an	
undertaking	 can	 have	 a	 legitimate	 expectation	 that	 information	 provided	 in	 a	
leniency	application	to	the	Commission	will	not	be	disclosed	to	third	parties	in	
follow	on	damage	actions.	To	enable	us	to	do	this	we	must	begin	by	considering	
the	Commission’s	Leniency	Notice.	Paragraph	38	of	the	Commission’s	Leniency	
Notice	sets	out	that:58	
	
‘The	 Commission	 is	 aware	 that	 this	 notice	 will	 create	
legitimate	 expectations	 on	 which	 undertakings	 may	 rely	
when	disclosing	the	existence	of	a	cartel	to	the	Commission.’	
																																																									
52	R	(Bhatt	Murphy)	v	Independent	Assessor	[2008]	EWCA	Civ	755.		
53	Within	the	UK	the	principle	of	legitimate	expectation	was	first	recognised	in	the	case	of	
Schmidt	v	Secretary	of	State	for	Home	Affairs	[1968]	EWCA	Civ	1.	
54	Takis	Tridimas	The	General	Principles	of	EU	Law	(2nd	edn,	Oxford	University	Press	2006)	251.	
55	Case	C-177/90	Kuhn	v	Landwirtschaftskammer	Weser-Ems	[1992]	ECR	I-35	para	14.	
56	Case	C-289/81	Mavridis	v	Parliament	[1983]	ECR	1731	para	21,	Case	C-127/80	Grogan	v	
Commission	[1982]	ECR	869.	
57	Case	74/74	CNTA	[1975]	ECR	533.	
58	Commission	Notice	(n	2)	emphasis	added.	
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What	we	can	 identify	 immediately	from	considering	paragraph	(38)	 is	that	the	
Commission	 is	 acknowledging	 that	 its	 Leniency	 Notice	 creates	 a	 legitimate	
expectation	 that	 undertakings	may	 rely	 on.	 Yet,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	Notice	
provides	no	information	as	to	what	this	legitimate	expectation	or	expectations	
may	be.	Presumably	one	of	these	expectations	would	be	a	reduction	in	fine	or	
complete	 immunity	 where	 the	 undertaking	 cooperates	 and	 provides	 the	
Commission	 with	 all	 the	 necessary	 information	 on	 the	 cartel	 as	 that	 is	 the	
premise	 of	 the	 Leniency	 Notice.	 But,	 can	 we	 also	 validly	 claim	 that	 an	
undertaking	would	 have	 a	 legitimate	 expectation	 that	 the	 Commission	would	
not	disclose	the	information	provided	to	it	by	the	undertaking	to	anyone	else	or	
even	third	parties	seeking	to	bring	damage	actions?		
	
Broadly	speaking	one	would	expect	confidential	business	information	to	be	kept	
private	where	possible	 because	of	 the	nature	of	 the	 information.59	Therefore,	
perhaps	an	undertaking	would	have	a	legitimate	right	to	believe	and	expect	that	
the	 Commission	 would	 not	 disclose	 these	 documents	 to	 third	 parties.	 Let	 us	
now	consider	the	Leniency	Notice	itself	again	to	delve	deeper	into	the	possible	
foundation	 of	 this	 potential	 belief	 and	 expectation.	We	 can	 see	 at	 paragraph	
(40)	that:60	
	
‘The	 Commission	 considers	 that	 normally	 public	
disclosure	 of	 documents	 and	 written	 or	 recorded	
statements	received	in	the	context	of	this	notice	would	
undermine	 certain	 public	 or	 private	 interest,	 for	
example	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 purpose	 of	 inspections	
and	 investigations,	 within	 the	meaning	 of	 Article	 4	 of	
Regulation	(EC)	No	1049/2001,	even	after	the	decision	
has	been	taken.’	
																																																									
59	For	example,	non-disclosure	agreements	are	often	entered	into	between	employees	and	
employers,	or	it	is	part	of	an	individual’s	contract.	
60	Commission	Notice	(n	2).	
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And	at	paragraphs	(33)	and	(35)	of	the	Leniency	Notice	we	can	identify	that:	
	
‘Access	 to	 corporate	 statements	 is	 only	 granted	 to	 the	
addresses	of	a	statement	of	objections	[…]	other	parties	such	
as	 complainants	 will	 not	 be	 granted	 access	 to	 corporate	
statements.’61	
	
‘Corporate	statements	made	under	 the	present	Notice	will	
only	 be	 transmitted	 to	 the	 competition	 authorities	 of	 the	
Member	 States	 […]	 provided	 that	 the	 level	 of	 protection	
against	 disclosure	 awarded	 by	 the	 receiving	 competition	
authority	 is	 equivalent	 to	 the	 one	 conferred	 by	 the	
Commission.’62	
	
What	we	 recognise	 from	 examining	 these	 paragraphs	 is	 that	 the	 Commission	
quite	 clearly	 give,	 or	 at	 the	 very	 least	 provide	 the	 impression	 that,	 it	will	 not	
disclose	 these	 documents	 to	 other	 parties.	 Indeed,	 reading	 the	 discussed	
paragraphs	 seems	 to	 highlight	 the	 Commission’s	 concern	 of	 disclosing	 any	
confidential	business	information.63	The	Commission	even	goes	so	far	as	to	note	
how	 the	 leniency	documents	will	 only	be	 shared	with	 competition	authorities	
that	 have	 at	 least	 the	 same	 level	 of	 protection	 against	 disclosure	 as	 the	
Commission	 themselves. 64 	Therefore,	 one	 can	 justifiably	 assume	 that	 the	
Commission	 values	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 non-disclosure	 of	 these	 documents.	
From	 examining	 the	 assurances	 given	 by	 the	 Commission	 in	 the	 Leniency	
Notice,	 it	 seems	 logical	 that	 an	 undertaking	 would	 reasonably	 believe,	 and	
therefore	 legitimately	 expect,	 that	 documents	 and	 information	 provided	 in	 a	
leniency	application	would	not	be	disclosed	to	third	parties	to	help	facilitate	the	
bringing	 of	 a	 follow	 on	 damage	 claim.	 But	 what	 of	 other	 EU	 Legislation	 that	
																																																								
61	ibid	para	(33)	emphasis	added.	
62	ibid	para	(35).	
63	Owing	to	the	potential	harm	it	can	do	to	future	or	current	investigations.	
64	Commission	Notice	(n	2)	para	(35).	
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might	lead	to	the	establishment	of	a	legitimate	expectation	of	non-disclosure	of	
leniency	documents?	
	
There	 are	 two	 crucial	 pieces	 of	 legislation	 here,	 Article	 339	 of	 the	 TFEU	 and	
Articles	27	and	28	of	Council	Regulation	No	1/2003/EC.65	Article	339	of	the	TFEU	
provides	 against	 disclosure	 of	 information	 by	 the	 members	 of	 the	 EU	
institutions,	committees	and	officials,	even	after	their	duties	have	ceased.	With	
particular	 protection	 being	 afforded	 here	 to	 the	 ‘information	 about	
undertakings,	their	business	relations	[and]	their	cost	components’.66	Article	27	
of	 Regulation	 1/2003	 –	 which	 focuses	 on	 the	 hearing	 of	 the	 parties,	
complainants	and	others	–	states	that:67	
	
‘2.	 […]	 They	 [other	 undertakings]	 shall	 be	 entitled	 to	 have	
access	 to	 the	 Commission's	 file,	 subject	 to	 the	 legitimate	
interest	 of	 undertakings	 in	 the	 protection	 of	 their	 business	
secrets.	 The	 right	 of	 access	 to	 the	 file	 shall	 not	 extend	 to	
confidential	 information	 and	 internal	 documents	 of	 the	
Commission	 or	 the	 competition	 authorities	 of	 the	 Member	
States.	
4.	[…]	Publication	shall	have	regard	to	the	legitimate	interest	
of	undertakings	in	the	protection	of	their	business	secrets.’	
	
Article	 28	 of	 Regulation	 1/2003	 (which	 regards	 professional	 secrecy)	
advocates:68		
	
‘1.	 [...]	 Information	 collected	 […]	 shall	 be	 used	 only	 for	 the	
purpose	for	which	it	was	acquired.	
2.	 Without	 prejudice	 to	 the	 exchange	 and	 to	 the	 use	 of																																																									
65	Council	Regulation	(EC)	No	1/2003	of	16	December	2002	on	the	Implementation	of	the	Rules	
on	Competition	laid	down	in	Articles	81	and	82	of	the	Treaty	[2003]	OJ	L1/1.	
66	Article	339	TFEU,	emphasis	added.	
67	Regulation	1/2003	(n	65)	Article	27	emphasis	added.	
68	ibid	Article	28	emphasis	added.	
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information	 foreseen	 in	 […]	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	
competition	 authorities	 of	 the	Member	 States	 […]	 shall	 not	
disclose	 information	 acquired	 or	 exchanged	 by	 them	
pursuant	 to	 this	 Regulation	 and	 of	 the	 kind	 covered	 by	 the	
obligation	of	professional	secrecy.’	
	
These	pieces	of	legislation	add	weight	to	the	claim	that	an	undertaking	can	have	
a	 legitimate	expectation	with	regard	to	non-disclosure	of	documents	provided	
by	 it	 to	 the	 Commission.	 Therefore,	when	we	 consider	 these	 aforementioned	
pieces	 of	 legislation	 one	 can	 clearly	 see	 that	 the	 TFEU	offers	 protection	 from	
disclosure	of	business	secrets	to	third	parties.	 Indeed,	even	Regulation	1/2003	
Article	 27	 provides	 for	 this	 protection,	 noting	 undertakings	 will	 have	 a	
legitimate	interest	in	this	information’s	protection.	Though	the	Regulation	does	
not	 expressly	mention	 an	 undertaking	 forming	 a	 legitimate	 expectation,	 as	 it	
refers	to	a	legitimate	interest,	one	could	reasonably	infer	–	in	this	context	–	that	
a	 legitimate	expectation	can	be	formed.	This	 is	because	the	undertaking	has	a	
legitimate	 interest	 in	 protecting	 its	 business	 secrets.	 Article	 28	 of	 Regulation	
1/2003	goes	further	than	this	though,	by	stating	that	the	information	will	only	
be	 used	 for	 the	 purposes	 it	 was	 collected	 for.	 If	 one	 considers	 why	 the	
Commission	collects	leniency	documentation,	we	can	identify	that	it	is	collected	
to	help	prove	the	existence	of	a	cartel	and	enable	the	Commission	to	prosecute	
that	 cartel. 69 	The	 Leniency	 Notice	 nowhere	 expressly	 mentions	 that	 the	
information	garnered	from	a	leniency	applicant	will	be	provided	to	third	parties	
for	 use	 in	 follow	 on	 damage	 actions.	 Indeed,	 nowhere	 in	 any	 of	 the	
Commission’s	 documentation	 does	 it	 state	 this.	 In	 fact	 it	 states	 that	 the	
information	will	be	protected	and	not	disclosed.	Indeed,	Article	28	of	Regulation	
1/2003	 expressly	 states	 again	 that	 it	 will	 protect	 the	 information	 covered	 by	
‘professional	 secrecy’.	 This	 therefore	 strengthens	 the	 reasons	 why	 an	
undertaking	would	legitimately	expect	the	information	it	provides	in	a	leniency	
application	not	to	be	disclosed	to	third	parties.	
																																																								
69	The	leniency	programme	also	seeks	to	encourage	self-reporting	and	the	disruption	of	cartels.	
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Additionally,	there	is	a	form	of	a	legitimate	expectation	that	an	undertaking	can	
rely	 upon	 when	 the	 legislation	 requires	 a	 Community	 institute	 to	 take	 into	
account	 a	 specific,	 well-defined	 interest, 70 	known	 as	 a	 ‘specific	 interest’	
legitimate	 expectation. 71 	In	 this	 case	 the	 well-defined	 interest	 that	 the	
legislation	 clearly	 sets	 out	 is	 that	 the	 Commission	 shall	 protect	 confidential	
business	 information	 from	 disclosure. 72 	Therefore,	 if	 the	 courts	 or	 the	
Commission	 were	 to	 allow	 the	 disclosure	 of	 this	 information	 an	 undertaking	
would	have	a	claim	under	the	‘specific	interest’	legitimate	expectation.	
	
From	the	aforementioned	discussion	it	is	clear	that	an	undertaking	will	acquire	
a	legitimate	expectation	of	‘non-disclosure’.	The	next	requirement	is	that	there	
is	 a	 breach	 of	 this	 legitimate	 expectation.	 However,	 a	 breach	 can	 only	 be	
pleaded	 when	 the	 Commission	 has	 frustrated	 the	 legitimate	 expectation	 in	
question.73	The	case	where	the	Commission	discloses	an	undertaking’s	leniency	
application	 documentation	 (particularly	 the	 confidential	 information)	 to	 third	
parties	will	lead	to	the	legitimate	expectation	of	non-disclosure	being	frustrated	
and	 thus	 breached.	 However,	 when	 the	 EU	 Courts	 have	 considered	 cases	
regarding	the	‘specific	interest’	they	will	also	consider	any	potential	‘overriding	
public	interest’	that	might	justify	the	frustration	of	the	legitimate	expectation	in	
the	case	before	them.74		
	
When	 one	 considers	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	 documents	 we	 see	 that	 a	
balancing	problem	arises.	On	the	one	hand	we	have	the	public	enforcement	of	
competition	law	–	which	seeks	to	prevent	and	deter	cartels	–	and	on	the	other,	
we	 have	 the	 private	 enforcement	 of	 competition	 law,	 which	 seeks	 to	 allow	
those	 harmed	 to	 recover	 losses	 for	 the	 harm	 caused	 by	 a	 cartel.	 It	 is	 very	
difficult	to	know	which	side	a	court	would	come	down	on	in	this	matter;	as	it	is	
important	 to	 allow	 parties	 to	 recover	 damages	 for	 the	 harm	 they	 have																																																									
70	Case	74/74	CNTA	(n	57).	
71	Tridimas	(n	54)	273.	
72	As	was	noted	earlier	both	Article	339	TFEU	and	Article	27	and	28	Regulation	1/2003	provide	
for	this	interest	protection.	
73	Case	T-123/89	Chomel	v	Commission	[1990]	ECR	II-131	para	26.	
74	For	example,	see	Case	C-152/88	Sofrimport	v	Commission	[1990]	ECR	I-2477.	
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suffered,75	yet	 it	 is	also	 important	to	ensure	that	undertakings	are	encouraged	
to	provide	 leniency	 information	 so	 that	 the	Commission	 can	detect	 and	deter	
cartels.76	The	question	is	which	would	and	should	be	prioritised?	
	
It	 could	 be	 claimed	 that	 protecting	 the	 public	 enforcement	 is	 the	 most	
important	as	without	it	follow	on	damage	actions	could	never	ensue,	as	cartels	
would	go	undetected.	However,	one	could	advance	that	even	if	this	information	
were	disclosed	undertakings	would	still	report	cartels	to	avoid	the	severe	fines	
when	 they	 are	 caught.	 This	 is	 not	 an	 easy	 question	 to	 answer	 but	 when	 we	
consider	 the	 legislation,	 Leniency	 Notice	 and	 the	 cases	 –	 that	 have	 come	
through	the	courts	so	far	–	it	seems	that	the	EU	Court’s	support	a	balancing	of	
these	 two	 approaches	 and	 would	 only	 advocate	 for	 the	 provision	 of	
documentation	 when	 it	 is	 necessary. 77 	This	 means	 that	 although	 an	
undertakings	 legitimate	 expectation	 may	 be	 breached	 by	 the	 Commission	
disclosing	documents	–	there	is	potentially	a	public	interest	which	may	override	
this	 depending	 on	 how	 a	 court	 balances	 and	 priorities	 public	 and	 private	
enforcement	 of	 competition	 law.	 Additionally,	 we	must	 note	 that	 the	 Courts	
have	held	that	the	principle	of	protection	of	legitimate	expectations	may	not	be	
relied	upon	by	an	undertaking	 that	has	committed	a	manifest	 infringement	of	
the	rules	in	force.78	Based	on	this	it	is	clear	that	an	undertaking	would	acquire	a	
legitimate	expectation	of	non-disclosure	but	how	a	court	would	balance	these	
two	conflicting	interests	is	uncertain.	
	
This	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 has	 asked	 whether	 an	 undertaking	 can	 have	 a	
legitimate	 expectation	 of	 non-disclosure	 of	 the	 information	 it	 provides	 to	 the	
Commission	in	exchange	for	immunity.	From	the	consideration	of	the	Leniency	
Notice,	 TFEU	 and	 Regulation	 1/2003	 we	 can	 see	 that	 it	 is	 reasonable	 for	 an	
undertaking	 to	 gain	 a	 legitimate	 expectation	 that	 the	 Commission	 would	 not																																																									
75	Case	C-453/99	Courage	(n	28).	
76	Especially	given	how	many	cartels	are	detected	only	owing	to	the	Leniency	Notice.		
77	Case	C-360/09	Pfleiderer	(n	13).	
78	(Joined	Cases	T-551/93,	T-231/94,	T-232/94,	T-233/94	and	T-234/94	Industrias	Pesqueras	
Campos	and	Others	v	Commission	[1996]	ECR	II-247	para	76).	
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disclose	 its	 confidential	 leniency	 information.	 This	 therefore	 means	 that	 the	
Commission	 in	 disclosing	 this	 information	 to	 third	 parties	 is	 breaching	 this	
legitimate	expectation.	However,	what	is	harder	to	know	is	how	a	court	would	
deal	with	 a	 case	where	 it	was	 claimed	 that	 there	 has	 been	 a	 frustration	 of	 a	
legitimate	 expectation	 by	 the	 Commission,	 because	 of	 the	 potential	 public	
interest	defence	that	can	override	the	frustration	of	a	legitimate	interest.	What	
one	can	say	though,	is	that	the	Commission	wishes	to	protect	this	 information	
as	 much	 as	 possible	 as	 the	 legislation,	 Leniency	 Notice	 and	 even	 the	 cases	
regarding	disclosure	have	sought	to	do	this.	
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4.4	Disclosure	and	Article	8	of	the	ECHR	
	
This	 section	 moves	 on	 to	 consider	 the	 second	 potential	 procedural	 rights	
challenge	 that	 an	 undertaking	 might	 seek	 to	 make.	 It	 examines	 whether	
disclosure	of	confidential	leniency	documents	to	third	parties	could	amount	to	a	
breach	of	Article	8	of	the	ECHR.	
	
Article	 8	 is	 a	 ‘qualified	 right’;	 therefore,	 it	 is	 important	we	 establish	 how	 the	
disclosure	of	confidential	Commission	leniency	documents	to	third	parties	could	
engage	this	right.	The	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	(ECtHR)	has	developed	
what	 is	known	as	 the	 ‘standard	approach’	 for	dealing	with	cases	 that	assert	a	
breach	of	Articles	8	–	11	of	the	Convention.79	This	process	involves	five	stages,	
which	 shall	 now	 be	 examined	 in	 turn.	 The	 first	 two	 stages	 of	 the	 ‘standard	
approach’	place	the	burden	of	proof	on	the	claimant	(of	the	right	abused),	and	
the	three	latter	stages	shift	this	burden	of	proof	to	the	State,	or	in	our	case	the	
Commission.	
	
The	first	stage	of	this	approach	requires	the	claimant	to	demonstrate	that	the	
issue	in	question	falls	within	the	scope	of	one	of	the	substantive	Articles	of	the	
Convention.	 The	 issue	 we	 are	 discussing	 regards	 confidential	 information	
provided	to	the	Commission	by	an	undertaking	in	exchange	for	leniency.	Thus,	
we	shall	consider	this	alongside	Article	8	of	the	ECHR.	Article	8	specifies	that:		
	
‘1.	 Everyone	has	 the	 right	 to	 respect	 for	his	private	and	 family	
life,	his	home	and	his	correspondence’.	
	
When	undertakings	provide	 information	to	the	Commission	 it	 is	 liable	to	be	 in	
the	form	of	documentation	or	oral	information,	that	the	Commission	can	use	to	
establish	 the	existence	of	a	cartel	and	which	undertakings	were	 involved.	This																																																									
79	Douwe	Korff,	‘The	Standard	Approach	Under	Articles	8-11	ECHR	and	Article	2	ECHR’	
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/events/conference_dp_2009/presentations_speeches/KORF
F_Douwe_a.pdf>	accessed	24	January	2014.	
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information	is	likely	to	contain	confidential	business	information	and	data	and,	
thus,	 this	 content	 could	 potentially	 fall	 within	 the	 ambit	 of	 the	 materials	
protected	 by	 Article	 8	 if	 it	 were	 to	 be	 disclosed	 to	 third	 parties.	 The	 ECtHR	
interprets	Article	8	widely.80	Indeed,	we	see	that	the	Court	has	held	that	Article	
8	includes	protection	for,	legal	persons,81	business	premises	and,82	a	company’s	
registered	 office,	 branch	 or	 other	 premises.83	We	 can	 also	 identify	 that	 the	
Court	has	 interpreted	‘private	and	family	 life’	widely.	For	example,	 it	has	been	
held	 that	 there	 is	 a	 positive	 obligation	 on	 the	 State	 to	 provide	 information	
concerning	the	fate	of	a	newborn	baby	that	was	taken	into	hospital	care	and,84	
public	information	which	is	systematically	collected	and	stored	in	files	–	held	by	
the	 public	 bodies	 of	 the	 State	 –	 also	 falls	 within	 the	 ambit	 of	 Article	 8.85	
Consequently,	 (given	 the	 jurisprudence	 and	 the	wide	 interpretation)	 it	 seems	
highly	likely	that	the	Court	would	hold	that	this	issue	would	fall	within	the	scope	
of	Article	8	ECHR.86	This	therefore	means	we	can	consider	the	second	stage.	
	
The	 second	 stage	 requires	 that	 there	 was	 an	 “interference”	 with	 the	 right.87	
‘Any	 “formality”,	 “condition”,	 “restriction”	 or	 “penalty”	 constitutes	 an	
interference.’88 	When	 we	 consider	 an	 undertaking	 giving	 the	 Commission	
confidential	 information	 we	 find	 that	 under	 the	 Commission’s	 Leniency	
Notice,89 	an	 undertaking	 must	 meet	 a	 variety	 of	 requirements,	 including	
providing	 a	 corporate	 statement	 and,90	all	 relevant	 information	 and	 evidence	
																																																								
80	ibid	2.	
81	Société	Stenuit	v	France	(1992)	14	EHRR	509.	
82	Niemietz	v	Germany	(1993)	16	EHRR	97.	
83	Société	Stenuit	(n	81)	para	41.	
84	Zorica	Jovanović	v	Serbia	(2013)	App	no	21794/08.	
85	Rotaru	v	Romania	(2000)	ECHR	2000-V.	Another	example	is	the	UK	High	Court	case	of	Mosley.	
The	High	Court	held	that	an	equitable	breach	of	confidence	is	covered	by	Article	8	ECHR.	Mosley	
v	News	Group	Newspapers	[2008]	EWHC	1777	(QB).		
86	It	is	beyond	doubt	doctrinally	in	the	UK	at	least	that	companies	can	actually	enjoy	a	private	
life:	see	R	v	Broadcasting	Standards	Commission	ex	parte	BBC	(2000)	3	WLR	1327.	
87	Again,	this	stage	has	a	low	threshold.	
88	Douwe	Korff	(n	79)	2.	
89	Commission	leniency	notice	(n	2).	
90	ibid	(9)(a).	
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relating	 to	 the	 alleged	 cartel.91	Therefore,	 it	 is	 probable	 that	 this	would	meet	
the	low	threshold	requirements	for	an	“interference”	with	this	right.	
The	third	stage	in	the	standard	approach	requires	identification	of	whether	the	
“interference”	 was	 based	 on	 –	 authorised	 or	 prescribed	 by	 –	 “law”.	 This	 in	
essence	requires	that	there	is	a	specific	legal	rule	or	regime	that	authorises	the	
interfering	act	that	is	sought	to	be	justified.92	Since	the	decision	in	Pfleiderer,93	
where	the	ECJ	stated	that	access	 to	 leniency	documents	by	 third	parties	must	
be	decided	upon	by	weighing	up	the	 interests	 in	 favour	and	against	disclosing	
the	 confidential	 documents	 in	 each	 given	 case	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis,	 there	
has	 been	 the	 legal	 potential	 for	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	 documents	 to	 be	
disclosed	to	third	parties.94	We	have	also	seen	further	cases	since	the	Pfleiderer	
judgment	that	have	illustrated	how	the	balancing	act	for	disclosure	versus	non-
disclosure	 can	 be	 conducted. 95 	Because	 the	 disclosure	 of	 documents	 is	
authorised	 and	 has	 been	 prescribed	 by	 the	 EU	 courts	 it	 is	 believed	 that	 the	
ECtHR	would	likely	see	this	interference	as	being	prescribed	by	law.	
	
The	 fourth	 stage	 requires	 the	 consideration	 of	 whether	 ‘the	 interference	
pursued	a	“legitimate	aim”?’	The	legitimate	aims	for	Article	8	ECHR	are	set	out	
in	 the	 second	 paragraph	 of	 Article	 8,	 and	 include:	 ‘national	 security,	 public	
safety,	 economic	 well-being	 of	 the	 country,	 prevention	 of	 disorder	 or	 crime,	
protection	 of	 health	 or	 morals,	 or	 protection	 of	 the	 rights	 and	 freedoms	 of	
others’.	 The	 ECtHR	 interprets	 these	 very	 widely.96	Therefore,	 helping	 ensure	
that	victims	of	a	cartel	can	recover	damages	from	the	perpetrators	should	fall	
under	 a	 legitimate	 aim	 of	 Article	 8,	 namely;	 the	 protection	 of	 rights	 and	
freedoms	of	others.	 Indeed,	when	we	consider	 that	 the	Commission	has	been	
actively	 attempting	 to	 encourage	 and	 enhance	 the	 ability	 to	 bring	 damages	
																																																								
91	ibid	(12)(a).	
92	Silver	and	Others	v	UK	(1983)	5EHRR	383	paras	45-46	
93	Case	C-360/09	Pfleiderer	(n	13).	
94	The	ECJ	made	its	reference	based	on	its	interpretation	of	the	TFEU	and	Regulation	1/2003.	
95	T-437/08	CDC	Hydrogene	(n	36)	and	Case	C-536/11	Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde	(n	38).	
96	For	example,	see	Groppera	Radio	AG	and	Others	v	Switzerland	(1990)	12	EHRR	321.	
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claims	within	the	EU	for	a	while	now,97	it	is	likely	that	the	Court	would	consider	
this	 when	 making	 its	 determination	 of	 whether	 the	 interference	 pursued	 a	
legitimate	aim.	
The	 fifth	 stage	 within	 this	 approach	 is	 split	 into	 two	 parts.	 The	 first	 part	 (a)	
requires	 that	 the	 interference	 was	 “necessary	 in	 a	 democratic	 society”	 to	
achieve	 the	 legitimate	 aim	 in	 question	 in	 the	 particular	 case	 and	
“proportionate”	 to	 that	aim,	 taking	 into	account	 the	 “margin	of	 appreciation”	
accorded	to	the	State	 in	question.	The	second	part	(b)	asks	whether	there	are	
appropriate	 and	 effective	 procedural	 guarantees	 against	 abuse?	 Part	 (b)	 will	
form	 part	 of	 the	 examination	 under	 the	 proportionately	 analysis.	 Let	 us	
dissemble	 the	 fifth	 stage	 and	 apply	 it	 to	 the	 situation	 of	 the	 disclosure	 of	
confidential	leniency	documents.	In	Handyside	v	UK	the	ECtHR	explained	what	is	
meant	by	“necessary”	in	this	context.98	This	was	succinctly	stipulated	in	Olsson	v	
Sweden	(No	1):99	
	
‘The	 notion	 of	 necessity	 implies	 that	 an	 interference	 corresponds	 to	 a	
pressing	 social	 need	 and,	 in	 particular,	 that	 it	 is	 proportionate	 to	 the	
legitimate	aim’	
	
In	our	analysis	 the	argument	would	be	that	 there	 is	a	pressing	social	need	for	
the	 disclosure	 of	 the	 leniency	 documents	 so	 that	 third	 parties	 can	 bring	
effective	damages	claims.	As	we	established	early	 in	 the	chapter,	 it	 is	difficult	
for	 undertakings	 to	 bring	 follow-on	 damage	 claims	 without	 access	 to	 this	
information,	because	proving	the	harm	suffered	and	identifying	the	‘cost’	of	this	
harm	 is	 significantly	 difficult	 without	 the	 proof	 provided	 by	 the	 undertakings	
involved	in	the	cartel.		
	
																																																								
97	For	example,	see	the	Green	Paper	on	Damages	actions	for	breach	of	the	EC	antitrust	rules	
COM	(2005)	672,	19.12.2005	and	the	White	Paper	on	Damage	Actions	for	Breach	of	the	EC	
antitrust	rules	COM	(2008)	165,	02.04.2008.	
98	(1976)	1	EHRR	737	para	48.	
99	(1988)	11	EHRR	259	para	67.	
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Next,	 consideration	 needs	 to	 be	 had	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 interference	 was	
proportionate	 to	 achieve	 this	 aim.	 There	 is	 no	precise	 test	 for	 proportionality	
within	the	ECHR,100	but	from	the	case	law	of	the	ECtHR	we	can	extrapolate	four	
general	factors	that	the	ECtHR	regularly	considers:101	
(i)	The	level	to	which	the	interference	impairs	the	very	essence	of	the	right.102	
This	means	we	need	to	examine	how	serious	the	interference	is	to	the	right.	For	
our	 analysis	 we	 therefore	 have	 to	 assess	 and	 balance	 the	 protection	 of	
confidential	 leniency	 documents	 –	 and	 the	 right	 to	 an	 undertaking’s	 privacy,	
against	the	right	of	third	parties	to	receive	redress	and	restitution	(in	the	form	
of	damages)	 for	 the	harm	caused	by	 the	cartel.	We	can	see	 that	by	disclosing	
confidential	 documents	 this	 would	 involve	 an	 interference	 with	 Article	 8.	
However,	as	the	disclosure	involves	company	documents	and	information,	and	
not	an	individual’s	personal	data	the	Court	will	award	the	State	greater	latitude	
when	 assessing	 the	 interference.103	Therefore,	 it	 is	 possible	 the	 court	 would	
accept	that	the	interference	is	proportionate	here.	
		
(ii)	 Blanket	 rules	 do	 not	 allow	 for	 the	 examination	 of	 the	 merits	 of	 each	
individual	case.	Thus,	blanket	rules	can	be	held	to	be	disproportionate.104	In	this	
case	there	is	not	a	blanket	ban	as	the	courts	are	required	to	conduct	a	balancing	
and	weighing	analysis	on	a	case-by-case	examination.	This	means	that	 in	each	
case	the	judges	are	assessing	whether	disclosure	is	necessary	and	what	parts	(if	
any)	of	the	leniency	documents	need	to	be	disclosed.	
	
																																																								
100	There	is	a	wealth	of	material	on	the	concept	of	proportionality	and	balancing:	recent	
examples	would	include:	Aharon	Barak,	Proportionality:	Constitutional	Rights	and	Their	
Limitations	(Cambridge	University	Press	2012),	Grant	Huscroft,	Bradley	Miller	and	Gregoire	
Webber,	Proportionality	and	the	Rule	of	Law:	Rights,	Justification	and	Reasoning		(Cambridge	
University	Press2014),	Jacco	Bomhoff,	Balancing	Constitutional	Rights:	The	Origins	and	
Meanings	of	Post-War	Legal	Discourse	(Cambridge	University	Press	2014)	and,	in	the	UK	
context,	Alan	Brady,	Proportionality	and	Deference	under	the	UK	Human	Rights	Act:	An	
Institutionally	Sensitive	Approach	(Cambridge	University	Press	2012).	
101	John	Wadham	and	others,	Blackstone’s	Guide	to	the	Human	Rights	Act	1998	(5th	edn	Oxford	
University	Press	2009)	37.	
102	ibid.	
103	ibid.	
104	For	example	see,	Campbell	v	UK	(1992)	15	EHRR	137	para	62.	
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(iii)	Whether	there	is	a	less	restrictive	alternative	that	is	still	equally	effective	to	
pursue	 the	 legitimate	 aim.105	A	 good	 example	 of	 the	 application	 of	 this	 stage	
was	 in	the	Campbell	case.106	Here,	 it	was	held	that	a	blanket	measure	to	open	
all	 of	 the	 prisoners	mail	 was	 disproportionate.	 It	 was	 held	 that	 opening	 only	
those	 letters	 reasonably	 considered	 to	 contain	 contraband	 would	 be	
proportionate.	 Thus,	 if	we	apply	 this	 to	 the	 consideration	of	 the	disclosure	of	
leniency	 documents,	 we	 can	 identify	 that	 the	 approach	 currently	 used	 is	
proportionate	as	disclosure	 is	examined	on	a	case-by-case	basis	and	it	 is	not	a	
blanket	 approach.	 However,	 there	 is	 another	 approach	 –	 the	 documents	 are	
disclosed	to	the	Court	but	not	to	third	parties	(discussed	later	in	this	Chapter	in	
Section	5)	–	which	can	achieve	the	same	legitimate	aim	but	is	less	restrictive	on	
the	leniency	applicants’	rights.	Consequently,	it	is	possible	the	Court	would	hold	
that	 the	 current	 approach	 is	 not	 proportionate	 as	 there	 is	 a	 less	 restrictive	
alternative	that	is	still	equally	effective	to	pursue	the	legitimate	aim.	
	
(iv)	 Finally,	 are	 there	 any	 effective	 safeguards	 or	 judicial	 controls	 over	 the	
measure?	This	stage	requires	a	consideration	of	the	legal	remedies	of	affected	
measures.107	In	the	case	of	disclosure	of	 leniency	documents	the	protection	 in	
place	 centers	 around	 the	 court	 as	 it	 is	 conducts	 the	 analysis	 itself	 and	has	 to	
weigh	up	 the	 pros	 and	 cons	 in	 each	 given	 case.	 Additionally,	 the	 case	 can	be	
appealed	to	a	higher	court	if	a	party	feels	the	decision	regarding	disclosure	was	
incorrect.	
	
With	regards	to	the	margin	of	appreciation	the	ECtHR	looks	to	see	if	the	State	
(or	 in	 our	 case	 the	 Commission)	 has	 performed	 a	 balancing	 act	 between	 the	
two.108	The	 Court	 will	 interpret	 this	 broadly	 or	 narrowly	 depending	 on	 the																																																									
105	John	Wardham	and	others	(n	101)	38.	
106	Campbell	(n	104).	
107	John	Wardham	and	others	(n	101)	38.	
108	Hirst	v	UK	(No	2)	(2005)	42	EHRR	849.	The	most	comprehensive	work	on	the	margin	of	
appreciation,	though	now	dated,	remains	Howard	Yourow,	The	Margin	of	Appreciation	Doctrine	
in	the	Dynamics	of	European	Human	Rights	Jurisprudence	(Martinus	Nijhoff	Leiden	1996)	and	
more	recently	see	George	Letsas,	A	Theory	of	Interpretation	of	the	European	Convention	on	
Human	Rights	(Oxford	University	Press	2007)	–	Chapter	4	"Two	Concepts	of	the	Margin	of	
Appreciation".	
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nature	of	the	rights	in	issue	in	the	case.109	It	is	therefore	difficult	to	identify	how	
the	court	will	view	this,	but	as	it	involves	the	disclosure	of	corporate	documents	
it	is	probable	that	a	wider	margin	of	appreciation	would	be	permitted	here.110	
	
As	 we	 can	 identify	 from	 the	 above	 analysis	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 assess	 what	 the	
ECtHR	would	decide	regarding	the	disclosure	of	leniency	documents.	However,	
the	various	stages	have	been	examined	and	areas	where	problems	or	challenges	
may	 occur	 have	 been	 highlighted.	 This	 section	 of	 the	 Chapter	 has	 assessed	
whether	an	undertaking	could	bring	a	potential	challenge	under	Article	8	of	the	
ECHR	 to	 the	 disclosure	 of	 confidential	 leniency	 documents.	 From	 considering	
the	 five	 stages	of	 the	standard	approach	we	have	 identified	 that	 it	 is	possible	
that	 the	ECtHR	would	hold	 that	 there	 is	no	breach	of	Article	8	when	 leniency	
documents	are	disclosed,	assuming	the	disclosure	is	achieved	proportionally	by	
a	 case-by-case	analysis.	However,	 there	 is	a	 less	 restrictive	way	 to	pursue	 the	
legitimate	 aim	of	 follow-on	 damage	 actions	 and	 thus	 it	 is	 conversely	 possible	
that	 the	 Court	 would	 require	 the	 disclosure	 of	 documents	 to	 follow	 this	
procedure,	 as	 it	 is	 equally	 effective	 but	 protects	 both	 sets	 of	 rights	 more	
successfully.	
	 	
																																																								
109	Jacobs,	White	and	Ovey,	The	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	(5th	edn,	Oxford	
University	Press	2010)	326.	
110		John	Wardham	and	others	(n	101).	
	208	
4.5	Could	Disclosure	Amount	to	a	Breach	of	Confidence?	
	
The	 final	 potential	 procedural	 right	 challenge	 deliberated	 is	 the	 UK	wrong	 of	
breach	of	confidence.	Breach	of	confidence	is	an	equitable	doctrine	that	allows	
for	 an	 action	 when	 an	 individual’s	 confidence	 has	 been	 breached.	 A	 duty	 of	
confidence	occurs	where	confidential	information	comes	to	the	knowledge	of	a	
person	in	circumstances	where	it	would	be	unfair	if	it	were	then	to	be	disclosed	
to	others.	 This	 ‘commonly	arises	 in	 circumstances	where	 there	 is	or	has	been	
some	relationship	or	transaction	between	the	parties’.111		
	
For	 a	 breach	 of	 confidence	 to	 occur	 three	 key	 elements	 are	 required,	 which	
were	set	forth	in	the	seminal	case	of	Coco	v	AN	Clark	by	Magarry	J.112	First,	the	
information	must	have	the	necessary	element	of	confidence	about	it,	namely,	it	
must	not	be	 in	 the	public	domain.113	Second,	 the	 information	must	have	been	
imparted	in	circumstances	where	"an	obligation	of	confidence"	arises.114	Third,	
there	 needs	 to	 be	 an	 "unauthorised	 use"	 of	 the	 information	 that	 is	 to	 the	
detriment	of	the	original	communicator	of	the	information.115	
	
Let	us	now	apply	these	three	requirements	for	breach	of	confidence	to	the	case	
of	 the	 disclosure	 of	 confidential	 Commission	 leniency	 documents	 to	 third	
parties,	seeking	to	bring	a	damage	claim	against	the	undertaking	that	provided	
the	 leniency	 information	 to	 the	 Commission.	 To	 conduct	 this	 examination	we	
shall	 utilise	 a	 hypothetical	 scenario	 involving	 a	 company	 called	 Widgets	 PLC	
(hereafter,	 ‘Widgets’).	 Widgets	 are	 a	 member	 of	 a	 cartel	 facing	 possible	
investigation	 by	 the	 Commission.	 It	 pre-empts	 any	 possible	 enforcement	 by	
applying	 for	 leniency	 under	 the	 Commission’s	 Leniency	 Notice.	 Widgets	 is	
successful	 and	 the	 Commission	 grants	 it	 leniency.	 However,	 the	 Commission																																																									
111	John	Cooke,	Law	of	Tort	(11th	edn,	Pearson	Education	Limited	2013)	500.	
112	Coco	v	AN	Clark	(Engineers)	Ltd	[1969]	RPC	41.	
113	ibid	para	47.	
114	ibid	para	48.	
115	ibid.	Note	that	if	confidential	information	is	obtained	and	disclosed	without	any	abuse	of	a	
confidential	relationship	no	tort	will	be	committed:	Malone	v	Metropolitan	Police	Commissioner	
[1979]	344	Ch.	
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had	 already	 begun	 investigation	 proceedings	 and	 Widgets	 was	 actually	 the	
second	undertaking	to	come	forward	and	report	the	cartel.	It	therefore	receives	
a	 fine	 for	 its	 competition	 law	 infringement	 with	 a	 50	 percent	 reduction	 for	
assisting	 the	 Commission.	 Widgets	 believed	 this	 was	 the	 end	 of	 the	 matter.	
However,	 one	 of	 its	 customers	 –	 Buyers	 of	 Widgets	 PLC	 (hereafter,	 ‘BW’)	 is	
seeking	to	bring	a	damage	claim	for	the	harm	it	suffered	because	of	the	cartel.	
To	prove	the	harm	suffered,	BW	has	sought	access	to	the	Commission’s	leniency	
file.	 A	 court	 ordered	 disclosure	 of	Widgets	 leniency	 documents,	 and	BW	now	
has	 the	 information	 it	 needs	 to	 prove	 the	 harm	 it	 has	 suffered.	 Could	 the	
disclosure	of	these	documents	amount	to	a	breach	of	Widgets’	confidence?	
	
First	we	need	to	begin	by	considering	the	information	that	Widgets	gave	to	the	
Commission.	This	is	likely	to	meet	the	requirements	of	‘confidence’	–	as	per	the	
first	stage	of	the	Coco	test.	The	corporate	statement	that	Widgets	provided	to	
the	 Commission	 obliges	 them	 to	 deliver	 business	 information	 that	 is	
confidential.	 This	 information	 will	 include	 details	 such	 as,	 product	 and	
geographic	scope,	market	share	and	data	on	employees	who	were	 involved	 in	
the	 infringement. 116 	This	 data	 and	 information	 is	 not	 typically	 publically	
available,	which	is	why	the	Commission	seeks	leniency	applications		–	to	detect	
cartels	 and	 have	 access	 to	 the	 information	 necessary	 to	 establish	 an	
infringement.	 Consequently,	we	 can	 identify	 that	 the	 confidence	 requirement	
will	be	met	at	this	stage.	
	
Next,	we	need	to	ascertain	whether	an	obligation	of	confidence	arises	when	the	
Commission	receives	this	confidential	 information	from	Widgets.	This	can	only	
arise	 expressly	 or	 by	 implication	 of	 law	 from	 either	 the	 circumstances	 or	 the	
relationship.	 Indeed,	 an	 obligation	 of	 confidence	 will	 arise	 here	 as	 the	
Commission	expressly	notes	within	the	Leniency	Notice	that	it	will	not	disclose	
information	provided	 in	 a	 leniency	 application	 to	 third	parties.117	Additionally,	
Widgets	will	 rely	on	 the	other	guarantees	given	within	Regulation	1/2003	and																																																									
116	Commission	Notice	(n	2)	(9)(a).	
117	ibid	para	40	and	33.	
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the	assurances	provided	in	regards	to	the	protection	of	business	secrets	within	
Commission’s	files,118	and	any	publication.119	Alongside	this,	Widgets	will	rely	on	
the	guarantees	that	the	 information	 it	provides	 is	only	used	for	the	purpose	 it	
was	 collected	 for.120	Thus,	 again	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 court	would	hold	 that	 the	
second	stage	of	the	Coco	test	is	fulfilled.	
	
The	 third	 requirement	 for	 Widgets	 claim	 to	 succeed	 is	 that	 there	 is	 an	
“unauthorised	use”	of	the	information	that	it	provided	to	the	Commission	and	
that	 it	 is	 to	Widgets	detriment.	 “Unauthorised	use”	 in	 this	 context	 essentially	
means	 that	 it	 is	 effectively	 disclosed	 without	 Widgets’	 consent.	 Let	 us	
disassemble	 this	 and	 apply	 it	 to	 our	 case.	 Widgets	 provides	 the	 confidential	
information	 to	 the	 Commission	 in	 exchange	 for	 immunity,	 but	 what	 can	 the	
Commission	use	this	information	for?	When	we	consider	the	Leniency	Notice	it	
makes	 it	clear	 that	 the	 information	provided	to	 the	Commission,	 in	a	 leniency	
application,	 is	 provided	 to	 enable	 it	 to	 investigate	 a	 cartel	 and,	 then	 initiate	
legal	 proceedings	 against	 the	 cartel	 members,	 for	 a	 breach	 of	 Article	 101(1)	
TFEU.121	The	Leniency	Notice	does	not	provide	for	the	information	to	be	used	in	
any	 other	 way,	 in	 fact,	 as	 we	 noted	 in	 the	 previous	 section’s	 discussion,	 the	
Leniency	 Notice	 provides	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 information	 garnered	
through	 the	 leniency	 programme.122	Widgets	 would	 not	 give	 consent	 for	 the	
information	provided	in	its	leniency	application	to	be	disclosed	to	third	parties	
as	 it	 would	 mean	 a	 third	 party	 would	 gain	 access	 to	 confidential	 business	
information.	 In	 fact,	 if	 this	were	 to	 occur	 it	 could	 actually	 place	Widgets	 in	 a	
worse	position	(with	regards	to	a	follow-on	damages	claim)	than	an	undertaking	
that	did	not	apply	for	 leniency.	This	 is	because	the	third	party	would	not	have	
that	 detailed	 information	 to	 prove	 the	 cartel	 and	 harm	 if	 there	 was	 not	 a	
leniency	applicant.	Therefore,	it	seems	reasonable	to	believe	that	disclosing	this																																																									
118	Regulation	1/2003	(n	65)	Article	27	para	2.	
119	ibid	Article	27	para	4.	
120	ibid	Article	28	para	2.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	while	probably	only	relevant	to	breach	of	
confidence	in	the	context	of	media	intrusion	–	Widgets	claim	would	be	stronger	if	it	is	founded	
on	a	“reasonable	expectation”	of	privacy	following	cases	such	as	Campbell	v	MGN	[2004]	UKHL	
22.	
121	Commission	Notice	(n	2)	para	1,	33,	35	and	40.	
122	ibid	para	33,	35	and	40.	
	211	
information	–	to	a	third	party	seeking	to	sue	the	undertaking	that	provided	this	
information	–	would	be	an	unauthorised	use	of	the	information.	
	
Subsequently,	 we	 need	 to	 identify	 whether	 this	 disclosure	 would	 be	 to	 the	
detriment	of	Widgets,	as	it	provided	the	information	to	the	Commission.	If	BW	
then	 uses	 the	 information	 disclosed	 from	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	
documentation	 to	 sue	 Widgets	 it	 seems	 logical	 that	 this	 would	 be	 to	 the	
detriment	of	Widgets,	as	they	will	have	expenses	and	damages	to	pay	because	
of	the	documents.	Therefore,	this	would	likely	mean	that	the	third	stage	of	the	
Coco	test	is	also	met.	
	
What	 we	 therefore	 see	 is	 that	 the	 three	 crucial	 elements	 for	 a	 breach	 of	
confidence	 action	 appear	 to	 be	 met.	 However,	 there	 are	 a	 variety	 of	 other	
considerations	 to	 be	 had	 here	 as	 to	 whether	 an	 action	 for	 a	 breach	 of	
confidence	would	be	upheld	by	the	court.		
	
First,	one	of	the	aims	of	breach	of	confidence	is	to	prevent	people,	to	whom	the	
information	has	been	divulged	to	in	confidence,	from	using	the	information	to	
gain	 an	 unfair	 advantage	 for	 themselves.	 One	 of	 the	 issues	 in	 our	 case	 with	
Widgets	is,	that	it	is	not	the	Commission	gaining	a	benefit	here,	but	a	third	party	
(BW	in	our	examples),	who	is	acquiring	access	to	the	documents.	This	could	lead	
to	a	potential	problem,	as	there	is	no	benefit	to	the	Commission.123	
	
Second,	as	within	legitimate	expectations,	breach	of	confidence	permits	courts	
to	consider	whether	there	is	a	public	interest	defence	that	would	allow	for	the	
breach	 of	 confidence.	 In	 our	 example,	 BW	might	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 a	 public	
interest	in	Widgets’	leniency	documents	being	disclosed	to	enable	it	and	other	
customers	affected	by	the	cartel	to	be	able	to	bring	follow-on	damage	claims.	
																																																								
123	However,	once	a	relationship	has	been	established	the	obligation	that	binds	the	recipient	of	
the	confidential	information	then	also	binds	any	third	party	to	whom	that	information	is	
disclosed	to.	Printers	and	Finishers	Ltd	v	Holloway	[1964]	3	All	ER	731.	
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In	the	Spycatcher	case,	the	House	of	Lords	set	out	three	 limiting	principles	for	
the	 rights	 of	 confidentiality	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 public	 interest.124	First,	 the	
principle	 of	 confidentiality	 only	 applies	 to	 information	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 is	
confidential.125	This	 therefore	 means	 anything	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	
documentation	 that	 is	 not	 confidential	 could	 be	 disclosed	 without	 breaching	
confidence.	 Second,	 the	 duty	 of	 confidence	 applies	 to	 neither	 useless	
information	 nor	 trivia.126	Third	 –	 and	 the	most	 important	 for	 our	 analysis	 –	 is	
that	 though	 there	 is	 a	 public	 interest	 that	 the	 law	 protects	 confidences,	 this	
public	 interest	 may	 be	 outweighed	 by	 other	 countervailing	 public	 interests,	
which	favour	disclosure.	This	principle	requires	the	court	to	perform	a	balancing	
act	 weighing	 up	 the	 public	 interest	 in	 maintaining	 confidence	 against	 the	
counter	public	 interest	 in	favour	of	disclosure.	This	means	that	BW	could	seek	
for	the	court	to	hold	that	there	would	not	be	a	breach	of	confidence	as	it	would	
be	 in	 the	 public	 interest	 for	 these	 documents	 to	 be	 disclosed.	 However,	 the	
court	 in	practice	appears	 to	permit	a	public	 interest	 in	 cases	where	 there	 is	a	
large	 proportion	 of	 the	 public	 that	 may	 be	 affected.	 For	 example,	 in	 Lion	
Laboratories	 the	 court	 held	 there	 was	 an	 overriding	 public	 interest	 in	
confidential	 information	being	disclosed	regarding	the	Lion	Intoximeter.127	This	
was	because	the	information	(which	raised	serious	doubts	about	the	reliability	
of	a	specific	model	of	intoximeter)	affected	the	general	public,	as	it	was	the	sole	
evidence	 used	 in	 many	 prosecutions	 of	 ‘drunk	 drivers’.128	Nonetheless,	 the	
Court	 may	 also	 utilise	 the	 public	 interest	 defence	 in	 cases	 where	 a	 limited	
number	of	the	public	could	be	affected,	even	if	there	is	not	an	imminent	risk	to	
an	 identifiable	 third	party.129	Thus,	 the	key	determinants	 in	whether	 the	court	
holds	there	to	be	a	public	 interest	 in	disclosure	that	overrides	confidentially	 is	
likely	 to	 depend	on	how	many	 customers	 are	 affected	by	 the	 cartels	 artificial	
price	rises,	and	the	impact	on	the	wider	general	public	at	large.																																																										
124	Attorney	General	v	Guardian	Newspapers	Ltd	(No2)	(Spycatcher)	[1990]	1	AC	109.	
125	ibid.	
126	ibid.	
127	Lion	Laboratories	Ltd	v	Evans	[1985]	QB	526.	
128	ibid.	Additionally,	the	court	held	in	this	case	there	is	no	requirement	of	iniquity	on	the	part	of	
the	plaintiffs.	
129	Rosemary	Pattenden,	The	Law	of	Professional-client	Confidentiality:	Regulating	the	
Disclosure	of	Confidential	Personal	Information	(Oxford	University	Press	2003)	335.	
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Third,	 it	 is	 not	 technically	 the	 Commission	 that	 is	 disclosing	 the	 leniency	
documents;	it	is	actually	the	Court	that	orders	the	disclosure	of	these.	In	fact	we	
find	that	the	Commission	is	refusing	to	disclosure	these	documents	and	seeks	to	
avoid	disclosure	of	them	at	all	costs.	Hence,	the	third	parties	have	to	go	to	court	
in	 order	 to	 get	 the	 documents	 divulged.	 Thus,	 a	 breach	 of	 confidence	 is	
technically	not	occurring,	as	the	third	stage	of	the	test	is	not	being	met,	because	
it	 is	 an	 authorised	 disclosure	 and	 not	 an	 unauthorised	 one,	 as	 the	 court	 is	
requiring	 it.	 If	 the	Commission	were	 to	be	disclosing	 the	documents	 then	 this	
would	be	a	different	situation,	but	it	is	not.	Consequently,	an	undertaking	would	
likely	fail	at	the	third	stage.	
	
Fourth,	 and	 finally,	we	need	 to	 examine	 the	 role	 of	 the	 equitable	 doctrine	of	
‘clean	hands’.	This	doctrine	permits	the	court	to	consider	whether	an	equitable	
remedy	should	not	be	allowed,	as	the	claimant	has	acted	unethically	or	in	‘bad	
faith’.	 It	 then	falls	upon	the	defendant	(BW	in	our	case)	to	show	that	Widgets	
has	not	acted	 in	good	 faith.	BW	would	 likely	utilise	 the	 fact	 that	Widgets	had	
breached	Article	101(1)	TFEU	to	 illustrate	that	Widgets	had	acted	 in	bad	faith.	
However,	Widgets	would	 likely	counter	this	claim	by	arguing	that	whilst	 it	had	
breached	Article	101(1)	TFEU	it	was	seeking	to	readdress	this	by	reporting	the	
cartel	to	the	Commission	and	assisting	it	in	its	investigation	and	paying	the	fine.	
Therefore,	when	it	provided	the	leniency	documents	it	did	so	in	good	faith.	The	
court	would	 then	 need	 to	 decide	 if	Widgets	 has	 come	with	 clean	 hands.	 It	 is	
likely	 the	 court	 would	 find	 that	 Widgets	 had	 not	 come	 before	 it	 with	 clean	
hands.	 This	 is	 because	 it	 had	 committed	 a	 breach	 of	 Article	 101(1)	 TFEU	 and	
although	 it	 has	 reported	 this	 and	 assisted	 the	 Commission,	 it	 has	 still	 been	
involved	 in	 a	 cartel.	 Indeed,	 the	 court	 may	 question	 the	 true	 motives	 and	
incentives	behind	Widgets’	 leniency	application.130	In	addition,	 it	 is	 also	worth	
noting	the	Court’s	comments	in	Gartside	v	Outram	regarding	its	view	that	there	
is	 ‘no	confidence	as	to	the	disclosure	of	 iniquity’.131	Because	of	 this,	 it	may	be																																																									
130	Although	Widgets	may	seek	to	argue	it	is	because	it	feels	remorseful	about	its	actions,	it	may	
indeed	be	due	to	an	ulterior	motive,	namely;	the	potential	reduction	in	fine	it	can	receive.	
131	[1856]	26	LJ	Ch	(NS)	113,	114.	
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the	case	that	the	court	holds	that	as	Widgets	breached	Article	101(1)	TFEU	and	
the	 documents	 in	 question	 relate	 to	 that	 infringement	 that	 these	 cannot	 be	
protected.	Conversely,	 it	 is	possible	because	 this	 information	was	provided	 to	
assist	 the	 Commission	 in	 its	 investigation	 and	 as	 Widgets	 is	 not	 seeking	 to	
conceal	its	illegal	activity	that	this	is	not	a	case	of	iniquity.	
	
By	utilising	 the	 illustrative	example	of	Widgets	and	BW	we	have	been	able	 to	
consider	whether	an	undertaking	could	bring	a	claim	for	breach	of	confidence.	
Whilst	 it	 appeared	 that	 the	 three	 stages	 required	 for	 a	 breach	 of	 confidence	
were	met,	we	identified	a	variety	of	reasons	as	to	why	Widgets	claim	would	not	
succeed.	 First,	 the	 court	 orders	 disclosure	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	
documents,	 not	 the	 Commission.	 Therefore,	 a	 breach	 of	 confidence	 is	 not	
occurring	by	 the	Commission,	 it	 is	 the	Court	 choosing	 to	disclose	 them.	 If	 the	
Commission	were	to	disclose	the	documents	this	may	lead	to	a	different	result,	
but	this	is	not	the	case.	Second,	Widgets	does	not	come	with	‘clean	hands’	as	it	
has	 committed	 a	 breach	 of	 Article	 101(1)	 TFEU	 and	 therefore	 is	 unlikely	 to	
succeed	 in	 its	 equitable	 claim.	 Third,	 there	 may	 be	 a	 public	 interest	 in	 the	
disclosure	of	this	information	to	affected	parties,	although	the	court	appears	to	
take	 a	 narrow	 approach	 to	 the	 ‘public	 interest’.	 Because	 of	 these	 reasons	 a	
breach	of	confidence	claim	against	the	disclosure	of	the	Commission’s	leniency	
documents	would	be	highly	unlikely	to	succeed.	
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4.6	A	better	and	fairer	way	forward?	
	
As	 it	 has	 been	 established	 that	 there	 may	 be	 a	 potential	 challenge	 that	 an	
undertaking	could	make	against	disclosure	–	thus	suggesting	that	the	Damages	
Directive	is	correct	to	restrict	access	to	these	documents	–	we	need	to	ascertain	
whether	a	better	and	 fairer	balance	can	be	had	between	the	protection	of	an	
undertaking’s	 rights	 and	 a	 third	 party’s	 rights.	 This	 shall	 be	 achieved	 by	 the	
consideration	 of	 four	 potential	 options	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 disclosure	 of	
leniency	documents	to	third	parties.	The	first	option	examined	is	the	approach,	
which	the	Damages	Directive	currently	adopts,	that	is	to	say,	where	a	complete	
blanket	 ban	 is	 placed	 on	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	 documents.	 Option	 2	
considers	 the	 approach	 that	 the	 European	 Courts	 had	 previously	 promoted,	
where	the	court	has	to	perform	a	balancing	act	on	a	case-by-case	basis	of	which	
parts	 (and	whether)	 to	 disclose	 documents	 to	 the	 claimant.	 The	 third	 option	
explored	 is	where	 the	NCA	or	Commission	–	depending	on	which	competition	
authority’s	documents	the	third	party	is	seeking	access	to	–	decides	on	a	case-
by-case	basis	whether	to	disclose	relevant	parts	of	the	leniency	documentation	
to	 the	 third	 party	 or	 court.	 The	 final	 option	 mooted	 is	 where	 the	 Court	 has	
access	to	all	of	the	leniency	documentation	to	use	in	its	damages	claim	analysis,	
but	where	it	does	not	disclose	this	information	to	third	parties.		
	
Before	beginning	this	analysis	however,	we	must	consider	the	options	that	have	
been	 proposed	 by	 other	 academics.	 Canenbley	 and	 Steivorth	 have	 asked	
whether	the	EU	needs	a	one-step	approach	–	namely,	a	single	procedure	to	deal	
with	fines	and	damages	–	to	solve	this	problem.132	Whilst	 in	theory	this	would	
be	 an	 ideal	 solution	 to	 the	 issue,	 it	 would	 require	 that	 the	 Commission	 be	
involved	with	managing	the	private	enforcement	of	competition	law.	This	would	
limit	the	rights	of	those	that	have	been	a	victim	of	a	cartel	and	mean	that	the	
Commission	has	to	identify	and	include	–	within	its	fining	calculation	–	a	figure																																																									
132	Cornelis	Canenbley	and	Till	Steinvorth,	'Effective	enforcement	of	competition	law:	Is	there	a	
solution	to	the	conflict	between	leniency	programmes	and	private	damages	actions?'	(2011)	
2(4)	Journal	of	European	Competition	Law	and	Practice	315.	
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which	represents	the	harm	that	the	cartel	has	caused	to	the	various	victims.	As	
a	 result,	 this	 is	 unlikely	 to	 work	 in	 practice	 and	 would	 require	 a	 significant	
amendment	of	 the	Commission	 current	procedures,	 practices	 and	 focus	of	 its	
work.	Petit	has	suggested	four	alternate	ways	of	managing	the	disclosure	of	this	
information:133	(1)	Judges	could	decide	on	a	case-by-case	basis;	(2)	competition	
authorities	 could	allow	 the	disclosure	of	 certain	 types	of	 information	only;	 (3)	
disclosure	could	be	limited	to	situations	where	the	leniency	applicant	is	placed	
in	a	worse	situation	than	other	conspirators;	and	(4)	‘the	damages	borne	by	the	
leniency	applicant	may	be	transferred	to	its	conspirators’.134	These	options	offer	
differing	possibilities	to	manage	the	disclosure	of	 information.	Judges	deciding	
on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis	 forms	 part	 of	 the	 options	 considered	 within	 this	
Chapter,	 and	 shall	 therefore	 be	 examined	 in	 our	 later	 analysis.	 There	 are	
potential	 issues	with	Options	2-4,	 in	regard	to	the	 identification	of	the	type	of	
information	 that	 would	 qualify	 for	 disclosure	 or	 what	 situations	 would	 be	
covered.	 Additionally,	 these	 options	 would	 still	 potentially	 allow	 for	 a	
procedural	 rights	challenges	 to	be	made.	Let	us	now	move	on	to	consider	 the	
four	options	proposed	in	this	chapter.	
	
4.6.1	Option	1	–	A	complete	blanket	ban	
The	 first	 option	 that	 could	 be	 utilised	 is	 the	 approach	 that	 the	 Damages	
Directive	 takes.	 That	 is,	 to	 place	 a	 blanket	 ban	 on	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	
documents	in	all	cases.	This	has	a	variety	of	benefits	(alongside	an	assortment	
of	problems),	which	shall	be	examined.	
		
By	adopting	this	approach,	it	leads	to	complete	certainty	for	all	parties	involved,	
as	they	know	that	the	documents	will	not	be	disclosed	to	Courts	or	third	parties	
in	 any	 circumstances.	 Indeed,	 the	 leniency	 and	 settlement	 documents	 shall	
remain	completely	confidential	and	can	only	ever	be	disclosed	to	NCAs	who	are	
members	 of	 the	 European	 Competition	 Network	 (ECN)	 and	 meet	 the																																																									
133	Nicolas	Petit,	‘New	Challenges	for	21st	Century	Competition	Authorities’	(2013)	
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2207886	>	accessed	21	March	2013,	9.	
134	ibid.	
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requirements	of	the	network.	This	approach	also	prevents	differing	standards	of	
disclosure	and	tests	developing	across	the	Member	States.	Additionally,	 it	also	
ensures	 that	 leniency	 applications	 are	 not	 dissuaded	 from	 reporting	 cartels	
because	there	is	no	potential	for	disclosure	of	leniency	documents.	
	
Whilst	 this	 approach	 adequately	 protects	 the	 leniency	 applicant’s	 rights	 this	
method	leaves	a	 lot	wanting	for	the	undertaking	or	 individuals	that	have	been	
harmed	by	 the	cartel	and	wish	 to	bring	damages	claim.	With	a	blanket	ban	 in	
place	 third	parties	are	not	able	 to	gain	access	 to	 the	 leniency	documentation,	
which	provides	them	with	crucial	information	to	establish	their	claim	and,	assist	
in	the	calculation	of	the	harm	they	have	suffered	because	of	a	cartel.	Thus,	their	
right	 to	 bring	 a	 claim	 effectively	 is	 impacted	 upon.	 Owing	 to	 this	 we	 shall	
examine	what	 other	 potential	 viable	 options	 are	 available	 to	 allow	 these	 two	
conflicting	sets	of	rights	to	be	balanced	more	fairly	and,	if	possible,	effectively.	
	
4.6.2	Option	2	–	The	Court	weighs	–	on	a	case-by-case	basis	–	whether	to	
disclose	documents	to	third	parties		
The	 second	 option	 considered	 is	 the	 method	 that	 the	 European	 Courts	
repeatedly	 held	 was	 the	 approach	 that	 needed	 to	 be	 adopted	 –	 until	 the	
Damages	Directive	was	enacted.	Here,	national	 courts	 conduct	an	assessment	
on	a	case-by-case	basis	to	decide	whether	leniency	documents,	and	particularly	
which	 specific	 parts	 should	 be	 disclosed	 to	 third	 parties	 to	 assist	 with	 their	
follow-on	 action.	 This	 approach	means	 that	 only	 select	 parts	 of	 the	 leniency	
documentation	is	disclosed	and	only	when	it	 is	necessary	to	do	so,	so	that	the	
claimant	can	substantiate	its	damages	action.		
	
Whilst	this	approach	allows	for	a	third	party’s	rights	to	potentially	be	protected,	
by	being	granted	access	to	the	information	they	need	to	bring	a	damages	claim,	
there	are	an	assortment	of	deficits	to	this	option.	By	operating	an	approach	that	
varies	and	allows	for	a	case-by-case	evaluation,	it	leads	to	uncertainty	for	all	the	
parties	 involved,	 because	 they	 are	unsure	 as	 to	when	 the	 information	will	 be	
disclosed.	 There	 is	 no	 clarity	 for	 either	 party	 here,	 as	 it	 will	 be	 down	 to	 the	
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court’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 case	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 third	 parties	 are	
granted	access	to	parts	of	 the	 leniency	documents.	Additionally,	 it	can	 lead	to	
arbitrary	 factors	 being	 considered	 in	 a	 given	 case	 and	 a	 patchwork	 approach	
developing	 across	 the	Member	 States	 to	 the	 disclosure	 of	 documents;	where	
some	 courts	 –	 which	 favour	 disclosure	 –	 may	 be	 more	 willing	 to	 grant	
unfettered	access	to	these	documents.	Alongside	these	concerns	this	approach	
would	also	fall	foul	of	an	undertakings	legitimate	expectation	of	non-disclosure	
of	 these	documents.	However,	 one	 could	 attempt	 to	 address	 this	 problem	by	
informing	undertakings	 clearly	 that	 the	 information	 that	 they	provide	may	be	
utilised	by	third	parties	bringing	follow	on	damage	actions.	Nonetheless,	this	is	
unlikely	 to	adequately	 incentivise	undertakings	 to	apply	 for	 leniency,	and	thus	
may	 lead	 to	 fewer	 leniency	 applications	 or	 the	 quality	 of	 information	 being	
provided	 by	 undertakings	 in	 applications	 deteriorating,	 which	 could	 have	 a	
knock-on	effect	for	cartel	enforcement	and	deterrence	within	the	EU.	The	final	
factor	 worth	 noting	 here	 is	 that	 this	 approach	 means	 that	 the	 Court	 has	 to	
review	all	of	the	leniency	documentation	to	decide	which	parts	are	relevant	to	
the	 claimant.	 This	 has	 resource	 and	 cost	 implications	 for	 the	Court	 and,	 thus,	
the	parties	involved.	
	
4.6.3	Option	3	–	The	NCA	or	Commission	decide	on	a	case-by-case	whether	to	
disclose	‘select	parts’	of	the	leniency	documentation	to	the	third	party	or	
court		
Option	 3	 addresses	 –	 in	 certain	 regards	 –	 some	 of	 the	 issues	 identified	 with	
Option	 2.	 This	 approach	 sees	 the	 NCA	 or	 Commission	 (depending	 on	 whose	
leniency	documentation	the	third	party	is	seeking	access	to)	deciding	on	a	case-
by-case	basis	whether	 to	disclose	 relevant	parts	of	 the	 leniency	application	 to	
(a)	the	third	parties	or	(b)	the	national	court.	Consequently,	this	approach	can	
be	broken	down	in	to	two	further	options	(a)	and	(b),	which	shall	each	now	be	
considered.	 By	 the	 NCA	 or	 Commission	 deciding	 whether	 to	 disclose	 the	
documents	to	third	parties	it	removes	the	issue	identified	earlier	regarding	the	
court	 having	 resource	 and	 cost	 implications	 with	 needing	 to	 examine	 the	
leniency	 documentation	 to	 decide	what	 to	 disclose.	 However,	 it	 actually	 only	
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moves	 or	 shifts	 this	 cost	 onto	 the	 NCA	 or	 the	 Commission	 as	 they	 are	 now	
required	to	conduct	this	assessment.		
	
This	 option	 would	 prevent	 the	 concerns	 raised	 about	 a	 patchwork	 approach	
occurring	 at	 the	 court	 level	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	
documents	across	 the	EU.	Unfortunately,	 this	again	only	shifts	 the	problem	to	
the	Commission	or	NCA,	meaning	that	a	unsystematic	and	piecemeal	approach	
could	still	develop	across	the	EU.	This	method	also	does	nothing	with	regards	to	
certainty	for	the	parties	involved.	Under	Option	3(a)	third	parties	may	still	gain	
access	 to	 certain	 parts	 of	 the	 leniency	 documentation	 depending	 on	whether	
the	NCA	or	Commission	decide	that	they	require	access	to	this	information	for	
their	claim.	However,	under	Option	3(b)	no	third	party	is	granted	access	to	the	
leniency	documentation	–	this	we	can	be	certain	on.	Nevertheless,	undertakings	
cannot	 still	 be	 sure	 which	 parts	 (if	 any)	 of	 their	 leniency	 application	 will	 be	
disclosed	to	the	Court.	Whilst	Option	3(b)	is	clearly	preferable	to	Option	3(a)	–	
from	an	undertakings	and	a	procedural	right	protection	point	of	view	–	it	is	still	
questionable	 what	 information,	 how	 and	 if	 the	 Commission	 and	 NCAs	 would	
disclose	the	relevant	leniency	documentation.	Indeed,	we	can	see	the	ECN	were	
so	concerned	about	 the	potential	 for	disclosure	prior	 to	 the	enactment	of	 the	
Damages	Directive	that	they	produced	a	Resolution	stating	that:135	
	
‘as	 far	 as	 possible	 under	 the	 applicable	 laws	 in	 their	
respective	 jurisdictions	 and	 without	 unduly	 restricting	 the	
right	to	civil	damages,	Competition	Authorities	take	the	joint	
position	 that	 leniency	materials	 should	be	protected	against	
disclosure	to	the	extent	necessary	to	ensure	the	effectiveness	
of	leniency	programmes’.	
	
																																																								
135	‘Resolution	of	the	Meeting	of	Heads	of	the	European	Competition	Authorities	of	23	May	
2012:	Protection	of	leniency	material	in	the	context	of	civil	damages	actions’	
<ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/leniency_material_protection_en.pdf>	Accessed	13	June	2012.	
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Because	of	this	we	can	deduce	that	Option	3	(a)	and	(b)	would	be	unlikely	to	be	
workable	in	practice.	Accordingly,	Option	4	warrants	examination.	
	
4.6.4	Option	4	–	The	Court	has	access	to	all	of	the	leniency	documentation	but	
does	not	disclose	the	information	to	third	parties	
Option	 4	 sees	 the	 national	 court	 being	 given	 access	 to	 all	 of	 the	 leniency	
documentation	 from	 the	 Commission	 or	 the	 NCA	 so	 it	 can	 utilise	 this	 in	 its	
assessment	of	the	damages	action	(and	if	need	be	the	calculation	of	damages	to	
be	 awarded).	 This	means	 that	 leniency	documentation	 is	 not	 disclosed	 to	 the	
third	parties,	thus	protecting	the	leniency	applicant’s	rights.	Consequently,	this	
approach	 appears	 to	 offer	 the	 best	 balance	 between	 the	 protections	 of	 both	
parties’	 rights.	 The	 courts	 gain	 access	 to	 the	 information	 they	 need	 to	
effectively	assess	the	damages	claim	–	meaning	that	the	affected	third	party	can	
receive	 compensation	 for	 the	 harm	 suffered	 by	 the	 cartel	 –	 and	 the	 leniency	
applicant	does	not	have	its	confidential	business	information	disclosed	to	third	
parties.	 Whilst	 of	 course,	 the	 leniency	 applicant	 would	 wish	 to	 minimise	 its	
exposure	 to	damage	actions,	 this	 approach	does	 at	 least	offer	 the	assurances	
that	 confidential	 information	 will	 not	 be	 disclosed	 to	 third	 parties	 and	 the	
general	public	at	 large.	But,	 if	 the	undertaking	were	 that	concerned	regarding	
potential	damage	actions	and	competition	law	infringements,	it	would	not	have	
decided	to	breach	Article	101(1)	TFEU	in	the	first	instance.	
	
There	are,	however,	potential	issues	with	adopting	this	approach.	For	example,	
there	will	be	a	lack	of	clarity	(for	all	parties	in	the	case)	as	to	how	the	damages	
restitution	 was	 calculated.	 Indeed,	 as	 information	 is	 not	 disclosed	 to	 either	
party	they	will	have	no	clear	way	of	 identifying	how	or	why	the	court	decided	
the	way	it	did.	This	is	because	parts	of	the	information	that	the	judge	may	have	
based	their	decision	on	may	have	came	from	leniency	documentation	which	is	
not	to	be	disclosed	to	third	parties.	This	could	lead	to	either	parties	wishing	to	
challenge	 the	 amount	 awarded	 due	 to	 uncertainty,	 unfairness	 and	 or	 lack	 of	
transparency.	In	a	similar	vein,	if	the	claimant	feels	that	the	damages	awarded	
do	not	sufficiently	reflect	the	harm	caused	to	them	by	the	cartel	they	may	seek	
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to	have	the	damages	reviewed	and	increased	by	an	appeals	court.	Both	of	these	
have	 negative	 connotations	 for	 the	 enforcement	 of	 competition	 law.	
Nonetheless,	certainty	is	achieved	for	both	parties	as	they	know	the	documents	
will	 only	 be	 disclosed	 to	 the	 court	 and	 used	 in	 its	 analysis	 of	 the	 damages	
actions	and	that	no	information	will	be	given	to	third	parties.	
	
This	 option	 may	 also	 have	 the	 effect	 of	 dissuading	 potential	 future	 leniency	
applications	 because	 the	 information	 the	 applicant	 provides	 could	 then	 be	
utilised	 by	 judges	 in	 calculating	 a	 damages	 action	 against	 them.	 However,	 an	
undertaking	 that	 has	 been	 involved	 in	 a	 cartel	 will	 still	 have	 a	 significant	
incentive	to	seek	leniency,	as	if	the	cartel	is	detected	and	the	undertaking	does	
not	 receive	 complete	 (or	 partial	 immunity)	 from	 the	 Commission’s	 fines	 the	
resulting	 costs	 are	 likely	 to	be	 significantly	higher	 than	any	 follow-on	damage	
actions.136	Nonetheless,	it	is	difficult	to	discern	if	the	risk	of	detection	will	still	be	
sufficient	 to	 ensure	 that	 undertakings	 in	 the	 first	 instance	 will	 continue	 to	
report	 cartels.	 This	 approach	 does	 offer	 protection	 to	 a	 leniency	 applicant’s	
confidential	 business	 information.	 In	 addition,	 by	 allowing	 effective	 follow-on	
damage	 actions	 to	 be	 brought	 by	 third	 parties	 there	 could	 be	 an	 increase	 in	
deterrence,	as	an	undertaking	will	now	need	to	include	in	its	‘costing	analysis’	–	
of	joining	a	cartel	–	the	potential	expense	of	follow-on	actions	(which	could	be	
brought	more	 easily	 because	 of	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	 documents	 to	 the	
court).	
	
A	further	concern	one	may	raise	in	regards	to	this	is	approach	is	that	the	quality	
of	the	information	gained	through	the	Commission’s	 leniency	programme	may	
deteriorate.	This	 is	because	leniency	applicants	may	seek	to	limit	the	potential	
cost	of	follow-on	actions	by	providing	the	least	amount	of	information	required	
to	 qualify	 for	 immunity.	 However,	 this	 potential	 concern	 could	 be	 seen	 as	
somewhat	 unjustified.	 The	 Commission’s	 leniency	 programme	 places	
reasonably	strict	requirements	on	what	undertakings	are	mandated	to	provide																																																									
136	So	far,	follow-on	damage	actions	have	fallen	significantly	short	of	the	‘costs’	of	the	fines	
imposed	by	the	Commission	through	public	enforcement.	
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to	 the	 Commission	 in	 order	 to	 quality	 for	 immunity.	 In	 addition,	 if	 the	
Commission	 were	 to	 feel	 (or	 identify)	 that	 an	 undertaking	 was	 not	 fully	
cooperating,	 then	 they	 do	 not	 need	 to	 offer	 the	 undertaking	 partial	 (or	
complete)	 immunity,	 as	 they	would	be	 in	breach	of	 their	 requirements	under	
the	leniency	programme.137	
	
Even	 with	 the	 potential	 aforementioned	 concerns	 regarding	 Option	 4,	 this	
approach	seems	superior	to	the	current	approach.	Whilst	there	are	benefits	to	
adopting	the	current	approach	–	of	placing	a	blanket	ban	on	the	disclosure	of	
leniency	documents	in	all	contexts	–	it	appears,	to	the	author	of	this	thesis,	that	
Option	4	is	a	‘fairer	way’	to	balance	the	rights	of	undertakings	and	third	parties	
seeking	 to	 bring	 damage	 claims.	 Option	 4	 allows	 an	 undertaking	 to	 have	 its	
rights	protected	–	as	documentation	would	not	be	disclosed	to	third	parties	–	
and,	third	parties	would	have	their	rights	protected,	as	they	would	still	be	able	
to	bring	effective	damage	claims.	Undertakings	–	would	of	course	–	prefer	the	
current	 approach	where	 the	 leniency	 documentation	 is	 not	 disclosed	 to	 third	
parties	or	 courts	 so	 it	 cannot	be	utilised	 in	 the	calculation	of	damage	actions.	
Except,	 this	 does	 not	 balance	 the	 leniency	 applicant’s	 and	 the	 cartel	 victim’s	
rights	 effectively	 or	 fairly.	 This	 Chapter	 therefore	 recommends	 that	 the	
Damages	 Directive	 be	 altered	 to	 include	 this	 change.	 In	 addition,	 the	
Commission	should	amend	its	Guidelines	and	documentation	to	recognise	that	
disclosure	 can	 occur	 to	 Courts	 to	 allow	 for	 damage	 actions	 to	 be	 brought	 by	
third	parties.	Nonetheless,	it	should	be	reiterated	throughout	the	Commission’s	
documentation	that	this	information	will	never	be	disclosed	to	third	parties	and	
that	confidential	business	information	will	remain	undisclosed	to	third	parties.	
	 	
																																																								
137	Commission	Notice	(n	2)	12	(a).	
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4.7	Conclusion	
	
The	 Leniency	 Notice	 is	 an	 important	 weapon	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 arsenal	
against	 cartels.	However,	with	 the	 recent	developments	 in	European	case	 law	
on	follow-on	damage	actions	concerns	were	raised	from	various	sides	about	the	
potential	 effects	 that	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	 documents	 could	 have	 on	 the	
Commission’s	main	 tool	 against	 cartels.	 Consequently,	we	 saw	 that	 a	 delicate	
balancing	 act	 is	 required	 between	 the	 protection	 of	 public	 enforcement	 of	
competition	 law,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 private	 enforcement,	 on	 the	 other.	
However,	 because	 of	 the	 various	 concerns	 to	 the	 public	 enforcement	 of	
competition	 law,	the	Damages	Directive	provided	for	the	complete	blanket	on	
the	disclosure	of	 leniency	documents.	Whilst	 this	may	protect	 the	benefits	 of	
the	 Commission’s	 leniency	 programme,	 this	 chapter	 has	 sought	 to	 identify	
whether	allowing	disclosure	 could	have	 led	 to	 (i)	 a	breach	of	 an	undertakings	
rights	and,	(ii)	whether	a	better	balance	can	be	had	between	the	protection	of	
the	 rights	 of	 the	 leniency	 applicant	 and	 the	 cartel	 victims	 wishing	 to	 bring	 a	
follow-on	damages	claim	than	the	current	approach.	The	chapter	achieved	this	
analysis	by	investigating	three	possible	rights	challenges.		
	
The	 first	 of	 these	 was	 the	 potential	 breach	 of	 an	 undertakings	 legitimate	
expectation.	 It	was	identified	that	 if	the	Commission’s	 leniency	documents	are	
disclosed	this	could	 lead	to	a	breach	of	an	undertakings	legitimate	expectation	
of	 non-disclosure	 (because	 of	 the	 various	 assurances	 given	 throughout	 the	
Commission’s	 documentation).	 However,	 it	 was	 not	 clear	 whether	 in	 these	
circumstances	 the	 court	 would	 allow	 the	 overriding	 of	 the	 frustration	 of	 the	
legitimate	expectation	because	of	the	potential	public	interest	defence	–	which	
is	wide	and	could	allow	 for	disclosure	–	 so	as	 to	permit	 for	 the	 rights	of	 third	
parties	to	be	adequately	protected.	
	
Next,	 the	 possible	Article	 8	 challenge	 that	 an	 undertaking	 could	 bring	 against	
disclosure	 was	 assessed.	 The	 five	 stages	 of	 the	 standard	 approach	 were	
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considered	and	 led	 to	 two	possible	conclusions:	 (1)	 that	 it	 is	possible	 that	 the	
ECtHR	would	hold	that	there	is	no	breach	of	Article	8	because	the	disclosure	of	
the	 documents	 is	 achieved	 proportionally	 owing	 to	 the	 case-by-case	
consideration	of	disclosure;	 (2)	 that	 there	 is	a	breach	of	Article	8	as	 there	 is	a	
less	restrictive	way	to	pursue	the	follow-on	damage	actions	–	by	disclosing	the	
documents	only	to	the	courts	and	not	the	third	parties.	This	achieves	the	aim	of	
enabling	 third	parties	 to	be	able	 to	bring	 follow-on	damage	actions,	 and	 is	 as	
equally	 effective	 as	 the	 current	 approach,	 but	 it	 protects	 both	 sets	 of	 rights	
more	effectively.	
	
The	final	potential	challenge	analysed	was	that	of	a	breach	of	confidence.	Here	
we	saw	that	a	duty	of	confidentially	could	arise,	but	that	an	undertaking	could	
not	rely	on	this	for	two	reasons.	First,	the	challenge	would	fail	at	the	third	stage	
of	 the	Coco	 test.138	Second,	 the	 leniency	 applicant	 does	 not	 come	with	 ‘clean	
hands’	before	the	court.	
	
From	the	analysis	of	these	three	possible	challenges	we	can	ascertain	that	there	
are	 potential	 rights	 arguments	 an	 undertaking	 could	 make	 and,	 thus,	 the	
Damages	 Directive	 is	 correct	 in	 seeking	 to	 protect	 the	 leniency	 applicant’s	
rights.	However,	this	blanket	ban	means	that	a	cartel	victim	finds	it	much	harder	
to	 be	 able	 to	 bring	 a	 follow	 on-damages	 claim.	 Consequently,	 this	 chapter	
assessed	whether	there	was	a	better	and	fairer	way	to	balance	these	two	sets	of	
competing	rights.	It	was	identified	that	there	is	indeed	a	superior	and	fairer	way	
to	balance	these	rights.	By	granting	only	courts	access	to	leniency	documents	–	
to	be	utilised	in	the	proving	and	calculation	of	cartel	damage	actions	–	it	allows	
for	 the	 fairer	and	more	balanced	protection	of	both	 sets	of	 rights.	Whilst	 this	
approach	balances	 rights	more	 fairly	 it	 should	also	prevent	a	drop	 in	 leniency	
applications,	 because	 undertakings	 will	 still	 be	 encouraged	 to	 apply	 for	
immunity	–	so	as	to	avoid	higher	fines	from	the	Commission	and,	because	the	
																																																								
138	Coco	(n	112).	
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confidential	 information	 is	 not	 disclosed	 to	 third	 parties,	 there	 are	 no	 rights	
concerns	or	fears	that	confidential	business	information	is	released.		
	
This	 chapter	advocates	 that	 the	Damages	Directive	 is	 amended	accordingly	 to	
allow	 for	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	 documents	 to	 the	 courts	 in	 follow-on	
damage	 claims.	 This	will	 enable	 effective	 private	 enforcement	 of	 competition	
law,	 whilst	 still	 protecting	 the	 crucial	 and	 fundamental	 role	 of	 the	 public	
enforcement	of	competition	law.	
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Chapter	5:	What	can	the	European	
Commission’s	Direct	Settlement	
Procedure	learn	from	the	US	Plea	
Bargaining	System?1	
	
5.1	Introduction	
	
Since	 2008,	 the	 European	 Commission	 (hereafter,	 ‘the	 Commission’)	 has	
operated	 a	 direct	 settlement	 procedure	 for	 cases	 involving	 cartels. 2 	This	
procedure	 may	 be	 utilised	 when	 parties	 to	 the	 proceedings	 are	 prepared	 to	
acknowledge	their	participation	in	a	cartel	and	their	liability	for	an	infringement	
of	Article	101	of	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	(TFEU).3	
In	exchange,	 the	undertaking	benefits	 from	a	 ten	percent	 reduction	 in	 its	 fine	
and	an	expedited	and	simplified	procedure.4		
	
The	 settlement	procedure	was	 implemented	 to	 allow	 the	Commission	 to	deal	
with	cartel	cases	more	efficiently	and	so	its	finite	resources	could	be	used	more	
effectively.5	Indeed,	given	the	current	financial	climate	it	has	been	seen	as	a	key	
concern	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 limited	 resources	 are	 utilised	 in	 the	 most	
effective	ways	possible.	To	bring	about	these	efficiency	gains,	the	Commission’s	
settlement	procedure	is	different	in	various	ways	to	the	standard	procedure	for	
the	adoption	of	an	infringement	decision.	For	example,	in	settlement	decisions																																																									
1	Chapter	5	was	presented	at	the	7th	Annual	Law	Research	Colloquium	in	Norwich	on	the	7th	May	
2015,	the	CCP	Research	Seminar	Series	in	Norwich	on	the	22nd	May	2015,	the	9th	CLEEN	
Workshop	in	Tilburg	on	the	29th	May	2015	and	the	CCP	New	Researchers	Workshop	in	Norwich	
on	the	17th	June	2015.	The	feedback	and	comments	from	the	attendees	of	these	events	was	
greatly	appreciated.	
2	30th	June	2008.	Please	see:	<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-
1056_en.htm?locale=en>	accessed	21	March	2014.	
3	European	Commission,	Commission	Notice	on	the	conduct	of	settlement	procedures	in	view	of	
the	adoption	of	Decisions	pursuant	to	Article	7	and	Article	23	of	Council	Regulation	(EC)	No	
1/2003	in	cartel	cases	(Text	with	EEA	relevance),	Official	Journal	C	167,	2	July	2008,	para	[2].	
4	ibid	para	[32].	
5	ibid	para	[1].	
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the	 Commission	 issues	 a	 shorter	 streamlined	 Statement	 of	 Objections	 to	 the	
parties,	 gives	 a	 shorter	 final	 decision,	 and	 offers	 undertakings	 only	 restricted	
access	to	the	file.		
	
Nevertheless,	 the	 uptake	 and	 use	 of	 the	 EU	 direct	 settlement	 procedure	 has	
been	slow.	As	of	March	2015,	the	procedure	had	been	in	place	seven	years	yet	
the	Commission	had	concluded	a	mere	seventeen	cartel	cases	under	it.6	In	stark	
contrast,	 the	 US	 operates	 a	 highly	 developed,	 effective	 and	 efficient	 plea	
bargaining	 system,7	which	 leads	 to	 over	 ninety	 percent	 of	 cartel	 cases	 being	
concluded	via	plea	bargains.8		
	
The	EU	settlement	procedure	has	a	variety	of	procedural	differences	to	that	of	
the	US	plea	bargaining	system.	For	example,	the	EU	system	is	not	designed	to	
be	 a	 bargaining	 system	 but,9	rather,	 one	 that	 operates	 a	 fixed	 ten	 percent	
reduction	in	fine	for	cooperation.10	The	various	differences	between	the	EU	and	
US	 approaches	may	 account	 for	 the	 disparities	 in	 efficiency	 and	 effectiveness	
between	 the	 two	 systems.11	In	 light	 of	 this,	 this	 chapter	 seeks	 to	 answer	 the	
question	of	what	the	EU	direct	settlement	procedure	can	 learn	from	the	well-
established	US	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 to	 help	 improve	 its	 utilisation,	 success	
and	 efficiency.	 In	 undertaking	 this	 analysis,	 the	 chapter	 will	 ensure	 that	 the	
rights	enshrined	within	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	(ECHR)	are																																																									
6	However,	it	should	be	noted	that	there	has	been	a	significant	increase	of	settlements	with	the	
Commission	recently	from	six	(between	2008	–	2013)	to	eleven	from	(2013	–	December	2014).	
7	See	<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/302601.pdf>	accessed	21	March	2014.	
8	Scott	Hammond,	‘“The	U.S.	Model	of	Negotiated	Plea	Agreements:	A	Good	Deal	with	Benefits	
for	all”’	(Speech	delivered	to	OECD	Competition	Committee	Working	Party	No.	3,	Paris,	France	
October	17	2006)	1.	
9	Indeed,	this	is	something	the	Commission	has	strongly	argued	will	not	happen.	For	example,	in	
its	press	release,	‘Antitrust:	Commission	introduces	settlement	procedure	for	cartels’	it	stated	
that	‘the	Commission	neither	negotiates	nor	bargains	the	use	of	evidence	or	the	appropriate	
sanction’	<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-1056_en.htm?locale=en>	accessed	2	
March	2015.	
10	See,	Maarten	Pieter	Schinkel,	‘Bargaining	in	the	Shadow	of	the	European	Settlement	
Procedure	for	Cartels’	(2011)	56(2)	The	Antitrust	Bulletin	461.	
11	Although	it	should	be	noted	that	this	is	not	a	view	held	by	all,	some	feel	that	the	EU	
settlement	procedure	is	working	effectively.	For	example,	Laina	and	Bogdanov	claim	that	the	
procedure	is	now	a	‘well-oiled	instrument’.	Flavio	Laina	and	Aleko	Bogdanov,	‘The	EU	Cartel	
Settlement	Procedure:	Latest	Developments’	(2014)	5(10)	Journal	of	European	Competition	Law	
&	Practice	717.	
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complied	with,	particularly	Article	6	–	the	right	to	a	fair	trial.	Indeed,	this	is	one	
of	 the	 areas	 which	 differentiates	 this	 chapter	 and	 makes	 it	 unique	 from	 the	
previous	 research	 into	 the	Commission’s	 direct	 settlement	procedure	 and	 the	
Department	 of	 Justice’s	 (hereafter,	 ‘the	 DOJ’)	 plea	 bargaining	 system.	 The	
chapter	 will	 also	 take	 this	 unique	 opportunity	 to	 consider	 the	 potential	 of	
implementing	 a	US-style	 plea	 bargaining	 system	within	 the	 EU	 for	Article	 101	
TFEU	cases.	
	
Research	 has	 been	 conducted	 generally	 in	 to	 the	 EU	 settlement	 procedure,12	
and	 the	 US	 plea	 bargaining	 system,13	however,	 there	 is	 little	 literature	 that	
compares	 the	 two	 or	 considers	 the	 potential	 rights	 implications	 of	
implementing	a	plea	bargaining	system.14	Nonetheless,	there	is	some	literature																																																									
12	For	example,	see	Mag.	Marie-Therese	Richter,	‘The	Settlement	procedure	in	the	context	of	
the	enforcement	tools	of	European	competition	law	–	a	comparison	and	impact	analysis’	(2012)	
33(11)	ECLR	537;	Anne	Tercinet,	‘Competition	policies:	Contributions	to	the	Commission	
consultation	on	the	draft	settlement	procedure	in	cartel	cases’	(2008)	3	International	Business	
Law	Journal	365;	Aurora	Ascione	and	Massimo	Motta,	‘Settlements	in	Cartel	Cases’	(2008)	
MPRA	paper	24416;	Molly	Kelley,	‘Settling	for	Settlement:	The	European	Commission’s	New	
Cartel	Settlement	Procedure’	(2010)	9(4)	Washington	University	Global	Studies	Law	Review	699;	
Maarten	Pieter	Schinkel,	‘Bargaining	in	the	shadow	of	the	European	settlement	procedure	for	
cartels’	(2011)	56(2)	The	Antitrust	Bulletin	461;	Jochen	Burrichter	and	Daniel	Zimmer,	
‘Reflections	on	the	Implementation	of	a	Plea	Bargaining/Direct	Settlement-System	in	EC	
Competition	Law’	(2006)	EU	Competition	Law	and	Policy	Workshop/Proceedings	2006;	and,	
Julian	Joshua,	‘Settlements	urged	to	ease	cartel	case	clog’	(2007)	65	European	Lawyer	10.	
13	For	example,	Scott	Hammond,	‘“The	U.S.	Model	of	Negotiated	Plea	Agreements:	A	Good	Deal	
with	Benefits	for	all”’	(2006)	OECD	Competition	Committee	Working	Party	No.	3,	Paris	France	
October	17	2006;	Andreas	Reindl,	‘The	Legal	Framework	Governing	Negotiated	
Settlements/Plea	Agreements	in	Cartel	Cases	in	the	United	States’	(2008)	13th	Annual	
Competition	Law	and	Policy	Workshop	Florence	6-7	June	2008;	Shivani	Pal,	‘Issues	and	
Controversies	Surrounding	the	Use	of	Plea	Bargaining	in	International	Criminal	Tribunals’	(2013)	
PhD	Thesis;	Pieter	Kalbfleisch,	‘The	Dutch	Experience	with	Plea-bargaining/Direct	Settlements’	
(2008)	Speech	delivered	at	the	13th	Annual	Competition	Law	and	Policy	Workshop	Florence	6-7	
June	2008;	and,	Michael	O'Kane	and	Jasvinder	Nakhwal,	'The	Plea	that	crossed	the	sea'	(2008)	
77	The	European	Lawyer	12.	
14	With	regards	to	the	plea	bargaining	procedure	in	the	US,	Lynch	and	Wan	have	conducted	
separate	analyses	into	some	of	the	procedural	concerns	that	may	arise	from	having	a	plea	
bargaining	system.	Timothy	Lynch,	‘The	case	against	Plea	Bargaining’	(2003)	Regulation	Fall	
2003	24	and	Tina	Wan,	‘The	unnecessary	evil	of	plea	bargaining:	An	unconstitutional	conditions	
problem	and	a	not-so-least	restrictive	alternative’	(2007)	17(1)	Review	of	Law	and	Social	Justice	
33,	40.	In	the	context	of	the	EU	settlement	procedure	and	with	regards	to	discussing	procedural	
rights	there	has	been	little	written.	Scordamaglia	conducted	a	critical	assessment	of	the	
procedure	considering	the	legal	certainty	issues:	Andreas	Scordamaglia,	‘The	new	Commission	
settlement	procedure	for	cartels:	A	critical	assessment’	(2009)	2	Global	Antitrust	Review	61.	
Zingales	has	discussed	the	role	the	hearing	officer	plays	generally	within	cartel	proceedings:	
Nicolo	Zingales,	‘The	Hearing	Officer	in	EU	Competition	Law	Proceedings:	Ensuring	Full	Respect	
for	the	Right	to	Be	Heard?’	(2010)	7(1)	CompLRev	129.	However,	Lawrence,	O’Kane,	Rab	and	
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where	comparisons	have	been	made	between	the	EU	settlement	procedure	and	
the	 US	 plea	 bargaining	 system.	 Macchi	 di	 Cellere	 and	 Mezzapesa	 have	
conducted	 a	 broad	 comparison	 between	 the	 two	 systems,	 just	 after	 the	
settlement	 procedure	 was	 implemented	 in	 the	 EU.15	At	 this	 time	 there	 was	
limited	 information	 on	 how	 the	 EU	 procedure	would	 operate	 in	 practice	 and	
crucially,	there	had	been	no	settlements.	But,	Macchi	di	Cellere	and	Mezzapesa	
focused	their	discussion	around	four	key	areas	that	they	felt	are	important	for	
settlement	procedures	to	be	successful:	transparency,	certainty,	confidentiality	
and	the	awarding	of	reductions.	O’Brien	has	examined	some	of	the	similarities	
and	differences	between	the	EU	and	US	settlement	procedures.16	O’Brien	noted	
that	there	were	a	variety	of	similarities	between	the	two	programmes	as	well	as	
some	stark	differences.	Again,	this	discussion	was	had	at	the	very	early	stages	of	
the	 Commission’s	 settlement	 procedure	 –	 prior	 to	 any	 cases	 having	 being	
settled	 under	 it.	 Moreover,	 there	 was	 a	 lack	 of	 discussion	 as	 to	 how	 each	
procedure	 maybe	 improved.	 Finally,	 Stephan	 has	 conducted	 a	 comparative	
analysis	 between	 the	 two	 systems	 to	 identify	 how	 they	 fare	 at	 enhancing	
efficiency	and	deterrence,	whilst	also	maintaining	transparency.17	He	notes	that	
the	 two	systems	are	different	 in	a	variety	of	 regards,	but	 that	 in	a	number	of	
respects	 the	 US	 settlement	 system	 achieves	 greater	 gains	 with	 regards	 to	
administrative	efficiency.18		
	
Research	 has	 also	 been	 conducted	 to	 examine	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	
Commission’s	current	settlement	procedure	by	considering	the	cases	that	have	
																																																																																																																																																						
Nakhwal	considered	whether	a	US	plea	bargaining	system	could	offer	something	in	UK	criminal	
cartel	offences.	They	felt	that	it	could	offer	the	OFT	the	opportunity	to	be	‘imaginative	in	
negotiating	the	outcome	of	criminal	prosecutions,’	alongside	other	efficiency	benefits.	Jon	
Lawrence,	Michael	O’Kane,	Suzanne	Rab	and	Jasvinder	Nakhwal,	‘Hardcore	bargains:	What	
could	plea	bargaining	offer	in	UK	criminal	cartel	cases?’	(2008)	Comp	Law	17,	42.	
15	Stefano	Macchi	di	Cellere	and	Gluseppe	Mezzapesa,	‘The	Commission’s	settlement	package:	
EU-US	comparison’	(2009)	30(12)	ECLR	604.		
16	Ann	O’Brien,	‘“Cartel	Settlements	in	the	U.S.	and	EU:	Similarities,	Differences	&	Remaining	
Questions”’	(2008)	Antitrust	Division	of	the	Department	of	Justice	–	13th	Annual	EU	Competition	
Law	and	Policy	Workshop,	Florence,	Italy	June	6	2008.	
17	Andreas	Stephan,	‘The	Direct	Settlement	of	EC	Cartel	Cases’	(2009)	58(3)	International	and	
Comparative	Law	Quarterly	627.	
18	ibid	Stephan	[653].	
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been	settled	thus	far	by	the	Commission.19	The	most	notable	pieces	of	research	
regarding	 this	 are	 three	 separate	 works	 by	 Laina	 and	 Laurinen,	 Laina	 and	
Bogdanov	 and	 Dunne.	 Laina	 and	 Laurinen	 conducted	 an	 analysis	 of	 all	 the	
Commission’s	settlement	decisions	in	2013	and	claimed	that	as	the	Commission	
had	begun	settling	more	cases	it	was	building	up	a	‘solid	experience’	in	utilising	
the	 direct	 settlement	 procedure.20	They	 also	 asserted	 that	 the	 efficiencies,	
‘which	 were	 the	 aim	 of	 the	 Commission	 when	 introducing	 the	 [settlement]	
system	have	been	achieved’.21	This	work	was	 built	 upon	 and	updated	 in	 2014	
when	 Laina	 and	 Bogdanov	 conducted	 another	 assessment	 of	 the	 settlement	
procedure,	 considering	 all	 fourteen	 cases	 that	 had	 been	 settled	 by	 the	
Commission,	at	the	time.22	They	identified	that	the	procedure	was	now	a	‘well-
oiled	 instrument’,	 and	 that	 the	pace	of	 settling	 had	 accelerated	 in	 the	period	
between	2013-2014.23	Furthermore,	they	noted	that	the	system	had	produced	
procedural	 efficiencies	 by	 reducing	 the	 duration	 of	 the	 procedure	 by	 two	
years.24	However,	one	has	to	take	into	account	that	this	study	was	conducted	by	
the	 head	 of	 the	 cartel	 settlement	 unit	 at	 the	 Commission,	 and	 whether	
intentional	or	not,	this	could	bias	his	opinion	regarding	the	efficiency	gains	the	
settlement	 procedure	 is	 achieving.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 by	 the	 study	 being	
conducted	by	the	head	of	the	unit	it	allows	for	insights	that	other	researchers,	
who	are	not	involved	with	the	procedure	could	not	have.	
	
Dunne	has	considered	the	Commission’s	settlement	procedure	in	the	context	of	
the	 ‘proliferation	of	hybrid	cases’.25	She	considers	the	effects	on	the	efficiency	
of	the	programme	by	the	Commission	operating	hybrid	settlements	and	ways	of																																																									
19	For	example,	see	Sean-Paul	Brankin,	‘The	first	cases	under	the	Commission’s	cartel-settlement	
procedure:	problems	solved?’	(2011)	32(4)	ECLR	165;	Anna-Louise	Hinds,	‘All	settled?	Some	six	
years	of	cartel	settlement’	(2014)	35(6)	ECLR	292;	and,	Angela	Ortega	Gonzalez,	‘The	cartel	
settlement	procedure	in	practice’	(2011)	32(4)	ECLR	170.	
20	Flavio	Laina	and	Elina	Laurinen,	‘The	EU	Cartel	Settlement	Procedure:	Current	Status	and	
Challenges’	(2013)	4(4)	Journal	of	European	Competition	Law	&	Practice	302,	303.	
21	ibid.	
22	Flavio	Laina	and	Aleko	Bogdanov,	‘The	EU	Cartel	Settlement	Procedure:	Latest	Developments’	
(2014)	5(10)	Journal	of	European	Competition	Law	&	Practice	717.	
23	ibid.	
24	ibid.	
25	Amy	Dunne,	‘Hybrid	cases	under	the	EU	cartel	settlement	procedure:	The	individuality	in	
collective	infringement’	(2015)	6(1)	The	King’s	Student	Law	Review	38.	
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improving	 the	 current	 system	 against	 this	 backdrop.	 Dunne	 identified	 that	 in	
order	to	salvage	the	efficiency	gains	of	operating	the	procedure	the	Commission	
needs	 to	 remodel	 the	 framework	 of	 settling	 so	 as	 to	 place	 emphasis	 on	 the	
voluntariness	of	the	consensus	reached	and	individual	targeted	settlements.	
	
As	we	can	see	 from	the	 literature,	 there	has	been	a	comparison	between	 the	
two	different	settlement	systems.	However,	 these	comparisons	were	all	made	
prior	 to	 the	Commission	 settling	 any	 cases	under	 the	procedure.	Additionally,	
there	has	been	no	analysis	of	what	the	EU	procedure	could	learn	or	take	from	
the	US	experience,	or	whether	a	US-style	settlement	system	could	be	beneficial	
for	 the	 EU.	 There	 has	 been	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 efficiencies	 of	 the	 current	
systems,	but	not	whilst	considering	all	of	the	cases	that	have	been	settled	or	in	
the	context	of	potential	improvements.	These	are	all	issues	that	this	chapter	will	
address.		
	
To	effectively	address	these	gaps	within	the	literature	the	chapter	is	structured	
as	 follows.	 First,	 it	 begins	 by	 outlining	 the	 current	 EU	 and	 US	 settlement	
procedures	so	that	the	differences	between	the	two	procedures	and	areas	for	
improvement	 can	 be	 identified.	 Then,	 the	 seventeen	 cases	 that	 have	 been	
settled	thus	far	by	the	Commission	are	examined	to	allow	for	the	identification	
of	any	trends	and	patterns	that	have	occurred	regarding	procedural	issues	and	
potential	areas	for	improvements.	Next,	the	chapter	moves	on	to	consider	the	
question	 of	 whether	 plea	 bargaining	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	 ECHR	 and	
particularly	 Article	 6.	 The	 chapter	 conducts	 this	 assessment	 by	 considering	
various	 decisions	 by	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (hereafter,	 ‘the	
ECtHR’)	 involving	 the	 right	 to	 a	 fair	 trial.	 Whilst	 this	 analysis	 ensues,	 the	
procedural	concerns	and	benefits	of	plea	bargaining	will	be	addressed	through	a	
discussion	 of	 the	 facts	 and	 decision	 in	 the	 Natsvlishvili	 and	 Togonidze	
judgment.26		
	
																																																								
26	Natsvlishvili	and	Togonidze	v	Georgia	App	no	9043/05	(ECtHR,	29	April	2014).	
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Once	this	analysis	has	been	completed	and	it	is	established	that	plea	bargaining	
is	compatible	with	the	ECHR,	a	discussion	is	then	had	regarding	the	possibility	of	
implementing	 such	 a	 system	 within	 the	 EU	 to	 help	 improve	 the	 procedural	
efficiency	 and	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 settlement	 procedure.	 This	 part	 of	 the	
chapter	 will	 have	 wider	 implications	 than	 just	 for	 the	 Commission’s	 direct	
settlement	 procedure,	 as	 it	 will	 identify	 the	 necessary	 requirements	 that	 a	
signatory	party	to	the	ECHR	will	need	to	ensure	are	met	to	implement	or	utilise	
a	plea	bargaining	 system	 that	 remains	 compatible	with	Article	 6	of	 the	ECHR.	
After	 this	 assessment	 is	 completed	 other	 potential	 amendments	 to	 the	 EU	
settlement	 procedure	 will	 be	 considered.	 Finally,	 the	 chapter	 concludes	 by	
identifying	 the	 most	 effective	 and	 efficient	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 EU	 direct	
settlement	 procedure’s	 efficiency	 and	 utilisation	 can	 be	 improved	 whilst	
remaining	compatible	with	the	ECHR.		
	
The	chapter	will	identify	that	there	are	two	key	areas	in	which	the	Commission’s	
settlement	programme	currently	has	procedural	shortcomings,	 (a)	the	amount	
of	time	 it	takes	for	a	case	to	be	settled	and	(b)	the	fact	that	various	cases	are	
having	to	proceed	as	hybrid	ones.	It	also	identifies	that	the	EU	could	implement	
a	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 but	 that	 it	 would	 require	 a	 radical	 overhauling	 of	
procedures.	Owing	to	this,	there	are	four	recommendations	made	that	could	be	
implemented	 to	 the	 current	 settlement	 procedure	 which	 could	 lead	 to	
efficiency	gains	that	would	not	require	a	radical	overhaul.	
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5.2	A	plea	bargaining	system	within	the	EU?	
	
Before	 we	 can	 begin	 identifying	 ways	 of	 improving	 the	 EU	 direct	 settlement	
procedure	it	is	necessary	for	us	to	understand	how	the	current	procedure	works	
in	practice.	Consequently,	this	section	shall	outline	how	the	Commission’s	direct	
settlement	 procedure	 operates	 in	 its	 current	 guise.	 Then,	 the	 DOJ’s	 plea	
bargaining	 procedure	 will	 be	 outlined	 so	 we	 can	 identify	 how	 the	 two	
programmes	differ.	Next,	 the	cases	that	have	been	settled	by	the	Commission	
shall	be	explored	to	identify	any	reoccurring	issues	with	the	current	procedure	
and	areas	where	efficiency	gains	can	be	made.	Finally,	the	analysis	will	conclude	
by	discussing	 the	plausibility	of	 a	plea	bargaining	 system	operating	within	 the	
EU	whilst	remaining	compliant	with	Article	6	of	the	ECHR.	
	
5.2.1	The	EU	Direct	Settlement	Procedure	and	US	Plea	Bargaining	Process		
Prior	 to	 identifying	 how	 the	 EU	 settlement	 procedure	 and	US	plea	 bargaining	
systems	operate	there	are	a	couple	of	matters	that	need	to	be	discussed.	The	
first	 of	 these	 concerns	 commitment	 decisions.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 this	
chapter	will	only	consider	the	Commission	and	DOJs’	settlement	procedures.	It	
will	 not	 reflect	 upon	 commitment	 decisions.	 It	 is	 important	 however	 that	we	
identify	 the	 differences	 between	 commitment	 decisions	 and	 settlement	
decisions	 to	 clarify	 why	 these	 are	 not	 discussed.	 Commitment	 decisions	 fall	
under	 Article	 9	 of	 Regulation	 1/2003, 27 	and	 allow	 undertakings	 to	 offer	
commitments	 to	 address	 competition	 concerns	 that	 the	 Commission	 has	
identified.	 They	 do	 not	 result	 in	 a	 finding	 of	 infringement	 nor	 a	 fine	 being	
imposed	 on	 the	 undertakings.	 These	 are	 therefore	 significantly	 different	 to	
settlement	decisions	and	are	entirely	inappropriate	for	consideration	in	cases	of	
hard-core	cartel	agreements.		
	
The	second	matter	regards	distinguishing	the	EU	settlement	procedure	from	the	
Commission’s	leniency	policy,	and	in	a	similar	vein,	the	US	amnesty	programme																																																									
27	Council	Regulation	(EC)	No	1/2003	of	16	December	2002	on	the	Implementation	of	the	Rules	on	
Competition	laid	down	in	Articles	81	and	82	of	the	Treaty,	(2003)	OJ	L1/1.	
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to	the	DOJ’s	plea	bargaining	procedure.	The	EU	leniency	programme	and	direct	
settlement	 procedure	 are	 tools	 which	 serve	 very	 different	 purposes.	 The	
leniency	 programme	 is	 designed	 to	 be	 an	 investigative	 tool	 to	 help	 assist	 the	
Commission	 in	 detecting	 and	 uncovering	 cartels.28	Here	 undertakings	 disclose	
the	 existence	 of	 a	 cartel	 to	 the	 Commission	 by	 bringing	 evidence	 to	 the	
Commission.	The	reduction	in	fine	that	an	undertaking	receives	varies	based	on	
the	value	of	the	information	and	evidence	that	they	provide	to	the	Commission	
and	when	it	is	provided.	The	settlement	procedure,	on	the	other	hand,	seeks	to	
speed	 up	 the	 procedure	 for	 adoption	 of	 cartel	 decisions.	 It	 simplifies	 and	
shortens	 the	 formal	 procedure	 to	 enable	 this	 and	 allows	 the	 Commission	 to	
invest	 resources	 in	 other	 cartel	 investigations	 and	 cases	which	 in	 turn	 should	
increase	the	deterrence	effect	of	enforcement.29	
	
The	 US	 similarly	 operates	 two	 programmes	 that	 have	 differing	 aims.	 The	
amnesty	programme	provides	immunity	to	the	first	company	to	come	forward	
and	 report	 a	 cartel.	 However,	 only	 one	 company	 can	 get	 immunity,	 all	 other	
companies	can	only	get	a	 reduction	 in	 fines	by	engaging	 in	plea	bargains	with	
the	DOJ.	 This	means	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 incentive	 for	 companies	 to	ensure	 they	
engage	 in	 negotiations	 with	 the	 DOJ.	 The	 DOJ	 operate	 a	 plea	 bargaining	
procedure	 to	 allow	 enforcement	 to	 be	 sped	 up,	 manage	 cartel	 cases	 more	
effectively	and	reduce	potential	litigation	costs.	
	
5.2.1.1.	The	EU	Direct	Settlement	Procedure		
The	EU	 settlement	procedure	 is	 laid	down	 in	 the	Commission’s	Notice	on	 the	
conduct	of	settlement	procedures	in	view	of	the	adoption	of	Decisions	pursuant	
to	Article	7	and	Article	23	of	Council	Regulation	(EC)	No	1/2003	in	cartel	cases.30	
The	procedure	of	settling	can	only	begin	after	the	Commission	has	conducted	a	
full	 investigation	 into	 the	 cartel	 (as	 it	 would	 normally	 do	 in	 the	 ‘standard’																																																									
28	Commission,	‘Commission	Notice	on	Immunity	from	fines	and	reduction	of	fines	in	cartel	cases	
(Leniency	in	cartel	cases)’	[2006]	OJ	C298/17.	
29	Commission,	‘Settlements’	
<ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/legislation/cartels_settlements/settlements_en.html>	
accessed	15	February	2015.	
30	(Text	with	EEA	relevance),	Official	Journal	C	167,	2	July	2008.	
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procedure).	This	investigation	can	be	triggered	by	the	regular	methods,	such	as	
market	 investigations	 or	 leniency	 applications.	 The	 Commission	 then	 assesses	
whether	 this	 infringement	 is	 suitable	 for	 settlement.	 When	 making	 this	
assessment	 the	 Commission	 considers	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 criteria,	 such	 as,	 the	
probability	 of	 reaching	 a	 common	 understanding	 regarding	 the	 scope	 of	
potential	objections	within	a	reasonable	timeframe.31	It	is	worth	noting	that	an	
undertaking	 has	 no	 automatic	 right	 to	 settle	 with	 the	 Commission.32	This	
decision	 rests	 entirely	 with	 the	 Commission	 and	 indeed	 it	 should.33 	The	
Commission	 then	 sends	 letters	 to	 undertakings	 informing	 them	 that	 they	 are	
considering	 settlement	 and	 that	 undertakings	 may	 express	 their	 interest	 in	
settling	with	the	Commission.	The	Commission	will	set	a	period	of	no	less	than	
two	weeks	for	undertakings	to	respond	to	declare	whether	they	wish	to	engage	
in	settlement	discussions.34		
	
Then	 settlement	 discussions	 begin	 between	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	
undertakings.	 The	 Commission	 determines	 the	 order	 and	 sequences	 of	 the	
bilateral	agreements	and	when	to	disclose	information	that	 is	 in	the	file,35	and	
upon	request	by	a	party,	 the	Commission	will	grant	 the	undertaking	access	 to	
non-confidential	versions	of	any	specified	accessible	document	listed	in	the	case	
file. 36 	Once	 the	 parties	 and	 the	 Commission	 have	 reached	 a	 ‘common	
understanding’	 regarding	the	scope	of	potential	objections	and	the	estimation	
of	 the	 range	 of	 likely	 fines	 to	 be	 imposed	 on	 the	 undertaking	 –	 and	 the	
Commission	 takes	 the	 view	 that	 the	 procedural	 efficiencies	 are	 likely	 to	 be	
achieved	 –	 the	 Commission	 can	 grant	 a	 final	 time-limit	 of	 at	 least	 fifteen	
working	 days	 for	 an	 undertaking	 to	 introduce	 a	 final	 settlement.37	This	 time-
limit	can	be	extended	following	a	reasonable	request	from	the	undertakings.38																																																									
31	Commission	Notice	(n	3)	para	[5].	
32	ibid	para	[6].		
33	ibid	para	[5].	Automatically	allowing	undertakings	the	right	to	settle	would	diminish	the	
deterrent	effect	of	EU	cartel	enforcement.	
34	ibid	para	[11].	
35	ibid	para	[15].	
36	ibid	para	[16].	
37	ibid	para	[17].	
38	ibid.	
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The	 undertakings	 then	 submit	 settlement	 submissions	 to	 the	 Commission,	
which	the	Commission	will	acknowledge	receipt	of.	The	settlement	submission	
must	include:	a	clear	and	unequivocal	acknowledgement	of	the	parties’	liability	
for	the	infringement(s);	the	maximum	fine	that	the	parties	would	accept	in	the	
settlement	 procedure;	 the	 acknowledgement	 that	 they	 have	 been	 sufficiently	
informed	 of	 the	 objections	 the	 Commission	 is	 seeking	 to	 raise	 against	 them;	
that	 they	 have	 had	 sufficient	 opportunity	 to	 raise	 their	 views	 before	 the	
Commission;	and,	 finally	 that	 the	parties	do	not	envisage	requesting	access	 to	
the	 file	 or	 requesting	 to	 be	 heard	 again	 in	 an	 oral	 hearing	 unless	 the	
Commission	does	not	reflect	 their	settlement	submissions	 in	the	Statement	of	
Objections	and	the	decision.39		
	
The	 Commission	 should	 then	 consider	 the	 parties’	 settlement	 submissions	 so	
that	their	rights	of	defence	can	be	exercised	effectively	and	taken	into	account	
in	the	preliminary	analysis,	where	appropriate.40	These	can	then	be	considered	
whilst	 the	 Commission	 is	 drafting	 the	 Statement	 of	 Objections. 41 	If	 the	
streamlined	 Statement	 of	 Objections	 reflects	 the	 parties’	 settlement	
submissions	 the	 parties	 should	 (within	 two	 weeks)	 reply	 by	 confirming	 the	
Statement	 of	 Objections	 corresponds	 to	 the	 contents	 of	 their	 settlement.42	It	
should	be	noted	here	that	the	Commission	can	adopt	a	Statement	of	Objections	
that	does	not	 reflect	 the	parties	 settlement	 submission,	 and	 this	would	mean	
that	the	parties	settlement	submissions	would	be	deemed	to	be	withdrawn	and	
therefore	 that	 the	 parties	would	 no	 longer	 be	 bound	 by	 their	 settlement.43	If	
the	College	of	Commissioners	agrees	with	the	settlement	it	is	then	adopted	and	
the	decision	is	implemented.		
	
Diagram	 5.1	 below	 illustrates	 the	 Commission’s	 settlement	 procedure	 more	
simply	in	graphic	form.																																																									
39	ibid	para	[20].	
40	ibid	para	[24].	
41	ibid	para	[25].	
42	ibid	para	[26].	
43	ibid	para	[27].	
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Diagram	5.1	EU	Commission	Direct	Settlement	Procedure	
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The	 final	 points	 to	 note	 before	we	 leave	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 EU	 settlement	
procedure	 are	 the	 procedural	 protections	 that	 are	 in	 place	 to	 ensure	 that	 an	
undertaking’s	 rights	 are	 not	 unduly	 interfered	with.	 First,	 an	 undertaking	 still	
has	the	right	to	appeal	the	settlement	decision	to	the	EU	court	(just	like	under	
the	standard	procedure)	if	it	is	has	any	concerns	regarding	part	of	the	decision.	
Second,	 although	 the	 parties	 waive	 certain	 procedural	 rights	 to	 engage	 in	
settlements,	if	at	any	point	they	have	any	apprehensions	regarding	due	process	
they	 may	 call	 upon	 the	 Hearing	 Officer.44	The	 Hearing	 Officer’s	 role	 is	 to	
guarantee	 that	 the	effective	exercise	of	 the	undertaking’s	 rights	of	defence	 is	
respected.45	This	 includes	 inter	alia,	ensuring	that	the	undertakings	right	to	be	
heard	 and	 the	 right	 to	 access	 to	 the	 file	 are	 respected.46	Additionally,	 the	
Hearing	Officer	ensures	the	protection	of	an	undertaking’s	rights	(such	as	legal	
professional	 privilege	 and	 the	 privilege	 against	 self-incrimination)	 during	 the	
Commission’s	investigation	are	met.	
	
5.2.1.2	The	US	Plea	Bargaining	Procedure			
The	US	utilises	a	different	system	for	enforcing	competition	 law	to	that	of	the	
EU;	where	 the	 EU	 operates	 an	 administrative	 system,	 the	US	 utilises	 criminal	
law	enforcement.	This	means	there	are	significant	differences	between	the	two	
systems	and	how	the	settlement	procedures	operate	in	practice.	
These	crucial	differences	are	summarised	in	Table	5.2	below,	with	some	of	the	
key	distinctions	being	discussed	below	the	table.	
	 	
																																																								
44	ibid	para	[18].	
45	ibid.		
46	European	Commission,	‘Hearing	Officers’	
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/hearing_officers/index_en.html>	accessed	24	July	2015.	
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Table	5.2	EU	and	US	Settlement	Procedures	Comparison	
The	DOJ	does	not	determine	whether	a	company	has	breached	the	law;	they	act	
as	the	prosecutor	and	a	court	and	jury	decide	if	an	offence	has	been	committed.	
The	DOJ	does,	however,	operate	a	plea	bargaining	programme,	which	
distinguishes	between	individuals	and	corporations.47	As	the	EU	cartel	
enforcement	procedure	only	applies	to	companies	we	shall	focus	our	analysis	to	
that	of	the	DOJ’s	corporate	plea	bargaining	programme.		
	
A	plea	bargain	between	the	DOJ	and	a	company	is	a	negotiated	agreement.	The	
company	pleads	guilty	to	a	criminal	offence	and	cooperates	‘fully	and	truthfully’	
with	the	DOJ’s	on-going	investigation,	and	waives	its	rights	to	appeal.	In	return	
for	 doing	 this,	 the	 company	 is	 granted	 concessions	 by	 the	 DOJ.	 These	
concessions	 lead	 to	 a	 lesser	 offence	 or	 reduced	 sanction.	 In	 antitrust	 cases	
these	 concessions	 mainly	 come	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 reduction	 in	 criminal	 fines.	
																																																								
47	As	follows,	respectively:	Antitrust	Division	of	the	Department	of	Justice,	Model	Annotated	
Individual	Plea	Agreement	(updated	2/18/2014)	–	available	at	
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/302600.pdf>	and	Antitrust	Division	of	the	
Department	of	Justice,	Model	Annotated	Corporate	Plea	Agreement	(updated	12/20/2013)	–	
available	at	<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/302601.pdf>.	
Criteria		 EU	 US	
Type	of	system		 Administrative	 Criminal	
Aim	of	the	tool	
To	speed	up	the	
process	and	reduce	
costs	
To	gain	information	
on	cartels,	speed	up	
the	process	and	
reduce	costs	
Who	decides	on	whether	
there	has	been	an	
infringement?	 The	Commission	 The	Court	
Reduction	in	fines	 10%	fixed	
Variable	based	on	
the	case	
Negotiating	system?	 No	 Yes	
Automatic	right	to	settle?	 No	 No	
When	can	settlement	
discussions	start?	
Only	after	a	full	
investigation	has	
been	conducted	
At	anytime	in	the	
investigation	
Right	to	appeal	settlement?	 Yes	 No		
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Once	the	court	approves	the	plea	bargain	it	becomes	legally	binding.		
	
Plea	bargains	in	the	US	are	governed	by	the	Federal	Rules	of	Criminal	Procedure	
Rule	11	(hereafter,	 ‘FRCPR	11’).	11(c)	of	the	FRCPR	sets	out	the	three	types	of	
plea	agreement	that	a	company	may	be	offered	by	the	DOJ	depending	on	the	
circumstances	of	the	case.	The	first	of	these	 is	a	Type	A	agreement	where	the	
DOJ	will	not	bring,	or	will	move	to	dismiss,	other	charges	against	the	company.48	
Type	 B	 agreements	 recommend,49	that	 a	 particular	 sentence	 or	 sentencing	
range	is	appropriate	or	that	a	particular	provision	of	the	Sentencing	Guidelines,	
or	 policy	 statement,	 or	 sentencing	 factor	 does	 or	 does	 not	 apply	 (noting	 that	
such	a	request	or	recommendation	does	not	bind	the	court).50	Finally,	there	are	
Type	 C	 agreements	 where	 a	 specific	 sentence	 or	 sentencing	 range	 is	 the	
appropriate	 disposition	 of	 the	 case,	 or	 that	 a	 particular	 provision	 of	 the	
Sentencing	Guidelines,	or	policy	 statement,	or	 sentencing	 factor	does	or	does	
not	 apply	 (and	 such	 a	 recommendation	 or	 request	 binds	 the	 court	 once	 the	
court	accepts	the	plea	agreement).51			
	
Owing	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 these	 bargains,	 Type	 B	 agreements	 are	 the	 most	
commonly	entered	into	by	the	DOJ	in	antitrust	cases.	This	is	because	the	courts	
are	 more	 willing	 to	 accept	 and	 endorse	 them	 as	 they	 are	 able	 to	 reject	 the	
proposed	sentence	and	impose	a	different	one	where	necessary.52	
	
What	now	follows	below	is	an	outline	of	the	DOJ’s	plea	bargaining	procedure,	
however,	 as	 the	 methods	 of	 negotiating	 are	 extremely	 subjective	 it	 is	 only	
possible	 to	 make	 broad	 remarks	 based	 on	 how	 the	 procedure	 ‘typically’	
operates	in	practice.53	To	begin,	the	DOJ	initiates	an	antitrust	investigation.	This	
may	 arise	 from	 concerns	 that	 the	DOJ	 has	within	 the	market,	 but	more	 than	
likely	will	 stem	from	an	 immunity	applicant.	After	 the	 investigation	has	begun																																																									
48	FRCPR	11(c)(1)(a).	
49	Or	agree	not	to	oppose	the	defendant’s	request.	
50	FRCPR	11(c)(1)(b).	
51	FRCPR	11(c)(1)(c).	
52	The	DOJ’s	‘Grand	Jury	Manual’	Chapter	9,	November	1991	(1st	Edition)	IX-1,	IX-4.		
53	Diagram	5.2	below	illustrates	the	DOJ’s	procedure	graphically.	
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the	defendant	company	usually	initiates	discussions	with	the	DOJ.	However,	the	
DOJ	 themselves	may	 start	discussions	with	 the	defendant	 company.	Next,	 the	
DOJ	approves	the	commencement	of	negotiations	with	the	company.	Then,	the	
DOJ	 internally	 discusses	 the	 parameters	 of	 the	 potential	 agreement.	 	 This	
discussion	will	 include	the	consideration	of	factors	such	as:	the	provisions	that	
should	be	considered	as	non-negotiable,	the	provisions	that	are	negotiable	and	
the	 likely	 range	 of	 the	 fine.	 Next,	 the	 DOJ	 will	 provide	 the	 company	 with	 a	
proposed	 draft	 agreement	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 further	 discussions.	 Then,	 the	
company	 and	 DOJ	 will	 engage	 in	 negotiations	 over	 various	 parts	 of	 the	
agreement.	Once	 an	 agreement	 is	 reached	 the	DOJ	 and	 company	will	 sign	 it.	
Finally,	 the	 plea	 agreement	 will	 go	 before	 a	 court,	 where	 it	 will	 assess	 the	
agreement.	 If	 the	agreement	 is	of	Type	A	or	C	 the	court	may	 then	accept	 the	
agreement, 54 	reject	 it, 55 	or	 defer	 a	 decision	 until	 it	 has	 reviewed	 the	
presentence	report.56	If	the	plea	agreement	is	a	Type	B	agreement	the	court	has	
to	advise	the	company	that	it	has	no	right	to	withdraw	the	plea	if	the	court	does	
not	follow	the	recommendation	or	request.57		
	
Diagram	 5.3	 below	 illustrates	 the	 ‘typical’	 DOJ	 plea	 bargaining	 procedure	
graphically.	
	
	 	
																																																								
54	If	the	court	does	it	must	inform	the	company	that	the	agreed	disposition	will	be	included	in	
the	judgment.	FRCPR	11(c)(4).	
55	If	the	court	does	so	it	must	specify	the	following	on	record	and	in	open	court:	inform	the	
company	that	the	court	has	rejected	the	plea;	inform	the	company	that	the	court	is	not	bound	
by	the	agreement	and	allow	the	company	to	withdraw	its	plea;	and,	if	the	company	does	not	
withdraw	the	plea	the	court	may	dispose	of	the	case	less	favorably	then	was	recommended	in	
the	plea	agreement.	FRCPR	11(c)(5).	
56	FRCPR	11(c)(3)(a).	
57	FRCPR	11(c)(3)(b).	
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Diagram	5.3	‘Typical’	DOJ	US	Plea	Bargaining	Procedure	 	
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The	final	thing	to	note	before	we	leave	the	discussion	of	the	US	plea	bargaining	
procedure	 is	 the	 safety	 mechanisms	 that	 the	 US	 has	 in	 place	 to	 ensure	 that	
individuals	 rights	 are	 respected	 and	 that	 the	 agreement	 is	 entered	 into	 fairly	
and	 legally.	To	begin,	within	the	corporate	plea	there	will	be	a	statement	that	
the	company	will	need	to	approve	which	notes	that:	
	
‘The	plea	has	[been]	entered	into	freely	and	voluntarily	
and	 not	 as	 the	 result	 of	 force,	 threats,	 assurances,	
promises	 or	 representations	 which	 are	 not	 contained	
within	the	plea	agreement.’58	
	
However,	 the	 main	 guarantor	 of	 these	 protections	 is	 a	 US	 court.	 Under	 the	
FRCPR	11	section	(b)	there	are	a	variety	of	rights	that	the	court	needs	to	ensure	
that	 company	understands	 it	 has.	 Rather	 than	 list	 these	 in	 their	 entirety	 only	
the	most	pertinent	shall	be	noted:	 the	 right	 to	plead	not	guilty;	 the	 right	 to	a	
jury	 trial;	 the	 right	 to	 be	 represented	 by	 counsel;	 the	 right	 to	 confront	 and	
cross-examine	 adverse	 witnesses;	 and,	 that	 if	 the	 company’s	 guilty	 plea	 is	
accepted	 it	 waives	 these	 rights.59		 The	 court	 also	 has	 to	 ensure	 the	 plea	 is	
voluntary	and	did	not	result	from	force,	threats	or	promises	(other	than	those	
contained	 within	 the	 plea	 agreement)	 before	 accepting	 the	 plea	 bargain.60	
Finally,	the	court	must	ensure	that	there	is	a	factual	basis	for	the	plea.61		
	
These	protections	are	discussed	 in	greater	depth	when	 the	potential	 for	 a	EU	
plea	bargaining	system	is	muted.	These	protections	will	be	 important	as	many	
of	 the	 aforementioned	 rights	 correspond	 directly	 across	 with	 equivalent	
elements	from	the	ECHR’s	right	to	a	fair	trial.	
	
	 																																																									
58	Antitrust	Division	of	the	Department	of	Justice,	Model	Annotated	Corporate	Plea	Agreement	
(updated	12/20/2013)	–	available	at	<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/302601.pdf>	
para	[21].	
59	FRCPR	11(b)(1).	
60	FRCPR	11(b)(2).	
61	FRCPR	11(b)(3).	
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5.2.2	The	Commission’s	Settlement	Decisions	thus	far		
Now	that	 the	procedural	processes	of	 the	EU	and	US	 settlement	programmes	
have	been	explained	we	can	explore	the	cases	that	have	been	settled	under	the	
current	 EU	 procedure	 to	 help	 identify	 the	 areas	 where	 procedural	
improvements	could	be	made	and	challenges	that	the	Commission’s	settlement	
procedure	presently	faces.	What	will	be	identified	from	the	empirical	analysis	in	
this	 section	 is	 that	 there	 are	 two	 key	 areas	where	 further	 improvements	 and	
enhancements	 can	 be	 made	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 settlement	 procedure.	 The	
first	of	these	is	the	length	of	time	that	the	Commission’s	decisions	take,	owing	
to	 the	 investigation	 and	 settlement	 negotiations	 periods,	 respectively.	 The	
second	area	 relates	 to	hybrid	 cases,	 particularly	 the	 resources	 it	 costs	 for	 the	
Commission	to	run	dual	procedures	and	the	continuing	growth	in	hybrid	cases	
of	this	nature.	The	dataset	for	this	analysis	was	compiled	by	the	author	from	the	
Commission’s	 published	 non-confidential	 decisions,	 summary	 decisions	 and	
press	releases.	It	was	last	updated	on	the	30	March	2015.		
	
The	 Commission	 thus	 far	 has	 settled	 seventeen	 cases,	 which	 represents	 a	
settlement	rate	of	27.87	percent.62	This	is	significantly	lower	than	the	US	rate	of	
over	ninety	percent	of	cases	being	settled	by	plea	bargaining.	However,	one	has	
to	be	careful	when	comparing	such	an	established	system	to	that	of	an	 infant	
one.	For	example,	there	are	a	variety	of	differences	in	the	systems,	such	as	the	
US	 utilising	 criminal	 sanctions	 and	 sanctions	 against	 individuals,	 and	 the	 fact	
that	it	is	a	proven	settlement	procedure.	Nonetheless,	accepting	the	limitations	
to	 this	 comparison,	what	we	 can	derive	 from	contrasting	 these	 figures	 is	 that	
there	 is	 significant	 room	 for	 the	Commission	 to	 increase	 the	utilisation	of	 the	
settlement	 procedure	 to	 conclude	 cases.	 Table	 5.4	 below	 catalogues	 the	
seventeen	 cases	 that	 have	 been	 settled	 alongside	 the	 date	 of	 the	 decision,	
number	of	parties,	the	collective	fines	imposed	on	the	settling	and	non-settling	
																																																								
62	These	figures	are	correct	to	the	30	March	2015.	The	figure	includes	all	(61)	cases	from	June	
2008-to-March	2015,	including	those	still	pending	and	5	cases	that	were	administratively	closed.	
Though	this	percentage	figure	may	be	open	to	discussion	over	how	it	should	be	calculated,	what	
is	clear,	however	it	is	calculated,	it	is	significantly	less	than	the	US	figure.	
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parties	 and	 the	 length	 of	 time	 between	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 settlement	
discussions	and	to	the	final	adoption	of	the	decisions.		
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Table	5.4	The	Commission’s	Settlement	Decisions	 	
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1	 19.05.2010	
COMP/38.511	
DRAMs	 11	
10	(excluding	
full	immunity	
app)	 €	331,273,800	 N/A	 14	months	
2	 20.07.2010	
COMP/38.866	
Animal	Feed	
Phosphates	 6	
4	(excluding	
full	immunity	
app)	 €	115,797,000	 €	59,850,000	 18	months	
3	 13.04.2011	
COMP/39.579	
Consumer	
Detergents	 3	
2	(excluding	
full	immunity	
app)	 €	315,200,000	 N/A	 10	months	
4	 19.10.2011	
COMP/39.605	
CRT	Glass	 4	 4	 €	128,736,000	 N/A	 15	months	
5	 07.12.2011	
COMP/39.600	
Refrigeration	
Compressors		 5	
4	(excluding	
full	immunity	
app)	 €	161,198,000	 N/A	 13	months	
6	 27.06.2012	
COMP/39.611	
Water	
Management	
Products		 3	 3	 €	13,661,000	 N/A	 16	months	
7	 10.07.2013	
AT.39748	
Automotive	
Wire	
Harnesses		 5	
4	(excluding	
full	immunity	
app)	 €	141,791,000	 N/A	 10	months	
8	 04.12.2013	
AT.39861	
YIRD		 7	 6	 €	669,719,000	
No	data	for	
non-settling	
party	
Information	
not	available		
9	 04.12.2013	
AT.39914	
EIRD		 7	 4	
€	
1,042,749,000	
No	data	for	
non-settling	
parties	
Information	
not	available		
10	 29.01.2014	
AT.39801	
Polyurethane	
Foam	 4	 4	 €	114,077,000	 N/A	
Information	
not	available		
11	 05.03.2014	
AT.39952	
Power	
Exchanges	 2	 2	 €	5,979,000	 N/A	 9	months	
12	 19.03.2014	
AT.39922	
Bearings	 6	 6	 €	953,306,000	 N/A	 12	months	
13	 02.04.2014	
AT.39792	
Steel	
Abrasives		 5	 4	 €	30,707,000	
No	data	for	
non-settling	
party	 14	months	
14	 25.06.2014	
AT.39965	
Mushrooms	 4	 3	 €	32,225,000	
No	data	for	
non-settling	
party	 14	months	
15	 21.10.2014	
AT.39924	
SFIRD	-	CHF	
LIBOR	 2	 2	 €	61,676,000	 N/A	 15	months	
16	 21.10.2014	
AT.39924	
SFIRD	-	Bid	
Ask	Spread	
Infringement		 4	 4	 €	32,355,000	 N/A	 15	months	
17	 11.12.2014	
AT.39780	
Envelopes	 5	 5	 €	19,485,000	 N/A	 11	months	
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From	Table	5.4	above	we	can	see	that	the	collective	fines	 imposed	on	settling	
parties	 varies	 quite	 significantly.	 The	 highest	 fines	 imposed	were	 in	 the	 EIRD	
case,63	then	 the	 Bearings	 case	 and	 the	 third	 highest	 were	 levied	 in	 the	 YIRD	
settlement.64	Within	each	of	these	settlements	there	were	between	four-to-six	
parties	engaging	in	bilateral	discussions	with	the	Commission	and	the	fines	were	
significantly	higher	than	the	other	settlement	decisions	due	to	the	market	share	
of	the	parties	and	the	gravity	of	the	infringement.		
	
The	Commission’s	first	settlement	decision	was	given	in	the	DRAMs	case	on	the	
19th	May	 2010.65	There	 are	many	 elements	 of	 this	 settlement	 that	 are	 quite	
notable.	First,	although	it	was	the	Commission’s	first	ever	settlement	it	actually	
has	been	one	of	its	quickest.	As	will	be	shown	later	this	settlement	falls	straight	
within	 the	median	 for	 the	period	of	 time	 it	 typically	 takes	 the	Commission	 to	
adopt	 a	 decision	 from	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 settlement	 to	 the	 final	 decision.	
Second,	 this	 case	 has	 had	 the	 most	 parties	 with	 which	 the	 Commission	 has	
sought	 to	 settle.	 It	 could	 indeed	 be	 that	 the	 Commission	 realised	 after	 this	
decision	that	settling	with	so	many	parties	is	challenging	and	hence	why	it	has	
sought	not	to	settle	with	more	than	seven	parties	since.	Finally,	collectively	on	
all	settling	parties	this	has	been	one	of	the	highest	fines	imposed	–	to	be	precise	
it	has	been	the	fourth	highest.	This	may	however	be	more	down	to	the	facts	of	
the	case	–	that	there	was	a	large	number	of	parties	involved	in	the	case	and	the	
nature	of	the	infringement	–	than	that	it	was	the	Commission’s	first	settlement	
decision.		
	
The	 second	 settlement	 decision	 (Animal	 Feed	 Phosphates)	 followed	 quickly	 –	
only	two	months	later.66	Coincidently,	this	also	happened	to	be	the	first	hybrid	
settlement	decision	by	the	Commission.	Prior	to	this	there	were	questions	as	to																																																									
63	Euro	Interest	Rate	Derivatives	-	EIRD	(Case	COMP	39.914)	Commission	Decision	4	December	
[2013].	
64	Bearings	(Case	COMP	39.922)	Commission	Decision	[2014]	2014/C238/09	OJ	C238/10	and	Yen	
Interest	Rate	Derivatives	-	YIRD	(Case	COMP	39.861)	Commission	Decision	4	February	[2013].	
65	DRAMs	(Case	COMP	38.511)	Commission	Decision	2011/C180/09	[2010]	OJ	C180/15.	
66	Animal	feed	phosphates	(Case	COMP	38.866)	Commission	Decision	2011/C111/10	[2010]	OJ	
C111/19.	
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what	would	happen	if	some	parties	withdrew	from	the	settlement	discussions.67	
In	 this	 case,	 all	 parties	were	originally	 engaged	 in	 settlement	discussions	with	
the	 Commission.	 However,	 when	 the	 Commission	 provided	 the	 undertakings	
with	 all	 the	 information	 regarding	 the	elements	of	 the	 case,	 the	 scope	of	 the	
infringement	and	the	range	of	the	fine	Compagnie	Financière	et	de	Participation	
Roullier	 /	 Timab	 Industries	 S.A	 (hereafter,	 ‘CFPR/TI’)	 decided	 to	 discontinue	
settlement	discussions.	The	Commission	then	ran	two	procedures	–	one	by	the	
streamlined	approach,	 for	the	settling	parties,	and	the	standard	procedure	for	
CFPR/TI.	Therefore,	 the	full	efficiency	gains	of	settlement	were	not	reached	 in	
this	case	as	the	Commission	had	to	run	one	full	procedure	and	one	streamlined	
procedure.	Coincidently,	CFPR/TI	ended	up	appealing	the	Commission’s	decision	
before	the	General	Court,	thereby	reducing	the	efficiency	of	the	procedure	even	
further.	
	
In	2011	there	was	a	rise	in	settled	cases	to	three,68	although	2012	saw	a	drop	to	
one.69	Since	2013	there	has	been	an	upward	trend	and	a	stark	rise	of	settling,70	
in	2013	three	cases	where	again	settled	and	in	2014	this	figure	rose	to	eight.71	
We	therefore	see	that	in	the	last	two	years	there	has	been	nearly	a	doubling	in	
the	number	of	cases	being	settled	compared	to	pre-2013.	
	
																																																								
67	For	example,	see	the	comments	made	by	Macchi	di	Cellere	and	Mezzapesa	(n	15)	609.	
68	CRT	Glass	(Case	COMP	39.605)	Commission	Decision	2012/C48/07	[2011]	OJ	C48/18,	
Refrigeration	compressors	(Case	COMP	39.600)	Commission	Decision	2012/C122/04	[2011]	OJ	
C122/6	and	Consumer	Detergents	(Case	COMP	39.579)	Commission	Decision	2011/C193/06	
[2011]	OJ	C193/14.	
69	Water	management	products	(Case	COMP	39.611)	Commission	Decision	[2012]	
2012/C335/04	OJ	C335/4.	
70	Automotive	wire	harnesses	(Case	COMP	39.748)	Commission	Decision	[2013]	2013/C283/05	
OJ	C283/5,	EIRD	(n	63)	and	YIRD	(n	64).	
71	Envelopes	(Case	COMP	39.780)	Commission	Decision	[2014]	2015/C74/05	OJ	C74/5,	
Mushrooms	(Case	COMP	39.965)	Commission	Decision	[2014]	2014/C453/11	OJ	C453/21,	
Polyurethane	foam	(Case	COMP	39.801)	Commission	Decision	[2014]	2014/C354/07	OJ	C354/6,	
Power	Exchanges	(Case	COMP	39.952)	Commission	Decision	[2014]	2014/C334/06	OJ	C334/5,	
Smart	Cards	Chips	(Case	COMP	39.574)	Commission	Decision	3	September	[2014],	Steel	
abrasives	(Case	COMP	39.792)	Commission	Decision	[2014]	2014/C362/07	OJ	C362/8,	Swiss	
Franc	Interest	Rate	Derivatives	-	Bid	Ask	Spread	Infringement	(Case	COMP	39.924)	Commission	
Decision	[2014]	2015/C72/10	OJ	C72/14	and	Swiss	Franc	Interest	Rate	Derivatives	-	CHF	LIBOR	
(Case	COMP	39.924)	Commission	Decision	[2014]	2015/C72/07	OJ	C72/9.	
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We	can	also	identify	from	Table	5.4	that	when	we	consider	the	length	of	time	it	
takes	 the	 Commission	 and	 undertakings	 to	 settle	 from	 the	 beginning	 of	
settlement	discussions	to	the	adoption	of	a	decision	there	is	a	range	of	nine-to-
eighteen	months.	This	range	is	illustrated	graphically	below	in	Graph	5.5.	
	
	
	
There	is	no	publically	available	data	from	the	Commission	regarding	when	they	
begun	 settlement	 discussions	 in	 decisions	 8,	 9	 and	 10	 (YIRD,	 EIRD	 and	
Polyurethane	 Foam	 decisions).72	Thus,	 the	 graph	 does	 not	 provide	 data	 for	
these	decisions.	From	the	other	14	decisions	we	can	extrapolate	that	the	mean	
length	of	time	from	the	beginning	of	settlement	decisions	to	the	adoption	of	a	
decision	 by	 the	 Commission	 is	 13.28	 months	 (to	 two	 decimal	 places),	 the	
median	was	14	months	and	the	mode	was	14-15	months.	Therefore,	what	we																																																									
72	YIRD	(n	64),	EIRD	(n	63)	and	Polyurethane	foam	(n	71).	
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can	 identify	 is	 that	 the	 settlement	 decisions	 average	 around	 13.3	 months.	
However,	this	figure	is	actually	very	deceptive,	as	it	does	not	take	into	account	
the	often	long,	protracted	and	drawn	out	investigation	prior	to	the	beginning	of	
the	 settlement	 discussions.	 For	 example,	 if	 we	 consider	 the	 Consumer	
Detergents	 settlement	 decision	 we	 can	 see	 that	 the	 Commission	 launched	
inspections	 in	 June	 2008,73	but	 did	 not	 begin	 settlement	 discussions	 until	 late	
2010.	 This	 meant	 that	 there	 was	 a	 two-year	 investigation	 period	 and	 a	 ten-
month	settlement	period.	Similarly,	when	we	consider	the	Envelopes	settlement	
decision	we	identify	that	the	Commission	begun	its	investigation	and	conducted	
its	first	inspection	on	the	14	September	2010	and	did	not	finish	the	investigation	
until	 January	 2014,	 when	 it	 begun	 settlement	 discussions	 with	 the	 parties.74	
Therefore,	what	we	can	see	is	that	when	we	include	the	investigation	stage	into	
these	time	periods	we	 inevitably	see	that	this	period	goes	up	significantly	and	
into	many	years,	 sometimes	more	 than	 trebling	 the	overall	 time	period	when	
compared	 to	 the	 settlement	 discussion	 period.75	Nonetheless,	 it	 should	 be	
noted	that	the	settlement	procedures	are	significantly	quicker	then	the	 length	
of	time	it	would	take	these	procedures	to	progress	via	the	standard	procedure.	
Indeed,	 Laina	 and	 Bogdanov	 in	 their	 2014	 piece	 noted	 that	 the	 current	
settlement	procedure	has	allowed	a	‘speeding	up’	of	decisions	by	reducing	the	
length	of	time	it	takes	to	reach	a	decision	by	an	average	of	two	years.76		
	
If	we	consider	the	cases	that	the	Commission	has	settled,	there	has	been	a	wide	
variation	 in	 the	 number	 of	 parties	 involved	 in	 settlement	 discussions.	 At	 the	
top-end	there	have	been	cases	where	the	Commission	has	been	in	discussions	
with	up	to	ten	parties,	and	at	the	lower-end	only	two.	When	we	consider	all	of	
the	settlement	decisions	together	we	find	that	the	mean	is	for	there	to	be	4.17	
parties	involved	in	discussions	(to	two	decimal	places)	and	that	the	median	and	
mode	 is	 4.	 What	 we	 can	 see	 from	 this	 is	 that	 the	 cases	 that	 appear	 to	 get	
chosen	 for	 settlement	 decisions	 seem	 to	 average	 around	 four	 parties.	 This	 is																																																									
73	Consumer	Detergents	(n	68).	
74	Envelopes	(n	71).	
75	ibid.		
76	Laina	and	Bogdanov,	(n	22)	720.	
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likely	 to	 be	 down	 to	 a	 multitude	 of	 factors,	 including	 the	 nature	 of	 cartels	
themselves	–	which	require	a	limited	number	of	suppliers	that	collectively	have	
a	high	market	share	–	but	also	it	could	be	because	this	is	an	optimal	number	of	
parties	 for	 the	 Commission	 to	 manage	 and	 maintain	 settlement	 discussions	
with.	
	
This	chapter	will	now	consider	empirical	settlement	decisions	in	‘hybrid	cases’.	
To	date,	there	have	been	five	hybrid	cases.	These	are	cases	where	not	all	parties	
in	 the	 infringement	decide	 to	 settle.	 These	hybrid	 cases	may	 take	one	of	 two	
forms.	The	first	of	these	is	where	a	party	makes	 it	clear	from	the	beginning	of	
the	settlement	discussions	that	it	has	no	interest	in	partaking	in	them	(Type	1);	
the	 other	 is	 where	 the	 party	 withdraws	 from	 the	 settlement	 discussions	
somewhere	 throughout	 them	 (Type	 2).	 In	 hybrid	 cases	 –	 whichever	 of	 these	
‘Types’	occur	–	it	requires	the	Commission	to	run	two	procedures	(if	it	plans	to	
bring	an	infringement	decision),	one	via	the	streamlined	settlement	procedure	
for	the	settling	parties	and	the	other	via	the	normal	standard	procedure	for	the	
non-settling	parties.	
	
These	 are	 perhaps	 some	 of	 the	 most	 interesting	 and	 unusual	 cases	 for	 this	
chapter	to	explore,	as	the	settlement	procedure	was	primarily	implemented	to	
‘allow	the	Commission	to	handle	more	cases	with	the	same	resources…[whilst]	
fostering	 the	 public	 interest	 in…the	 effective	 and	 timely	 punishment	 [of	
cartelists]	and	increasing	overall	deterrence’.77	However,	if	the	Commission	has	
to	 run	 dual	 procedures	 this	 is	 unlikely	 to	 lead	 to	 positive	 efficiency	 gains.	 In	
essence	 the	 Commission	will	 still	 have	 to	 conduct	 the	 full	 proceedings	 for	 at	
least	 one	party	 –	 therefore	more	work	 and	 resources	 are	 required	 to	 go	 into	
this.	In	fact,	it	has	the	potential	to	be	even	less	efficiently	than	just	running	the	
normal	procedure	as	the	Commission	may	have	to	invest	even	more	resources	
due	to	failed	settlement	discussions.	
	
																																																								
77	Commission	Notice	(n	3)	para	[1].	
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Having	said	this,	the	benefits	of	continuing	to	settle	when	one	party	withdraws	
should	 not	 be	 down	 played.	 Although	 the	 procedural	 gains	 will	 not	 be	 as	
significant	–	as	would	be	the	case	if	all	parties	were	to	settle	–	it	should	still	save	
the	Commission	and	undertakings	resources	from	converting	all	parties	back	to	
the	 standard	 procedure.78	Since	 the	 entering	 into	 force	 of	 the	 settlement	
procedure	 the	Commission	has	managed	 five	hybrid	cases,	with	 there	being	a	
fairly	even	split	between	these	of	Type	1	and	2	cases.	As	was	noted	earlier	the	
first	hybrid	case	occurred	in	2010	and	resulted	from	a	party	dropping	out	of	the	
settlement	 discussions	 at	 a	 late	 stage.79	In	 the	YIRD	 case	 one	undertaking	 did	
not	 partake	 in	 settlement	 discussions	 and	 thus	 the	 Commission	 run	 dual	
procedures.80	Similarly,	 in	 the	EIRD	 case	 three	parties	 opted	not	 to	 settle	 and	
the	Commission	chose	to	run	dual	procedures.81	
	
It	is	perhaps	concerning,	from	an	efficiency	point	of	view,	that	hybrid	cases	are	
becoming	 more	 common.	 The	 Commission	 is	 then	 opting	 to	 run	 the	 two	
procedural	 routes	concurrently,	and	as	has	been	previously	noted	this	defeats	
part	 of	 the	 key	 efficiency	 objective	 of	 settlements.	 Indeed,	 even	 Laina	 and	
Bogdanov	have	stated	categorically	that	unsuccessful	settlements	that	are	then	
followed	 by	 the	 standard	 procedure	 do	 not	 bring	 procedural	 efficiencies.82	
Indeed,	this	is	why	it	is	imperative	that	we	consider	the	potential	role	that	plea	
bargaining	could	now	play.	
	
There	are	two	final	points	that	should	be	discussed	before	we	leave	our	analysis	
of	the	empirical	data	on	settlement	decisions.	First,	if	settlement	discussions	fail	
the	Commission	 is	more	than	willing	to	revert	back	to	the	standard	procedure	
to	 enforce	 Article	 101	 (TFEU).	 Indeed,	 we	 saw	 this	 in	 the	 Smart	 Cards	 Chip	
case.83	The	 Commission	 could	 not	 reach	 agreements	with	 at	 least	 two	 of	 the	
																																																								
78	For	example,	fewer	Commission	resources	would	have	to	be	dedicated	to	oral	hearings.	
79	Animal	feed	phosphates	(n	66).	
80	YIRD	(n	64).	
81	EIRD	(n	63).	
82	Laina	and	Bogdanov	(n	22)	718.	
83	Smart	Cards	Chips	(n	71).	
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parties,84	thus	they	diverted	straight	back	to	the	standard	procedure	and	would	
not	let	the	undertakings	involved	get	off	the	‘hook’	just	because	the	settlement	
discussions	had	failed	–	even	though	they	had	progressed	along	the	settlement	
route	 quite	 far.	 Although	 it	 is	 good	 that	 the	 Commission	 continues	 to	 tackle	
cartelist	after	settlements	fail,	there	are	significant	efficiency	costs	from	having	
to	 switch	 back	 to	 the	 standard	 procedure	 after	 coming	 from	 the	 streamlined	
one;	namely,	 it	 is	more	time	consuming	and	resource	intensive.	This	 is	both	in	
the	sense	of	switching	between	the	two	and	also	because	the	normal	procedure	
is	 itself	highly	resource	intensive	and	requires	much	more	detail.	For	example,	
the	 Statement	 of	 Objections	 cannot	 be	 of	 a	 streamlined	 nature	 and	
undertakings	have	full	access	to	the	file.		
	
The	 second	 and	 final	 thing	 to	 consider	 is	 that	 one	 of	 the	 settlement	
programmes	 key	 aims	 is	 to	 reduce	 costs,	 and	 in	 regards	 to	 reducing	 litigation	
costs	it	appears	to	have	achieved	this	quite	effectively.	Normally	many	decisions	
that	 go	 via	 the	 standard	 procedure	 are	 appealed	 by	 undertakings	 before	 the	
European	 Courts.	 These	 appeals	 often	 focus	 on	 issues	 regarding	 the	
Commission’s	calculation	of	the	fine,	such	as,	the	gravity	or	length	of	the	cartel.	
However,	 so	 far	 based	on	 the	parties	 that	 have	 settled	with	 the	Commission,	
only	 one	 undertaking	 has	 sought	 to	 appeal	 the	 settlement	 decision	 –	 even	
though	all	parties	have	a	right	to	appeal	the	settlement	decisions.	The	appellant	
–	Société	Générale	–	was	involved	in	the	settlement	discussion	in	the	EIRD	case.	
They	 are	 primarily	 appealing	 the	 settlement	 decision	 based	 on	 the	
Commission’s	determination	of	 the	value	of	 sales.85	This	will	be	an	 interesting	
case	 to	 follow,	as	 it	will	hopefully	answer	some	of	 the	questions	around	what	
happens	 when	 a	 settling	 party	 opts	 to	 appeal	 the	 settlement	 decision	 they	
agreed	to.	For	example,	questions	such	as	to	whether	the	reduction	for	settling	
will	still	apply,	how	the	Court	will	reassess	the	calculation	of	the	fine,	how	far	it																																																									
84	King	&	Wood	Mallesons,	‘Statement	of	objections	sent	to	suspected	participants	in	smart	card	
chips	cartel’	<http://www.kwm.com/en/uk/knowledge/insights/statement-of-objections-sent-
to-suspected-participants-in-smart-card-chips-cartel-20130426>	accessed	25	July	2015.	
85	Case	T-98/14	Société	Générale	v	Commission	OJ	C142,	12th	May	2014,	36-37-	action	brought	
on	the	14th	of	February	2014.		
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will	go	at	looking	into	the	facts	of	the	case,	and	what	the	Commission	will	need	
to	produce	and	can	argue	in	Court	regarding	the	settlement	will	all	potentially	
need	answering.86		
	
The	fact	that	so	few	appeals	have	occurred	speaks	to	the	credit	of	the	current	
enforcement	 procedure.	 Although,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 a	 significant	 part	 of	 this	 is	
down	to	the	fact	that	settling	parties	can	engage	in	discussions	(and	to	a	degree	
influence)	the	Commission	with	regards	to	a	variety	of	factors	in	their	case.	It	is	
still	 believed	by	 the	author	 that	 there	are	 further	efficiency	gains	 that	 can	be	
had	 with	 amendments	 to	 the	 current	 procedure.	 This	 is	 something	 that	 is	
sought	 to	 be	 explored	 more	 in	 the	 context	 of	 plea	 bargaining	 in	 the	 next	
section.	
	
From	the	cases	discussed	within	this	section	we	can	see	that	there	are	two	key	
areas	 that	 could	 be	 further	 improved	 to	 enhance	 the	 efficiency	 and	
effectiveness	 of	 the	 current	 settlement	 procedure,	 and	 another	 area,	 which	
needs	to	be	monitored	closely.	The	first	area	relates	to	the	 length	of	time	the	
decisions	 take	 as	 a	 whole.	 The	 settlement	 procedure	 time	 period	 averages	
around	13.28	months.	With	procedural	enhancements	made	this	period	of	time	
should	 be	 able	 to	 be	 reduced.	 However,	 the	main	 issue	 –	 from	 an	 efficiency	
point	of	view	–	seems	to	be	with	the	length	of	time	that	the	investigation	period	
can	 add	 to	 the	 settlement	 of	 the	 cases.	 From	 the	 examples	 considered	 we	
identify	that	the	investigation	period	takes	the	greatest	time	and	resources.	As	
the	 Commission	 cannot	 begin	 settlement	 discussions	 with	 parties	 until	 the	
investigation	 has	 been	 fully	 completed	 this	 further	 exacerbates	 this	 issue.	 By	
identifying	ways	to	reduce	the	investigation	period	and	settlement	period	cost	
savings	and	procedural	benefits	could	be	achieved.	The	second	area	relates	to	
hybrid	cases.	The	procedural	benefits	here	are	greatly	reduced	from	having	to	
run	 two	 procedures.	Ways	 of	managing	 or	 improving	 the	 procedure	 in	 these	
cases	could	lead	to	great	efficiency	and	cost	savings.	The	final	area	that	needs																																																									
86	ibid.	To	date,	limited	information	regarding	the	case	has	been	released.	In	due	course	
hopefully	some	of	the	questions	will	be	answered.	
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monitoring	 closely	 is	 the	 case	 where	 Société	 Générale	 is	 appealing	 the	
settlement	 decision.	 This	 is	 so	 we	 can	 identify	 whether	 the	 case	 has	 a	
detrimental	impact	on	the	efficiency	of	the	settlement	programme.	Depending	
on	how	the	Court	decides	this	case,	it	could	lead	to	other	undertakings	seeking	
to	appeal	their	settlement	decisions	to	get	a	further	reduction	in	fine,	which	in	
the	 future	would	 lead	 to	higher	 litigation	costs	and	 thus	negatively	 impact	on	
the	procedural	and	cost	efficiency	benefits	 settlement	brings	 the	Commission.	
Either	 way,	 appeals	 are	 always	 detrimental	 to	 efficiency	 goals	 as	 there	 are	
resource	implications	for	all	concerned.	
	
Given	the	aforementioned	problems	this	chapter	has	identified	with	regards	to	
the	 current	 settlement	 procedure,	 we	 shall	 now	 determine	 whether	
implementing	a	plea	bargaining	procedure	within	the	EU	for	settling	cartel	cases	
would	 address	 the	 issues	 raised.	 To	 begin	 this	 analysis,	we	 shall	 identify	why	
one	may	wish	to	 implement	a	plea	bargaining	system	within	the	EU.	Then,	we	
shall	 assess	 whether	 plea	 bargaining	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	 ECHR	 through	 a	
discussion	 of	 the	 seminal	 case	 of	Natsvlishvili	 and	 Togonidze	 v	 Georgia.	 This	
case	concerns	a	challenge	to	a	plea	bargain	brought	by	the	defendant	party	to	
it.	Once	this	discussion	has	been	concluded	and	it	has	been	demonstrated	that	
plea	bargaining	 is	compatible	with	the	ECHR	our	attention	shall	be	focused	on	
how	a	plea	bargaining	procedure	could	be	realised	within	the	EU.	
	
5.2.3	Why	we	may	wish	to	implement	a	plea	bargaining	system	within	the	EU	
If	a	plea	bargaining	system	were	implemented	within	the	EU	it	would	have	the	
potential	 to	address	 some	of	 the	 concerns	 that	have	been	 identified	with	 the	
current	direct	settlement	procedure.	Just	to	recap,	there	were	two	key	areas	of	
concerns	 and	 one	 area	 that	 needs	 to	 be	monitored	 closely;	 (a)	 the	 length	 of	
time	the	investigation,	settlement	discussions	and	decisions	take	to	be	reached,	
(b)	 the	 efficiency	 in	 the	management	 of	 hybrid	 cases,	 and	 (c)	 the	 impact	 the	
undertaking	appealing	the	settlement	decision	has	on	future	settlements.	
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The	operation	of	a	plea	bargaining	system	within	the	EU	instead	of	the	current	
direct	 settlement	 procedure	would	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 dramatically	 reduce	
the	 length	 of	 time	 the	 Commission’s	 procedures	 take.	 These	 efficiency	
improvements	 would	 be	 achieved	 in	 various	 ways.	 To	 begin	 with,	 plea	
bargaining	would	 offer	 the	 potential	 for	 undertakings	 and	 the	 Commission	 to	
begin	 negotiations	 and	 discussions	 from	 the	 opening	 of	 the	 Commission’s	
investigations.	 This	 would	 mean	 that	 the	 undertakings	 could	 cooperate	 and	
assist	the	Commission	with	its	investigation	thereby	reducing	the	length	of	time	
the	Commission’s	investigation	takes	–	which	is	currently	the	lengthiest	part	of	
the	Commission’s	procedures.	In	addition,	by	entering	discussions	early	with	the	
Commission	all	parties	are	more	 likely	 to	 come	 to	an	agreement	quicker	 than	
when	 they	 have	 to	 wait	 until	 the	 investigation	 is	 completed	 to	 begin	
discussions.	 Indeed,	we	 see	 from	 the	 current	 settlement	 decisions	 that	when	
these	 discussions	 begin	 they	 often	 focus	 around	 the	 value	 of	 sales	 and	 the	
scope	 of	 potential	 objections.	 Under	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 procedure	 these	
discussions	 could	 simply	occur	as	 the	Commission	 is	deciding	on	 those	 issues,	
again	leading	to	a	reduction	in	the	length	of	proceedings.	This	approach	would	
offer	the	EU	the	ability	to	speed	up	the	time	it	takes	it	to	conclude	the	entirety	
of	the	case	–	from	the	investigation	stage	right	through	to	the	settlement	stage.	
	
There	 is	however	a	 cost	of	 implementing	a	plea	bargaining	 system	 to	achieve	
these	efficiency	benefits.	This	cost	is	not	financial	though,	it	is	at	the	expense	of	
investigatory	rigour.	By	allowing	discussions	to	occur	prior	to	the	 investigation	
being	 completed	 it	 potentially	 means	 that	 the	 investigation	 will	 not	 be	 as	
detailed	and	thorough.	In	addition,	the	role	of	judicial	scrutiny	is	limited,	as	an	
undertaking	 loses	 its	 right	 to	 appeal.	 Although,	 we	 need	 to	 note	 that	 there	
would	still	be	‘checks	and	balances’	in	place	here.	For	example,	the	courts	prior	
to	 authorising	 the	 plea	 agreement	 will	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 assess	 the	
Commission’s	 case	 against	 the	 undertaking	 and	 ensure	 that	 there	 is	 a	 factual	
basis	 for	 the	 infringement	 charges	 against	 the	 undertaking.	 Additionally,	 an	
undertaking	does	not	need	to	plea	bargain,	it	can	refuse	to	enter	an	agreement	
with	the	Commission	and	challenge	the	infringement	decision	when	it	is	issued	
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before	the	General	Court.	The	problem	we	are	witnessing	here	is	one	of	a	trade-
off	between	investigatory	rigor	(and	the	costs	associated	with	this),	on	the	one	
side,	 against,	 speed,	 efficiency	 and	 resource	 savings	 on	 the	 other.	 This	 is	 a	
delicate	 task	 to	 perform	 and	 currently	 the	 EU	 has	 chosen	 to	 ensure	 that	
investigatory	 rigor	 is	of	paramount	 importance.	This	 is	 a	 respectable	decision,	
but	plea	bargaining	does	not	have	to	come	at	the	complete	cost	of	investigatory	
rigor.	As	will	be	illustrated	later,	with	the	necessary	safety	measures	in	place	a	
reasonable	balance	can	be	had	between	right	protection	and	efficiency	gains.	
	
Some	 may	 also	 wish	 to	 question	 the	 necessity	 for	 utilising	 plea	 bargaining	
within	 the	 EU	 when	 the	 Commission	 operates	 a	 leniency	 programme	 that	 is	
designed	to	help	uncover	cartels	and	provide	information	on	the	infringements.	
Whilst	 it	 is	 correct	 that	 the	 Commission	 operates	 a	 leniency	 programme	 that	
helps	 it	 collect	 evidence	on	 cartels;	 plea	bargaining	offers	 something	 that	 the	
leniency	 programme	 does	 not.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 it	 offers	 the	 ability	 for	
undertakings	 to	 engage	 in	 discussions	 and	 negotiations	with	 the	 Commission.	
The	 benefit	 of	 facilitating	 discussions	 between	 the	 Commission	 and	
undertakings	should	not	be	underplayed.	The	efficiencies,	which	can	be	derived	
from	 this,	 are	 significant.	 In	many	 instances	 it	will	mean	 undertakings	 do	 not	
seek	 to	discontinue	 the	negotiations	and	 return	 to	 the	 standard	procedure	or	
appeal	the	decision.	Litigation	costs	are	substantial	and	by	minimising	them	this	
enables	the	Commission	to	use	those	resources	to	 investigate	and	deter	other	
cartels.	 If	a	plea	bargaining	procedure	were	 to	be	 implemented	within	 the	EU	
the	 current	 leniency	 programme	 would	 need	 modifying.	 These	 modifications	
are	 discussed	 later	 in	 this	 section	when	 how	 the	 EU	 could	 implement	 a	 plea	
bargaining	system	is	considered.		
	
Another	benefit	which	is	derived	from	plea	bargaining	over	the	current	system	
is	that	the	Commission	will	engage	in	separate	discussions	with	each	party.	This	
will	mean	that	one	party	will	not	be	able	to	hold	up	the	progress	of	settlement	
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discussions	with	all	of	the	other	parties	in	the	negotiations.87	Under	the	current	
system,	 this	 can	occur	and	 therefore	 the	Commission’s	 settlement	discussions	
can	only	move	at	the	speed	of	the	slowest	party.		
	
However,	 under	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 programme	 this	 would	 be	 different.	 For	
example,	if	the	Commission	is	in	negotiations	with	a	party	(A)	who	are	stalling,	
the	 Commission	 can	 still	 progress	 effectively	 with	 discussions	 with	 the	 other	
parties	 (B,	C,	D)	 independently	and	not	have	 to	wait	 for	party	 (A)	 to	conclude	
the	 discussions.	 In	 addition,	 plea	 bargaining	 may	 help	 the	 Commission	 in	 its	
investigation	of	the	cartel.	If	we	consider	the	above	example	again,	we	may	find	
that	 party	 (B)	 is	 very	 keen	 to	 settle	 and	 get	 the	 best	 deal	 possible,	 so	 they	
provide	the	Commission	with	as	much	detailed	information	on	the	cartel	and	its	
activities	as	possible.	This	information	could	then	be	used	by	the	Commission	to	
help	it	in	its	investigation	and	negotiations	with	the	other	members	of	the	cartel	
–	 parties	 (A,	 C	 and	D).88	There	 are	 even	 further	 potential	 benefits	 here.	 First,	
because	 all	 of	 the	 undertakings	 know	 that	 the	 other	 parties	 are	 also	 in	
negotiation	 talks	 with	 the	 Commission,	 this	 should	 help	 create	 a	 persuasive	
interest	 in	cooperating	and	settling	with	the	Commission	–	similar	to	the	‘race	
for	leniency’.	Second,	this	approach	will	assist	greatly	in	a	hybrid	case	scenario,	
because	 the	 Commission	 is	 already	 managing	 the	 case	 against	 each	 party	
individually.	 If	 the	Commission	begins	settlement	discussions	with	a	party	and	
they	 drop	 out	 of	 these	 discussions,	 this	 will	 not	 affect	 the	 discussions	 the	
Commission	is	having/has	had	with	the	other	parties	and	they	can	default	back	
to	 the	 standard	 procedure	 against	 this	 party	 once	 the	 investigation	 and	
discussions	 with	 the	 other	 parties	 have	 been	 concluded.	 If	 the	 Commission	
waits	 it	 can	 then	 utilise	 all	 of	 the	 information	 it	 gains	 from	 the	 settlement	
discussions	 with	 the	 other	 parties	 to	 create	 its	 case	 against	 the	 non-settling	
party.																																																									
87	In	addition,	it	will	mean	that	the	Commission	can	utilise	the	fact	that	one	party	has	settled	to	
seek	to	pressurise	the	other	parties	into	not	defending	themselves.	
88	Indeed,	the	ECtHR	has	held	in	Karaman	v	Germany	App	no	17103/10	(ECtHR,	27	Feb	2014),	
that	confessions	made	in	a	plea-bargaining	process	by	co-defendants	in	separate	proceedings	–	
to	which	the	claimant	was	not	a	party	to	–	do	not	amount	to	a	violation	of	Article	6(2)	ECHR	(the	
presumption	of	innocence).		
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A	potential	 concern	with	 the	Commission	utilising	 a	plea	bargaining	 system	 is	
that	some	cases	may	not	be	appropriate	for	a	plea	agreement	as	they	contain	a	
novel	 legal	 issue	that	requires	a	more	detailed	analysis.	 If	 these	cases	were	to	
be	settled	 legal	 jurisprudence	would	not	develop	and	parties	may	settle	when	
there	is	actually	not	a	sufficient	case	against	them.	However,	this	is	actually	not	
as	much	as	a	problem	as	it	first	appears.	First,	if	the	Commission	feels	this	to	be	
the	case,	or	even	the	undertaking	feels	this,	they	can	refuse	to	settle	and	appeal	
the	 infringement	 decision	 when	 it	 is	 issued.	 Second,	 as	 will	 be	 shown	 later,	
under	the	judicial	safety	measures	the	Court	will	need	to	be	satisfied	that	there	
is	 a	 case	 to	 be	 answered.	 If	 the	 Court	 feels	 that	 the	 case	 against	 the	
undertaking(s)	 is	 questionable	 it	 can	 refuse	 the	 plea	 and	 force	 the	 parties	 to	
proceed	down	the	normal	procedure.	Therefore,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	we	would	see	
the	Commission	seek	to	choose	the	settlement	cases	wisely	so	as	to	ensure	this	
is	not	a	problem	that	would	occur	in	practice.			
	
An	 additional	 benefit	 that	 plea	 bargaining	would	 bring	 for	 the	 Commission	 is	
that	it	would	prevent	further	litigation	costs,	because	once	the	Court	endorses	a	
plea	bargain	 the	undertaking	 loses	 its	 right	 to	 appeal.	As	 litigation	 costs	 from	
undertakings	 appealing	 Commission	 infringement	 decisions	 are	 significantly	
high	–	in	terms	of	finance	and	time	–	this	will	greatly	benefit	the	Commission	by	
reducing	their	costs	and	saving	their	finite	resources.	The	Commission	can	then	
utilise	 the	 saved	 resources	 to	 detect	 and	 uncover	 additional	 cartels	 bringing	
further	 benefits	 to	 cartel	 deterrence.	 Though	 under	 the	 current	 direct	
settlement	procedure	there	has	only	been	one	appeal,	we	cannot	be	sure	as	to	
what	will	happen	in	this	case	and	whether	other	undertakings	will	look	to	bring	
appeals	in	the	future.	When	an	undertaking	appeals	the	procedural	benefits	of	
settlement	for	the	Commission	are	lost	to	a	degree,	as	it	has	to	prepare	and	put	
forward	its	case	before	the	Court,	which	 leads	to	weighty	 legal	costs.	Thus,	by	
having	this	ability	 for	an	undertaking	to	appeal	 the	agreement	removed	 it	has	
the	potential	to	save	on	possible	future	appeal	costs.	
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Having	said	this,	implementing	a	plea	bargaining	system	could	lead	to	additional	
problems	 regarding	 the	 perception	 the	 general	 public	 (and	 those	 in	 the	
judiciary)	 have	 of	 utilsing	 it.	 The	 general	 public	may	 struggle	 to	 comprehend	
why	 companies	 should	 be	 allowed	 to	 negotiate	 with	 the	 Commission	 about	
their	breach	of	competition	law.	Indeed,	we	see	that	Stephan	identified	that	the	
general	public	have	 similar	misapprehensions	 regarding	 the	use	of	 leniency	 in	
cartel	 cases.89	Thus,	 there	 could	 be	 a	 comparable	 issue	 here.	 Actually,	 this	
problem	with	perception	of	negotiating	with	parties	may	be	part	of	the	reason	
the	 Commission	 has	 sought	 to	 reiterate	 on	 various	 occasions	 that	 it	 neither	
negotiates	 nor	bargains	 in	 settlement	 decisions.90	However,	 the	 concerns	 the	
general	 public	may	 have	 could	 be	 addressed	 to	 a	 degree	 by	 the	 Commission	
explaining	why	bargaining	in	these	cases	can	be	beneficial	and	sometimes	even	
necessary.	 Complex	 cases	 of	 fraud	 often	 require	 bargaining	 with	 the	
defendants,	as	they	are	so	time	consuming	and	difficult	to	prosecute.91		
There	are	 those	within	 the	 judiciary	who	may	 come	 from	backgrounds	where	
plea	 bargains	 are	 frowned	 upon,	 seen	 as	 inappropriate	 or	 are	 treated	with	 a	
great	 deal	 of	 cynicism	 and	 scepticism.	 For	 example,	 within	 the	 UK	 judiciary	
there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 general	 consensus	 against	 the	 use	 of	 plea	 bargaining.	
Raphael	has	noted	this	strong	feeling,	observing	that	it	is	often	argued	that	a	US	
plea	bargaining	 system	would	be	 inappropriate	 for	 the	UK.92	In	 a	 similar	 vein,	
Lord	Justice	Maurice	Kay	in	the	McKinnon	case	stated	that:93	
	
“We	make	no	secret	of	the	fact	that	we	view	with	a	degree	
of	distaste	the	way	 in	which	the	American	authorities	are																																																									
89	Andreas	Stephan,	‘Survey	of	Public	Attitudes	to	Price-Fixing	and	Cartel	Enforcement	in	Britain’	
(2008)	5(1)	CLR	123,	141.	
90	Commission,	Press	release,	‘Antitrust:	Commission	introduces	settlement	procedure	for	
cartels’	<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-1056_en.htm?locale=en>	accessed	2	
March	2015.	
91	For	example,	one	can	see	the	UK’s	position	regarding	plea	bargaining	complex	fraud	cases.	
Serious	Fraud	Office,	SFO	Operational	Handbook	(2012)	–	‘Guilty	Pleas	and	Plea	Bargaining’.	
92	Monty	Raphael,	‘Plea	Bargaining	and	the	role	of	the	lawyer’	(2008)	Peters	&	Peters.	Speech	
delivered	to	the	European	Criminal	Bar	Association	at	Bratislava	12	March	2008,	1.	Similar	
concerns	have	also	been	raised	by	the	Judiciary	in	Ireland	see:	Peter	Charleton	SC	and	Paul	
McDermott	BL,	‘Constitutional	Implications	of	Plea	Bargaining’	(2000)	July	BarReview	476.	
93	Gary	McKinnon	v	Government	of	the	USA	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Home	Department	[2007]	
EWHC	762	(Admin)	para	[54].	
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alleged	to	have	approached	the	plea	bargain	negotiations.	
Viewed	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 an	 English	 court	 the	
notion	 that	 a	 prosecutor	 may	 seek	 to	 induce	 a	 plea	 of	
guilty	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 substantial	 benefits	 will	 be	
withdrawn	if	one	is	not	forthcoming	is	anathema.”	
	
This	is	a	relevant	consideration	for	our	analysis	because	if	judges	sitting	in	the	
EU	 General	 Court	 are	 similarly	 sceptical	 or	 disapprove	 of	 the	 use	 of	 plea	
agreements	it	may	cause	issues	if	the	EU	were	to	implement	a	plea	bargaining	
system.	 For	 example,	 it	 could	 lead	 to	 perfectly	 acceptable	 plea	 agreements	
being	rejected,	or	unfairly	scrutinised.	However,	the	exact	opposite	could	also	
occur,	 where	 judges	 who	 favour	 plea	 agreements	 may	 not	 conduct	 a	
thorough	 analysis	 of	 the	 case	 and	 treat	 it	 more	 as	 a	 ‘rubber	 stamping’	
exercise.	 Nevertheless,	 these	 issues	 could	 successfully	 be	 addressed	 with	
clear	guidance	from	the	both	the	Commission	and	Court’s	on	plea	bargaining	
and	 by	 ensuring	 that	 the	 necessary	 judicial	 safeguards	 –	 that	 are	 discussed	
later	–	are	met.	
	
A	 further	concern	 that	could	be	 raised	 is	with	 regards	 to	 the	potential	 lack	of	
consistency	 between	 the	 reductions	 the	 Commission	 awards	 in	 plea	
agreements.	 This	 issue	 stems	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 plea	 bargaining	 reductions	
could	 be	 very	 flexible	 and	 hence	 can	 lead	 to	 concerns	 regarding	 unequal	
treatment	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 legal	 certainty	 in	 settlement	 decisions	 –	 something	
which	 this	 thesis	 has	 discussed	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	
procedure	 in	Chapter	3.	But,	 this	again	 is	not	 really	an	 issue	because	detailed	
guidelines	 (like	 those	 issued	 around	 the	 current	 leniency	 programme)	 can	
address	 these	 concerns	 by	 effectively	 helping	 undertakings	 understand	 what	
criteria	 are	 used	 in	 awarding	 the	 discounts	 and	 broadly	 how	 these	 ranges	 of	
discounts	are	set.		
	
Simply	 transplanting	 a	plea	bargaining	 system	 into	 the	EU	 cartel	 enforcement	
procedure	may	not	be	the	answer	to	addressing	the	issues	that	this	chapter	has	
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identified.	 Indeed,	 Alkon	 has	 analysed	 whether	 transplanting	 plea	 bargaining	
procedures	to	countries	which	are	trying	to	deal	with	multiple	cases	can	solve	
their	 problems.94	Her	 analysis	 identified	 that	 doing	 so	 can	 lead	 to	 unintended	
negative	 consequences	 and	 one	 has	 to	 identify	 if	 there	 are	 better	 ways	 of	
bringing	reform	to	address	the	issues.95	Yet,	we	have	identified	what	the	issues	
are	 with	 the	 current	 regime	 and	 seen	 what	 the	 potential	 benefits	 of	
implementing	a	plea	bargaining	procedure	are,	alongside	the	possible	problems	
that	could	result	from	doing	so.	Let	us	now	consider	how	we	can	implement	the	
system	 within	 the	 EU	 and	 quell	 most	 of	 these	 concerns	 through	 the	 judicial	
safeguards,	which	would	be	put	in	place.	
	
5.2.4	Is	a	system	of	plea	bargaining	compatible	with	the	ECHR:	the	case	of	
Natsvlishvili	and	Togonidze	v	Georgia?		
As	 we	 are	 seeking	 to	 ascertain	 the	 ECtHR’s	 decision	 and	 views	 on	 plea	
bargaining	it	is	important	that	the	facts	and	procedural	background	to	this	case	
are	 examined	 in	 detail	 so	 that	we	 can	 understand	 how	 the	 plea	 bargain	was	
agreed	 between	 the	 Georgian	 prosecutors	 office	 and	 the	 applicants.96	This	 is	
crucial	 as	 we	 need	 to	 appreciate	 what	 procedural	 safeguards	 need	 to	 be	 in	
place	 to	 protect	 the	 individual’s	 right	 of	 fair	 trial	 for	 plea	 bargaining	 to	 be	
permissible.	 Additionally,	 this	 is	 the	 first	 case	 where	 the	 ECtHR	 has	 assessed	
plea	bargaining	 in	 the	context	of	Article	6	of	 the	ECHR.	For	 these	 reasons	 the	
facts	of	the	case	and	procedural	process	are	discussed	in-depth	below.		
	
5.2.4.1	The	Procedural	Process	and	Material	Facts	of	the	Case	
There	were	two	applicants	to	the	case,	the	first	applicant	was	Mr	Natsvlishvili,	
and	 the	 second	 was	 Mrs	 Togonidze	 (henceforth,	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘N’	 and	 ‘T’	
respectively).	The	applicants	were	husband	and	wife	–	Georgian	nationals	–	who	
at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 original	 charges	 resided	 in	 Georgia.	Mr	 N	was	 the	 deputy																																																									
94	Cynthia	Alkon,	‘Plea	Bargaining	as	a	Legal	Transplant:		A	Good	Idea	for	Troubled	Criminal	
Justice	Systems?’	(2010)	19	Transnational	Law	&	Contemporary	Problems	355.	
95	ibid	418.	
96	Although	this	decision	was	not	that	of	the	Grand	Chamber,	the	judgment	of	the	Chamber	of	
the	Court	has	become	final	under	Article	44(2)	of	the	ECHR	and	thus	it	cannot	be	appealed.	
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Mayor	 of	 Kutaisi	 from	1993-to-1995	 and	 the	managing	director	 of	 one	of	 the	
most	important	public	companies	(hereafter,	referred	to	as	‘the	factory’)	in	the	
country	 from	 1995-to-2000.97	Mr	 N	 held	 12.95	 percent	 of	 the	 shares	 in	 the	
factory,	Mrs	 T	2.6	percent	 and	 the	 State	held	 the	 remaining	78.61	percent	of	
shares.98		
	
In	 December	 2002	 Mr	 N	 was	 kidnapped	 and	 held	 for	 ransom.	 Whilst	 in	 his	
abductors	 care	 Mr	 N	 was	 ‘severely	 ill-treated’	 by	 his	 captors. 99 	He	 was	
eventually	 released	when	 his	 family	 paid	 a	 large	 ransom	 for	 his	 freedom.	On	
March	12th	2004	charges	were	brought	against	him	alleging	that	he	had	illegally	
reduced	 share	 capital	 in	 the	 factory.	 He	 was	 charged	 with	 ‘making	 fictitious	
sales,	transfers	and	write-offs,	and	spending	the	proceeds	without	regard	to	the	
company’s	 interests’.100	On	March	 15th	 2004	Mr	 N	 was	 arrested	 and	 on	 the	
16th	he	had	appointed	a	 lawyer	 to	 represent	himself.101	When	questioned	on	
the	17th	March	2004	Mr	N	protested	his	 innocence	and	exercised	his	 right	 to	
silence.102	On	the	same	day,	the	prosecution	brought	an	application	before	the	
Court	 for	Mr	N	 to	be	detained	 in	 custody	 as	 if	 not	he	may	 interfere	with	 the	
case.	The	Court	granted	 this	application	and	he	was	held	 in	 custody	 for	 three	
months.	On	March	25th	2004	Mr	N	sent	a	letter	to	the	prosecution	stating	that:		
	
“Since	 I	 [Mr	 N]	 am	 not	 indifferent	 to	 the	 future	 of	 the	
automobile	 factory	 and	 consider	 it	 possible	 to	 settle	 the	
problems	[I	am	having]	with	the	State,	I	express	my	readiness	
to	forfeit	the	shares	in	the	factory	which	are	currently	in	my	
and	my	wife’s	possession	to	the	State.”103	
	
																																																								
97	Natsvlishvili	and	Togonidze	(n	26)	para	[9].	
98	ibid	para	[10].	
99	ibid	para	[11].	
100	ibid	para	[12].	
101	ibid	para	[15].	
102	ibid	para	[16].	
103	ibid	para	[18].	
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On	the	14th	June	2004	the	Court	extended	Mr	N’s	detention	until	the	15th	July	
2004,	 and	 then	 again	 in	 July	 until	 15th	 September	 2004.104	For	 the	 first	 four	
months	of	Mr	N’s	detention	he	spent	 it	 in	a	cell	with	the	same	person	as	who	
was	charged	with	his	kidnapping	in	2002	–	alongside	another	 inmate	who	was	
serving	 a	 prison	 sentence	 for	 murder. 105 	The	 Public	 Defender’s	 Office	
complained	 that	 this	 put	 Mr	 N’s	 ‘physical	 and	 psychological	 well-being	 at	
risk,’106	which	led	to	him	being	placed	in	a	different	cell.	It	was	not	until	the	1st	
of	August	2004	that	Mr	N	and	his	lawyer	were	given	access	to	his	case	file	and	
materials.107	On	the	6th	August	2004	Mr	N	appointed	a	second	lawyer,	and	on	
the	 6th	 September	 2004	 the	 prosecutor’s	 office	 finally	 terminated	 the	
investigation	into	him.108	At	this	time,	Mr	N	again	protested	his	innocence,	but	
confirmed	his	intention	to	cooperate	with	the	prosecutions	investigation.109	On	
the	same	day	as	making	this	statement	Mr	N	and	Mrs	T	transferred	their	12.95	
and	 2.6	 (respectively)	 percentage	 of	 shares	 in	 the	 factory	 to	 the	 State.	 The	
prosecutor’s	office	then	demanded	that	Mr	N’s	family	pay	50,000	Georgian	Laris	
to	the	‘Fund	for	the	Development	of	State	Bodies	ensuring	the	Protection	of	the	
Law’,	but	 that	Mr	N’s	and	Mrs	T’s	names	must	not	appear	as	 the	ones	paying	
the	money.110	Mrs	M.I.-dze	–	who	was	Mrs	T’s	 sister-in-law	–	 therefore	made	
this	 payment	 on	 the	 family’s	 behalf	 on	 the	 8th	 September	 2004	 by	 bank	
transfer.111		
	
Mr	 N	 then	 filed	 a	 written	 statement	 with	 the	 prosecutor’s	 office	 on	 9th	
September	 2004	 to	 arrange	 a	 plea	 bargain	 with	 them.112	In	 the	 written	
statement	Mr	N	stated	that	he	still	considered	himself	to	be	innocent,	but	that	
he	was	willing	to	reach	a	settlement	with	the	State.	He	stated	that	he	would	pay																																																									
104	ibid	para	[19].	
105	ibid	para	[20].	
106	ibid.	
107	ibid	para	[21].	
108	ibid	para	[22].	
109	ibid.	
110	ibid	para	[25]	this	was	according	to	a	witness	statement	by	Mrs	M.I.-dze,	who	was	Mrs	T’s	
sister-in-law.	
111	ibid	para	[26].	
112	ibid	para	[27].	This	procedure	had	only	recently	been	introduced	into	the	Georgian	judicial	
system	in	February	2004.	
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35,000	 Georgian	 Laris	 to	 the	 State	 budget	 and	 that	 he	 ‘fully	 understood	 the	
contents	of	the	agreement	[plea	bargain].’113		The	prosecutor’s	office	–	on	the	
same	day	–	offered	him	a	plea	bargain	regarding	the	sentence	to	be	 imposed.	
The	plea	agreement	noted	that	Mr	N	had	refused	to	confess	to	the	charges,	but	
had	 ‘actively	 cooperated	with	 the	 investigation’	 by	 repaying	 the	harm	he	had	
caused	by	returning	shares	 in	the	factory	to	the	State.114	It	was	then	noted	by	
the	prosecutors	that	even	though	this	was	a	serious	offence	punishable	with	a	
prison	sentence	of	six-to-twelve	years,	that	it	was	still	possible	–	due	to	the	full	
compensation	and	interest	of	the	most	effective	use	of	State	resources	to	offer	
him	a	plea	agreement.115	The	prosecutor	promised	 that	he	would	 request	 the	
court	 to	 convict	 Mr	 N	 without	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 merits	 and	 seeking	 a	
reduced	sentence	in	the	form	of	a	35,000	Georgian	Laris	fine.116	At	this	stage	Mr	
N	 was	 informed	 that	 this	 plea	 agreement	 would	 not	 exclude	 him	 from	 civil	
liability	 and	 he	 stated	 that	 he	 fully	 understood	 this	 and	 the	 agreement	 itself	
again.	He	then	stated	how	he	was	ready	to	accept	the	agreement	and	that	the	
decision	 was	 ‘not	 the	 result	 of	 any	 duress,	 pressure	 of	 any	 kind	 or	 undue	
promise’.117	Mr	N,	his	two	lawyers	and	the	prosecutor’s	office,	then	signed	the	
plea	bargain	agreement.	On	the	same	day	the	prosecutor’s	office	filled	the	plea	
agreement	with	the	court	requesting	for	its	approval,	and	Mrs	M.I.-dze	paid	the	
fine	of	35,000	Georgian	Laris.118	
	
On	the	10th	September	2004	the	City	Court	examined	the	prosecution	office’s	
request,	and	 the	 judge	again	explained	 to	Mr	N	about	his	 rights	under	Article	
679-3	of	 the	Code	of	Criminal	Procedure.119	Mr	N	then	acknowledged	that	 ‘he	
was	 well	 aware	 of	 his	 rights	 and	 that	 he	 had	 agreed	 to	 bargain	 voluntarily,	
without	 having	 being	 subjected	 to	 any	 kind	 of	 undue	 pressure	 during	 the	
																																																								
113	ibid	emphasis	added.	
114	ibid	para	[28].	
115	ibid.	
116	ibid.	
117	ibid.	
118	ibid	paras	[29	and	30].	
119	ibid	para	[31].	
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negotiations	with	the	prosecutor’.120	His	lawyer	also	confirmed	this	to	the	court.	
They	both	 then	asked	the	 judge	to	endorse	 the	plea	bargain	stating	 they	 fully	
assumed	the	consequences.	The	Court	accepted	that	the	charges	against	Mr	N	
were	well	 founded,121	and	that	after	 judicial	examination	the	plea	bargain	had	
been	 reached	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 law	 and	 endorsed	 it	 and	 Mr	 N	 was	
consequently	released.122	
	
5.2.4.2	Analysis	of	the	ECtHR	assessment	of	the	case		
The	 applicants	 raised	 various	 challenges	 before	 the	 ECtHR	 under	 the	
Convention.	However,	the	relevant	allegations	for	our	analysis	of	the	viability	of	
plea	 bargaining	within	 the	 EU	 are	 those	 that	 focus	 on	 the	 argument	 that	 the	
plea	bargaining	process	had	been	an	abuse	of	process	and	unfair	and,	therefore,	
was	 in	 breach	 of	 Article	 6(1)	 of	 the	 ECHR;	 and,	 that	 the	 financial	 penalties	
imposed	on	 the	 applicants	 as	 part	 of	 the	plea	bargain	were	 a	 breach	of	 their	
rights	under	Protocol	1,	Article	1.123	
	
The	ECtHR	begun	by	noting	 that	 it	 is	 a	 common	 feature	of	 European	 criminal	
justice	systems	to	allow	for	the	accused	to	be	granted	a	reduction	in	sentence	
or	lessening	of	the	charges	if	the	defendant	pleads	guilty	or	provides	assistance	
with	 the	 authorities	 investigation.124	Indeed,	 if	 one	 wishes	 to	 consider	 how	
prevalent	plea	bargains	are	within	the	EU	consulting	the	Ahmad,	Aswat,	Ahsan	
and	Mustafa	 v	 UK	 case	 is	 fruitful	 –	 as	 in	 this	 case	 the	 ECtHR	 highlighted	 the	
prevalence	of	plea	bargains	within	EU	Member	States	–	and	signatory	States	to	
the	Convention.125																																																										
120	ibid.	
121	ibid	para	[32].	
122	ibid	para	[33].	
123	ibid	Para	[3].	
124	ibid	para	[90].	
125	Ahmad,	Aswat,	Ahsan	and	Mustafa	v	UK	App	nos	24027/07,	11949/08	and	36742/08	partial	
decision	as	to	admissibility	(ECtHR,	6	July	2010),	para	[167].	For	example,	plea	bargains	have	
been	involved	in	the	following	cases:	Slavcho	Kostov	v	Bulgaria	App	no	28674/03	(ECtHR,	27	
November	2008)	para	[17];	Ruciński	v	Poland	App	no	33198/04,	(ECtHR,	20	February	2007)	para	
[12];	Sardinas	Albo	v	Italy	App	no	56271/00	(ECtHR,	17	February	2005)	para	[22];	Erdem	v	
Germany	(dec)	App	no	38321/97	(ECtHR,	9	December	1999)	and	Dimitrov	and	Hamanov	v	
Bulgaria	App	nos	48059/06	and	2708/09	(ECtHR,	10	August	2011).	
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In	 the	Natsvlishvili	 and	 Togonidze	 case	 the	 Court	 stated	 that	 in	 itself	 it	 is	 not	
improper	to	have	a	plea	bargaining	system	and	that	 ‘[the	Court]	subscribes	to	
the	idea	that	plea	bargaining,	apart	from	offering	[…]	important	benefits	[…]	can	
also,	 if	 applied	 correctly,	 be	 a	 successful	 tool	 in	 combating	 corruption	 and	
organised	 crime’.126	Indeed,	 the	 Court	 has	 held	 before	 there	 is	 not	 anything	
improper	in	the	process	of	a	prosecuting	authority	offering	charge	or	sentencing	
bargaining	 as	 long	 as	 the	 individual’s	 rights	 are	 adequately	 protected.127	The	
key	question	here	becomes	what	 is	 sufficient	 to	 form	adequate	protection	of	
the	 individual’s	 rights?	 The	 ECtHR	 sought	 to	 reiterate	 in	 the	Natsvlishvili	 and	
Togonidze	judgment	that	an	individual	can	waive	their	procedural	rights	if	they	
wish	 as	 there	 is	 nothing	 within	 the	 ‘letter	 or	 spirit’	 of	 Article	 6	 ECHR	 which	
prohibits	a	person	from	waiving	them	as	long	as	it	is	of	their	freewill	and	there	
are	 sufficient	 safeguards	 in	 place	when	 they	 do	 so.128	It	 is	 worth	 noting	 here	
that	this	 is	a	belief	that	the	ECtHR	has	held	for	some	time	now	–	for	example,	
one	can	consider	the	comments	of	the	Court	in	the	Scoppola	case	from	2009.129		
	
The	 Court	 stated	 that	 Mr	 N	 waived	 his	 right	 to	 have	 the	 case	 against	 him	
examined	 on	 the	 merits	 as	 he	 struck	 a	 bargain	 and	 plead	 no	 contest	 to	 the	
charges	with	 the	 prosecution	 authority.130	However,	 the	 Court	 felt	 that	when	
Mr	N	or	any	applicant	strikes	a	plea	agreement	it	needs	to	be	accompanied	by	
the	following	conditions:	
	
‘(a)	 The	 bargain	 [has]	 to	 be	 accepted	 by	 the	 applicant	 in	
full	 awareness	 of	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 case	 and	 the	 legal	
consequences	 and	 in	 a	 genuinely	 voluntary	manner;	 and	
(b)	 the	 content	 of	 the	 bargain	 and	 the	 fairness	 of	 the	
																																																								
126	Natsvlishvili	and	Togonidze	(n	26)	para	[90].	
127	Ahmad,	Aswat,	Ahsan	and	Mustafa	v	UK	App	nos	24027/07,	11949/08	and	36742/08	partial	
decision	as	to	admissibility	(ECtHR,	6	July	2010).		
128	Natsvlishvili	and	Togonidze	(n	26)	para	[91].	
129	Scoppola	v	Italy	(no.	2)	[GC]	App	no	10249/03	para	135,	17	September	2009.	
130	Natsvlishvili	and	Togonidze	(n	26)	para	[92].	
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manner	in	which	it	had	been	reached	between	the	parties	
had	to	be	subjected	to	sufficient	judicial	review’.131	
	
These	requirements	are	what	one	can	assume	are	necessitated	by	the	ECtHR	to	
ensure	 that	 an	 individual’s	 rights	 are	 adequately	 protected.	 This	 therefore	
means	that	Mr	N	needed	to	be	fully	aware	of	the	facts	and	legal	consequences,	
and	 that	 he	 entered	 the	 plea	 agreement	 in	 a	genuinely	 voluntary	manner.	 In	
addition,	the	plea	agreement	has	to	also	be	subject	to	judicial	review	by	a	court.	
In	Mr	 N’s	 case	 one	 could	 question	 whether	 this	 has	 occurred.	 However,	 the	
ECtHR	felt	that	there	had	been	no	violation	of	the	Convention	as:	Mr	N	initiated	
the	plea	agreement;132	he	expressed	his	own	unequivocal	willingness	 to	 repay	
the	 harm	 he	 caused	 to	 the	 State	 (through	 the	 shares); 133 	he	 had	 legal	
representation	 throughout	 the	 proceedings	 and	 negotiations	 and	 adequate	
access	to	the	case	materials	early	on	in	the	proceedings;134	the	plea	was	written	
up	and	then	examined	by	the	National	Court,	with	the	court	not	being	bound	by	
the	agreement;135	and	finally,	that	Mr	N	had	expressed	regularly	that	there	had	
been	no	undue	pressure	or	coercion	in	the	bargaining	process.136	
	
Nevertheless,	 the	 author	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 much	 more	 sceptical	 of	 the	 plea	
bargain	agreement	in	this	case	than	the	Court	has	been.	When	we	consider	the	
facts	of	the	case	there	seem	to	be	some	serious	procedural	irregularities	which	
could	have	–	in	the	authors	mind	–	led	to	this	plea	bargain	being	held	as	being	
unfair,	 or	 potentially	 even,	 coerced.	 Let	 us	 begin	with	 the	 fact	 that	 the	Court	
held	that	Mr	N	had	initiated	the	plea	agreement.	Yes,	it	is	true	that	on	the	25th	
March	2004	he	sent	a	letter	to	the	prosecution’s	office	indicating	he	was	willing	
to	‘give’	the	shares	back	to	the	State,	but	we	need	to	consider	the	reasons	why	
he	was	so	quick	to	make	this	offer,	when	in	particular,	the	case	was	still	being																																																									
131	ibid.	
132	ibid	para	[93].	
133	ibid.	
134	ibid.	
135	ibid	paras	[94]	and	[95].	The	ECtHR	placed	a	great	amount	of	value	on	the	national	court	
being	able	to	assess	the	written	agreement	and	the	fact	that	Mr	N	had	begun	the	negotiation	
discussions	himself.	
136	ibid	para	[93].	
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investigated.	Mr	N	was	detained	in	custody	on	the	17th	March	2004	and	held	in	
a	cell	with	the	person	who	had	been	charged	with	his	kidnapping	in	2002.	This	
letter	was	sent	after	spending	eight	days	in	a	cell	with	the	accused.	It	seems	a	
reasonable	premise	to	conclude	that	Mr	N	being	placed	in	a	cell	with	a	person	
who	 has	 seriously	mistreated	 him	 and	 kidnapped	 him	would	 have	 a	 negative	
impact	on	his	wellbeing.	Indeed,	 it	does	not	seem	a	stretch	of	the	imagination	
to	suggest	that	this	may	have	been	a	massive	factor	 in	him	seeking	to	enter	a	
plea	agreement.	That	is	to	say,	he	probably	sought	desperately	to	get	out	of	jail	
and	away	from	his	previous	kidnapper	as	soon	as	possible.	
	
Another	 apprehension	 that	 can	 be	 had	 around	 this	 plea	 agreement	 is	 the	
peculiar	 way	 in	 which	 shares	 and	 money	 changed	 hands	 prior	 to	 the	 plea	
bargain	 being	 agreed.	 The	 shares	 in	 the	 factory	were	 transferred	 back	 to	 the	
State	 at	 the	 very	 beginning	 of	 the	 case	 prior	 to	 any	 agreement	 even	 being	
made.	 This	 in	 itself	 seems	 highly	 questionable.	 The	matter	 is	 however	 made	
worse	when	we	consider	 that	Mr	N’s	 family	 then	had	 to	pay	50,000	Georgian	
Laris	to	the	‘Fund	for	the	Development	of	State	Bodies	ensuring	the	Protection	
of	 the	Law’,	but	yet	his	and	Mrs	T’s	names	could	not	 appear	as	 the	ones	 that	
were	paying	the	money.	This	meant	that	Mrs	M.I.-dze	–	Mrs	T’s	sister-in-law	–	
had	 to	make	 the	payment.	 Then,	Mr	N	had	 to	pay	 a	 further	 35,000	Georgian	
Laris	 to	 the	 State	 budget,	 which	 again	 was	 paid	 by	Mrs	M.I.-dze.	 This	 seems	
rather	 suspicious	 even	 to	 the	 uncynical.	 Why	 did	 two	 payments	 have	 to	 be	
made	 (one	of	which	 could	not	have	 the	defendants	name	on	 it);	why	did	 the	
shares	 also	 have	 to	 be	 transferred	 back	 to	 the	 State	 of	 one	 of	 the	 country’s	
most	 important	 companies?	 It	 is	 felt	 that	 these	 are	 questions	 that	 the	 ECtHR	
should	 have	 asked	 and	 conducted	 a	 more	 detailed	 analysis	 into	 as	 it	 seems	
counterintuitive	not	to	when	one	is	supposed	to	be	ensuring	that	an	individual’s	
right	 to	 a	 fair	 trial	 is	 adequately	 protected.	 These	 questions	 still	 remain	
unanswered,	and	will	do	so	now.	
	
In	the	 judgment,	the	ECtHR	stated	that,	 the	National	Court	examined	the	plea	
agreement.	However,	what	 is	not	clear	 from	the	 judgment	 is	how	much	of	an	
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analysis	 the	 National	 Court	 actually	 conducted	 into	 the	 agreement.	 It	 is	
acknowledged	 that	 the	 National	 Court	 did	 note	 that	 there	 was	 sufficient	
evidence	to	charge	Mr	N,	confirmed	that	he	understood	his	rights	and	that	he	
had	agreed	to	the	agreement	voluntarily.	However,	was	sufficient	time	allotted	
to	 truly	deliberate	on	 the	plea	and	 the	evidence	against	him?	 It	 is	possible	 to	
conclude	 that	given	 the	 time	 in	which	 this	plea	agreement	was	considered	 in,	
that	 the	 National	 Court	 might	 have	 actually	 just	 been	 conducting	 more	 of	 a	
‘rubber	stamping	exercise’	than	truly	assessing	the	case.	
	
These	 concerns	 and	 procedural	 irregularities	 within	 plea	 agreements	 are	
something	 that	has	often	been	 raised	as	potential	 issues	 and	 concerns	within	
the	academic	literature	on	plea	bargaining.137	The	vast	majority	of	this	literature	
is	 of	 US	 origin	 and	 therefore	 focuses	 on	 their	 procedure,	 but	 many	 of	 the	
concerns	 can	 transcend	across	all	plea	bargaining	programmes.	Therefore,	we	
shall	now	consider	some	of	the	 issues	raised	 in	the	 literature	 in	regards	to	Mr	
N’s	case	and	 into	the	 implementation	of	plea	bargaining	system	within	a	 legal	
system.		
	
It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 plea	 bargaining	 is	 unconstitutional	 as	 it	 sets	 up	 a	
system,	which	in	essence,	forces	defendants	to	plead	guilty	and	accept	the	plea	
bargain.138	This	 is	 because	 if	 the	 defendant	 opts	 for	 a	 trial	 by	 jury	 the	
prosecution	 will	 charge	 the	 defendant	 more	 harshly	 than	 if	 they	 agree	 to	
plead.139	This	 in	 turn	 leads	 to	 fewer	 trials	 by	 jury.	 One	 could	 see	 this	 as	
potentially	being	the	case	for	Mr	N	where,	he	could	have	been	prosecuted	for	
an	offence,	which	carried	a	potential	prison	sentence	of	six-to-twelve	years	but	
by	 plea	 bargaining	 he	 got	 a	 greatly	 reduced	 sentence,	 specifically,	 a	 fine.	
																																																								
137	For	example,	Pal	has	written	broadly	on	the	various	issues,	Shivani	Pal,	‘Issues	and	
Controversies	Surrounding	the	Use	of	Plea	Bargaining	in	International	Criminal	Tribunals’	(2013)	
PhD	Thesis,	p51-76.	
138	Timothy	Lynch,	‘The	case	against	Plea	Bargaining’	(2003)	Regulation	Fall	2003	24	and	Tina	
Wan,	‘The	unnecessary	evil	of	plea	bargaining:	An	unconstitutional	conditions	problem	and	a	
not-so-least	restrictive	alternative’	(2007)	17(1)	Review	of	Law	and	Social	Justice	33,	40.	
139	ibid	Lynch	[25].	
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Though	 he	 had	 already	 spent	 time	 detained	 in	 prison	 so	 that	 he	 did	 not	
‘interfere	with	the	case’.		
	
Dervan	and	Eddkins	have	conducted	a	psychological	study	on	college	students	
to	 identify	 whether	 innocent	 ‘defendants’	 would	 plead	 guilty.140	They	 found	
that	more	 then	half	 of	 the	 innocent	 participants	were	willing	 to	 falsely	 admit	
guilt	in	return	for	a	benefit.141	If	we	consider	Mr	N’s	case	we	can	see	that,	right	
from	the	start	of	the	case	–	and	throughout	the	case	–	he	maintained	the	claim	
that	he	was	innocent	but	just	wished	to	put	the	matter	behind	him.	In	cases	like	
this	it	is	worrying	that	the	defendant	does	not	go	to	a	full	trial	so	that	the	facts	
of	 the	 case	 can	be	 fully	 assessed	by	 the	 court;	 and	hopefully	 a	 truly	 innocent	
defendant	would	be	found	not	guilty	here.	It	is	scenarios	like	this	where	we	see	
an	 innocent	 defendant	 coerced	 into	 pleading	 guilty	 because	 of	 the	 potential	
risks	from	taking	the	case	to	trial	are	much	higher	than	accepting	a	plea	bargain.	
This	 is	 the	 situation	 where	 plea	 bargaining	 becomes	 most	 dangerous	 to	
defendants;	namely,	a	truly	innocent	defendant.	Even	though	they	are	innocent	
they	may	 not	 be	 able	 to	 prove	 their	 case,	 and	 no	 one	 can	 say	with	 certainty	
what	will	happen	if	they	go	to	court.	But,	if	they	accept	the	plea	agreement	they	
know	what	 fine	or	sentence	the	prosecution	will	 recommend	and,	 if	 the	court	
endorses	the	plea	what	fine	or	sentence	they	will	receive.	As	Mr	N	found,	once	
a	 court	 approves	 a	 plea	 agreement	 it	 is	 incredibly	 difficult	 for	 a	 defendant	 to	
manage	 to	overturn	 it.	 In	 the	US	 for	example,	 there	are	only	 three	categories	
that	a	defendant	can	raise	a	challenge	under.142	Yet,	even	if	the	defendant	can	
raise	 an	 issue	 under	 one	 of	 these	 categories	 they	 are	 unlikely	 to	 succeed	 in	
having	 the	 plea	 bargain	 overturned.143	Plea	 bargains	 may	 lead	 to	 ‘buyer’s	
remorse’	but	a	defendant	cannot	get	it	overturned	simply	because	they	regret																																																									
140	Lucian	Dervan	and	Vanessa	Edkins,	‘The	Innocent	Defendant’s	Dilemma:	An	Innovative	
Empirical	Study	of	Plea	Bargaining’s	Innocence	Problem’	(2013)	103(1)	Journal	of	Criminal	law	
and	Criminology	1.		
141	ibid	36.	
142	Prison	Law	Office,	‘Challenging	a	Conviction	or	Sentence	After	a	Plea	Bargain’	(2013).	These	
are:	(1)	issues	that	can	be	raised	on	direct	appeal	without	a	certificate	of	probable	cause;	(2)	
issues	that	can	be	raised	on	direct	appeal	only	with	a	certificate	of	probable	cause	 and	(3)	
issues	that	can	be	raised	only	in	a	state	court	petition	for	writ	of	habeas	corpus.		
143	ibid	[2].	
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agreeing	to	the	decision.	Indeed,	the	ECtHR	noted	that	Mr	N	chose	to	waive	his	
right	 to	 have	 the	 evidence	 and	 case	 heard	 and	 cannot	 have	 the	 agreement	
overturned	just	because	he	may	regret	the	decision.	
	
Given	the	fact	that	there	are	so	many	procedural	 irregularities	within	this	plea	
bargain	 and	 that	 many	 of	 the	 criticisms	 levied	 against	 operating	 a	 plea	
bargaining	system	seem	to	occur	here,	it	could	legitimately	lead	one	to	question	
why	 the	 ECtHR	 did	 not	 find	 that	 in	 this	 case	 the	 plea	 agreement	was	 unfair.	
Perhaps,	given	 the	 fact	 that	 the	plea	bargaining	system,	had	at	 the	 time,	only	
recently	been	 introduced	 in	Georgia	 and	 that	 there	has	been	 further	 changes	
made	 to	 the	 system	 by	 the	 time	 the	 case	 went	 before	 the	 court	 the	 ECtHR	
sought	not	to	interfere	in	the	domestic	system.	However,	whatever	the	reasons,	
this	plea	agreement	appears	unfair	and	the	Court’s	decision	(on	the	legality	of	
this	plea	agreement)	seems	suspect.	Indeed,	even	one	of	the	judges	within	the	
decision	 was	 herself	 much	more	 critical	 of	 the	 plea	 agreement.	 Judge	 Alvina	
Gyulumyan	 partially	 dissented	 with	 regards	 to	 whether	 there	 had	 been	 a	
violation	of	Article	6(1)	ECHR	and	Protocol	7	Article	2.	The	reasons	why	 Judge	
Gyulumyan	dissented	are	insightful	for	our	analysis	of	plea	bargaining	and	raise	
similar	concerns	to	those	that	the	author	has	above.		
	
Judge	 Gyulumyan	 begun	 by	 stating	 that	 there	 was	 no	 objection	 or	 concerns	
raised	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 utilisation	 of	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 system.	 Indeed,	 she	
sought	to	make	this	fact	crystal	clear	by	stating	that	it	was	not	her	objective	‘to	
call	 into	 question	 the	 system	of	 plea	 bargaining	 as	 such,	 in	 general	 terms’.144	
The	 concerns,	 which	 she	 raised	 here,	 were	 related	 specifically	 to	 the	
circumstances	 of	 the	 case	 before	 the	 Court	 and	 the	 early	 Georgian	model	 of	
plea	bargaining.		
	
The	opinion	of	 Judge	Gyulumyan	was	 that	 the	question	of	whether	Mr	N	and	
the	 prosecutions	 office	 were	 on	 ‘equal	 footing’	 during	 the	 plea	 bargaining	
																																																								
144	Natsvlishvili	and	Togonidze	(n	26)	para	[2]	Dissenting	Opinion.	
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process	could	not	have	been	thoroughly	examined	by	the	National	Court	as	the	
plea	 bargaining	 process	 negotiations	 had	 not	 been	 recorded	 in	 full.145	Judge	
Gyulumyan	 was	 also	 concerned	 that	 there	 had	 been	 several	 ‘shady	 factual	
circumstances	of	 the	case’	–	 such	as	 factory	 shares	changing	hands	as	well	as	
monetary	 payments	 prior	 to	 the	 procedural	 agreement	 being	 agreed	 –	which	
leads	 to	 one	 questioning	 the	 equality	 of	 power	 during	 the	 negotiations.146	In	
addition	to	these	concerns	Judge	Gyulumyan	had	questions	as	to	whether	Mr	N	
could	have	agreed	to	the	plea	bargain	in	a	‘truly	voluntary	manner’	because	of	
the	extremely	high	 conviction	 rate	 in	Georgia	 at	 the	material	 time	 (99.6%).147	
Indeed,	if	we	consider	this	objectively	we	can	see	that	it	was	arguably	almost	a	
full-blown	conclusion	that	he	would	have	been	convicted	had	he	gone	to	court.	
Therefore,	the	best	option	for	him	would	be	to	take	whatever	the	prosecutor’s	
office	would	offer	him	with	open-arms.		
	
Judge	Gyulumyan	also	expressed	fears	that	the	evidence	against	Mr	N	was	not	
sufficiently	 examined	 by	 the	National	 Court	 so	 as	 to	 ensure	 that	 there	was	 a	
strong	enough	case	against	him	that	he	had	to	answer.	This	was	based	on	the	
fact	that	the	National	Court	only	examined	the	brief	in	a	day	and	approved	the	
plea	 bargain	 the	 next	 day.	 Judge	 Gyulumyan	 argues	 that	 this	 did	 not	 allow	
sufficient	 time	 for	 detailed	 consideration	 of	 the	 evidence	 against	 the	
defendant.148		
	
Lastly,	Judge	Gyulumyan	raised	concerns	regarding	the	fact	that	Mr	N	could	not	
lodge	 an	 appeal	 against	 the	 plea	 bargain	 at	 a	 national	 level,	which	 limits	 the	
important	role	of	judicial	supervision	in	plea	bargain	agreements.149	Therefore,	
she	argued	that	there	needs	to	be	stricter	procedural	safeguards	in	place	when	
a	defendant	enters	a	plea	bargain	but	pleads	not	guilty	to	the	charges.150		
																																																									
145	ibid	para	[3]	Dissenting	Opinion.	
146	ibid.	
147	ibid	para	[4]	Dissenting	Opinion.	
148	ibid	para	[5]	Dissenting	Opinion.	
149	ibid	para	[6]	Dissenting	Opinion.	
150	ibid	para	[7]	Dissenting	Opinion.	
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The	 concerns	 raised	by	 Judge	Gyulumyan	are	 similar	 to	 those	 that	 the	author	
raised	and	 to	what	one	would	presumably	have	expected	 the	other	 judges	 to	
wish	to	be	discussed	in	the	case.	Perhaps	this	difference	in	opinion	is	down	to	
the	 personal	 perception	 of	 the	 individual	 considering	 the	 issue,	 where	 some	
may	take	a	more	cautious	approach	to	these	matters	than	others.	However,	all	
of	the	concerns	raised	here	appear	to	be	matters	that	a	court	which	is	reviewing	
the	plea	agreement	or	the	procedural	process	should	consider,	especially	when	
they	are	deliberating	on	an	individual’s	right	to	a	fair	trial.	
	
In	conclusion,	as	long	as	procedural	safeguards	are	in	place;	namely,	there	is	an	
independent	 court	 that	 assesses	 the	 plea	 agreement	 and	 the	 agreement	 is	
documented	and	entered	into	voluntarily	by	the	defendant,	then	there	will	be	
no	 issues	with	Article	6	of	 the	ECHR.	 Indeed,	as	 long	as	 these	safe	guards	are	
met	a	company	or	individual	may	freely	waive	its/their	right	to	a	trial.	Although	
the	 author	 feels	 there	 are	 areas	 of	 questions	 around	 the	 legality	 of	 the	 plea	
agreement	 in	 the	 Natsvlishvili	 and	 Togonidze	 case;	 plea	 bargaining	 systems	
themselves,	are	not	suspect.	However,	to	avoid	the	issues	identified	within	the	
Natsvlishvili	and	Togonidze	 judgment	 it	would	be	essential	that	 if	the	EU	were	
to	 implement	a	plea	bargaining	system	that	clear,	documented	guidance	–	on	
the	 use	 and	 procedure	 of	 the	 system	 –	 be	 provided.	 The	 next	 part	 of	 the	
chapter	now	takes	the	opportunity	to	consider	how	to	potentially	implement	an	
EU-wide	plea	bargaining	system	for	settling	cartel	cases.	
	
5.2.5	How	the	EU	could	implement	a	Plea	Bargaining	System	
We	shall	now	take	what	we	have	 learned	 from	the	previous	discussion	of	 the	
Natsvlishvili	 and	 Togonidze	 v	 Georgia	 case	 and	 identify	 how	 the	 EU	 could	
implement	a	plea	bargaining	system	for	settling	cartel	cases	that	would	comply	
with	Article	6	of	the	ECHR.		
	
To	implement	a	plea	bargaining	system	within	the	EU	there	would	need	to	be	a	
significant	 and	 radical	 overhauling	 of	 the	 current	 cartel	 enforcement	
procedures,	which	is	why	this	approach	is	referred	to	as	the	‘radical	approach’	
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within	this	chapter.	The	procedure	would	still	be	an	administrative	one,	as	it	is	
now.	The	Commission	would	 conduct	 the	 investigation;	 calculate	 the	 fine	and	
award	 leniency	 and	 settlement	 reductions	 to	 undertakings.	 However,	 the	
Commission	 would	 no	 longer	 determine	 whether	 there	 has	 been	 an	
infringement	and	impose	the	fine	on	an	undertaking;	this	would	be	conducted	
by	 the	 General	 Court.	 This	 is	 a	 requirement	 of	 operating	 a	 plea	 bargaining	
system;	 namely,	 having	 effective	 judicial	 scrutiny	 of	 the	 agreement.	 The	
Commission	in	essence	becomes	the	prosecutor.	The	Court	will	then	assess	the	
Commission’s	 case	and	 the	 calculation	of	 the	 fine.	Once	 they	have	 conducted	
this	 assessment	 the	 Court	 will	 be	 able	 to	 endorse	 the	 Commission’s	 decision	
(and	if	there	 is	one	the	plea	bargain)	or	reject	the	case	 if	they	feel	there	 is	no	
case	 to	 answer	 (or	 the	 plea	 bargain	 if	 it	 is	 inappropriate).	 The	 Commission	
would	 not	 need	 to	 produce	 a	 full	 decision	 under	 the	 normal	 route;	 it	 could	
create	a	streamlined	one	–	as	it	does	under	the	current	settlement	decision	–	to	
put	its	case	before	the	Court.	Although	the	plea	bargain	procedure	means	that	
Commission	infringement	decisions	will	need	to	go	before	the	General	Court	for	
the	 infringement	 decision	 to	 become	 final	 –	where	 currently	 the	 Commission	
makes	the	 infringement	decision	final	through	the	College	of	Commissioners	–	
this	will	 be	 very	 different	 to	 a	 fully	 litigated	 case	 that	 goes	 before	 the	 courts	
currently.	Therefore,	the	litigation	costs	of	having	to	have	the	decision	imposed	
in	 court	 would	 be	 minimal	 and	 not	 on	 par	 with	 legal	 proceedings	 where	 an	
undertaking	appeals	a	Commission	decision.	
	
The	plea	bargain	that	the	Commission	would	enter	into	with	a	defendant	would	
involve	the	undertaking	waiving	certain	rights.	For	example,	undertakings	would	
be	 required	 to	waive	 the	 right	 to	appeal	 the	Commission’s	decision	 (once	 the	
bargain	has	been	approved	by	the	Court),	challenge	the	Commission’s	evidence,	
calculation	 and	 assumptions.	 Although,	 through	 the	 plea	 agreement	 the	
undertaking	should	have	had	a	chance	to	effectively	 influence	and	discuss	the	
Commission’s	 evidence,	 calculations	 and	 assumptions.	 The	 undertaking	would	
also	 have	 to	 admit	 its	 liability	 for	 the	 infringement	 of	 Article	 101(1)	 TFEU.	 In	
return	for	waiving	all	of	these	rights	an	undertaking	would	receive	a	significant	
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reduction	 in	 the	 fine	 imposed	 upon	 it	 for	 its	 infringement,	 a	 much	 quicker	
decision	 and	 procedure,	 and	 have	 limited	 legal	 fees	 to	 pay,	 because	 the	
undertaking	 will	 not	 have	 to	 challenge	 the	 case	 before	 a	 court	 since	 it	 has	
influenced	the	decision	through	discussions	with	the	Commission.	
	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 above	 changes	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	
programme,	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	 programme	 will	 also	 have	 to	 be	
amended	 if	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 procedure	 were	 implemented.	 The	 leniency	
programme	 would	 need	 to	 align	 itself	 more	 with	 the	 US-style	 of	 leniency	
programme.	That	is	to	say,	only	the	first	undertaking	to	come	forward	would	be	
able	 to	 apply	 for	 leniency	 under	 the	 programme,	 the	 remaining	 undertakings	
would	need	to	enter	into	plea	bargains	with	the	Commission.	This	change	would	
be	important,	as	it	would	encourage	undertakings	to	settle	so	that	the	benefits	
of	 plea	 bargaining	 can	 be	 achieved.	 If	 undertakings	 can	 still	 get	 reductions	 in	
fines	 from	 a	 leniency	 programme	 then	 they	 may	 not	 opt	 into	 using	 plea	
bargains	and	the	full	procedure	will	therefore	need	to	be	followed	as	normal.	
	
Let	us	now	consider	and	remind	ourselves	of	the	necessary	 judicial	safeguards	
which	 will	 also	 need	 to	 be	 put	 in	 place.	 The	 ECtHR	 listed	 these	 ‘judicial	
safeguards’	in	the	Natsvlishvili	and	Togonidze	v	Georgia	case.		The	court	stated	
that	 where	 there	 is	 a	 plea	 agreement	 involving	 a	 defendant	 it	 needs	 to	 be	
accompanied	by	the	following	conditions:	that	the	bargain	was	accepted	in	full	
awareness	of	 the	 facts	of	 the	 case	and	 the	 legal	 consequences	 in	 a	 genuinely	
voluntary	 manner	 to	 comply	 with	 Article	 6	 of	 the	 ECHR.	 In	 addition,	 the	
bargain’s	contents	and	the	manner	in	which	the	parties	had	reached	it	have	to	
be	subjected	 to	sufficient	 judicial	 review.151	For	plea	bargaining	 in	cartel	 cases	
this	will	mean	that	 the	General	Court	will	have	to	scrutinise	the	Commission’s	
case	against	the	undertakings	and	the	plea	bargain	itself.	The	Court	will	need	to	
satisfy	itself	that	there	is	a	case	for	the	undertaking	to	answer	and	that	the	plea	
agreement	 was	 entered	 into	 freely	 and	 voluntarily	 and	 not	 as	 the	 result	 of	
																																																								
151	Natsvlishvili	and	Togonidze	(n	26)	Para	[92].	
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force,	 threats,	 assurances,	 promises	 or	 representations	 from	 the	 Commission	
which	are	not	contained	within	 the	plea	agreement.	To	do	 this	effectively	 the	
General	Court	will	need	to	ensure	that	the	bargain	itself	and	the	way	in	which	it	
was	reached	had	been	done	so	 fairly	and	 legally	by	thoroughly	examining	and	
considering	 all	 the	 details	 of	 the	 agreement,	 the	 case	 and	 the	 negotiations.	
Because	 of	 this	 it	 will	 be	 very	 important	 that	 all	 of	 the	 negotiations	 are	
documented	so	that	the	Court	can	adequately	inspect	them	and	establish	how	
the	 agreement	 was	 reached	 and	 ensure	 there	 were	 no	 false	 promises	 or	
coercion	 made.	 A	 potential	 way	 of	 addressing	 this	 could	 be	 to	 have	 an	
independent	party	sit	in	on	all	the	discussions	that	reports	directly	to	the	court	
itself.	This	is	something,	which	is	explored	more	generally	in	the	next	section	of	
the	 chapter	 as	 a	 potential	 improvement	 under	 the	 current	 settlement	
procedure;	 therefore,	 it	 will	 not	 be	 discussed	 in	 any	 depth	 here.	 Finally,	 the	
General	 Court	 will	 need	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 undertaking	 is	 full	 aware	 of	 its	
procedural	rights,	the	facts	of	the	case	and	the	legal	consequences	of	entering	
into	 a	 plea	 bargain.	 As	 long	 as	 these	 requirements	 are	 met	 an	 undertaking	
waving	certain	procedural	rights	would	not	result	in	a	breach	of	Article	6	ECHR.	
In	addition,	with	 these	protections	 in	place	and	 the	General	Court	 thoroughly	
examining	and	scrutinising	 the	plea	agreements	we	should	not	 see	any	of	 the	
concerns	 the	 author	 raised	 around	 the	 Natsvlishvili	 and	 Togonidze	 v	 Georgia	
judgment	occurring.	
	
In	addition	to	the	aforementioned	considerations	we	also	need	to	study	the	role	
of	Article	 263	 TFEU	when	 contemplating	 how	 the	 EU	 could	 implement	 a	 plea	
bargaining	 procedure.	 In	 essence,	 this	 Treaty	 provision	 stipulates	 that	 the	
European	Court	of	Justice	(hereafter,	the	‘CJEU’)	shall	have	the	power	to	review	
the	 legality	of	acts	of	the	Commission.	 It	means	that	any	Commission	decision	
will	be	appealable	or	subject	to	review	by	the	CJEU.	The	possible	issue	that	one	
might	propose	here	is,	if	a	plea	bargaining	procedure	were	to	be	implemented	
within	 the	EU	 this	would	 lead	 to	 an	undertaking	 losing	 its	 right	 to	 appeal	 the	
settlement	agreement	between	it	and	the	Commission	to	the	CJEU.	This	would	
therefore	mean	that	a	plea	bargaining	procedure	would	fall	 foul	of	Article	263	
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TFEU	and	thus,	it	would	not	be	possible	to	implement	one	within	the	EU	for	the	
settlement	 of	 cartel	 cases.	 However,	 this	 is	 not	 such	 a	 problem	 as	 it	 first	
appears.	We	need	to	remember	that	every	plea	agreement	would	be	subject	to	
review	by	 the	European	Court	before	 it	would	be	accepted	and	 implemented.	
This	means	 that	 the	court	will	 assess	 the	agreement	and	 the	case	against	 the	
undertaking.	 Consequently,	 ensuring	 that	 there	 is	 a	 case	 against	 the	
undertaking,	that	the	undertaking	understands	the	implications	of	entering	into	
the	agreement,	 that	 it	did	so	without	duress	and	any	 false	promises,	and	that	
the	 undertaking	 wishes	 to	 waive	 its	 right	 to	 appeal.	 Alongside	 this	 an	
undertaking	has	the	right	–	under	Article	6	of	 the	ECHR	–	to	waive	 its	 right	to	
appeal	where	it	wishes	too.	This	therefore	means	that	Article	263	TFEU	will	be	
complied	 with	 and	 will	 not	 be	 breached	 if	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 were	
implemented	within	the	EU.	
	
As	 has	 been	 illustrated	 within	 this	 part	 of	 the	 chapter	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 the	
Commission	 could	 implement	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 for	 cartel	 cases	 that	
would	 comply	 with	 the	 ECHR	 and	 also	 bring	 a	 variety	 of	 benefits	 to	 the	
settlement	procedure.	However,	this	would	involve	a	radical	overhauling	of	the	
Commission’s	 current	 procedures,	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 cartel	 cases	 are	
managed	and	dealt	with.	For	these	reasons,	and	the	other	concerns	regarding	
plea	bargaining	raised	in	the	chapter,	it	is	felt	that	a	plea	bargaining	procedure	
is	unlikely	to	be	implemented	anytime	soon	within	the	EU	even	though	it	would	
bring	significant	procedural	benefits	for	both	the	Commission	and	undertakings.	
Still,	 if	 the	EU	were	 to	undertake	 the	necessary	 changes	 to	 the	Treaty	and	 its	
policies	then	the	benefits	identified	in	this	section	can	be	achieved.	Indeed,	the	
analysis	 in	 this	 research	 will	 be	 invaluable	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 such	 a	
procedure.	 The	 next	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 will	 now	 consider	 other	
improvements	 that	 can	 be	 made	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 settlement	 procedure	
which	 are	 less	 radical	 and	 easier	 to	 implement,	 but	 yet,	 can	 still	 bring	
procedural	 efficiency	 gains	 without	 some	 of	 the	 potential	 costs	 of	 plea	
bargaining.	
	
	280	
5.3	Improvements	to	the	current	system	
	
The	previous	section	sought	to	identify	the	benefits	that	plea	bargaining	could	
bring	 to	 the	 EU.	 This	 section	 takes	 a	more	 restrictive	 approach	 and	 considers	
less	 radical	 options	 for	 improving	 the	 Commission’s	 direct	 settlement	
procedure.	 These	 options	 stem	 from	 the	 identification	 of	 areas	 within	 the	
current	 procedure	 that	 need	 improving	 and	 the	 comparison	 had	with	 the	 US	
system	 of	 plea	 bargaining.	 There	 are	 four	 suggestions	 for	 improvements	 put	
forward	within	this	section,	specifically;	(1)	allowing	an	undertaking	to	request	
and	 begin	 settlement	 discussions	 with	 the	 Commission	 at	 any	 stage	 of	 the	
proceedings,	 including	within	 the	 investigation	 period;	 (2)	 having	 the	 Hearing	
Officer	 sit	 in	 on	 all	 settlement	 discussions;	 (3)	 removing	 the	 mandatory	 ten	
percent	reduction	in	settlements	and	allowing	this	to	be	flexible;	and	finally,	(4)	
allowing	 undertakings	 to	 have	 an	 ‘effective	 say’	 in	 negotiations.	 None,	 it	 is	
submitted,	would	involve	violations	of	Article	6	ECHR	and	indeed	several	may	go	
some	way	to	reducing	any	extant	risk	of	violation.	
	
These	options	may	be	adopted	as	 ‘standalone’	options	or	 combined	with	one	
another	 in	 various	 arrangements	 to	 improve	 the	 efficiency	 of	 the	 current	
procedure.	 Each	 of	 the	 four	 options	 seeks	 to	 help	 address	 the	 problems	
identified	 in	 relation	 to	 time	 and	 resources	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 ways.	 There	 are	
further	improvements	that	have	been	identified	by	the	analysis,	however,	these	
would	 lead	 to	 the	 need	 to	 adopt	 the	 changes	 suggested	 under	 the	 ‘radical	
approach’	and	thus	they	have	not	been	discussed	here	again	as	they	necessitate	
the	need	for	substantially	amending	the	Commission’s	procedures.152		
	
	 	
																																																								
152	As	an	example,	removing	an	undertakings	right	to	appeal	could	lead	to	further	cost	savings	as	
they	would	not	be	able	to	appeal	the	decision.	However,	to	do	this	the	settlement	decision	
would	need	to	be	agreed	by	a	Court	for	the	necessary	judicial	safeguards	to	be	met.	Thus,	it	in	
essence	would	require	the	implementation	of	a	plea	bargaining	procedure.	
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5.3.1	Option	1	–	Allowing	an	undertaking	to	request	and	begin	settlement	
discussions	with	the	Commission	at	any	stage	within	the	proceedings	
This	 first	 option	 would	 allow	 an	 undertaking	 –	 if	 the	 Commission	 deems	 it	
appropriate	in	the	case	–	to	begin	settlement	discussions	with	the	Commission	
at	any	stage	of	its	procedure.	The	benefits	of	allowing	an	undertaking	to	enter	
into	 discussions	 with	 the	 Commission	 in	 the	 investigation	 stage	 were	
highlighted	 and	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 when	 the	
implementation	of	a	plea	bargaining	procedure	within	the	EU	was	considered.	
Therefore,	 these	 benefits	 and	 potential	 issues	 need	 not	 be	 debated	 again.	
However,	there	are	some	additional	points	we	can	note	and	discuss	here	in	this	
regard.	 Currently	 the	 Commission	 cannot	 instigate	 discussions	 until	 the	 full	
investigation	has	been	conducted	and	this	dramatically	 restricts	and	slows	the	
procedure.	Indeed,	some	practitioners	have	noted	that	‘what	actually	delays	the	
EU	settlement	is	the	exhaustive	and	long	investigation,’153	prior	to	the	beginning	
of	 settlement	 discussions.	 Although,	 there	 are	 those	 who	 would	 dispute	 this	
claim.	 For	 example,	 Laina	 –	 the	 head	 of	 the	 cartel	 settlement	 unit	 at	 the	
Commission	 –	 believes	 ‘the	 fact	 that	 the	 Commission	 does	 a	 complete	
investigation	before	deciding	whether	a	case	will	 follow	the	settlement	or	 the	
standard	 procedure’	 allows	 for	 more	 flexibility	 in	 case,	 because	 if	 the	
settlement	procedure	is	discontinued	it	enables	the	standard	procedure	to	‘kick	
in’	very	quickly.154		
	
It	 is	true	that	there	are	benefits	from	having	the	investigation	completed	prior	
to	beginning	settlement	discussions,	such	as	the	ability	to	revert	back	quickly	to	
the	standard	procedure.	However,	there	are	greater	benefits	that	can	be	had	by	
allowing	 undertakings	 to	 settle	 during	 the	 investigation.	 For	 example,	 there	
would	 be	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 speed	 of	 the	 investigation	 and	 consequently	 the	
decision	because	the	discussions	can	begin	earlier	which	allows	the	parties	and	
the	 Commission	 to	 reach	 an	 agreement	 around	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 case	 sooner.																																																									
153	David	Vascott,	‘EU	cartel	settlements;	are	they	working?’	(GCR	News)	
<https://www.lw.com/mediaCoverage/are-eu-cartel-settlements-working>	accessed	27	
November	2014,	interview,	Hansen.	
154	ibid	interview	discussions	with	Laina.	
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Additionally,	 undertakings	 are	more	 likely	 to	 seek	 to	 provide	 information	 and	
cooperate	with	the	Commission’s	investigation,	as	they	are	involved	in	it.	All	of	
these	reasons	should	then	lead	to	a	reduction	in	time	and	financial	costs	for	the	
Commission	and	indeed	the	undertakings	involved.	
	
One	of	the	biggest	advantages	of	keeping	the	current	settlement	procedure	and	
allowing	 an	 undertaking	 to	 begin	 settlement	 discussions	 during	 the	
investigation	 is	 that	 the	 judicial	 safety	 measures	 required	 in	 plea	 bargaining	
would	not	be	necessary	as	an	undertaking	would	not	be	mandated	to	waive	its	
right	 to	 appeal.	 In	 essence	 the	 EU	 would	 gain	 one	 of	 the	 most	 beneficial	
features	 of	 the	 US	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 (with	 regards	 to	 speed	 and	
efficiency),	yet	this	would	come	without	the	high	costs	usually	associated	with	
it.	However,	an	additional	safety	measure,	which	should	be	put	in	place	to	help	
protect	 an	undertakings	 rights	 if	Option	1	were	 to	be	 implemented	would	be	
that	mooted	 in	Option	 2.	 A	 Hearing	Officer	 should	 be	 present	 for	 settlement	
discussions	 whenever	 they	 transpire,	 but	 particularly	 when	 they	 occur	 in	 the	
investigatory	stage.	
	
5.3.2	Option	2	–	Having	the	Hearing	Officer	sit	in	on	all	settlement	discussions	
Currently	 undertakings	 ‘may	 call	 upon	 the	Hearing	Officer	 at	 any	 time	 during	
the	settlement	procedure	 in	relation	to	 issues	that	might	arise	relating	to	due	
process.	The	Hearing	Officer's	duty	is	to	ensure	that	the	effective	exercise	of	the	
rights	 of	 defence	 is	 respected.’155	This	 means	 that	 the	 Hearing	 Officer	 only	
becomes	involved	in	the	Commission’s	settlement	procedure	if	an	undertaking	
has	 concerns	 regarding	 due	 process	 and	 calls	 upon	 them.	However,	Option	 2	
would	see	the	Hearing	Officer	sit	in	on	all	settlement	discussions	to	ensure	that	
due	process	rights	are	respected	and	that	the	settlement	decisions	are	reached	
fairly.	This	would	lead	to	a	greater	protection	of	an	undertaking’s	rights,	could	
increase	the	efficiency	of	the	settlement	procedure	and	potentially	reduce	the	
number	 of	 hybrid	 cases	 occurring.	 For	 instance,	 if	 an	 undertaking	 felt	 there	
																																																								
155	Commission	Notice	(n	3)	para	[18].	
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were	 a	 due	process	 problem	and	 the	Hearing	Officer	 is	 not	 in	 the	 settlement	
discussions	 (as	 is	 the	 case	 now)	 then	 the	 discussions	 have	 to	 stop	whilst	 the	
Hearing	 Officer	 investigates	 and	 addresses	 the	 undertakings	 concerns.	 The	
Hearing	 Officer	 will	 need	 to	 collect	 and	 evaluate	 the	 necessary	 information	
before	 the	 discussions	 and	 settlement	 can	 continue.	 Yet,	 had	 the	 Hearing	
Officer	been	 in	 the	 settlement	discussions	when	 it	happened	 they	would	 fully	
appreciate	the	context,	have	the	necessary	information	and	be	there	to	assess	
and	address	 the	problem	 immediately.	By	having	a	Hearing	Officer	within	 the	
settlement	 discussions	 it	 means	 that	 the	 undertakings	 concerns	 may	 be	
addressed	 and	 dealt	with	 quickly	which	 in	 turn	 leads	 to	 procedural	 efficiency	
gains	over	cases	where	the	Hearing	Officer	is	not	there.	It	also	means	that	the	
Hearing	Officer	maybe	able	to	assist	with	communications	and	issues	between	
the	 Commission	 and	 undertakings,	 ensuring	 that	 the	 discussions	 progress	 if	
there	is	a	breakdown	between	the	two	parties.	The	primary	reason	to	advocate	
for	this	Option	though	is	where	one	of	the	other	Options	–	particularly	Option	1	
or	4	–	are	sought	to	be	implemented.	In	these	cases	having	a	Hearing	Officer	in	
the	 settlement	 discussions	 at	 all	 times	will	 help	 ensure	 that	 the	 undertakings	
rights	are	adequately	protected	as	Option	1	and	4	could	potentially	lead	to	due	
process	issues	and	a	loss	of	adequate	right	protection.	Let	us	now	consider	the	
reasons	for	implementing	Option	2	when	Option	1	and	4	are	employed.	
	
In	the	instance	of	Option	1	it	becomes	important	because	the	investigation	will	
be	 less	 thorough	as	 the	Commission	will	not	have	completed	 its	 investigation.	
This	 means	 that	 the	 undertaking	 will	 be	 entering	 into	 discussions	 with	 the	
Commission	 when	 it	 does	 not	 have	 all	 the	 evidence.	 Therefore,	 it	 becomes	
paramount	 that	an	undertaking’s	due	process	 rights	are	adequately	protected	
and	are	seen	to	be.	In	the	case	of	Option	4	being	employed,	an	undertaking	will	
be	able	to	negotiate	with	the	Commission	on	certain	issues;	it	will	therefore	be	
important	 that	 there	 is	 a	 Hearing	 Officer	 present	 so	 as	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	
undertaking’s	 right	 to	 defence	 is	 resected	 and	 that	 the	Commission	 considers	
the	 parties’	 settlement	 submissions.	 By	 having	 the	Hearing	Officer	 present	 at	
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settlement	 discussions	 it	 can	 reduce	 the	 appearance	 of	 any	 procedural	
impropriety	and	ensure	that	an	undertaking’s	rights	are	sufficiently	protected.	
Currently	there	are	only	two	Hearing	Officers	employed	by	the	Commission	for	
competition	proceedings.	Consequently,	if	this	approach	were	to	be	considered	
for	 implementation	 it	would	 become	 essential	 for	 the	 Commission	 to	 employ	
further	Hearing	Officers	to	ensure	that	there	were	enough	staff	to	be	involved	
in	all	stages	of	the	settlement	discussions.	
	
However,	 a	 superior	 approach	 to	 utilising	 a	 Hearing	 Officer	 would	 be	 to	
implement	 a	 truly	 independent	body	 to	 sit	 in	on	 these	procedures.	 This	 body	
would	 not	 report	 to	 or	 fall	 under	 the	 ambit	 of	 the	 DG	 Competition	
Commissioner	but	to	the	EU	Commission	as	a	whole	or	the	EU	Court	(were	the	
case	to	go	before	it	under	the	plea	bargaining	model).	Their	role	would	to	be	to	
ensure	that	an	undertaking’s	due	process	rights	are	adequately	protected	and	
that	 the	 settlement	 decisions	 were	 reached	 fairly.	 This	 role	 would	 be	 of	
particular	 importance	 if	 the	 settlement	 decisions	 were	 to	 begin	 during	 the	
investigatory	stage	or	involve	negotiations.	As	these	would	be	the	cases	where	
the	 Commission’s	 case	 would	 be	 at	 its	 weakest,	 as	 they	 would	 not	 have	
conducted	a	full	investigation	and	have	all	the	information.	In	essence	this	body	
would	be	the	same	as	a	Hearing	Officer	but	the	DG	Competition	Commissioner	
would	not	oversee	them.	This	would	ensure	and	enable	greater	objectivity	and	
impartiality	in	the	proceedings.		
	
Having	an	independent	party	or	the	Hearing	Officer	involved	in	the	settlement	
discussions	to	ensure	that	an	undertakings	rights	are	adequately	protected	can	
lead	to	procedural	efficiency	benefits	to	the	current	procedure	when	compared	
to	 the	 counterfactual	 of	 not,	 but	 this	 improvement	 becomes	 categorically	
necessary	when	Option	1	or	4	are	employed.	
	 	
	285	
5.3.3	Option	3	–	The	removal	of	the	arbitrary	mandatory	ten	percent	
reduction	in	settlement	decisions	and	allow	a	more	flexible	approach	to	be	
adopted	
Currently	 the	 Commission	 awards	 settling	 undertakings	 a	 flat	 ten	 percent	
reduction	 in	 the	 fine	 for	engaging	 in	settlement	discussions	with	 them.	This	 is	
low	in	comparison	to	many	other	jurisdictions.156	For	example,	in	the	UK	up	to	a	
twenty	 percent	 discount	 may	 be	 awarded	 for	 undertakings	 settling	 with	 the	
CMA.157	In	France,	the	fine	ceiling	is	reduced	from	ten	percent	of	global	annual	
turnover	 to	 five	 percent	 when	 undertakings	 settle.158	This	 reduction	 is	 an	
important	 part	 of	 the	 benefit	 of	 settling	 with	 the	 competition	 authority	 or	
Commission	 for	 an	 undertaking.	 Removing	 the	 mandatory	 reduction	 and	
allowing	 it	 to	be	more	 flexible,	 so	as	 to	 represent	how	an	undertaking	assists	
the	 Commission	 in	 settling	 could	 lead	 to	 a	 greater	willingness	 on	 the	 part	 of	
undertakings	 to	 settle	 and	 other	 procedural	 benefits	 relating	 to	 speed	 to	 be	
achieved.	This	is	because	undertakings	will	have	an	increased	incentive	and	thus	
desire	 to	 cooperate	 to	 receive	 a	 higher	 reduction,	 as	 the	 reduction	 they	 can	
receive	will	vary	based	upon	their	assistance.	By	allowing	undertakings	greater	
reductions,	 so	 as	 to	 reflect	 the	 effort	 and	 information	 they	 provide	 this	 will	
incentivise	 and	 encourage	 cooperation,	 negotiation,	 discussions	 and	
information	 sharing	 with	 the	 Commission.	 All	 of	 this	 will	 lead	 to	 an	
enhancement	of	the	settlement	procedure.	
	
Having	 said	 this,	 it	has	been	 implied	 that	 the	Commission	 is	already	awarding	
greater	 discounts	 than	 the	 ten	 percent	 reduction	 via	 the	 leniency	
programme,159	and	through	the	way	it	is	defining	the	scope	and	duration	of	the	
																																																								
156	Sean-Paul	Brankin,	‘The	first	cases	under	the	Commission’s	cartel-settlement	procedure:	
problems	solved?’	(2011)	32(4)	ECLR	165,	167.	
157	See	Competition	and	Markets	Authority,	‘Competition	Act	1998:	Guidance	on	the	CMA’s	
investigation	procedures	in	Competition	Act	1998	cases’	available	at:	
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/288636/CM
A8_CA98_Guidance_on_the_CMA_investigation_procedures.pdf>	accessed	29	July	2015.	
158	Article	L464-2	III	of	the	French	Commercial	Code.	
159	Anna-Louise	Hinds,	‘All	settled?	Some	six	years	of	cartel	settlement’	(2014)	35(6)	ECLR	292,	
295/296.	
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infringement.160	If	 this	 is	 the	case,	 it	 is	good	that	the	Commission	 is	rewarding	
undertakings	 for	 cooperating,	 however	 this	 procedure	 needs	 to	 be	 clear	 and	
transparent.	 Awarding	 discounts	 ‘under	 the	 table’	 so	 to	 speak,	 does	 not	
enhance	the	procedure	or	allow	undertakings	to	appreciate	the	true	benefits	of	
settling	 from	the	outside.	This	 is	because	undertakings	will	be	unaware	of	 the	
potential	 reductions	they	may	receive	 if	 they	partake	 in	a	settlement	with	the	
Commission.	The	legislation	and	guidance	clearly	states	that	only	a	ten	percent	
reduction	 for	 settling	 will	 be	 applied	 to	 the	 undertakings	 fine.	 A	 better	 way	
forward	here	would	be	 for	 the	Commission	 to	 remove	 the	 cap,	 and	 state	 the	
range	of	reductions	that	it	will	offer	an	undertaking	when	they	cooperate.	If	the	
Commission	were	to	produce	detailed	guidelines	like	they	have	for	its	leniency	
programme	undertakings	could	consult	these	to	understand	what	is	required	of	
them	 to	 achieve	 certain	 reductions.	 The	 Commission	 would	 retain	 a	 broad	
margin	of	discretion	(like	when	enforcing	the	leniency	programme)	to	award	the	
settlement	reductions	based	on	the	facts	and	circumstances	of	each	individual	
settlement	procedure.		
	
By	 implementing	 a	higher	 reduction	 for	 settling	 and	producing	 clear	 guidance	
on	 how	 this	 range	 is	 defined	 the	 Commission	 would	 be	 able	 to	 allow	 more	
undertakings	to	appreciate	the	benefits	of	settling	and	encourage	this.	
	
5.3.4	Option	4	–	Allowing	undertakings	to	have	an	‘effective	say’	/	negotiate	
with	the	Commission	in	settlement	discussions	
The	fourth	and	final	option	would	see	that	an	undertaking	could	negotiate	with	
the	Commission	over	certain	select	points	of	the	infringement.	These	points	of	
discussion	would	 be	 limited,	 with	 the	 Commission	 deciding	 which	matters	 to	
negotiate	on	and,	the	Court	having	the	final	say	on	the	calculation	of	the	fine.	
These	 points	 would	 usually	 focus	 around:	 the	 length	 of	 the	 infringement,	
market	 definition	 and	 the	 value	 of	 the	 sales.	 This	would	 facilitate	 discussions																																																									
160	David	Vascott,	‘EU	cartel	settlements;	are	they	working?’	(GCR	News)	
<https://www.lw.com/mediaCoverage/are-eu-cartel-settlements-working>	accessed	27	
November	2014.	
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and	encourage	further	cooperation	from	an	undertaking,	as	they	would	be	able	
to	 influence	 the	 overall	 fine	 imposed	 upon	 them.	 This	 in	 turn	 should	 lead	 to	
more	fruitful	discussions,	quicker	settlements	and	a	reduction	in	the	likelihood	
of	 the	 settlement	 process	 being	 abandoned	 by	 an	 undertaking	 or	 the	
settlement	decision	being	appealed.		
	
Currently	 it	 is	purportedly	 the	 case	 that	 the	Commission	will	not	 negotiate	or	
bargain	with	settling	parties.	As	has	been	noted	previously	the	Commission	has	
on	a	variety	of	occasions	stated	that	it	does	not	negotiate	with	settling	parties.	
By	taking	this	approach	it	removes	one	of	the	greatest	potential	benefits	that	an	
undertaking	 could	get	 from	settling,	namely	 the	ability	 to	discuss	parts	of	 the	
cases	with	the	Commission.	Yet	having	claimed	this,	 the	settlement	procedure	
clearly	 states	 that	 the	 Commission	 should	 consider	 the	 parties’	 settlement	
submissions	 so	 that	 their	 rights	 of	 defence	 can	 be	 exercised	 effectively	 and	
taken	into	account	in	the	preliminary	analysis.161	In	fact,	when	we	consider	the	
comments	 from	 practitioners	 who	 deal	 with	 settlement	 cases	 we	 see	 that	 it	
appears	 that	 the	 Commission	 may	 already	 be	 negotiating	 to	 a	 degree	 with	
settling	 parties.	 For	 example,	 Van	 Gerven	 a	 partner	 at	 Linklaters	 stated	 in	 a	
interview	that	there	is	an:	
	
‘Expectation	 that	 settlement	 discussions	 allow	 for	 a	 more	
meaningful	 discussion	with	 the	 Commission	 staff	 than	what	
would	be	possible	in	a	standard	procedure	and	that	you	have	
a	 higher	 likelihood	 to	 have	 these	 discussions	 affect	 the	
outcome.	If	you	compare	the	sometimes	very	high	fines	after	
a	standard	procedure	with	the	fines	imposed	in	a	settlement	
procedure,	many	lawyers	perceive	the	settlement	option	now	
as	attractive.’162	
																																																									
161	Commission	Notice	(n	3)	para	[24].	
162	David	Vascott,	‘EU	cartel	settlements;	are	they	working?’	(GCR	News)	
<https://www.lw.com/mediaCoverage/are-eu-cartel-settlements-working>	accessed	27	
November	2014.	
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In	a	comparable	vein	Hansen,	a	partner	at	Latham	&	Watkins	stated	in	the	
same	joint	interview	that:	
	
‘I	am	not	so	sure	that	settlement	cases	always	end	up	with	
the	 same	 fine	 as	 cases	 resolved	 in	 a	 full	 procedure.	 I	 do	
have	 the	 impression	 that	 the	 dialogue	 with	 the	
Commission	in	the	months	leading	to	a	settlement	is	able	
to	 influence	 the	 scope	 and	 duration	 of	 the	 infringement.	
And	 certainly	 the	 dialogue	 on	 affected	 turnover	 ensures	
that	 fines	 are	 set	 by	 reference	 to	 sales	 volumes	 that	 are	
clearly	impacted	by	the	infringement.’163		
	
What	 this	 appears	 to	 show	 is	 that	 practitioners	 believe	 that	 those	
undertakings,	which	do	engage	in	settlement	discussions	with	the	Commission,	
can	have	an	effect	on	the	level	of	fine	they	receive.	This	perhaps	helps	explain	
in	part	why	undertakings	are	so	keen	to	settle	with	the	Commission	under	its	
current	procedure.	Namely,	 some	know	that	 they	can	have	an	 impact	on	 the	
Commission’s	findings	and	the	resulting	fine.	If	it	is	the	case	that	undertakings	
can,	 and	 currently	 do,	 influence	 the	 Commission’s	 findings	 and	 analysis	 it	
would	be	beneficial	 to	have	 this	 recognised	within	 the	 settlement	procedure	
documentation	 somewhere,	 clearly	 laying	 down	 the	 areas	 which	 the	
Commission	may	discuss	or	be	willing	to	negotiate	upon	with	the	undertakings.	
This	 is	 important	 as	 without	 guidance	 on	 this	 we	 have	 the	 situation,	 which	
occurs	 before	 us	 now.	 We	 have	 the	 Commission	 stating	 that	 it	 does	 not	
negotiate;	yet	practitioners	and	the	empirical	data	suggesting	that	they	in	fact	
do.	There	is	no	clarity	over	what	points	they	may	negotiate	on.	If	undertakings	
are	considering	settling	with	the	Commission	and	only	read	the	guidelines	and	
legislation	they	will	not	appreciate	the	 ‘true	value’	of	settling.	This	 is	because	
they	 will	 be	 unaware	 of	 the	 potential	 for	 a	 greater	 reduction	 then	 the	 ten	
percent	through	the	calculation	on	the	effected	sales	or	market.	Since	a	greater	
																																																								
163	ibid.	
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reduction	 in	 fine	would	 be	 a	 further	 incentive	 for	 undertakings	 to	 cooperate	
and	apply	for	settling	it	is	important	that	this	reduction	and	procedure	is	clearly	
laid	down	in	guidelines	for	undertakings	to	understand.	Indeed,	for	procedural	
transparency,	 fairness	 and	 legal	 certainty	 reasons	 it	 is	 important	 that	 clear	
guidance	is	provided.	Whether	it	is	the	case	that	an	undertaking	can	currently	
influence	the	Commission’s	decision	or	not,	it	would	be	a	beneficial	procedural	
improvement	to	put	 in	place,	alongside	the	necessary	guidance	regarding	the	
points	that	can	be	negotiated.		
	
This	section	has	identified	four	potential	 improvements	that	could	be	made	to	
the	 Commission’s	 direct	 settlement	 system	 to	 further	 enhance	 its	 procedural	
efficiency.	Though	each	of	these	options	will	bring	differing	levels	of	gains,	the	
most	beneficial	of	these	appears	to	be	Option	1:	allowing	undertakings	to	enter	
settlement	 discussions	 at	 any	 stage	 of	 the	 proceedings	 –	 including	 the	
investigatory	 stage.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 investigatory	 period	 typically	 takes	 a	
long	time	and	has	a	significant	impact	on	the	length	of	the	proceedings	and	the	
resources	 utilised	 during	 the	 case.	 However,	 Option	 1	 could	 come	 at	 the	
expense	of	investigatory	rigor.	Nevertheless,	if	the	Hearing	Officer	is	allowed	to	
be	witness	 to	 the	 settlement	discussions	 (Option	2)	 these	 concerns	 should	be	
reduced	significantly.	This	section’s	suggested	 improvements	can	be	seen	as	a	
‘hybrid	approach’	as	they	involve	selected	parts	of	the	current	procedure	being	
improved	and	enhanced.	The	hybrid	name	originated	from	the	fact	that	not	all	
four	of	the	options	need	choosing,	this	approach	is	more	flexible	–	if	you	will	a	
‘pick-and-mix’	system	–	where	any	single	option	could	be	chosen	in	and	on	its	
own.	 Nevertheless,	 ideally	 all	 four	 of	 these	 options	 would	 be	 considered	 for	
implementation,	 but	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 only	 some	 could	 be	 chosen.	 This	
approach	is	the	opposite	to	the	‘radical	approach’	which	would	require	all	of	the	
recommended	changes	to	be	made	so	as	to	allow	the	plea	bargaining	system	to	
be	 implemented	 correctly	 and	 have	 the	 necessary	 judicial	 safety	measures	 to	
comply	with	the	ECHR.	
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5.4	Conclusions	
	
This	 chapter	 has	 taken	 the	 timely	 opportunity	 to	 identify	 what	 the	
Commission’s	 direct	 settlement	 process	 can	 learn	 from	 the	 DOJ’s	 plea	
bargaining	procedure	to	enhance	its	efficiency	whilst	complying	with	Article	6	of	
the	ECHR.	The	Commission’s	direct	settlement	procedure	has	been	in	operation	
for	seven	years	now,	yet	 it	has	had	a	very	slow	uptake	 in	use.	 In	 recent	years	
there	 has	 been	 a	 rise	 in	 cases	 settled	 under	 the	 procedure	 yet	 there	 has	 still	
only	been	a	mere	seventeen	cases	settled.	Nonetheless,	the	lack	of	cases	being	
settled	is	not	the	real	issue	here,	that	is	to	say,	although	it	is	disappointing	there	
has	 not	 been	 more	 settlements	 in	 this	 period	 of	 time,	 the	 real	 issues	 and	
concerns	 –	 from	 an	 efficiency	 and	 effective	 perspective	 –	 relate	 to	 (a)	 the	
amount	 of	 time	 it	 takes	 for	 a	 case	 to	 be	 settled	 and	 (b)	 the	 fact	 that	 various	
cases	are	having	to	proceed	as	hybrid	ones.		
	
The	concerns	under	 (a)	 relate	to	 the	matter	 that	an	undertaking	cannot	begin	
settlement	 discussions	 with	 the	 Commission	 until	 the	 Commission’s	
investigation	 has	 been	 completed.	 This	 means	 that	 though	 the	 beginning	 of	
settlement	 discussions	 to	 the	 final	 imposition	 of	 the	 decision	 only	 takes	 an	
average	 of	 13.28	 months,	 the	 investigation	 takes	 considerably	 longer	 and	
significantly	increases	the	period	of	time	from	the	opening	of	an	investigation	to	
completion.	Whilst	 it	 is	true	that	the	settlement	procedure	is	quicker	than	the	
standard	route	saving	both	the	Commission	and	undertakings	financial	and	time	
resources	 it	 is	 still	 not	 as	 efficient	 and	 effective	 as	 it	 can	 be	 owing	 to	 the	
inability	 for	 an	 undertaking	 to	 begin	 settlement	 discussions	 with	 the	
Commission	at	an	early	stage.	As	was	noted	earlier,	allowing	these	discussions	
at	 any	 stage	will	 significantly	 enhance	 the	 dialogue	 between	 the	 Commission	
and	 undertakings	 and	 this	 in	 turn	 should	 help	 the	 Commission	 complete	 the	
investigation	 much	 more	 quickly,	 as	 undertakings	 are	 cooperating	 from	 the	
start.	However,	one	has	to	be	cautious	here,	as	by	reducing	the	Commission’s	
investigatory	 rigour	 it	 can	 have	 a	 detrimental	 effect	 on	 the	 strength	 and	
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investigation	 of	 the	 case	 against	 an	 undertaking.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 important	 that	
investigatory	rigour	 is	carefully	balanced	against	 the	efficiency	and	cost	saving	
benefits.	
	
The	 concerns	 raised	 in	 regards	 to	 (b)	 hybrid	 cases	 surround	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
Commission	 has	 to	 run	 two	 separate	 proceedings	 –	 one	 via	 the	 streamlined	
approach	 and	 one	 via	 the	 standard	 procedure.	 Whilst	 it	 is	 important	 for	 a	
variety	 of	 reasons	 –	 that	 were	 recognised	 within	 the	 chapter	 –	 for	 the	
Commission	to	be	able	to	operate	hybrid	procedures,	doing	so	inevitably	has	a	
resources	 implication	 cost.	 As	 the	 Commission	 implemented	 the	 settlement	
procedure	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 making	 the	 most	 efficient	 use	 of	 its	 resources	 it	
would	 seem	 important	 to	 identify	 ways	 of	 reducing	 the	 resource	 cost	 of	 the	
current	hybrid	system.	
	
Through	 the	 examination	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 direct	 settlement	 procedure	 –	
and	a	comparison	with	the	US	DOJ’s	plea	bargaining	system	–	it	was	identified	
that	 there	 are	 a	 variety	 of	 ways	 of	 addressing	 the	 two	 key	 aforementioned	
problems	 and	 further	 enhancing	 the	 current	 EU	 procedure.	 Broadly,	 these	
improvements	could	be	achieved	by	adopting	one	of	 two	distinct	approaches,	
with	each	bringing	 varying	 levels	of	 enhancement	 to	 the	procedure.	Adopting	
the	 first	 approach	 would	 involve	 a	 significant	 overhauling	 of	 the	 current	 EU	
cartel	 enforcement	 procedure,	 but	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 bring	 the	 most	
significant	benefits.	The	first	approach	involved	implementing	a	plea	bargaining	
system	within	the	EU	and	amending	the	Commission’s	leniency	programme	–	so	
that	 it	 was	 an	 option	 open	 only	 to	 the	 first	 undertaking	 to	 come	 forward	 to	
report	a	cartel.	This	approach	was	defined	as	the	‘radical	approach’,	because	of	
the	 significant	 overhauls	 to	 the	 procedure	 that	 it	 would	 lead	 too.	 The	
Commission	would	still	conduct	the	investigation	and	calculate	the	fine	that	an	
undertaking	 should	 receive.	 However,	 this	 would	 then	 be	 authorised	 by	 the	
General	Court,	which	in	turn	allows	the	Court	to	assess	the	calculation	made	by	
the	Commission	and	scrutinise	the	settlement	agreement	(if	any	is	made)	with	
the	 undertaking.	 This	 approach	 would	 reduce	 the	 cost	 of	 litigation,	 remove	
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appeals, 164 	and	 increase	 the	 speed	 of	 the	 current	 procedure	 and	 the	
investigative	 stage.	 	By	 considering	 the	ECtHR	 jurisprudence	–	particularly	 the	
Natsvlishvili	and	Togonidze	v	Georgia	case	–	regarding	Article	6	of	the	ECHR	we	
identified	that,	as	long	as	the	necessary	procedural	safeguards	are	in	place	and	
sufficient	 judicial	 scrutiny	 occurs	 then	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 that	 includes	
removing	the	right	to	appeal	will	comply	with	the	ECHR.	
	
The	 second	 approach	 was	 classified	 as	 the	 ‘hybrid	 approach’,	 as	 it	 involves	
selected	 parts	 of	 the	 current	 EU	 settlement	 procedure	 being	 amended	 to	
enhance	it.	There	was	an	assortment	of	potential	 improvements	muted	within	
the	chapter;	which	included	the	following:	
	
1. Allowing	 an	 undertaking	 to	 request	 and	 begin	 settlement	 discussions	
with	 the	Commission	whilst	 the	 investigation	 into	cartel	conduct	 is	 still	
being	conducted;	
2. Having	 the	Hearing	Officer	–	or	more	 ideally	a	 truly	 independent	party	
who	 can	 report	 concerns	 to	 the	 Commission/Court	 –	 sit	 in	 on	 all	
settlement	 discussions	 so	 as	 to	 ensure	 that	 undertakings	 rights	 are	
adequately	protected	and	that	settlements	are	reached	fairly;		
3. Removing	the	arbitrary	mandatory	ten	percent	reduction	on	settlements	
and	 allow	 this	 to	 be	 more	 flexible	 and	 to	 be	 based	 on	 how	 the	
undertakings	assist	the	Commission	within	the	settlement	discussions;	
4. Allowing	undertakings	to	have	an	‘effective	say’	–	and	in	part	negotiate	
with	the	Commission	on	elements	of	the	infringement.165			
	
Which	of	the	aforementioned	improvements	are	chosen	would	depend	on	how	
willing	 the	policy	makers	 are	 to	make	 the	 changes,	which	 to	 a	 degree	will	 be	
affected	by	how	extensive	 the	 suggested	 reform	would	be.	Again,	 this	will	 be	
down	to	balancing	certainty	and	procedural	rigor	against	speed,	efficiency	and	
cost	concerns.																																																									
164	Only	undertakings	that	did	not	settle	would	have	the	ability	to	appeal	the	decision.	
165	Noting	that	in	part	this	appears	to	be	already	happening	to	a	degree.	
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Although	 the	 ‘radical	approach’	would	 lead	 to	potentially	 the	greatest	 savings	
and	 improvements	 it	would	 limit	 an	undertakings	 ability	 to	 appeal	 and	would	
require	 a	 significant	 change	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 current	 procedures	 and	
structure,	 including	 the	 need	 for	 every	 case	 to	 be	 heard	 before	 the	 General	
Court.	For	 these	reasons	 it	 is	advocated	that	 the	 ‘hybrid	approach’	 is	 the	best	
way	 forward	 for	 the	Commission	 to	 improve	 the	current	procedure;	whereby,	
all	of	 the	recommendations	 from	the	second	section	of	 the	chapter	should	be	
implemented.	This	should	include,	but	is	not	limited	to,	allowing	an	undertaking	
to	propose	settlement	discussions	at	any	point	of	 the	 investigation;	having	an	
independent	 party	 sit	 in	 on	 settlement	 discussions	 between	 the	 Commission	
and	 undertakings;	 and,	 the	 removal	 of	 the	 fixed	 ten	 percent	 reduction	 for	
settling.	 By	 implementing	 these	 changes	 the	 Commission’s	 settlement	
procedures	efficiency	can	be	enhanced	–	leading	to	greater	cost	savings.	At	the	
same	 time	 the	 settlement	 programme	 also	 becomes	 more	 appealing	 to	
undertakings	 because	 they	 can	 negotiate	 with	 the	 Commission	 and	 enter	
discussions	at	any	point.	This	in	turn	should	lead	to	a	greater	uptake	and	use	of	
the	programme,	which	will	again	help	enhance	its	efficiency	as	the	procedure	is	
being	effectively	utilised	by	undertakings.	It	should	also	help	ensure	less	hybrid	
cases	 occur	 as	 undertakings	 are	 able	 to	 influence	 the	 case	 and	 engage	 in	
discussions	sooner	with	the	Commission.		
	
Whether	 the	 direct	 settlement	 procedure	 stays	 the	 same	 or	 one	 of	 the	
approaches	forwarded	in	this	chapter	were	to	be	considered	it	 is	 important	to	
note	 that	 the	 policy	 maker	 is	 required	 to	 perform	 a	 balancing	 act	 between	
ensuring	a	thorough	and	vigorous	investigation,	and	legal	certainty	are	met,	on	
the	one	hand,	and	procedural	speed,	efficiency	and	cost	to	undertakings	and	EU	
citizens	on	the	other.	This	is	something	that	has	been	sought	to	be	highlighted	
throughout	the	discussion	of	the	issues	within	this	chapter.		
	
Finally,	 it	 is	worth	 stressing	 again	 that	 this	 chapter	 has	 potential	 implications	
that	 go	 significantly	 further	 than	 just	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	
policy.	This	chapter	identifies	and	highlights	the	considerations	signatory	parties	
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to	the	ECHR	need	to	undertake	(and	ensure	are	met)	to	implement	or	utilise	a	
plea	 bargaining	 system,	 so	 that	 it	 complies	 with	 the	 ECHR.	 Therefore,	 the	
chapter	has	a	much	wider	impact	in	the	literature	than	that	of	just	competition	
law;	 it	 affects	 other	 areas	 of	 civil	 law	 as	well	 as	 criminal	 law	 –	where	 a	 plea	
bargaining	system	is	most	likely	to	be	sought	to	be	implemented.	
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Chapter	6:	Conclusions,	
recommendations	and	
improvements	with	regards	to	the	
EU	cartel	enforcement	programme	
and	its	compliance	with	procedural	
rights	
	
6.1	Introduction	
	
This	 thesis	 has	 analysed	 the	 European	 Commission’s	 (hereafter	 the	
‘Commission’)	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies	 to	 ensure	 compliance	 with	 rights	
enshrined	 in	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights,1	‘the	 ECHR’,	 other	
procedural	 rights;	 and	 to	 identify	 areas	 for	 further	 improvements	 to	 the	
Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 programme	 –	 while	 remaining	 compatible	
with	rights	protection.	Whilst	the	thesis	broadly	found	compliance,	there	were	a	
variety	 areas	 identified	 where	 improvements	 and	 enhancements	 could	 be	
made.	 The	 remainder	 of	 this	 Chapter	 discusses	 the	 findings	 and	 the	 policy	
recommendations	that	flow	from	the	previous	analysis.	This	Chapter	concludes	
by	discussing	areas	of	potential	future	research.	
	 	
																																																								
1	European	Convention	for	the	Protection	of	Human	Rights	and	Fundamental	Freedoms,	Rome,	
4.X1.1950.	
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6.2	Thesis	Findings	and	Policy	Recommendations	
	
This	thesis	began	by	exploring	whether	corporations	qualify	for	right	protection	
under	 the	 ECHR	 and	 why	 one	 would	 want	 an	 undertaking	 to	 have	 its	 rights	
protected.	The	importance	of	the	security	of	rights	protection	in	the	context	of	
competition	law	proceedings	was	identified.	It	was	concluded	that	corporations	
do	 qualify	 for	 right	 protection	 under	 the	 Convention,	 when	 national	
competition	law	legislation	is	being	applied.	However,	until	the	EUs	accession	to	
the	 ECHR	 undertakings	 will	 not	 have	 standing	 to	 bring	 a	 claim	 against	 the	
Commission.	Nonetheless,	as	this	thesis	made	clear,	this	research	is	conducted	
against	 the	backdrop	of	when	the	EU	does	accede	 to	 the	ECHR,	which	 the	EU	
intends	to	do	and	has	provided	for,	within	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon.2	There	were	a	
variety	of	arguments	put	 forward	within	the	thesis	as	to	why	one	would	want	
undertakings	 to	 qualify	 for	 right	 protection,	 alongside	 an	 examination	 of	 the	
potential	 challenges.	 The	key	 challenges	against	 rights	protection	 consisted	of	
the	 following:	 (1)	 the	 ECHR	 was	 never	 intended	 to	 protect	 a	 corporation’s	
rights;	(2)	corporations	are	not	humans	so	how	can	they	have	human	rights?;	(3)	
granting	 corporations	 rights	 devalues	 and	 dehumanises	 human	 rights;	 (4)	
human	rights	were	designed	to	protect	the	vulnerable,	not	corporations;	(5)	the	
‘flood-gate’	 argument;	 and	 (6)	 the	 criticisms	 around	 corporations	 only	 having	
‘selective	 rights’.	 The	arguments	against	 these	and	 for	undertakings	 to	qualify	
for	 rights	 protection	 included	 that:	 (1)	 the	 ECHR	 provides	 corporations	 with	
rights	protection	and	 it	was	always	the	drafter’s	 intention;	 (2)	by	corporations	
having	 rights	 protection	 it	 brings	 additional	 benefits	 to	 the	 Commission’s	
procedures;	 (3)	 it	 can	 lead	 to	 stronger	 and	 better	 rights	 protection	 for	
individuals;	(4)	a	corporation	is	in	essence	a	group	of	individual	right	holders;	(5)	
corporations	 are	 treated	 as	 ‘legal	 persons’	 to	 be	 found	 guilty	 of	 offences	 in	
other	 areas	 of	 law;	 (6)	 the	 potential	 issues	 with	 ‘dual	 prosecution’	
requirements.		
																																																								
2	Treaty	of	Lisbon	Amending	the	Treaty	on	European	Union	and	the	Treaty	Establishing	the	
European	Community,	13	December	2007,	2007/C	306/01,	(Article	6	para	2).	
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This	 discussion	 was	 closed	 with	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 Yukos	 Oil	 judgment	 to	
illustrate	and	highlight	why	this	protection	is	necessary	and	what	can	happen	–	
in	extreme	circumstances	–	when	the	protection	of	rights	is	potentially	lacking.	
	
Next	 a	 consideration	 was	 had	 as	 to	 how	 specific	 ECHR	 rights	 could	 become	
engaged	when	 the	Commission	 imposes	 fines	on	undertakings	 (and	when	 the	
Convention	is	acceded	to).	Arguments	were	subsequently	developed	in	regards	
to	 the	 importance	 of	 certainty	 and	 equal	 treatment	 within	 the	 Commissions	
fining	procedures,	which	comprised	of	the	following:	(a)	that	legal	certainty	and	
equal	treatment	are	fundamental	legal	principles	and	hence	are	required	to	be	
complied	 with;	 (b)	 compliance	 with	 these	 will	 help	 prevent	 over-deterrence,	
which	could	lead	to	a	reduction	in	pro-competitive	behaviour	within	the	market	
which	 competition	 law	 seeks	 to	 promote;	 (c)	 by	 ensuring	 these	principles	 are	
complied	with	it	will	prevent	the	perception	or	the	actual	occurrence	of	abuses	
of	process	by	the	Commission;	(d)	by	complying	it	enables	the	retention	of	the	
legitimacy	 of	 the	 underlying	 offence,	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	 fining	 process	
itself;	 (e)	 the	 financial	 implications	 and	 harm	 that	 uncertainty	 in	 the	 fining	
process	can	cause	to	undertakings	and	the	wider	society	as	a	whole;	(f)	so	as	to	
ensure	that	the	leniency	and	settlement	stages	in	the	procedure	are	as	effective	
and	 efficient	 as	 they	 can	 be	 and	 are	 actively	 utilised	 by	 undertakings;	 and	
finally,	 (g)	 to	 ensure	 legitimacy	 in	 the	 leniency	 and	 settlement	 stages	 of	 the	
fining	procedure.			
	
The	 aforementioned	 analysis	 established	 the	 importance	 of	 this	 thesis,	which	
led	to	an	examination	of	the	various	Commission	procedures.	The	first	of	these	
considered	was	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 procedure	 overall.	 This	was	 assessed	
for	its	compliance	with	legal	certainty.3	The	chapter	began	by	assessing	(a)	the	
use	of	non-exhaustive	 lists,	 (b)	 the	 ‘specific	deterrence’	 stage,	 and	 (c)	 the	 ten	
percent	cap.	Whilst	 it	was	 identified	that	there	were	various	concerns	 (from	a	
legal	 certainty	 point	 of	 view)	within	 the	 Commission’s	 current	 fining	 process,																																																									
3	Commission,	‘Guidelines	on	the	method	of	setting	fines	imposed	pursuant	to	Article	23(2)(a)	of	
Regulation	No	1/2003	(Guidelines	on	fining	undertakings)’	[2006]	OJ	C210/02.	
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none	of	these	are	sufficient	to	lead	to	a	breach	of	legal	certainty.	Nevertheless,	
there	 were	 improvements	 identified	 that	 could	 be	 made	 to	 the	 current	
procedure	 –	 which	 would	 not	 detract	 from	 the	 current	 enforcement	 aims	 of	
deterrence,	 detection,	 prevention	 and	 punishment	 of	 cartelists	 –	 that	 would	
enhance	certainty	within	the	fining	procedure.		
	
The	first	recommendation	for	improvement	is	that	examples	should	be	offered	
as	 to	 the	 likely	 increase	 or	 decrease	 to	 the	 fine	 that	 might	 occur	 when	 an	
aggravating	or	mitigating	factor	is	considered.	The	second	proposal	is	made	in	a	
similar	vein	as	the	first	and	identifies	that	examples	be	given	of	what	constitutes	
to	‘sufficiently	deter’	and	what	is	meant	by	‘particularly	large	turnover	beyond	
the	 sales	 of	 goods	 or	 services	 to	which	 the	 infringement	 relates.’	 As	 there	 is	
currently	a	lack	of	guidance	on	this,	concerns	were	raised	that	this	may	lead	to	
confusion	 and	 potential	 unequal	 application	 of	 this	 stage.	 A	 further	
recommendation	 (in	 relation	 to	 this	 stage)	 is	 that	 illustrations	 of	 the	 liable	
percentage	 increases	 in	 fines	 are	 given	 to	 enhance	 certainty	 for	 undertakings	
and	 procedural	 legitimacy.	 Currently	 there	 is	 no	 indication	 at	 this	 stage	 as	 to	
what	the	percentage	increase	in	fine	may	be	at	to	‘sufficiently	deter’,	nor	do	the	
Commission	decisions	themselves	provide	much	clarity	as	to	what	this	may	be.	
The	third	and	final	suggestion	was	that	this	stage	of	the	fining	procedure	could	
have	 a	 clear	minimum	amount	 –	 to	which	when	 an	undertaking	 that	 has	 this	
market	share	and	turnover	in	another	market	outside	the	effected	market	–	the	
Commission	will	automatically	apply	this	stage	of	the	fining	procedure	to.	This	
could	allow	for	the	much	needed	clarity	in	this	stage.	However,	this	would	limit	
the	Commission’s	discretion	significantly	and	make	it	a	requirement,	thus	it	was	
not	the	authors	advocated	choice.		
	
These	 potential	 improvements	would	 require	 additional	 guidance	 being	 given	
by	 the	Commission	 in	 its	documentation	but	would	not	necessitate	 significant	
changes	to	its	current	practice.	Though	the	improvements	would	see	a	further	
reduction	of	the	discretion	afforded	to	the	Commission	through	various	stages	
of	 the	 fining	process,	by	 this	provision	of	enhanced	 fining	guidance.	However,	
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the	Commission	would	still	retain	their	broad	margin	of	discretion	and	decision-
making	power	but	undertakings	would	gain	more	certainty	and	clarity	whilst	the	
offence	and	procedure	its	self	would	also	gain	from	heightened	legitimacy.	
	
Next,	 the	 thesis	 analysed	 whether	 the	 Commission	 applies	 its	 fining	 policy	
equally	 to	 undertakings.	 Focus	 began	 by	 assessing	 the	 tenth	 stage	 of	 the	
Commission’s	fining	procedure:	the	‘inability	to	pay	discount’.	 It	was	identified	
that	as	 the	Commission	was	offering	such	a	wide	 range	of	 reductions	with	no	
express	 mention	 being	 given	 at	 this	 stage	 about	 how	 or	 why	 in	 a	 particular	
instance	 the	Commission	was	awarding	such	a	discount	 that	 it	was	difficult	 to	
understand	 how	 the	 Commission	 was	 applying	 this	 stage	 equally	 and	 fairly.	
Indeed,	 the	 arbitrary	 nature	 of	 these	 adjustments	makes	 effective	 scrutiny	 of	
the	reductions	impossible	and	in	fact,	inconsistencies	of	application	in	this	stage	
of	 the	 fining	 procedure	 inevitable.	 Owing	 to	 this,	 this	 stage	 can	 be	 greatly	
enhanced	with	more	transparency	with	regards	to	the	application	of	stage	ten	
and	more	detailed	guidance	as	to	how	this	stage	in	the	fining	procedure	is	likely	
to	be	 applied.	But	of	 course,	 the	balance	must	be	maintained	here	 to	 ensure	
that	transparent	application	and	clear	guidance	is	available	as	well	as	flexibility	
and	discretion	for	the	Commission.	If	the	guidance	is	overly	transparent	it	could	
potentially	 lead	 to	 undertakings	 being	 able	 to	 misrepresent	 their	 financial	
situation	to	an	advantage	to	gain	a	reduction	in	fines	that	they	should	receive.		
	
Next,	focus	moved	onto	the	way	fines	–	as	a	whole	–	are	calculated	and	applied	
to	undertakings	based	on	their	nationality.	This	section	compared	the	treatment	
of	an	undertaking	of	non-EU	nationality	against	those	of	an	EU	nationality;	with	
the	 nationality	 of	 an	 undertaking	 being	 defined	 here	 as	 ‘the	 country	 of	 the	
undertaking	 involved	 in	 the	 cartel’.	 What	 was	 identified	 from	 the	 empirical	
analysis	of	the	thirty-four	cartels	which	 involved	non-EU	national	undertakings	
(and	 the	 in-depth	 investigations	 of	 fining	 decisions)	 is	 that	 the	 Commission	 is	
currently	 applying	 its	 fining	 procedure	 equally	 based	 on	 an	 undertakings’	
nationality	 with	 no	 in	 discrepancies	 in	 the	 thirty-four	 cases.	 Therefore,	 the	
Commission	 should	 continue	 its	 current	 practices	 and	 continue	 to	 apply	 its	
	300	
policy	equally	in	this	regard.	Of	course,	periodic	reviews	and	comparison	of	this	
data	 are	 necessary	 to	 ensure	 no	 lapse	 or	 slippage	 occurs	 from	 this	 current	
equality	approach.		
	
Finally,	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 treatment	 of	 National	 Champions	 (NC)	 by	 the	
Commission	was	had.	This	examination	defined	a	NC	as	an	undertaking	that	has	
a	turnover	of	more	than	ten	billion	Euros.	Of	the	Commission’s	fining	decisions,	
twenty-five	 involved	 at	 least	 one	 NC.	 It	 was	 identified	 that	 the	 NC	 often	
received	 the	 lowest	 or	 some	 of	 the	 lowest	 percentage	 fines	when	 they	were	
compared	to	non-NC.	There	were	only	two	cartels	where	the	Commission	fined	
a	NC	more	harshly	than	non-NC:	the	‘Gas	Insulated	Switchgear’	and	the	‘Power	
Transformers’	 cartel.4	Therefore,	 the	 empirical	 data	 demonstrates	 that	 the	
Commission,	in	many	instances,	offers	favourable	treatment	to	an	NC	over	that	
of	a	non-NC	 in	 the	same	cartel.	This	appears	 to	be	unequal	 treatment,	as	 the	
undertakings	 in	 question	 are	 in	 the	 same	 position,	 apart	 from	 one	 being	
classified	as	an	NC.	Whilst	this	is	true	it	is	must	be	noted	that	it	is	unclear	as	to	
the	reasoning	why	NC	are	fined	less.	Thus,	it	is	difficult	to	say	with	certainty	that	
unequal	 treatment	 is	 definitely	 occurring,	 as	 we	 are	 not	 privy	 to	 all	 the	
information	 and	 data	 that	 is	 available	 to	 the	 Commission.	 However,	 the	
empirical	 data	 does	 clearly	 identify	 that	 –	 in	 the	 twenty-five	 cartels	 that	
involved	 NC	 –	 only	 two	 of	 these	 resulted	 in	 the	 NC	 receiving	 the	 highest	
percentage	 fines	 in	 the	 cartel.	What	 is	 required	 here	 is	 further	 transparency	
from	the	Commission	to	 identify	why	these	undertakings	received	 lower	fines.	
Though	there	may	not	be	unequal	treatment	there	does	appear	to	be	unequal	
treatment	in	the	application	of	the	fining	procedure	to	NC.	
	
The	 thesis	 then	moved	 on	 to	 assess	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	 programme,5	
within	the	context	of	the	Damages	Directive,	and	the	potential	procedural	rights																																																									
4	Gas	Insulated	Switchgear	(Case	COMP	38.899)	Commission	Decision	2008/C5/07	[2007]	OJ	
C5/7	and	Power	Transformers	(Case	COMP	39.129)	Commission	Decision	2009/C296/08	[2009]	
OJ	C296/21.	
5	Commission,	‘Commission	Notice	on	Immunity	from	fines	and	reduction	of	fines	in	cartel	cases	
(Leniency	in	cartel	cases)’	[2006]	OJ	C298/17.	
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reasons	 for	 advocating	 for	 a	 blanket	 ban	 on	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	
documents.	While	it	was	noted	within	the	discussion	that	there	were	a	variety	
of	arguments	that	one	could	make	about	the	importance	of	non-disclosure;	this	
thesis	 focused	 on	 the	 novel	 potential	 procedural	 rights	 reasons.	 Indeed,	 this	
discussion	 is	what	made	Chapter	4	unique	 to	 the	previous	 conducted	 studies.	
Further	 originality	 was	 derived	 from	 the	 chapter’s	 unique	 consideration	 of	
whether	there	were	ways	of	enhancing	the	current	approach	to	disclosure.	
	
First	 an	 undertakings	 legitimate	 expectation	 of	 non-disclosure	 by	 the	
Commission	was	analysed.	 It	was	 identified	that	 throughout	 the	Commissions’	
Guidance	 Documentation	 the	 Treaty	 on	 the	 Functioning	 of	 the	 European	
Union,6	and	 Regulation	 1/2003	 EC,7	a	 variety	 of	 assurances	 are	 given	 that	
confidential	information	will	not	be	disclosed	to	third	parties.	Because	of	these	
assurances	 and	 the	 subsequent	 analysis	 undertaken	 considering	 the	 case	 law	
surrounding	 legitimate	 expectations	 it	 was	 identified	 that	 if	 confidential	
leniency	information	is	disclosed	to	third	parties	it	will	likely	lead	to	a	breach	of	
an	undertakings	legitimate	expectation.	
	
The	second	procedural	 right	challenge	considered	here	was	under	Article	8	of	
the	 ECHR.	 It	 was	 identified	 (by	 considering	 the	 five	 stages	 of	 the	 standard	
approach),	 that	 it	 was	 difficult	 to	 assess	 what	 the	 ECtHR	 would	 decide,	 with	
regards	to	the	disclosure	of	leniency	documents.	It	was	noted	that	it	is	possible	
the	 Court	 would	 hold	 that	 there	 is	 no	 breach	 when	 leniency	 documents	 are	
divulged,	because	the	disclosure	is	proportionate.	However,	because	there	is	a	
less	 restrictive	 approach	 –	which	 could	 pursue	 the	 legitimate	 aim	of	 enabling	
third	 parties	 to	 bring	 follow-on	 damage	 actions	 –	 it	 is	 possible	 the	 Court	will	
hold	 that	 Article	 8	 of	 the	 ECHR	 is	 breached,	 as	 this	 other	 approach	 is	 not	
followed.	
																																																									
6	The	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	[2008]	OJ	C115/47,	hereafter	the	‘TFEU’.	
7	Council	Regulation	(EC)	No	1/2003	of	16	December	2002	on	the	Implementation	of	the	Rules	
on	Competition	laid	down	in	Articles	81	and	82	of	the	Treaty,	(2003)	OJ	L1/1.	
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The	 final	 procedural	 right	 challenge	 considered	 was	 that	 of	 a	 breach	 of	
confidence.	When	the	analysis	began,	this	procedural	right	challenge	appeared	
to	be	robust,	however	it	became	apparent	that	this	challenge	would	not	be	one	
that	an	undertaking	could	succeed	with.	 It	was	 identified	that	the	Commission	
never	technically	discloses	the	documents,	it	is	a	court,	and	thus,	they	have	the	
power	to	decide	on	disclosure	so	would	not	see	disclosure	here	as	a	breach	of	
confidence.	 This	 therefore	 means	 that	 this	 challenge	 would	 fail	 at	 the	 third	
stage	of	the	Coco	test.8	In	addition,	it	was	concluded	that	even	if	an	undertaking	
could	substantiate	the	claim	and	meet	the	three	stages	of	the	Coco	test	it	would	
be	unlikely	that	the	court	would	accept	this	challenge	because	the	undertaking	
would	not	come	to	them	with	‘clean	hands’.	
	
It	 was	 therefore	 identified	 that	 the	 strongest	 procedural	 right	 challenge	 an	
undertaking	could	bring	against	disclosure	of	leniency	documents	would	be	that	
by	 doing	 so	 breached	 an	 undertakings	 ‘legitimate	 expectation’	 of	 non-
disclosure.	 For	 this	 reason	 the	 Damages	 Directive	 has	 adopted	 the	 correct	
approach.	Nonetheless,	the	next	part	of	the	analysis	identified	various	potential	
options,	which	could	 lead	 to	a	better	approach	 than	placing	a	blanket	ban	on	
third	 parties	 being	 granted	 access	 to	 leniency	 documents.	 The	 approach	
recommended	was	 that	 judges	 be	 granted	 full	 access	 to	 these	 documents	 so	
that	they	can	balance	both	sets	of	rights	effectively:	those	of	the	undertakings	
who	 have	 committed	 a	 breach	 of	 competition	 law	 and	 those	 of	 third	 parties	
who	have	been	affected	by	the	cartel.	By	allowing	a	judge	to	have	access	to	this	
information	 it	would	not	breach	the	 legitimate	expectation	of	an	undertaking.	
This	would	allow	a	 judge	to	conduct	the	necessary	calculations	so	as	to	award	
third	parties	with	damages	that	they	are	entitled	to.	However,	if	this	approach	
were	to	be	implemented	it	would	be	important	that	the	Commissions’	Leniency	
notice	 –	 and	 the	 Damages	 Directive	 –	 are	 amended	 so	 that	 an	 undertaking	
understands	 that	 the	 information	 contained	 in	 a	 leniency	 application	may	 be	
disclosed	or	utilised	legitimately	by	a	court	in	awarding	a	third	party	damages.	
																																																								
8	Coco	v	AN	Clark	(Engineers)	Ltd	[1969]	RPC	41.	
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Finally,	 the	 thesis	 considered	 the	 Commission’s	 direct	 settlement	 procedure,9	
and	ways	of	enhancing	its	efficiency,	by	comparing	it	to	the	US	plea	bargaining	
procedure	–	whilst	ensuring	compliance	with	Article	6	of	the	ECHR.	In	addition,	
an	examination	was	had	as	to	whether	a	plea	bargaining	system	for	cartel	cases	
could	be	implemented	within	the	EU	and	was	compatible	with	the	ECHR.	
	
The	 discussion	 began	 by	 considering	 the	 Commission’s	 seventeen	 settlement	
decisions	 thus	 far	 and	 identified	 areas	where	 this	 procedure	 could	 be	 further	
enhanced.	These	improvements	related	to	(a)	the	amount	of	time	it	takes	for	a	
case	to	be	settled,	and	(b)	the	fact	that	various	cases	are	having	to	proceed	as	
hybrid	 cases.	When	 the	potential	 for	 the	 implementation	of	a	plea	bargaining	
procedure	 was	 examined	 it	 was	 identified	 that	 for	 it	 to	 comply	 with	 the	
requirements	 of	 Article	 6	 of	 the	 ECHR	 it	 would	 be	 necessary	 that;	 (a)	 the	
applicant	 accepts	 the	 bargain	 in	 a	 genuinely	 voluntary	manner;	 (b)	 in	 the	 full	
awareness	 of	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 case	 and	 legal	 consequences	 of	 doing	 so;	 and	
finally,	 (c)	 that	 the	 content	 of	 the	 bargain	 and	 the	 fairness	 of	 the	manner	 in	
which	 it	was	reached	 is	subjected	to	sufficient	 judicial	 review.10	Though	 it	was	
illustrated	 that	 it	 would	 be	 possible	 for	 the	 Commission	 to	 implement	 and	
utilise	a	plea	bargaining	procedure	 to	 settle	 cartel	 cases	within	 the	EU,	 it	was	
not	felt	that	this	was	the	best	way	forward	for	the	EU,	because	of	the	significant	
amendments	that	this	would	require	to	the	Commission’s	procedures.	In	fact,	it	
was	 felt	 that	making	 specific	 changes	 to	 the	 current	 system	would	 achieve	 a	
similar	 level	 of	 efficiency	 to	 that	 of	 the	US	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 but	 retain	
what	 is	 at	 its	 core	 a	 separate	 European	 Antitrust	 approach.	 These	 measures	
comprised	 of	 (a)	 allowing	 undertakings	 to	 begin	 discussions	 during	 the	
Commission’s	 investigation	 period;	 (b)	 amending	 the	 leniency	 programme	 so	
that	it	offers	immunity	only	to	the	first	undertaking,	with	others	being	required	
to	settle	with	the	Commission	to	gain	a	reduction;	(c)	ensuring	that	the	Hearing	
																																																								
9	Commission,	‘Commission	Notice	on	the	conduct	of	settlement	procedures	in	view	of	the	
adoption	of	Decisions	pursuant	to	Article	7	and	Article	23	of	Council	Regulation	(EC)	No	1/2003	
in	cartel	cases’	[2008]	OJ	C167/1.	
10	Natsvlishvili	and	Togonidze	v	Georgia	App	no	9043/05	(ECtHR,	29	April	2014)	para	92.	
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Officer	 is	 involved	 in	all	 settlement	discussions;	 (d)	 removal	of	 the	mandatory	
ten	percent	reduction	 in	settlement	case	and	allowing	this	to	be	more	flexible	
and	determined	based	on	the	parties	contribution;	and	finally	(e)	allowing	–and	
perhaps	more	importantly	acknowledging	and	recognising	–	undertakings	have	
an	‘effective	say’	in	negotiations.	These	measures	would	not	prove	problematic	
for	 the	 Commission	 to	 implement	 into	 its	 current	 procedures	 and	 would	
enhance	both	the	efficiency	and	transparency	of	the	present	approach.	This	 is	
particularly	 true	 when	 compared	 with	 the	 complete	 overhaul	 to	 the	
Commission’s	 procedures	 that	 the	 ‘radical	 approach’	 i.e.	 implementing	 a	 full	
plea	bargaining	system	would	require.		
	
Finally,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	findings,	in	regards	to	the	implementation	of	a	
plea	bargaining	system	have	a	wider	 impact	than	just	that	of	competition	law.	
Indeed,	the	findings	are	of	relevance	to	Member	States	that	are	contemplating	
implementing	a	plea	bargaining	procedure	within	their	domestic	law	–	and	that	
are	 signatory	 states	 to	 the	 ECHR.	 The	 analysis	 in	 Chapter	 5	 discussed	 and	
identified	 how	 to	 implement	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 whilst	 ensuring	 the	
correct	judicial	safety	measures	were	in	place.	
	
By	analysing	the	Commission’s	cartel	enforcement	programme	and	assessing	it	
critically	against	procedural	rights	requirements	–	whilst	also	aiming	to	ensure	
procedural	 rigour	 and	 fair	 and	 reasonable	 treatment	 –	 it	 has	 enabled	 the	
achievement	 of	 a	 variety	 of	 definite	 gains	 for	 the	 thesis.	 To	 begin,	 utilising	
procedural	 rights	 analysis	 in	 this	 way	 to	 assess	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	
enforcement	procedures	has	enabled	us	to	understand	where	we	are	in	regards	
to	compliance	now;	and,	it	has	offered	us	the	opportunity	to	gain	a	better	sense	
of	where	we	should	be	heading	and	thus	the	necessary	goals	and	objectives	to	
achieve	 this	 in	 practice	 in	 the	 future.	 Further	 to	 this,	 it	 has	 facilitated	 the	
exploration	of	a	variety	of	questions	which	have	arisen	as	the	analysis	has	been	
undertaken.	 These	 questions	 would	 not	 have	 been	 identified	 had	 this	 novel	
analysis	not	been	undertaken.	Whilst	not	all	of	these	questions	have	been	fully	
explored	in	this	thesis	(due	to	its	focus	and	other	constraints)	it	has	allowed	for	
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these	questions	 to	be	 raised	so	 that	 in	 further	 research	projects	 these	can	be	
explored	by	the	author	and	others.	These	questions	are	of	vital	importance	but	
are	often	overlooked	or	not	investigated	–	or	adequately	addressed	–	within	the	
literature.	However,	 various	questions	which	have	arisen	 through	 the	analysis	
within	 this	 thesis	 have	 been	 assessed.	 Such	 as	 the	 need	 for	 the	 correct	
balancing	of	conflicting	rights	interests	(of	the	various	parties)	and	enforcement	
objectives,	and	the	inherent	tension	this	leads	to.		
	
Chapter	3	examined	this	tension	in	two	separate	ways.	First,	it	investigated	the	
need	for	legal	certainty	under	Article	7	of	the	ECHR,	whilst	balancing	this	against	
the	requirement	 for	 there	 to	be	uncertainty	 in	 the	calculation	of	 the	 fine	–	 to	
enable	EU	cartel	enforcement	 to	be	effective.	This	chapter	also	 then	explored	
the	tension	further	by	identifying	the	issues	with	making	the	calculation	of	the	
fine	too	certain;	namely,	when	the	calculation	 is	very	clear	undertakings	could	
potentially	plan	and	cost	for	it.	Second,	it	examined	equal	treatment	in	regards	
to	 the	 calculation	 and	 administration	 of	 fines.	 Here,	 there	 is	 a	 necessity	 that	
similar	cases	be	treated	alike	–	to	ensure	compliance	–	but	at	the	same	time,	for	
cartel	enforcement	to	be	a	true	deterrent	and	thus	effective	there	needs	to	be	a	
degree	of	uncertainty	and	flexibility	in	this	calculation.	
	
Chapter	4	explored	 the	balancing	of	 rights	 in	 regards	 to	disclosure	 in	 leniency	
cases,	whilst	facilitating	the	legitimisation	of	the	operation	of	the	Commission’s	
leniency	 programme	 and	 illustrating	 the	 importance	 and	 necessity	 of	 the	
procedure,	 alongside	 identifying	 ways	 of	 improving	 the	 current	 programme.	
Considering	 the	 conflicting	 rights	 of	 both	 the	 leniency	 applicant	 and	 the	 third	
parties	 enabled	 the	 identification	and	exploration	of	ways	of	better	balancing	
both	of	these	parties’	rights.	Namely,	by	granting	only	courts	access	to	leniency	
documents	 –	 to	 be	 utilised	 in	 the	 proving	 and	 calculation	 of	 cartel	 damage	
actions	–	it	enables	a	fairer	and	more	balanced	protection	of	both	sets	of	rights.	
	
Finally,	 Chapter	 5	 investigated	 the	 balancing	 of	 rights	 in	 a	 different	 way.	 It	
investigated	 the	 Commission’s	 current	 direct	 settlement	 procedure	 and	
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compared	it	to	the	US	plea	bargaining	system.	Here,	it	was	identified	that	cost	
savings	and	efficiency	improvements	could	be	made	to	the	Commission’s	direct	
settlement	 procedure	 through	 the	 adoption	 of	 changes	 to	 the	 current	
programme	 or	 through	 the	 radical	 overhauling	 and	 implementation	 of	 a	 plea	
bargaining	procedure.	 The	balancing	discussion	here	 focused	on	 the	 flexibility	
and	 efficiency	 gains	 which	 could	 come	 from	 the	 amendments	 or	 the	
implementation	 of	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 versus	 the	 costs	 of	 doing	 so	 –	 a	
reduction	in	investigatory	rigour	and	legal	certainty.	
	
These	 aforementioned	 questions	 regarding	 the	 balancing	 of	 rights	 are	
important	to	investigate	and	have	an	impact	on	the	decisions	that	policy	makers	
make	but	would	often	be	overlooked	in	traditional	legal	analysis.	
	
Another	 gain	 from	 this	 form	 of	 analysis	 is	 that	 it	 enabled	 other	 non-legal	
reasons	 for	 EU	 cartel	 enforcement	 compliance	 with	 procedural	 rights	 to	 be	
considered.	 These	were	 able	 to	 be	 explored	 in	 this	 thesis	 and	 brought	many	
benefits	 to	 the	 findings.	 Indeed,	by	asking	and	examining	 these	questions	 the	
thesis	 was	 able	 to	 legitimise	 the	 Commission’s	 procedures	 at	 various	 stages,	
particularly	in	regards	to	the	necessity	for	the	Commission	to	operate	a	leniency	
and	direct	settlement	programme.	Alongside	this	it	was	able	to	assess	the	fining	
procedure	 to	 identify	areas	where	potential	or	actual	abuses	of	process	could	
occur,	 and	 consequently	 make	 recommendations	 for	 improvements	 here.	
Additionally,	 it	was	possible	to	examine	the	efficiency	and	effectiveness	of	the	
Commission’s	 fining	procedure	whilst	enhancing	 justice	 for	all	parties	 involved	
through	 ensuring	 that	 they	 were	 treated	 fairly	 and	 reasonably.	 This	 analysis	
assisted	 in	ensuring	greater	effectiveness	of	 the	enforcement	process	 through	
procedural	rigour.	Chapter	2	introduced	these	non-legal	reasons	and	identified	
why	they	were	crucial	to	consider	within	the	analysis,	with	Chapters	3-5	building	
upon	this	and	employing	them	in	their	analysis.		
	
All	of	these	aforementioned	insightful	discussions	were	only	possible	by	taking	
this	unique	approach	within	the	thesis,	 i.e.	utilising	procedural	rights	to	assess	
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the	 compliance	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 procedures	 and	
identifying	 ways	 of	 better	 improving	 the	 procedures	 whilst	 remaining	
procedural	right	compliant.	Additionally,	by	considering	other	non-legal	factors	
and	intertwining	these	with	the	procedural	rights	analysis	it	has	created	robust	
analytic	findings	and	policy	recommendations	whilst	at	the	same	time	leading	to	
a	strengthening	of	the	common	thread	which	has	run	throughout	this	thesis.	
	
This	 thesis	 has	made	 an	 important	 and	 invaluable	 contribution	 to	 the	 field	 of	
competition	 and	 procedural	 rights	 law	 by	 ascertaining	 whether	 the	
Commission’s	 three	key	policies	 for	cartel	enforcement	comply	with	 the	ECHR	
and	other	procedural	 rights	 requirements.	 In	addition	 to	 this,	 it	has	 identified	
improvements	 that	 can	 enhance	 detection,	 deterrence,	 prevention	 and	 the	
punishment	 of	 cartel	 conduct,	 whilst	 still	 remaining	 compliant	 with	 rights	
protection	needs.	
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6.3	Future	Research		
	
A	 variety	of	 further	 research-based	projects	 could	be	 founded	and	built	 upon	
the	 findings	 of	 this	 thesis.	 These	 potential	 projects	 shall	 now	 be	 briefly	
identified	and	explored.		
	
The	first	interesting	research	project	that	could	be	explored	is	whether	there	is	
a	more	effective	and	efficient	way	of	protecting	a	corporation’s	rights	than	via	
the	 ECHR. 11 	For	 example,	 a	 possible	 approach	 could	 be	 to	 provide	 the	
protection	 of	 corporations’	 rights	 via	 a	 specific	 convention	 or	 piece	 of	
legislation.	 This	 piece	 of	 legislation	 would	 only	 apply	 to	 corporations	 and	
individuals	would	still	have	their	 rights	protected	under	 the	ECHR	or	domestic	
legislative	equivalents.	This	would	mean	that	the	legislation	could	be	tailored	to	
meet	 the	 specific	 needs	 and	 degree	 of	 protection	 that	 corporations	 require,	
which	are	different	to	those	of	individuals.	
	
However,	there	would	be	difficulties	in	adopting	this	approach.	For	example,	it	
would	mean	 that	a	new	convention	or	charter	would	have	 to	be	enacted	and	
that	 countries	would	need	 to	 sign	up	or	 agree	 to	 it,	which	 leads	 to	questions	
regarding	how	achievable	this	would	be	in	practice.	Additionally,	 it	would	take	
years	 for	 the	 courts	 to	 develop	 jurisprudence	 and	 case	 law.	 Finally,	 this	
approach	 could	 also	 lead	 to	 assertions	 of	 the	 dehumanisation	 and	 the	
commercialisation	of	human	rights.	
	
Another	 potential	 method	 could	 be	 to	 grant	 corporations	 only	 specific	 rights	
under	 the	ECHR	and	clearly	 state	what	 these	 rights	are.	This	would	overcome	
some	of	 the	 concerns	 regarding	which	 rights	 apply	 to	 corporations	 under	 the	
ECHR.	 However,	 as	 the	 Convention	 is	 treated	 as	 a	 ‘living	 instrument'	 by	 the	
courts,	this	seems	unnecessary	owing	to	the	flexible	approach	adopted	and	the																																																									
11	Answering	this	question	was	outside	the	scope	of	this	research	as	it	is	seeking	to	assess	
whether	the	Commission’s	cartel	enforcement	policies	comply	with	the	rights	enshrined	within	
the	ECHR	and	other	procedural	rights	requirements.	
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way	 the	 Convention	 is	 able	 to	 take	 into	 consideration	 modern	 day	
circumstances.	 It	 is	also	questionable	how	plausible	 it	would	be	to	amend	the	
Convention	 to	 specifically	 grant	 certain	 rights	 to	 corporations	 as	 opposed	 to	
other	rights.	
	
The	second	two	possible	future	research	projects	could	build	upon	the	analysis	
of	equal	treatment	within	the	Commission’s	fining	procedure,	as	there	is	still	a	
lack	of	examination	of	 this	 issue	within	 the	 literature.	First,	a	 further	 in-depth	
study	 of	 how	 the	 Commission	 is	 fining	 undertakings	 with	 regards	 to	 their	
nationality	can	be	undertaken.	The	analysis	can	be	developed	by	exploring	the	
issue	of	nationality,	by	not	merely	considering	EU	vs.	Non-EU	nationality	but,	by	
breaking	this	down	further	into	the	various	Member	States	to	seek	to	identify	if	
any	discrepancies	in	application	of	the	fining	procedure	can	be	identified	at	this	
level.	Whilst	 undertaking	 this	 analysis,	 the	 post-July	 2012	 data	 could	 also	 be	
included	and	exploited	as	this	was	not	 incorporated	within	the	analysis	of	this	
thesis.	 Second,	 the	 NC	 issue	 could	 be	 explored	 in	 vaster	 depth	 to	 seek	 to	
establish	with	greater	 certainty	and	clarity	what	 is	occurring	 in	practice.	From	
the	analysis	 in	 this	 thesis	 it	 appears	 that	NCs	 receive	more	 lenient	 treatment,	
and	 the	 reasons	 for	 this	 and	 whether	 this	 is	 actually	 occurring	 need	 to	 be	
explored	 further.	 To	 achieve	 this,	 one	 could	 seek	 to	 drill	 down	 further	within	
the	 cases	 that	 involve	 NC	 and	 analyse	 whether	 there	 were	 any	 mitigating	
factors	 which	 resulted	 in	 the	 reduced	 fines	 or	 if	 there	 were	 any	 aggravating	
factors	which	 led	 to	 the	 non-NC	 receiving	 higher	 fines	 or	 if	 something	 else	 is	
occurring.	 In	addition	 to	 this,	 the	way	 the	 figures	are	calculated	could	also	be	
considered	to	identify	if	there	are	any	discrepancies	in	the	starting	points	of	the	
calculation	of	the	fines	or	in	the	market	definitions	utilised	by	the	Commission.	
	
The	 examination	 in	 this	 thesis,	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 settlement	
decisions,	forms	an	excellent	foundation	to	develop	further.	To	begin,	it	would	
be	greatly	beneficial	to	compare	the	time	that	it	takes	for	the	DOJ	to	conduct	an	
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investigation	to	that	of	the	Commission.12	This	would	enable	one	to	identify	the	
impact	that	allowing	parities	to	negotiate	with	the	prosecuting	body	has	to	the	
period	 of	 time	 an	 investigation	 takes.	 This	 analysis	 would	 also	 allow	 for	 an	
effective	comparison	of	the	US	approach	to	leniency	(of	only	allowing	the	first	
firm	 forward	 immunity,	 with	 the	 rest	 gaining	 a	 reduction	 through	 plea	
bargaining)	to	that	of	the	EU	where	information	is	gained	through	leniency	and	
there	is	a	fixed	reduction	for	settlement.	Alongside	this	analysis,	comparing	the	
period	of	time	it	takes	for	a	case	to	be	concluded	through	to	settlement	in	the	
EU,	 against	 the	period	of	 time	 to	 reach	an	agreement	 in	 the	US,	would	 allow	
further	evaluations	to	be	made	and	drawn	regarding	the	efficiencies,	similarities	
and	differences	between	the	two	systems.	In	addition,	further	development	of	
this	 analysis	 could	 consider	 the	 length	 of	 time	 it	 takes	 for	 the	 Commissions’	
normal	procedures	to	progress	to	that	of	the	cases	that	they	settle.	This	would	
allow	 an	 effective	 analysis	 of	 the	 benefits	 in	 reduction	 in	 times	 that	 the	
Commission	 and	 undertakings	 gain	 from	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 settlement	
procedure.	This	examination	could	be	even	further	enriched	by	also	attempting	
to	 calculate	 the	 potential	 financial	 cost	 saving	 which	 are	 made	 through	 the	
settlement	 procedure	 over	 the	 standard	 procedure.	 If	 the	 aforementioned	
evaluations	and	analysis	were	undertaken	it	would	produce	data	and	allow	for	
comparisons	 to	 be	 made	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 efficiency	 of	 the	 two	 systems	
(particularly	with	regards	to	time).	
	
A	further	extension	of	the	research	regarding	settlements	would	be	to	seek	to	
identify	 whether	 the	 claims	 made	 by	 practitioners	 are	 correct,	 i.e.	 that	
undertakings	that	settle	with	the	Commission	are	able	to	influence	the	outcome	
of	the	fine;	in	particular,	by	receiving	a	greater	reduction	than	the	standard	ten	
percent	 for	settling.	To	undertake	this	analysis	one	would	need	to	consult	 the	
cases	that	have	been	settled	and	compare	them	to	cases	that	were	not	settled	–	
particularly	cases	where	some	parties	did	not	settle	–	to	identify	whether	there	
were	differences	in	the	way	the	fines	were	calculated.	Additionally,	one	would																																																									
12	This	is	something	the	author	sought	to	do,	but	unfortunately	could	not	gain	access	(at	the	
time)	to	the	necessary	data.	
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wish	to	consider	any	formal	statements	made	by	the	undertakings	regarding	the	
fine	here,	 if	 any	are	given.	By	 identifying	 if	undertakings	are	able	 to	 influence	
the	Commissions’	decisions	it	could	lead	to	a	greater	interest	and	utilisation	of	
the	procedure	by	undertakings.	
	
Finally,	 it	will	be	 imperative	that	the	author	continues	to	maintain	and	update	
the	settlements	data	set	that	he	has	created.	This	will	enable	future	research	to	
be	 conducted	 into	 the	 settlement	 decisions,	 particularly	 with	 regards	 to	 the	
time	period	it	takes	for	settlement	decisions	to	be	concluded	–	so	as	to	be	able	
to	 identify	 whether	 this	 time	 period	 lessens	 as	 the	 procedure	 develops	 over	
time.	
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Appendices		
	
Table	Apen.1	Fine	Calculation	Table	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
The	Basic	Amount	of	the	Fine	
	1.	Percentage	of	the	company's	annual	sales	of	the	
concerned	product	involved	in	the	infringement	(0-30%)*		
X	(times)	
2.	Duration	of	the	infringement		
+	(add)	
3.	An	additional	deterrent	factor	of	15-25%	of	one	years	
sales	
Adjustments	to	the	Basic	Amount	
+	(add)	
4.	Aggravating	factors**	
	-	(minus)	
5.	Mitigating	factors***	
+	(add)	
6.	Specific	increase	for	deterrence	
Limited	to	(cannot	be	greater	than)	
7.	The	overall	fine	must	be	no	greater	than	10%	of	the	
annual	turnover	of	the	company	
Potential	Further	Reductions	
8.	Leniency	(First	applicant	100%,	second	applicant	up	to	
50%,	third	applicant	20-30%,	fourth	and	other	applicants	
up	to	20%)	
9.	Settlement	(10%	reduction)	
10.	Inability	to	pay	
	Table	Notes	
*	This	is	determined	based	on	the	seriousness	of	the	
infringement:	The	nature	of	the	infringement,	geographic	
scope	and	whether	the	infringement	was	implemented.	
	
**	For	example:	continuing	or	repeating	a	similar	
infringement,	refusing	to	cooperate	or	being	the	leader	of	
the	cartel.	
	
***	For	example:	terminating	the	agreement	as	soon	as	
the	Commission	intervenes,	negligence	by	the	
undertaking,	substantially	limited	involvement	in	the	
infringement,	cooperating	with	the	Commission	or	where	
the	conduct	was	encouraged	by	legislation	or	public	
authorities.	
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Cartel Name  Participants 
Name  
Undertaking's 
Nationality 
Basic Amount 
- Overall 
Gravity - (%) 
Duration of 
Infringement 
in Months 
Multiplier Recidivism 
(%) 
Leadership 
(%) 
Additional 
Deterrence 
(%) 
Professional 
Videotapes 
Sony Japan 18 32 3 N/A N/A 10 
 (Not 
Appealed) 
Fuji Japan 18 32 3 N/A N/A N/A 
  Maxwell Japan 18 32 3 N/A N/A N/A 
Flat Glass            
(Appeal 
Pending) 
Asahi Japan 18 13 1 (due to 
evidence 
submitted 
extending 
duration of 
cartel) 
N/D N/D N/D 
  Guardian USA 18 10 1 N/D N/D N/D 
  Pilkington UK 18 13 1.5 N/D N/D N/D 
  Saint-Gobain France 18 13 1.5 N/D N/D N/D 
Nitrile 
Butadiene 
Rubber 
Bayer Germany 16 24 2 50 N/A 10 
 (Not 
Appealed) 
Zeon Japan 16 24 0.5 (due to 
evidence 
submitted 
extending 
duration of 
cartel) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Car Glass Saint-Gobain France 16 60 5 60 N/A N/A 
(Appeals 
Pending) 
Asahi / AGC 
Flat Glass 
Japan 16 58 5 N/A N/A N/A 
  Pilkington UK 16 53 4.5 N/A N/A N/A 
  Soliver Belgium 16 16 1.5 N/A N/A N/A 
Marine Hoses      Bridgestone Japan 25 228, 183 19, 15.5 N/A 30 N/A 
(Appeals 
Pending) 
Yokoham Japan 25 217 18.5 N/A N/A N/A 
  Dunlop Oil & 
Marine / 
Continental 
Germany 25 94, 81, 25 8, 7, 2.5 N/A N/A N/A 
  Trelleborg France 25 227, 107 19, 9 N/A N/A N/A 
  Parker ITR Italy 25 228, 63 19, 5.5 N/A 30 N/A 
  Manuli Italy 25 92 8 N/A N/A N/A 
Power 
Transformers  
Siemens Germany 16 47, 23 4.2 N/A N/A 20 
(Appeals 
Pending) 
ABB Switzerland 16 47 4 50 N/A N/A 
  Alstom / Areva France 16 47 4 N/A N/A N/A 
  Fuji Japan 16 47 4 N/A N/A N/A 
  Hitachi Japan 16 47 4 N/A N/A 20 
  Toshiba Japan 16 47 4 N/A N/A 10 
LCD Samsung Korea 16 15 4 N/A N/A 20 
  LG Display Korea 16 14 4 N/A N/A N/A 
  AU Optronics Taiwan 16 15 4 N/A N/A N/A 
  Chimei Innolux 
Corporation 
Taiwan 16 15 4 N/A N/A N/A 
  Chunghwa 
Picture Tubes 
Taiwan 16 15 4 N/A N/A N/A 
  HannStar 
Display 
Corporation 
Taiwan 16 15 4 N/A N/A N/A 
Table	Apen.2	Selected	Fining	Cases	Table	
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